Xi’s strategy is as meticulous as it is bold. He has purged opposition within his ranks, securing a loyal cadre committed to his vision of Chinese supremacy on the world stage. His deft handling of relationships with giants like the US, India, Japan, and Russia has redefined traditional alliances and rivalries. For those watching, there’s a palpable sense of urgency – a recognition that we are witnessing the dawn of a new global order where China’s influence is inescapable and undeniable.

Meanwhile, the stage is set in India for a political showdown as the Lok Sabha Elections close. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is poised to secure a third consecutive term with his charisma (for his critics – an engineered charisma) and steadfast leadership. Despite murmurs of an upset from the Opposition Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), Modi’s decade-long tenure has undeniably transformed India into a formidable force on the global stage despite growing dissent, frustrations, and inequality in the constituency. 

Under his watch, India’s economy has flourished and its population of 1.5 billion stands as its greatest asset, driving innovation and growth. As the election results loom, the world watches closely, recognising that India’s trajectory under Modi’s continued leadership could redefine the balance of power in Asia and beyond.

China and India hold the key to unlocking the full potential of Asia, bearing the hopes and aspirations of 4.5 billion people in the region. This is undeniably Asia’s century, a period marked by rapid growth, technological innovation, and unprecedented influence on the global stage. As China leverages its economic clout and India capitalises on its vast human resources, both nations are poised to lead Asia into a new era of prosperity and power. The world can no longer deny these two giants’ pivotal role in shaping Asia’s future and the world. 

Anti-Modi narratives

Focusing on the Indian elections, many predicted an easy victory for Modi, yet doubt crept in during the campaign trail with various narratives at play. A section of Western media and their proxies crafted stories forecasting Modi’s downfall, challenging his bid for a third consecutive term. 

Historically, Western media narratives have often been critical of Asia’s rise and this election cycle was no different. For decades, one of Asia’s finest, Lee Kuan Yew, showcased the hypocrisy of Western media with one-sided narratives and it was the turn of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to turn the heat on the Western press this time.

Hundreds of op-eds and articles from around the globe were critical of Premier Narendra Modi, and the BJP mushroomed during the campaign trail. Some projected Modi as a face and Home Minister Amit Shah as everything else. It would have been a tremendous and balanced story if they had also mentioned the Bush-Cheney and Blair-Mandelson combinations without projecting only in Asia, as these things occur. Politics is universal; no one has a monopoly on the power play.

However, dissent is reasonable as it allows you to recreate your narrative compellingly, if necessary; otherwise some of it can be ignored. Premier Modi and the Opposition leaders, such as Rahul and Priyanka Gandhi and Arvind Kejriwal, all faced cyberbullying and hate from millions of social media critics. 

Dhruv Rathee, a young Indian YouTuber with 20.8 million subscribers, was adored by the anti-Modi section and hated by the Modi lovers. On average, his videos had 15 million views; some reaching 25 million views based on controversial subjects. Some of my colleagues who held independent or anti-Modi sentiments wanted to end Modi rule. Some were fearless and some were fearful. Young Rathee has shown the price of being daring, taking on a “tyrant,” as he narrated. Some enjoy money, some want fame, and some want power. Some want all three.

In our digital age, anti-Modi sentiments were widely disseminated and consumed. However, the impact on India’s 960 million voters will only become apparent in a few days as the world watches to see if these narratives swayed the electorate.

Modi and BJP campaign

The Modi and BJP campaign was bolstered by a decade of tangible successes, earning credibility despite facing numerous challenges and frustrations. Modi was presented as the definitive leader, synonymous with India’s recent economic strides and global presence. 

In contrast, the Opposition’s campaign lacked a singular anchor, relying instead on a collective team effort. Going up against a worldwide brand like Modi, with his track record of economic achievements, demanded a monumental and unified Opposition strategy. As election results loom, the question remains whether this collective effort was enough to challenge the incumbency and sway the electorate.

Modi projected himself as a divine gift to rejuvenate India and secure its rightful place on the global stage. This ‘messiah’ narrative is a familiar trope in political communications, evoking a sense of destiny and inevitability. 

The Opposition needed another charismatic leader or a robust alternative policy, action plan, and narrative to counter such an influential figure. However, Rahul and Priyanka Gandhi, the latest torchbearers of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, were criticised for their lack of imagination and coherence in their campaign. As a result, their efforts struggled to gain traction against Modi’s well-crafted persona and proven track record. 

It is seldom that a leader can blow his own trumpet. You need your allies to project how great you are. However, Modi said he was a godsend and gifted and his team said he was a godsend and gifted. It was missing in the Rahul and Priyanka duo. INDIA leaders like Kumar, Banerjee, Kejriwal, Yadav, Stalin, and Pawar seldom backed an anchor in cohesion. It’s understandable; all the above political brands are too big to sing hosanna for someone else. The fragile egos, personal interests, and political empires do not allow you to be united. Even in sports, all-star teams end up faring poorly. 

Modi, the saviour

Modi’s projection of himself as India’s saviour draws parallels to historical figures like Ashoka, Napoleon, and Alexander the Great, who also cast themselves as divinely-ordained leaders. After his transformative embrace of Buddhism, Ashoka positioned himself as a benevolent ruler destined to bring peace and prosperity to South Asia. Similarly, Napoleon portrayed himself as bringing order and reform to post-revolutionary France. At the same time, Alexander the Great saw himself as a destined conqueror, spreading Greek culture across the known world. 

In the book ‘Discovery of India’ (written in 1946), the great Jawaharlal Nehru (first Prime Minister of India from 1947 to 1964) writes: “Often, as I wandered from meeting to meeting, I spoke to my audience of this India of ours, of Hindustan and of Bharata, the old Sanskrit name derived from the mythical founder of the race. I seldom did so in the cities, for their audiences were more sophisticated and wanted strong fare. But to the peasant, with his limited outlook, I spoke of this great country for whose freedom we were struggling, of how each part differed from the other and yet was India, of common problems of the peasants from north to south and east to west, of the swaraj that only could be for all and every part and not for some. 

“I told them about journeying from the Khyber Pass in the far northwest to Kanyakumari or Cape Comorin in the distant south and how everywhere the peasants put me identical questions, for their troubles were the same – poverty, debt, vested interests, landlords, moneylenders, heavy rents and taxes, police harassment, and all these wrapped up in the structure that the foreign government had imposed upon us – and relief must also come for all. 

