The problem of effective management of water and energy resources is one of the most important for the countries of Central Asia. This is due to the constantly growing population of the region, climate change, and, importantly, the need for further economic development of the Central Asian states.

According to an analysis by the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), water shortages in Central Asia will be especially acute in five years, and by 2040 the load on water resources in the region will increase by 2.8 times. That is why the issue of creating a water-energy consortium (WEC) by the Central Asian states, which should resolve not only economic, but also a number of political issues, primarily related to the insufficient level of regional cooperation, has once again been put on the agenda.

The problem of insufficient water resources in Central Asia has existed for decades. It is known that there are two deep rivers in the region – the Amudarya and the Syr Darya, which are not enough to satisfy all the needs of the countries located here, which, in addition, have different economic interests. Thus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan generate electricity and are interested in storing water in the summer in order to generate electricity in the winter, while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan grow agricultural products and therefore need water in the summer season. During the existence of the USSR, the issue of water and energy balance was resolved through directive management from Moscow on the basis of the so-called barter. It consisted in the fact that in the summer Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan supplied water to their neighbors, and in the winter Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan supplied them with fuel oil and gas for the operation of power plants. However, after 1991, the situation changed: countries began to take care of their own economic interests, simultaneously remembering each other’s old grievances. As a result, the Soviet barter system was destroyed.

Despite the fact that back in 1992, the Central Asian states began to look for compromise solutions, signing various bilateral agreements and even creating some regional associations for joint management of water and energy resources, it turned out to be impossible to finally solve the problem in this format. The most significant event was the signing in 1998 by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan of a trilateral agreement on the use of water and energy resources in the Syr Darya basin. The document provided for “coordination and adoption of [joint] decisions on the passage of water,” as well as the rejection of unilateral actions that could harm other parties to the agreement.

At the same time, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan pledged to compensate Kyrgyzstan for the discharge of water “in an equivalent volume of energy resources (coal, gas, heating oil, electricity), as well as other products (work, services) or in monetary terms as agreed.” At the same time, the heads of countries instructed the governments to prepare an intergovernmental agreement on the creation of an International Water and Energy Consortium.

However, over the years since then, the situation has not changed radically, and countries, due to financial issues, began to violate the agreements reached. The situation was aggravated by the fact that in 2009 Kyrgyzstan suspended its participation in the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), which was one of the most important platforms for solving water problems in the region, and in 2016 it completely froze its membership in the organization.

At the same time, it cannot be said that the Central Asian countries did not try to change the current situation, relying on the agreements of 1998 and primarily in the area of creating the WEC. Another attempt to speed up the process was made by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in July 2003, and a year later the general “Concept for creating an interstate water-energy consortium” was approved. However, even after this, things did not come to the signing of a final agreement on the WEC. Even the involvement of the UN and various international financial institutions could not help solve the problem.

The seriousness of the current situation in the Central Asian countries, of course, is well understood. That is why the idea of ​​creating a consortium did not go anywhere, and Kazakhstan turned out to be the main initiator of its promotion. In 2018, the then Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev noted that the time had come to “automate the system of management, distribution, accounting and monitoring of water resources in the Aral Sea basin,” including within the framework of the creation of the WEC. At the same time, he absolutely correctly pointed out that such a mechanism “will ensure transparency in the use of water by countries and strengthen mutual trust,” and therefore it is necessary to focus on the implementation of regional projects.

Representatives of other Central Asian countries subsequently made similar statements, but again things did not go beyond conversations. True, in recent years it has been possible to strengthen bilateral interaction between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as well as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, including on issues of joint financing of the construction of Rogunskaya hydroelectric power station and two hydroelectric power stations on the Zeravshan River. In addition, it was decided to restore the parallel operation of national energy systems through the United Energy System of Central Asia.

In the current situation, Astana tried to involve even the European Union in solving the problem, calling on Brussels to join in the creation of the WEC, including through its financing. This year, the new head of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, again reminded everyone of the need to create a consortium “taking into account the interests of all countries in the region in the fields of irrigation, hydropower and ecology.” In this regard, he once again proposed developing a work plan for the introduction of a unified automated system for accounting, monitoring, management and distribution of water resources in the Aral Sea basin. Earlier it became known that it was planned to develop the water balance of the Syrdarya and automate interstate hydraulic structures.