“I tried to make them think of India as a whole and even to some little extent of this wide world of which we were a part. I brought in the struggle in China, Spain, Abyssinia, Central Europe, Egypt, and the countries of Western Asia. I told them of the wonderful changes in the Soviet Union and the great progress made in America. The task was not easy, yet it was not so difficult as I had imagined, for our ancient epics, myths, and legends, which they knew so well, had made them familiar with the conception of their country. Some there were always who had travelled far and wide to the great places of pilgrimage, situated at the four corners of India.”

I quote him again: “Sometimes I reached a gathering, a great roar of welcome would greet me. ‘Bharat Mata Ki Jai’ – ‘Victory to Mother India’. I would ask them unexpectedly what they meant by that cry: who was this ‘Bharat Mata,’ Mother India, whose victory they wanted? My question would amuse them and surprise them, and then, not knowing exactly what to answer, they would look at each other and me. I persisted in my questioning. At last, a vigorous Jat, wedded to the soil from immemorial generations, would say it was the ‘dharti,’ the good earth of India, that they meant. What earth? Their particular village patch, or all the patches in the district or province, or in the whole of India? And so question and answer went on till they would ask me impatiently to tell them all about it. 

“I would endeavour to do so and explain that India was all this that they had thought, but it was much more. The mountains and the rivers of India, and the forests and the broad fields, which gave us food, were all dear to us, but what counted ultimately were the people of India, people like them and me, who were speared out all over this vast land. ‘Bharat Mata,’ Mother India, was essentially these millions of people, and victory to her meant victory to these people. You are parts of this ‘Bharat Mata,’ I told them, you are in a manner to yourselves ‘Bharat Mata,’ and as this idea slowly soaked into their brains, their eyes would light up as if they had made an extraordinary discovery.”

Rahul and Priyanka, the great-grandchildren of the great Jawaharlal Nehru, were leading the anti-Modi campaign. The above paragraph could have been their campaign narrative, but it was Modi’s campaign line for the last 10 years – and for the next five years, if he succeeds in securing a third successive term on 4 June. 

Religio-political wars

‘Bharat Mata’ was the underlying campaign theme for Modi 3.0, which took Nehru’s ‘Bharat Mata’ concept to a different level. Nehru was widely regarded for his stand for secular India but there are severe questions and critics of Modi’s path for India – weaponising Hinduism for political power. In India, approximately 80% of the population by religion are Hindus and 14% are believers of Islam as per the 2011 census. As per census reports, a 1951 to 2011 comparison shows a 5% reduction of Hindus and in the same period a 45% growth of believers of Islam. 

The religious political wars have become the norm again; even the rise of Muslim political leadership in the United Kingdom has been the talk of the town recently, with Sadiq Khan holding onto the Mayorship of London since 2016. In Indonesia, vote bank politics are shaping up, with Islam as a shield; in Russia, the orthodox church plays a role in politics; and in the US, Christian nationalism is on the rise. 

Unfortunately, over centuries, humankind has been divided by religion. Instead, can religion unite people? Can a rejuvenated Bharat show the way for tolerance, diversity, and harmony to the world? 

In the last 30 years, India rebranded its main cities from colonial names to national names. Today, Bombay is Mumbai, Calcutta is Kolkata, Madras is Chennai, Bangalore is Bengaluru, Poona is Pune, and Banaras is Varanasi. If Modi succeeds in securing his third successive term on 4 June, will we see Bharat instead of India? Bharat will be Modi’s Ashoka moment. If that occurs, this will be one of the most significant brand changes in humanity’s history.

Xi and the ‘Chinese dream’

Like Modi, Xi crafted a narrative positioning himself as the chosen one, uniquely destined to lead China into a new era of greatness. Xi didn’t rely solely on revolutionary or economic credentials like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping. Instead, he blended these legacies, portraying himself as the leader who could fulfil China’s historic rejuvenation mission.

Just as Ashoka, Napoleon, and Alexander the Great used the mantle of destiny to consolidate their power, Xi presented himself as the harbinger of a ‘Chinese dream’ – a vision of national renewal and global prominence. Through sweeping reforms, an assertive foreign policy, and strategic purges within his party, Xi solidified his position, projecting an image of stability and certainty.

These modern leaders harnessed historical narratives of messianic leadership in China and India, crafting personas destined to elevate their nations. Modi and Xi’s stories underscore a timeless political truth: when a leader casts themselves as a divinely favoured saviour, it becomes a formidable task for any opposition to mount a practical challenge without an equally compelling vision or figurehead. As a result, their nations stand at the forefront of Asia’s rise, shaping the region’s destiny in profound and lasting ways.

Enter Arvind Kejriwal

In China, the one-party rule under Xi ensures a controlled political landscape. However, in India’s vibrant democracy, winning a third successive term is an uphill battle for any leader. Modi’s stature and the BJP’s well-oiled political machinery present formidable challenges. Yet, amidst this daunting scenario, INDIA began to find momentum in the middle of the campaign. 

Emerging against all odds, this coalition started to resonate with voters, presenting a united front capable of challenging Modi’s dominance. Its late surge introduced an element of unpredictability, with many fearing an upset. The alliance’s ability to galvanise support and craft a compelling narrative in the final stages underscored the dynamic and resilient nature of Indian democracy, where even the most entrenched leaders can face significant challenges.

Not many would agree with me, but the Arvind Kejriwal fiasco and his subsequent jail term significantly disrupted INDIA’s momentum. Suddenly, amid a carefully orchestrated campaign, the focus shifted entirely to Kejriwal. This unplanned and unwarranted incident highlights how fragile political campaigns can be. 

In the high-stakes arena of political campaigning, unexpected events can swiftly derail even the most well-planned strategies. INDIA, which had begun to find its footing and generate genuine enthusiasm, was blindsided by the controversy surrounding Kejriwal. Instead of pushing forward with its collective message, it was forced into a defensive position, grappling with damage control and standing for Kejriwal.

Power struggle on the cards

If Kejriwal survives his legal battles and Modi secures another victory, the political arena is set for a dramatic power struggle. Kejriwal, driven by boundless ambition and armed with a reputation for grassroots activism, could challenge the leadership of Rahul and Priyanka Gandhi within the Opposition. His relentless focus on anti-corruption (but he is booked for corruption now) and governance reforms resonates strongly with urban middle-class and disenfranchised voters, positioning him as a compelling alternative to Modi. 

This rise would inevitably clash with the Gandhis, who have long been the faces of the Congress Party and national politics. As Kejriwal’s influence grows, a fierce battle for dominance within the Opposition is likely to unfold, with his soaring ambitions threatening to overshadow the traditional leadership of the Gandhis. This internal struggle could redefine the dynamics of Indian politics, with both sides vying for the mantle of a chief challenger to Modi’s BJP.

‘Messiah’ narrative

The ‘messiah’ narrative is not confined to Asia. Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency in 2017 was a masterclass in creating a narrative more significant than life itself. With his ‘Make America Great Again’ slogan, he cast himself as the saviour of a nation that, in his telling, had lost its way. This powerful, emotionally-charged message resonated deeply with many Americans who felt left behind by the political establishment.

Trump’s unconventional, often irrational approach allowed him to dominate the news cycle and overshadow his opponent, Hillary Clinton. While Clinton campaigned on experience and policy, Trump ran circles around her with his relentless energy and brash rhetoric. His ability to tap into the fears and hopes of voters, combined with a relentless focus on his narrative of national rejuvenation, ultimately won him the day. Despite his unpredictability and contentious style, Trump’s message struck a chord, propelling him to a victory that defied conventional political logic. 

Trump vs. Biden in 2024 will be a great watch. The US needs a strongman at the negotiation table with Xi, Modi, and Putin. If the former President runs, he will inevitably invoke ‘Make America Great Again’ with more vigour than in 2016. The US is not Reagan’s US anymore. It’s easier to talk about the inner core desires of Americans for pride. The pride they grew up with is slowly vanishing by the day.

Politics makes strange bedfellows. It’s not for the faint-hearted. It’s a blood sport. It’s all about the art of possibility. It’s about capturing power and, most importantly, sustaining power. The below from ‘The Panchatantra’ sums up the world: ‘All things in the world live off one another, using many different strategies to do so, some peaceful, others not so peaceful. Think.’

Rulers live off their lands,

Physicians off the sick,

Merchants live off the consumers, 

They learned from fools;

Thieves live off the unwary,

Almsmen off householders;

Harlots off pleasure seekers,

And workers of the whole world.

Snares of many sorts are carefully set;

Day and night, they lie in wait, watchful,

Surviving by sheer strength – fish eating fish. 

Fish eating fish — for survival. Once in power, you would not want to leave. Politics is a microcosm of human life. ‘Messiahs’ are not immortal and there is a downside. The sustainability of the narrative depends on not only the leader’s code of conduct but also his followers and the machinery. 

In the midst of this, Asia is rising. There is hope for the world.

By Saliya Weerakoon

The post Asian roar appeared first on Tashkent Citizen.

As Victoria Nuland steps down, she gets real about a world on fire.

Victoria Nuland has long been known as a relentless, even pugnacious, U.S. diplomat, with a strong belief in American power. The approach sometimes got her in trouble, but it rarely held her back.

Nuland recently left the State Department after serving at its highest levels, first as the Biden administration’s undersecretary of State for political affairs, and, for several months, acting deputy secretary of State. She previously was a career diplomat who held an array of roles under presidents both Republican and Democratic; her first posting more than three decades ago was as a consular officer in China.

In an exit interview with POLITICO Magazine, Nuland discussed her time in public service — dismissing chatter that she was passed over for a promotion — as well as her views on where American foreign policy has gone wrong and right.

Notably, she said the United States was not quick enough to realize and prevent the expansionist ambitions of both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.

A longtime champion of Ukraine and the effort to counter Russia, she also warned about the perils of Donald Trump blowing up NATO if he wins back the White House in November.

“Don’t throw it out,” she said of the trans-Atlantic alliance, “because you would never be able to re-create it again.”

The following has been edited for length and clarity:

How’s life on the outside?

Life is wonderful. I am doing a lot of projects that I had put off, seeing a lot of people that I love, and I’m staying involved in ways that are meaningful. I’m speaking on foreign policy issues I care about — whether it is Ukraine or ensuring that the United States leads strongly in the world. I’m getting a chance to prepare for my classes in the fall and work with the next generation of foreign policy leaders. I’ll be at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs.

Why leave the Biden administration, really? People said you felt passed over for the deputy secretary of State job. Is that true?

I actually didn’t compete for the deputy secretary of State job. I loved being undersecretary for political affairs. I love working with Secretary [Antony] Blinken. But as you know, I’ve done three years altogether and I’ve done eight months plus in both jobs, and so it was just the right time for me and my family to do something different.

Do you have any regrets from your time in the role?

I think whenever you finish a job like this, you wish you’d been able to do more on more issues. Travel more, touch more people, get more done faster, ensure the U.S. was leading strongly on as many continents as possible, mentor more of the next generation. And you’re always constrained by time, by resources, by the crises that overwhelm the inbox. So you always want to have done more.

Can Ukraine win this war against Russia? And how do you define winning?

Let’s start with the fact that Putin has already failed in his objective. He wanted to flatten Ukraine. He wanted to ensure that they had no sovereignty, independence, agency, no democratic future — because a democratic Ukraine, a European Ukraine, is a threat to his model for Russia, among other things, and because it’s the first building block for his larger territorial ambitions.

Can Ukraine succeed? Absolutely. Can Ukraine come out of this more sovereign, more economically independent, stronger, more European than it is now? Absolutely. And I think it will. But we’ve got to stay with it. We’ve got to make sure our allies stay with it.

And we have to accelerate a lot of the initiatives that were in the supplemental, like helping Ukraine build that highly deterrent military force of the future, like deploying these longer-range weapons to strategic effect, like ensuring that the critical infrastructure and the energy sector are protected, like building up our own defense industrial base and that of our allies and Ukraine’s again, so that we and Ukraine are building faster than Russia and China.

But can it get all its territory back, including Crimea?

It can definitely get to a place where it’s strong enough, I believe, and where Putin is stymied enough to go to the negotiating table from a position of strength. It’ll be up to the Ukrainian people what their territorial ambitions should be. But there are certain things that are existential.

Any deal that they cut in their interest and in the larger global interest has to be a deal that Putin is compelled to stick to. We can’t be doing this every six months, every three years. It has to actually lead to a deal that includes Russian withdrawal.

Putin is a master at what we call rope-a-dope negotiating, where he never actually cuts the deal. It has to be a deal that ensures that whatever is decided on Crimea, it can’t be remilitarized such that it’s a dagger at the heart of the center of Ukraine.

Was it a mistake not to push the Ukrainians harder to go for some sort of negotiated end to the war in 2022, especially the fall of 2022?

They were not in a strong enough position then. They’re not in a strong enough position now. The only deal Putin would have cut then, the only deal that he would cut today, at least before he sees what happens in our election, is a deal in which he says, “What’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable.” And that’s not sustainable.