2023, apparently, may well become a turning point in the creation of the WEC. This is primarily due to the fact that recently there has been a strengthening of regional cooperation in Central Asia, which has opened up additional opportunities for reformatting relationships, including on the issue of jointly solving problems of water and energy resource shortages. In particular, in July it became known that Kazakhstan included the development of the WEC in its Concept for the development of a water resources management system for 2023-2029. At the same time, the head of the Kazakh Foreign Ministry, Murat Nurtleu, spoke at the Asian Forum on Security and Cooperation, where he again proposed creating a consortium to “ensure fair and rational distribution of water resources in the region,” which, according to Astana, will help not only overcome water shortages, but also “ prevent possible conflicts in the future.”

At the same time, international structures, primarily the EDB, became more active in this direction. Back in March, at the UN Water Conference in New York, the organization presented five measures that could solve the problems of regulating the water and energy complex of Central Asia. In particular, it was proposed to hold a “constructive open discussion regarding the system of general principles for regulating the EEC of Central Asia with their subsequent agreement.” In addition, it was noted that the search for solutions needs to be carried out not only within the framework of already established institutions, but also to form a new mechanism for coordinating decisions on water resource management and electricity flows in the region. In this regard, the EDB proposed creating an International Water and Energy Consortium in the form of either a full-fledged international organization, or through “the creation of project consortia for a specific investment project.”

At the same time, the latter option is seen by EDB analysts as more acceptable, since it will allow for faster construction and more efficient operation of large hydraulic projects. In addition, it was proposed to direct more resources to conduct interstate and intersectoral research work and, in particular, to consider the possibility of creating an International Research Center for the EEC of Central Asia. And all this must have a stable structure of overall financing and management, since without this it will not be possible to solve the current problems in the region. In this regard, as it became known in November, the EDB reported that it was ready to invest more than $400 million in the development of the water and energy complex of Central Asia in the next three years, including in the modernization of the current irrigation infrastructure of the region.

The progress that has emerged today in the process of creating the EEC suggests that the Central Asian countries, with the support of international financial structures, are ready to take a serious step towards the implementation of this idea. It seems that all interested parties have come to realize the need to stop just exchanging opinions and finally begin to put into practice everything that they have been talking about for decades. Not only the issue of water resource management, but also the overall stability of the entire region depends on this.

Source: Asiais

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We spent a lot of time in taxis as my friend Dinara and I traveled 2,200 kilometers (1,300-plus miles) from flat land through mountains to more mountains in Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia.

Instead of booking a bus or train, travelers in Kyrgyzstan head to a parking lot where the taxi drivers wait for customers. You can take the ride immediately if you are willing to pay for all of the seats in the vehicle. If you wait, the driver fills up every seat, the fare is cheaper and you will ride with strangers.

I must say, riding with strangers was a great way to see the country and hear a wide variety of perspectives. Dinara is an English teacher and she was willing to translate the many conversations. This is no small job and can be exhausting after an hour or more.

Nowadays, people don’t always like to chit-chat on airplanes and certainly not on the subways. However, we had really good luck, quite possibly because Dinara has such an open personality and her face is very inviting. People also seemed interested to hear about America from an American and from Dinara who spent a month in California.

“What do you like most about your country?” I asked on the first day we rode from the second largest city to Dinara’s village. We were in a mini-van packed with two middle-aged men, two men in their mid 20s and one teenage boy, plus the driver, Dinara and I.

The man sitting near us rattled off some of his favorite things — “the people, the landscape, clean water …”

“Clean water? What do you mean?”

He elaborated but I wouldn’t understand the full importance of the country’s clean water until later. Over the next 10 days we sampled water in streams, sipped handsful of water that gushed from the side of a steep gorge, and gathered special water from a spigot in a public park. We saw lakes that were blue from glacier water and teal-colored rivers. People often traveled with empty plastic containers in the trunk of their cars to fill the containers with water if they had an opportunity.