You’ve had a long career, especially when it comes to Europe. Where did the U.S. go wrong in its understanding of Russia?

With regard to both Russia and China, after the end of the Cold War, the prevailing wisdom among all of us — right, left and center — was that if you could knit Moscow and Beijing into the open and free global order that we had benefited from for so many years, that they would become prosperous, and they would become strong contributing members of that order. And that’s what we tried for a very long time.

That works if you have a leadership that is fundamentally accepting the current system. But once you have leaders who are telling their populations that this system keeps their country down, doesn’t allow it to have its rightful place, that has a territorial definition of greatness, that is bent on economic, political and or military coercion — that’s antithetical to this order, and then our policy has to change.

Did we realize fast enough Putin’s ambitions and Xi Jinping’s ambitions, and did we do enough to ensure that those ambitions stayed inside their own nations and didn’t spill out and coerce others? 20/20 hindsight? Probably not.

How much of it comes down to what particular guy is running the show? I sometimes wonder, could things be different if it wasn’t Putin in charge? If it wasn’t Xi? How much of it comes down to the dude at the top?

In highly centralized societies, which both China and Russia have historically been, without an electoral refresh of the kind that we all go through in the democratic world, it matters hugely, because it’s that human who’s defining what greatness means. It’s that human who’s deciding how to maintain order in that society. It’s that human — allowing them to speak, allowing a free press, allowing protests, allowing alternative political parties — who’s going to shape the options. And that constrains obviously the kind of relationship we can have.

What is the lesson we should learn about foreign policy in general when it comes to the experiences we’ve had in Russia and China?

We should always try to talk both to leaders and to people, to the extent that we’re allowed. We should always offer an opportunity to work together in common interest.

But if the ideology is inherently expansionist, is inherently illiberal, is inherently trying to change the system that benefits us, we’ve got to build protections and resilience for ourselves, for our friends and allies, and particularly for those neighbors of those countries who are likely to be on the front line of that first push.

Where do you see the Israel-Hamas war heading?

Essentially, there are two paths on the table. There is continuing this war with all of the destruction and horror and lack of clarity about how you end Hamas’ reign of terror.

The other path is the route that the administration and allies and partners and a lot of countries in the Gulf are pushing, and a lot of Israelis want, which is: a hostage deal leads to a long-term cease-fire, leads to a better future for Palestinians both in the West Bank and in Gaza, leads to Saudi-Israel normalization and a path to two states, and a region where the ideology and the violence that Hamas is offering is beaten by more opening, more opportunity, more peace, more stability.

Are you saying that because you believe it or because it’s the Biden administration’s position?

I’m saying it because, anything other than that, this is going to happen again and again and again.

If you could go back in time on that one, what, if anything, should the U.S. have done differently?

Beginning with the Trump administration, everybody fell in love with regional normalization as the cure-all for the instability and grievances and insecurity in the Middle East. And that’s a part of it.

But if you leave out the Palestinian issue, then somebody’s going to seize it and run with it, and that’s what Hamas did. I also think that both we and the Israelis knew too little about the terror state that had been established in Gaza.

You’re going to be teaching at Columbia, the epicenter of campus protests over this situation. If you could offer these protesters some advice as someone with significant policymaking experience, what would it be?

Peaceful protest is part of the fabric of who we are and the fact that we allow it, and the Chinese don’t and the Russians don’t, makes us Americans. But when that protest becomes violent, when it impinges on other people’s human rights or denigrates others, then you veer toward coercion.

So, express your views, ask for concrete paths forward. But stay away from violence, make sure that it’s actually indigenous to the campus, that you’re not becoming the tool of outside agitators. And be respectful of alternative views as you expect people to respect your views.

What if you are peaceful? And you say what you want and the people in charge just say, ‘Oh, that’s very nice, thank you,’ and then they ignore you and they keep doing what they’ve been doing for years. How do you do just keep pushing on that front? Do you join the government?

I would certainly say if you care enough to devote all day, every day to political change, come join the folks who are setting policy, commit your life to public service. I didn’t expect that that’s where my life would lead, but it’s been incredibly rewarding.

There are many, many ways to change policy, but being on the inside is not only extremely rewarding, but you can actually get stuff done.

If Trump wins, and leaves NATO or limits America’s role in NATO, does the alliance fall apart? What happens?

First and foremost, America suffers. Because if you look at every single one of the challenges we have globally, even as we make the security commitment to Europe, it is the European countries who have contributed more to Ukraine — on the security side, on the economic side, etc. It is the European countries who have to adapt their policies toward China if you want to have an impact on China’s eagerness to coerce others. It’s the European countries who we need to help fund the Haiti mission, to help defeat terrorism in Africa, and provide prosperity.

If we are not part of that family, on a daily basis, we are standing alone, our own influence in the world is greatly reduced, and we have no influence over how they choose to spend their energy and resources. And they’re less powerful in doing it without us.

What about this idea that look, we’re the U.S. at the end of the day. We’re the superpower. Whether we’re in NATO or not, people are going to come along with us. Isn’t there something to that argument?

I’ve worked for six presidents, Republicans and Democrats. I always believed that a new president with a fresh mandate from the American people should look at every global problem with fresh eyes, bring new solutions, and should have that opportunity, working with Congress, working with the American people, working with allies and partners.

That’s a different thing than turning your back on bedrock, bipartisan institutions and policies that have protected Americans and advanced our own prosperity and global influence for 70 years.

Why do you want to throw out what’s working and what benefits us for no other reason than you’ve had a fit of pique? Work within the institution to make it work better. Don’t throw it out, because you would never be able to re-create it again.

Does the rest of the world fear the United States?

Is fear what we want from the rest of the world?

Sometimes.

I think what we want from the rest of the world is they see us leading in a manner that advances their own security, advances their own prosperity, creates this community of nations that can handle global problems — whether they are terrorist problems, whether they are health problems, whether they’re environmental problems — and we do it in a primarily self-interested but unselfish way, and we’re creating that community.

They should only fear us if they’re opponents of a largely liberal democratic way of advancing human prosperity. And in that context, if they are viciously invading a neighbor, if they are coercing a little state because they can, then I hope they would fear our reaction and the reaction that we will build with other democracies who want to protect the system that favors freedom.

Do you ever plan to go back into government?

I love what I did for 35 years. I’ve always loved it. And I continue to love it. So in the right circumstances, of course.

Source: Politico

The post She Was at the Top of the State Department. Now She’s Ready to Talk appeared first on Tashkent Citizen.

The Middle East & Ukraine on trial as a Putin-emboldened Xi Jinping is set to meet the US President 

China and Russia are strengthening their strategic partnership in the Middle East, which helps counterbalance the United States in the region. The countries share the opinion that the cause of the Israel-Palestine conflict was not the Hamas terrorist attacks, but an inability to guarantee the rights of the Palestinian people.

On October 18 this year, when US President Biden visited Israel, a high-level forum was held in Beijing to mark the 10th anniversary of the Chinese Belt & Road Initiative. In numerous photos, Russian President Vladimir Putin stands next to President Xi Jinping. The latter paved the way for Putin to return to the international arena, as the Russian President was not able to travel to major events abroad after the West introduced a warrant for his arrest. In addition to Xi Jinping, Putin also held individual meetings in Beijing with the leaders of eight other countries.

In his speech at the same forum, the Russian President unveiled plans to connect Russia to the Belt & Road Initiative.

In terms of Russia-China connectivity, in addition to the already existing Indian Ocean Sea Routes, (via both Suez and Vladivostok) from next year, the Arctic Ocean Northern Sea Route (NSR) will be operated year-round. The Trans-Siberian Railway is being expanded to include a north-south route connecting the NSR with China and other countries. On the eve of Putin’s visit to Beijing, mutual visa-free group tourist trips between China and Russia were resumed. Although Russia is generally wary of Chinese expansion into Siberia, in light of the new international environment it has clearly strengthened its resolve to live within China’s orbit.

In a map published in late August, Beijing showed as its own territory the entire island of Greater Ussuri, which China and Russia agreed to divide equally into east and west parts in 2004. At present, Russia cannot raise any objections on this matter. The island has strategic importance at the mouth of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers.

However, China is not a bad partner for Russia. Xi and Putin completed their speeches at the forum in the morning and held a three-hour summit in the afternoon, during which Xi Jinping addressed Putin as “my old friend.” Is there any other country today that treats the Russian president so generously?

So, what was discussed at the Sino-Russian summit? The most important topics appear to have been the rapidly changing situation around Palestine and strategic cooperation between China and Russia with an eye toward the United States.

Both leaders focused on economic policy in their speeches at the forum. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, economic and multilateral cooperation issues, including the expansion of BRICS, were discussed at the summit. However, shortly afterwards, at a press conference, Putin said that he had discussed Ukraine and Gaza issues in detail with Xi Jinping. It is believed that both sides are coordinating their global strategies to deal with these two critical issues.

Immediately after these discussions, on October 19, China’s international activity in the Middle East became more pronounced. Xi met with the Egyptian prime minister and advocated a solution to the Palestine problem through a “two-state plan” that would make Palestine independent, as well as increase Beijing’s cooperation with Arab countries. China’s Special Envoy for the Middle East, Zhai Junyi and Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov held talks in Doha (Qatar). According to China’s State media outlet Xinhua, the root cause of the conflict is not Hamas’ terrorist attacks, but the failure to guarantee the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, and that China is working with Russia to resolve the issue. China expressed its intention to join Russia’s active position in proposing a UN resolution on the Gaza issue.

Meanwhile, Xi Jinping is attending the APEC 2023 forum, which has just begun and is being held in San Francisco. He is due to meet the US President on Wednesday (November 15). Will Beijing find it necessary to compromise with the United States?

In fact, the Xi administration is now moving in exactly the opposite direction. The Gaza issue has many important political aspects not only for Russia, but also for China’s global strategy. Unlike the military conflict in Ukraine, where the West supports the supposedly weak side, in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict the United States firmly supports Israel, which is considered a strong party in the Middle East. However, for the Arab world, Israel is a symbol of colonialism imposed on the Palestinians by the West, which was unable to resolve the Jewish question on its own. Moreover, opposition to Israel, which has been roundly criticized for killing Palestinian civilians in Gaza, is increasingly spreading to many developing countries. There is a growing sense in the global south that the United States is losing moral conscience.

Overall, the Middle East has recently become a key location in China’s global strategy. The Belt & Road Initiative has generally been well received in Central Asia and Africa. If China can effectively penetrate the Middle East and promote the BRI in the region, it will be able to connect its two most important zones of influence. This would allow China to divide the Western sphere of influence into zones in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region.

China would like to see much more active cooperation with oil-producing countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, which are strengthening their autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. In addition, it is encouraging for Beijing that Russia has recently been increasing its presence in West Africa.

However, there is a certain amount of irony in the fact that China, which strongly claims that Taiwan is part of China, advocates Palestinian independence. There is a possibility that the United States will use this example to criticize China as having double standards. The United States has said it will treat Russia as a full participant at the APEC summit, with the Russian delegation being lead by Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk. “He’s being treated as the head of delegation, and he’ll have the opportunity to participate fully in the week’s events,” Matt Murray, the State Department official in charge of APEC, has stated. Overchuk is under a variety of Western sanctions including from the European Union but is not specifically under US sanctions.

That said, the Russian position as concerns the Middle East appears already set in stone and aligned with China’s. Xi’s diplomacy and ingenuity in dealing with US President Biden therefore remains the key event.

Source: Silkroad Briefing

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It will be Putin’s first participation in a multilateral summit after a mercenary group launched a short-lived armed rebellion last week that rocked Moscow.

The summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) under India’s presidency is also set to welcome Iran as the new permanent member of the grouping.

The summit is also taking place against the backdrop of the over three-year eastern Ladakh border standoff between Indian and Chinese troops, and two weeks after Prime Minister Modi’s high-profile visit to the US.

The SCO, comprising India, China, Russia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, is an influential economic and security bloc and has emerged as one of the largest transregional international organisations.
India assumed the rotating chairmanship of the SCO at the Samarkand Summit of SCO on September 16 last year.

Heads of the two SCO bodies — the secretariat and the SCO RATS (Regional Anti- Terrorist Structure) are also set to attend Tuesday’s virtual summit whose theme is “Towards a SECURE SCO!The situation in Afghanistan, the Ukraine conflict and enhancing cooperation among the SCO member countries are expected to figure in the summit, people familiar with the matter said, adding boosting connectivity and trade is also likely to be discussed.

The SECURE acronym was coined by Prime Minister Modi at the 2018 SCO summit and it stands for Security; Economy and Trade; Connectivity; Unity; Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity; and Environment.

Heads of six international and regional organisations have also been invited to the summit.
The organisations are the UN, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation), EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union) and CICA (Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia).

India’s presidency of the SCO saw significant activities in a number of areas. New Delhi created five new pillars for cooperation in SCO. These are startups and innovation, traditional medicine, digital inclusion, youth empowerment and shared Buddhist heritage.