It makes sense there are so many locations with crystal clear water. The country has nearly 10,000 glaciers.

About an hour into our journey that day in the taxi, I learned of another thing dear to the hearts of people in Kyrgyzstan — kumis.

“Have tried kumis yet?” the same man said in a gruff and rather assertive voice, as he asked the driver to pull over at a roadside stand.

I needn’t bother to answer the question because he soon jumped out, ran ahead and bought me a plastic bottle filled with cream-colored liquid.

I understood it was horse milk, but didn’t know much more. As I took a sip or two I tried to keep my face neutral because everyone from the car was watching me.

“Hmm … interesting.”

One of the younger men in our minivan said I would be wise to go easy the first time, to make sure the milk did not upset my stomach. Maybe he was being kind because he could tell I didn’t love the taste.

I found it sour and overly salty, but the locals love it. I didn’t like Greek olives until I had them a few times, so I’m sure kumis would grow on me.

Kumis is not simply horse milk; it’s fermented horse milk. This may sound strange, but we drink a lot of kefir in the United States and kefir is fermented cow’s milk. One difference with kumis is that mare’s milk has more sugar than kefir and the fermentation results in a very small amount of alcohol in the brew. I never saw kumis chilled, but always at room temperature.

We traveled a lot and saw much of the country, thus there were many taxi cab conversations.

You can learn a lot about people by the questions they ask.

Sometimes people asked about prices in America – for cars and houses, or even the cost of my plane tickets. A few younger men wanted to know about work in America or how they could learn English. Dinara and I laughed because almost every person we met wanted to know my age, whether I was married and whether I had children. Some folks asked about politics, but I said that was a subject better left to the politicians. We all agreed that the scenery to the right and to the left was stunning and that clean water is a very good thing.

Source: Chicoer

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Following the Kyrgyz tradition, Manzura Orolbaeva welcomes guests with homemade bread and a saucer of melted butter. The bread is made from grain grown on their farm and the butter from the livestock they keep.

Following the Kyrgyz tradition, Manzura Orolbaeva welcomes guests with homemade bread and a saucer of melted butter. The bread is made from grain grown on their farm and the butter from the livestock they keep.

Agriculture is the main source of income and food for a large part of the local population in this mountain village of Kara-Dobo in southern Kyrgyzstan, but due to the dry climate and lack of arable land, it is difficult to grow crops here. Water is particularly challenging to access.

For Manzura, her nearest water source is a mountain spring located two kilometres away. Every day, this 63-year-old woman and her loved ones walk there and back, not once but several times a day, to bring back enough water for the people, animals and plants on their farm.

“You can live without gas; you can live without the Internet, but you cannot live without water,” said Manzura.

Water is scarce not only in Kara-Dobo, but also in many other villages in this region of little rainfall. In the winter, it is cold with almost no snow, and in summer, it is very hot with virtually no rain. The main water sources are mountain springs, but they are often in hard-to-reach places. 

As a high-altitude country, Kyrgyzstan has been experiencing the effects of climate change acutely. Variations in temperatures are leading to unreliable precipitation patterns and more frequent peaks in temperature are causing aridity and drought, especially in mountain pastures.

To increase the communities’ resilience to these weather anomalies, experts from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) proposed the construction of an artificial glacier in the region as part of the “Shared prosperity through cooperation in border regions of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan” project.

Funded by the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, the project is implemented jointly by FAO and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and is aimed at enhancing cross-border environmental and socio-economic cooperation between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan; it also works to build confidence and trust between local governments, communities and civil society organisations. The project uses сlimate-smart agricultural practices to preserve and sustain common natural resources.

Many took the idea of an artificial glacier as a joke, says Manzura Orolbaeva, but the residents of the village of Kara-Dobo supported the initiative.

“If we do not water the gardens, everything dries up. We will have nothing to cover our expenses or to feed our cattle,” said Manzura.

The villagers undertook the construction themselves, with FAO providing technical and financial support. Constructing the artificial glacier began with installing an underground pipeline. In just one week, 55 people manually dug a trench and laid pipes from the mountain spring to the pasture, where their livestock graze. The end of the pipe was then raised 20 meters above the ground.