The special working group on startups and innovation and experts working group on traditional medicine were created on India’s initiative.
“We intend to contribute substantially in both these areas,” said one of the people cited above.

To further Prime Minister Modi’s vision of Vasudhaiv Kutumbakom (world is one family), India emphasised on building greater people-to-people connect, the person said.
A number of signature events were held under the Indian presidency with the intention to further deepen people to people connect.

India’s association with the SCO began in 2005 as an observer country. It became a full member state of SCO at the Astana summit in 2017.

India has shown a keen interest in deepening its security-related cooperation with the SCO and its RATS, which specifically deals with issues relating to security and defence.

The SCO was founded at a summit in Shanghai in 2001 by the presidents of Russia, China, the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Pakistan became its permanent member along with India in 2017.

Source: Times of India

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President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev will pay a state visit to China on May 17-19, reported the Akorda press service on May 8. 

The President is expected to meet President of China Xi Jinping in the Chinese city of Xi’an to address the strategic partnership between the two countries, expanding cooperation in trade, economic, investment, transport and logistics and energy sectors, as well as deepening cultural and humanitarian ties.

The President also plans to meet with the leaders of major Chinese companies and take part in the China + Central Asia (C+C5) Summit.

Source: Astanatimes

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China’s Xi Jinping this week invited the leaders of the ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia to a first joint summit in China, a bid to boost Beijing’s influence in Russia’s backyard.

The Chinese president extended the offer to the “first China-Central Asia summit”, scheduled for May, in similar telegrams sent on Monday and Tuesday to the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and made public by the recipients.

Reclusive Turkmenistan, the top supplier of gas to China, has not yet announced whether it has been invited to the gathering.

The authoritarian republics of Central Asia were part of the Soviet Union and have been dominated by Moscow since the mid-19th century.

But Russia’s influence is being challenged, increasingly since the invasion of Ukraine.

Beijing is courting Moscow’s traditional allies in the region, both politically and economically — the latter via projects such as the mammoth road, rail and port infrastructure scheme designed as a modern iteration of the Silk Road through Central Asia and beyond.

Turkey and Western powers are also seeking to bolster their influence in the strategically located mineral-rich region.

In addition to Xi, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan, chief European Union diplomat Charles Michel and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken have all beaten a path to Central Asian doors in recent months.

Xi also hosted an online regional summit in January 2022 to celebrate the 30th anniversary of Sino-Central Asian diplomatic relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the four invitations sent out on Monday and Tuesday to mark Nowruz, the Persian New Year, which is celebrated in the region, Xi underlined the strengthening ties between China and the Central Asian regimes.

The missive published by the official Tajik news agency Khovar quotes Xi as saying he is “eager to discuss a grand plan to develop relations” between his country and the region.

However, Beijing’s increasing influence is not universally welcomed.

Sections of the population in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which along with Tajikistan have borders with China, have voiced a degree of concern and opposition. All have Muslim majorities.

These concerns relate particularly to land acquisition by China, government debt owed to Beijing and the latter’s brutal treatment of its Muslim Uyghur minority, which is also present in Central Asia.

Source : NDTV

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China imported US$42 million ($63 million) worth of Australian coal last month, according to government data, the first confirmation that Beijing has lifted an unofficial ban on the key export.

China customs data for January and February released this week shows 73,982 tonnes of coking coal and 134,254 tonnes of thermal coal were imported from Australia.

The total of 207,236 tonnes was a fraction of the 92 million tonnes of coal Australia exported to China in 2019, but analysts said they expected volumes to increase, now that the unofficial ban designed to punish the former Morrison government had been abolished.

Coal imports from Indonesia, Mongolia and Russia overshadowed the volumes from Australia in the same period. The data also shows China is stepping up coal imports from Russia as it seeks to bolster economic ties with Moscow despite Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

The volume of coal from Mongolia imported to China during the first two months of the year increased more than fivefold to more than 8 million tonnes. Russian coal imports also more than doubled to 14.8 million tonnes. Indonesian imports rose 84 per cent to 35 million tonnes.

Last month, S&P Global said three Chinese state-owned power plants – China Datang, China Huaneng Group and China Energy Investment – as well as steel producer China Baowu Steel Group had received permission to import Australian coal. Analysts said there were larger volumes of Australian coal currently on their way to China.

Today Think Tank, a China-based consultancy, said about 2 million tonnes of Australian coal was on its way to China that was not reflected in the current data. Bloomberg said last week that China would allow all domestic companies to import Australian coal.

Australia is the world’s biggest exporter of coking coal with a market share of about 56 per cent.

A resumption in Australian coal exports follows a thawing in bilateral relations since Anthony Albanese met Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali in October.

The Albanese government has asked China to remove sanctions on $20 billion worth of Australian exports, including coal, wine, seafood and other products imposed in 2020. There have been indications China is also easing restrictions on Australian lobsters, cotton and timber.

In January, China imported about 502 tonnes of timber-related products with another 449 tonnes in February, state media reported.

Trade Minister Don Farrell hopes to visit China this year.

China has never formally acknowledged the political bans imposed after the Morrison government called for an inquiry into the origins of COVID-19. Politically motivated sanctions would breach international trading rules.

Last week, China’s Ministry of Commerce declined to confirm whether the coal ban had been lifted, or whether one had been imposed in the first place.

“China implements automatic licensing management for coal imports, and automatic coal import licences can be applied for normally,” a ministry spokeswoman said when asked to confirm if the ban had been lifted.

“What needs to be emphasised is that China manages foreign trade in accordance with WTO rules and Chinese laws and regulations, and it is inappropriate to misinterpret relevant management methods as restrictive measures.”

Source : Financial Review

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When Xi Jinping was officially awarded a third term as president of the People’s Republic of China, after previously having altered the constitution to remove the two-term limit, it set him up to rule for 15 consecutive years – at least.

Considering the growing insecurities surrounding Northeast Asia, what does Xi’s third term mean for China-Mongolia bilateral relations?

Since Xi first ascended to the presidency in 2013, international relations and global governance have faced a profound change. As competition between the United States and China has sharpened, the significance of maritime security and freedom of navigation has become even more apparent. For landlocked countries like Mongolia, each shift can have an impact on the economy, security, and foreign policy. For Ulaanbaatar, particularly because of its close proximity to Beijing, China’s policy toward Mongolia and Mongolia’s policy toward China is something to be considered for the long haul.