While these works were going on, Manzura’s house became a type of “headquarters” where the villagers planned the course of work. She treated everyone who dug the trench with tea and homemade pastries.

In the winter, the glacier was born. The water from the pipe began to freeze and slowly turn into a huge ice tower. Then in the summer months, the mountain of ice slowly melts, providing residents with regular access to fresh water for irrigation and for their own use.

During the first winter, the glacier grew to more than 70 thousand metres³ of ice. That’s enough water to fill the size of 100 football fields.

“Now our experience interested residents of other villages, who at first did not believe us,” said Manzura. “Perhaps next year in our area there will be other artificial glaciers. Because water is life,” she added.

Local authorities plan to install one more glacier from their own funding sources and include the expenses into the local budget plan.

In Kyrgyzstan, FAO is supporting several projects to address water scarcity and help villagers use it judiciously. For example, an electronic system for measuring the volume of irrigation water has been recently introduced, with technical and financial assistance from FAO, in the Kochkor district of the Naryn region of Kyrgyzstan. Digital technologies like these have not only helped in the rational distribution of water but also eliminated conflicts among farmers over this vital resource.

Source: Yuba Net

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Earlier this year, Mohammed Noman could hear the faint but persistent sound of gunshots from his farm in western Afghanistan near the border with Iran. The gunfire was a reminder that, since the Taliban won control of the nation in 2021, conflict has continued. This time, however, “The fight is over the precious water,” Noman says.

Fueled in part by a prolonged drought, tensions over water between Iran and Afghanistan have escalated this year, with Iran accusing Taliban leaders of violating a long-standing agreement to share water from the Helmand River that flows from Afghanistan into Iran. In late May, clashes near the river reportedly led to the deaths of at least two Iranian border guards and one Taliban fighter. “We are close to the border, so we witnessed these battles with our own eyes,” Noman told ScienceInsider in June. “We live in constant fear.”

Climate change could only worsen the conflict, researchers say. Although detailed data are scarce, a recent study concluded that average temperatures in Afghanistan have risen by between 0.6°C and 1.8°C since 1950. And, “If you look at the map [of Afghanistan], the area that has the highest change in temperatures [is] … where the conflict has occurred,” says water specialist Assem Mayar, a former lecturer at Kabul Polytechnic University.

Other recent research finds that the hotter temperatures—together with shifts in precipitation, a growing population, expanding agriculture, and severe political instability—have put increasing pressure on water supplies in the Helmand River basin, which covers some 40% of Afghanistan. Satellite data show that groundwater levels, for example, dropped by an average of 2.6 meters from 2003 to 2021, as a result of drought, pumping, and water diversions, researchers reported this year in Earth Science Informatics. The Hāmūn Lakes along the border have shrunk by more than 90% since 1999, according to data published last year in Science of the Total Environment. And researchers estimate the amount of Helmand River water reaching Iran has dropped by more than half over the past 2 decades, in part because of the construction of new dams and the expansion of irrigated farming in Afghanistan.

In recent years, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network has reported that annual snow depth in Afghanistan has been markedly below average, reducing runoff. In 2021, the greatest snow deficit was recorded in the central Hindu Kush mountains, where all of Afghanistan’s major rivers, including the Helmand, originate.

Those trends have exacerbated long-standing tensions over a 1973 treaty between Afghanistan and Iran that guarantees Iran a share of the Helmand’s water. This year, the Iranian government claims it has been receiving less than 4% of the promised amount. The Taliban, in turn, have blamed drought for the restricted flow.

It’s a familiar spat, says Najibullah Sadid, an Afghan water specialist at the University of Stuttgart. “If you look at the history of dispute between Iran and Afghanistan—starting from 1872,1898,1902, and 1935—they all coincide with the years of droughts in the region,” he says. But now he and other researchers fear a warming climate and political instability will fuel more frequent and more intense conflicts.

One factor fueling distrust between the two nations is a lack of robust monitoring data. One key gauging station along the Helmand in Afghanistan, for example, “was destroyed in the conflict years ago … making it difficult to estimate water flows,” Sadid says.

In 2021, Afghanistan gained greater control over the river’s flow with the completion of the Kamal Khan Dam, creating a reservoir not far from the Iranian border that can store some 52 million cubic meters of water. But Iran has accused the Taliban of withholding water behind the dam in ways that violate the water-sharing treaty. In June, Iranian officials said the Taliban had agreed to a request for an Iranian “technical team” to visit the dam to measure water levels. Late last month, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it had reached a “preliminary agreement” with the Taliban on water sharing but released no details.

Over the long term, researchers say ensuring there is enough water for the region will involve extensive changes in farming, water storage, and other practices. Iran, for example, has built four reservoirs that lose enormous amounts of water to evaporation, Sadid says. And both nations have built highly inefficient irrigation systems. Overall, researchers estimate up to 70% of the available water is wasted. “If systems are updated and new technologies are applied it will help save and allocate water downstream,” Mayar says.

A shift in crops could also help. In Afghanistan, many farmers grow wheat varieties that are poorly adapted to heat and drought, Mayar notes. Other options, including saffron and some vegetables, need less water, but “Afghan farmers don’t opt for them since there aren’t sufficient facilities such as transport [or] access to regularized markets,” Mayar says. In some cases, water shortages have prompted farmers to switch to growing more drought-tolerant opium poppies—despite a Taliban-imposed ban on the crop because it is used to make heroin and other narcotics.

Noman says that although some farmers in his area have switched to growing opium, he will not. “My father and grandfather considered it a dirty crop,” he says. But Noman worries about what the future will bring if Afghanistan and Iran do not develop a workable water sharing system in an era of rapid climate change.

“The world should not ignore us and the situation we are in,” Noman says. “This conflict could spill over into the entire region.”

Source: Science

The post On the Afghanistan-Iran Border, Climate Change Fuels a Fight Over Water appeared first on Tashkent Citizen.

An ambitious infrastructure project in Afghanistan risks exacerbating scarcities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

An irrigation canal under construction in Afghanistan aims to transform its agricultural landscape, providing water to the millions of its citizens hit by regular droughts. Once completed, the Qosh Tepa conduit will stretch for 285 kilometres and help irrigate the country’s arid northern provinces.

Neighbouring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, however, are extremely concerned about the impact on their own water supplies. The canal will direct resources from the Amu Darya river and reduce the supply for the two countries, which have been siphoning water from the source since the Soviet era. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan may lose up to 15 per cent of the current supply once the waterway is completed in 2028. 

During a visit to Kabul in April, an Uzbek government delegation expressed concern about the plan to divert water to Afghanistan’s northern regions. Taleban officials responded that Kabul had as much right to access the water as its neighbours and that the three countries did not have formal agreements on its use.

The project, with a cost tag estimated at 684 million dollars, had been in the works for several years before the Taleban seized power, with the groundwork and feasibility studies initiated under Afghanistan’s former government with support from the USAID development agency . 

“It is a development project for Afghanistan that should have been implemented years ago. It is understandable that the Central Asian countries will be affected by this, but Afghanistan has the right to use the water of the Amu Darya River for its development,” Najibullah Sadid, a water and environmental expert at Germany’s University of Stuttgart, told IWPR, adding that successive wars had put the project on hold. 

While affirming that states had the right to use transnational rivers, Nekruz Kadyrov, a professor of international law at the National University of Tajikistan, noted that this applied to those both up and down river. 

“The issue of transnational river water distribution is regulated based on interstate agreements,” he told IWPR. “For example, Tajikistan cannot violate Uzbekistan’s rights in this matter. Moreover, Afghanistan cannot ignore the rights of countries downstream. If Afghanistan or Tajikistan only considers their own interests, what will happen to the interests of Uzbeks and Kazaks?”

When they took power in August 2021, the Taleban continued the work started by the previous government; at that time, seven kilometres of the canal had been built. The construction surged ahead under their government and satellite images reveal that approximately 100 kilometres of the canal were built between March 2022 and May 2023. 