There are three main areas of China-Mongolia bilateral relations: governance, economics, and diplomacy. Particularly in the Xi era, these areas all combine together to define the trajectory of China-Mongolia relations.

On the issue of governance, authoritarianism has been growing in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region at large. Freedom House’s 2022 Freedom in the World report indicated a rise in authoritarian rule, and both of Mongolia’s neighbors, Russia and China, are leading the authoritarian leadership narrative. One key finding from Freedom House is that authoritarian governments are collaborating to consolidate power and accelerate their attacks on democracy and human rights. This is the elephant in the room for Mongolia: It is a democracy, not only sandwiched between two large powers but linked tightly with two growing authoritarian regimes that are not leaving office anytime soon.

While Xi has extended his presidential grip to the third term, during his rule Mongolia has had three presidential elections and as many different presidents. Between 2009 to 2017, Elbegdorj Tsakhia served two consecutive terms, making him so far the longest-serving president of modern Mongolia’s history. Battulga Khaltmaa served from 2017-2021. Current President Khurelsukh Ukhnaa will be the first president to serve one six-year term, thanks to new constitutional amendments.

From a global governance perspective, Mongolia’s three successful presidential elections highlight the country’s democratic process. Freedom House’s rankings illustrate a sharp distinction between Beijing’s authoritarian governance and Ulaanbaatar’s democratic process. In 2022, Mongolia scored 84 out of 100, 36/40 on political rights and 48/60 on civil liberties. In contrast, China scored 9/100, -2/40 on political rights, and 11/60 on civil liberties.

Although these scores highlight the distinction between China and Mongolia in areas of political and social rights, the fact that Mongolia is landlocked between increasingly authoritarian governments obliges Ulaanbaatar to make additional efforts to defend and maintain its democracy, democratic governance, and its process.

Yet despite the differences in governance, Mongolian administrations have consistently sought economic opportunities in the economic powerhouse to the south. Former President Elbegdorj Tsakhia envisaged a tripartite economic corridor between Ulaanbaatar’s traditional partners, Moscow and Beijing, including 30 proposed investment projects.

Elbegdorj first proposed the trilateral economic corridor in 2014, during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) conference in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. From Ulaanbaatar’s economic standpoint, establishing an economic corridor with Moscow and Beijing is only natural and has tremendous tax and logistical advantages considering the close proximity of the three countries.

Under Xi’s tenure, China-Mongolia bilateral relations, particularly, economic partnerships, have only expanded. Chinese investments will continue to flow into Mongolia whether it is within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative – generally involving state-owned enterprises – or the private sector. The longevity of Xi’s presidency gives his administration an overall understanding of Mongolia’s foreign policy as a whole, and Xi believes that he can deliver economic cooperation.

Since Xi took office, his economic policy toward Ulaanbaatar ensured China remained Mongolia’s highest export destination and trade partner. According to the China Brief, in 2021, “Mongolia exported a total volume of goods worth US$7.63 billion into China, with mining products making up 93 percent of it.” Newly emerging investments will, however, target Mongolia’s renewable energy and banking sectors.

That said, as traditional partners, two nations whose history has been bound together for centuries, there comes a time when something else needs to be offered other than an economic gain. This was shown during the beginning of the COVID-19 lockdowns in both Ulaanbaatar and Beijing.

Battulga Khaltmaa’s presidency (2017-2021) saw China-Mongolia and Mongolia-Russia relations tested in many ways, but the significance of strong ties between Russia, China, and Mongolia, including trilateral activities, remained visible. Despite the challenges, the Battulga administration, did not derail from the general foreign policy direction. Instead, Battulga’s diplomacy strengthened China-Mongolia bilateral relations for the long haul.

While the rest of the world bashed Beijing for spreading the coronavirus, Battulga’s diplomacy demonstrated Mongolia’s “good neighbor” relations. The so-called sheep diplomacy, the donation of 30,000 sheep, was indeed more than a diplomatic gesture but carried deep symbolism..

The incumbent president of Mongolia, Khurelsukh Ukhnaa took office in 2021. For Xi Jinping, Khurelsukh will be the third Mongolian president he would meet.

Khurelsukh’s first state visit to Beijing in November 2022 placed a heavy emphasis on China-Mongolia economic ties, particularly in the context of the post-COVID economic recovery. During the Khurelsukh-Xi meeting, Xi pointed out that China’s development plan includes contributing to the development of its neighbors, and China is ready to accelerate projects in Mongolia.

On Mongolia’s part, the interest to attract investment, not just from Beijing, but also from global partners is a strong incentive.

Since he took office in 2012, Xi has built stable, progressive economic relations with Mongolia’s three different presidential administrations and even more prime ministers. Xi’s third term as president will likely sustain the previously established economic agreements. Although his third term may not launch a new direction with Ulaanbaatar, China-Mongolia economic ties will continue to be a top priority.

Mongolia currently envisions a two-step strategy in bolstering bilateral trade, investment, finance, mining, energy, infrastructure, e-commerce, and green energy sectors with Beijing. From a foreign policy perspective, Mongolia and China will maintain high-level dialogues on the economy, contemporary international affairs, and security issues concerning both Ulaanbaatar and Beijing.

Khurelsukh will be the Mongolian president who will have the longest relationship with Xi, now that the Chinese leader has secured a third term; they will both be in power for the entirety of Khurelsukh’s six-year term. As comprehensive strategic partners and as leaders of Mongolia and China, the two will likely increase cooperation in emerging sectors such as renewable energy, development projects, and infrastructure and construction.

Source : The Diplomat

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In recent years, China has pursued an increasingly aggressive foreign-policy posture known as “wolf warrior” diplomacy, one that has forcefully staked China’s positions across issues and regions.

But evidence is mounting that this strategy is backfiring. International opinion polls, such as the latest Pew Research Center survey, show that negative views of China is peaking around the world while China’s diplomatic initiatives, such as in Central and Eastern Europe, are failing.

Yet in the wake of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, China has defended its aggressive foreign policy and hinted at its intensification. At first glance, it would seem that China is simply unaware that its diplomacy is malfunctioning. But a closer look reveals that China’s choice has its own logic. Why is China so committed to this style of diplomacy despite the dangers that come with it?

Chinese media refers to this style as “Xiplomacy,” a coined term frequently used in Xinhua News headlines since 2019, short for “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.” It stands for China’s foreign-policy framework under Chinese President Xi Jinping’s leadership and is one of the five key elements of “Xi Jinping Thought,” the other four involving the economy, ecology, military, and rule of law.