AFGHANISTAN’S THIRST 

Water resources are critical for Afghanistan as the country is grappling with an unparalleled humanitarian crisis: according to the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), nearly 17 million people, or 40 per cent of population, face severe food insecurity. With 80 per cent of the populace reliant on agriculture for sustenance, the impact of climate change profoundly influences crop growth periods and yields, exacerbating the peril of food shortages.

Amidst Afghanistan’s desert terrain, an abundant reserve of water resources lies untapped. Over 80 per cent of the country’s water originates in the Hindu Kush mountains, which offer a continuous flow to major rivers throughout the year as the snow melts during summer.

Yet poor supply infrastructure poses colossal challenges in guaranteeing uninterrupted access to water. Afghanistan’s history of conflict and occupation has hindered the development of extensive hydraulic structures and canals.

Some worry that the canal could inadvertently bolster the opium trade. Afghanistan is the world’s largest poppy producer. Despite the Taleban’s proclamation of a poppy cultivation ban, surging opium prices have fueled a thriving illegal trade. 

The quality of the construction is a key concern. Satellite imagery suggests that building methods are rudimentary, with no real reinforcement or lining for the canal’s bottom and banks.

That poses the risk of significant water losses due to seepage into the dry, sandy soil, which would exacerbate already pressing issues of salinisation and waterlogging in irrigated lands. Indeed, according to Sadid, recent developments indicate erosion in parts of the canal’s diversion dam.

THE POLITICS OF WATER

The Amu Darya river provides 80 per cent of all accessible water resources in the region. Some assessments suggest that in the span of five or six years, upon the canal’s completion and operation, the average amount of water flowing along the river into Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will fall to 50 per cent of its overall capacity. Others, like 

Sadid, set the estimate at about 15 per cent.

In Uzbekistan, this would mean a dearth of vital water resources to irrigate its cotton plantations, the primary agricultural crop accounting for approximately 17 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). Overall, agriculture is central to the livelihoods of nearly 40 per cent of the population. 

According to the Uzbekistan Statistical Committee, the nation’s annual water consumption stands at an average of 51 billion cubic metres, with agriculture alone accounting for about 90 per cent, mostly for watering cotton fields. The cultivation of cotton has already contributed to the region’s largest environmental calamity, the desiccation of the Aral Sea.

The problem is equally acute in Turkmenistan, where the Amu Darya feeds into the Karakum Canal, enabling irrigation and navigation along its 1,300km length and sustaining approximately 1.25 million hectares of irrigated land. Agriculture consumes 91 per cent of all the country’s water resources.

Fluctuations in the river level are already causing problems. In June 2023, for instance, farmers in Turkmenistan’s northeastern region of Lebap Velayat struggled to irrigate their cotton fields because of insufficient water reaching the area. This presents a problem for the government, which promises farmers irrigation water, fertilisers, seeds, and agricultural machinery in return for providing specific crop quantities at predetermined prices. 

With climate change exacerbating water scarcity, any reductions in supply could damage both countries’ agriculture and food security.

THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

The absence of robust legal mechanisms governing water processes in the region, which affects water intake and river management, complicates the situation. 

Afghanistan is not party to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Waters (1992), which serves as a cornerstone of transboundary river and lake management. Nor is it part of the 1992 Almaty Agreement, which governs river use, while an earlier 1946 agreement with the USSR is no longer valid.

There is certainly room for negotiation, as Afghanistan depends on its neighbours for other vital resources. For example, Uzbekistan provides Afghanistan with electricity, while Turkmenistan supplies it with gas. 

But climate change is likely to add pressure and governments need to look beyond international agreements and adopt sustainable farming techniques, such as crop diversification, and sustainable irrigation methods, such as drip irrigation systems and the reuse of collector and drainage water. 

Sadid noted that, due to the rapid melting of the glaciers in the Pamirs, the water in the Amu Darya River will increase until 2050. However, this means it will then start shrinking, exacerbating disputes over water. 

Upgrading the irrigation systems in the wider region is key. 

“For example, Uzbekistan and other countries in the region should work on improving irrigation technology and enhancing it,” Sadid continued. “If we do not upgrade the irrigation system, undoubtedly, there will be more conflicts and disputes over water in the region.”

Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting

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