At heart, Xi’s diplomacy calls for a more active role for China as a great power on the world stage, including reforming the Western-dominated international order and creating what China calls “true multilateralism.”

Compared to the other key elements, however, Xiplomacy has seen a lackluster performer in Chinese state media. According to the China Media Project, which tracks the number of times each element has been mentioned in the People’s Daily since the beginning of 2022, Xiplomacy appeared less than five times most months, whereas others averaged around 15 times.

The underplaying of Xiplomacy in state media indicates China is aware of its disappointing diplomatic performance. The one other banner phrase that also saw low usage through this year is “Xi Jinping Economic Thought,” which corresponds with China’s weak economic performance. Although China’s diplomatic travails are harder to quantify than slowing growth, the term’s relative absence from state media tells us that the party is not completely blind to the reality.

So why does the party show no intention of reorienting its foreign policy despite being aware of its underwhelming performance? The answer is that Xiplomacy is more about Xi than anything else.

Yang Jiechi, director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission and the highest foreign-policy official in the party, spoke on the study and implementation of Xiplomacy this May, the transcript of which was published in the People’s Daily. The speech was all about Xi. Yang vowed to “take a coordinated approach to the domestic and international imperatives” and “resolutely follow through on General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important instructions on external work and the decisions and plans of the CPC Central Committee.”

This highlight a key characteristic of China’s foreign policy: It is valued only as an extension of its domestic agenda, with the priority to demonstrate loyalty to Xi and his agenda. Beijing’s overreactions to inquiries into COVID-19’s origin, aggressions in the South China Sea, obsessions over border disputes, or military demonstrations in the Taiwan Strait are more motivated by internal politics and what Xi identifies as China’s priorities than effective diplomacy aimed at managing foreign relations.

At its core, Xi’s foreign policy is about boosting citizen confidence in the state by flaunting national strength. The primary audience of China’s foreign policy is domestic, not international.

Xi’s diplomatic philosophy points back to the narrative of the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”—a concept that echoes domestic patriotic sentiment. As China analyst Elizabeth Economy explains, the rejuvenation narrative “evokes memories of the country as the Middle Kingdom demanding tribute from the rest of the world; China as a source of innovation, creating paper, gunpowder, printing, and the compass; and China as an expansive, outward-facing power.” It appeals more to a domestic audience nostalgic for China’s glorious past than for an international audience, some of which might still be traumatized by China’s history as an expansionist power.

Support on social media showcases the popularity of Chinese-style diplomacy at home. The Chinese internet’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, was largely pro-Russia and pro-Russian President Vladimir Putin, much of which mimicked the aggressive tone of Chinese diplomats. Although sentiments on social media could be biased due to censorship, a survey conducted by the Carter Center shows that 75 percent of respondents agree that supporting Russia in its invasion of Ukraine is in China’s national interest, and more surprisingly, support for Russia is correlated with higher education.

Although soft power was embraced by former Chinese leader Hu Jintao, it has somewhat lost its appeal under Xi. This shift is evident in Xi’s speech during the recently concluded 20th Party Congress. According to Reuters, Xi used hard-power terms, such as “security” or “safety,” 89 times in the full work report—up from 55 times in 2017. China does care about its global image, not so much about its appeal to other countries through non-coercive means—soft power—but rather in its ability to influence other countries’ diplomatic decisions through the power it has, such as economic coercion.

As the National Endowment for Democracy’s Christopher Walker explained in Foreign Policy, “the dynamics of soft power—which arise principally from a country’s culture, its political values, and its policies—are misaligned with the incentives of systems based on pervasive state control and repression.” As China grows increasingly authoritarian under Xi, the sources of soft power—civil society, individuals, and the private sector—inevitably suffers.

After failed attempts of growing China’s soft power abroad, Xi has turned to a so-called harder version of soft power: international influence. This is about using power resources—a state’s material and ideational assets—to influence other states’ behaviors. Xi proudly announced in his 20th Party Congress speech that “China’s international influence, appeal, and shaping power have been significantly improved.”

China’s flagship foreign-policy project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), showcases China’s intent to expand its international influence using economic coercion. One salient example is Lithuania, which joined the BRI in 2017.

After Lithuania announced it would open a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius in November 2021, Beijing retaliated by destroying their bilateral trade relationship, causing economic losses worth some $320 million for Lithuanian companies in 2021. Through Lithuania, Beijing hoped to exemplify the harsh consequences facing other BRI countries if they ever misalign with Beijing’s political agenda. In reality, China’s extreme measure was a failed public relations campaign: Not only did it fray China’s relations with other Eastern European countries, but it also further damaged China-European Union relations, with the latter calling for a World Trade Organization case against Beijing’s arbitrary trade restrictions.

China’s pursuit of international influence is also reflected in its diplomatic priorities. In September, Xi visited Central Asia for his first trip overseas since the pandemic began. The choice was deliberate: China has achieved relative success with the BRI in Central Asia. Instead of choosing another BRI region, such as Eastern Europe, which has grown increasingly distant from China due to failed infrastructure promises and China’s support of Russia, China turned to Central Asia, where many in the region view connectivity as a matter of survival, especially facing the economic disruptions of Russia’s war in Ukraine. This economic direness propels Central Asian countries to support China’s political agenda, such as regarding China’s territorial claims to Taiwan, in return for infrastructure investments.

Domestically, the trip was displayed as a successful venture at asserting China’s international influence. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs frames it as “fully show[ing] the strong confidence and influence of President Xi Jinping, and the growing international standing and influence of China.”

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was announced as a new Politburo member at the 20th Party Congress, implying that he is set to replace Yang as director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, the highest ranked official for China’s foreign policy.

As a fervent advocate of “wolf warrior” diplomacy, Wang being promoted affirms the continuation, if not the intensification, of China’s aggressive diplomacy style. But more so, it reinforces the notion that the foreign minister’s primary job is to show off their loyalty to Xi.

To please the central leader, officials are keeping critical feedback and advice from reaching Xi. As journalist Dake Kang explained recently, even China’s once powerful internal system of internal reports, known as Neican, has become dangerously censored under Xi. The broken feedback loop could lead to poor decision-making, a common phenomenon with autocrats, as recently witnessed in Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine.

Facing pressing domestic issues, Xi-centered diplomacy could suffer from tunnel vision and lose its true purpose: managing relationships abroad. Instead of spreading himself too thin, Xi should allocate responsibilities to trained diplomats and informed experts to design and implement a foreign policy that focuses China’s energy outward. But that’s an unlikely possibility in a system that increasingly turns around the whims of a single man.

Source : ForeignPolice

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