Moscow (11 September/ 33.33).

Russia waged a 2-year war of aggression against its neighbor, the Ukraine. Two years on, hundred thousand of deaths, families destroyed, Russia is no where near its 3-day goals of occupation. The Russian army slugs on, mile for mile, killed for killed. Vladimir Putin and his Siloviki continues a red army model. Heavy artillery, wave of men urging forward. The result, mass casualties. Total loss of life, and equipment.

What does Russians do if in trouble. Reversing to its all bag of tricks. Spies and sabotage. Recent Russian sabotage operations across Europe were “reckless”, Moore said, describing Russian intelligence as “having gone a bit feral”. But “in the UK that is not new”, he added, referring to the attempted assassination of Russian double agent Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018.

Asked if Russian intelligence might be conducting similar sabotage operations against the US by abetting illegal migration across the Mexico border, Burns said: “It’s something we are very sharply focused on. Part of that is a function of so many Russian agents [being] kicked out of Europe. So, they are looking for somewhere to go instead.”

But these sometimes child like operations cause blowbacks. Operations and governments getting increasingly more sophisticated in exposing the intelligence operations and their agents.

Bangladesh, Laos, Sri Lanka are countries who are exposed to Russian interests. However, Russians have very little to offer.

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Washington/Paris/Berlin (12/8 – 28.57).

Today is the twenty-anniversary of the sinking of the Kursk. A painful experience. A true shocker. All hands are lost, the shortcomings of the Russian system fully exposed. But today is another experience. Kursk, the region. After ceremonial pageantry by the military commander, it is clear the great Red Army was ambushed.

Hoodwinked by the Ukrainians who pulled off a surprise attack, a classic attack which has all the elements of a successful deception operation. Overwhelming strength, speed and first and foremost silence. Deception played a role keeping the Russian pre-occupied. Daily the news a filled of the exchanges between the Ukrainian defenders and the Russian occupation force.

The attention was given to the aging Admiral Kuznetsov long target of the security services of the Ukraine. In an audacious caper matching a Hollywood production the wily chief of the Intelligence Service Kyrylo Budanov the ship was targeted by sabotage teams of the Ukraine. Whereas Budanov’s boys of misfits drawn the attention of the Russians away from the home front the planning for the attack was carried out.

Then the surprise attack came.

The Ukrainian defenders breaking through the lines of Russian occupation forces, the Russians fumbled, reserves were rushed to the front but to no prevail. Ambushes were set up, forward observers guided cluster ammunition against convoys driving Russian occupation forces into retreat.

Troves of occupation forces are surrendering to the Ukrainian defenders. Social media is full of videos Russian occupation forces surrendering. Drones are used to instruct the surrender.

Surrender leaflets are circulating on the internet. Estimates state approximately 3,000 prisoners were taken.

Inside the liberated towns the situation is desperate, residents feel abandoned, many shops are looted by the Russian occupiers and residents feel abandoned. Vladimir Putin holding his security briefing annoyed with the presenter but stated the area will be liberated.

Ukraine’s relentless push into Russian territory, particularly in the Kursk region, has forced Moscow to employ extreme measures. Ukrainian forces have made significant inroads into the Kursk region, causing significant distress within the Russian military.

Ukrainian troops managed to penetrate Russian positions by over 30 kilometers, creating significant disruption among Russian forces.

The chaos led to varied responses from Russian units—some offered staunch resistance while others either deserted or surrendered. Among the latter were crews operating sophisticated T-80BWM tanks.

Russia has lost at least 156 T-80BWM tanks, a figure confirmed by video and photographic evidence collected by Oryxspioenkop. The T-80BWM’s modern features include an upgraded two-layer reactive Armor called Relikt, which provides enhanced protection against advanced tandem warhead munitions and FPV drones.

A unique characteristic of the T-80BWM is its gas turbine engine, offering superior responsiveness compared to traditional diesel engines. This feature has earned it the nickname “flying tank” in Russia due to its rapid acceleration and high performance.

The Russian army has reportedly begun withdrawing convoys, suffering substantial losses in both equipment and personnel. At least 16,000 have been evacuated.

It is clear from the language that the Russian occupying force will strike back. Never since 1941 has Russian territory occupied. And the outcome is unclear for the moment.

During the meeting, Putin reiterated his stance against engaging in dialogue with Ukraine, citing the ongoing attacks on civilian populations.

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He noted that the “first and only time” NATO’s Article 5 was invoked was after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US. Article 5 sets out that an attack on one member of the NATO military alliance is an attack on all.

“NATO stood by us,” he says. “We’re going to stand by NATO”.

Looking forward, Austin said the US will “not be dragged into Putin’s war of choice”, although it will continue to stand by Ukraine and strengthen the NATO alliance.

“NATO is now larger than ever,” he adds. “Putin’s war is not the result of NATO enlargement. Putin’s war is the cause of NATO enlargement.”

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Colonel Yuri Ivanov, the commanding officer of the Steel Wolves, surveyed his men with steely determination. These were the best of the best, handpicked for their courage, skill, and unwavering loyalty to Ukraine. They had been fighting tooth and nail to slow the Russian advance, launching daring raids and ambushes against overwhelming odds.

But despite their valiant efforts, the tide of the war seemed to be turning against them. Russian tanks rumbled through the streets, their tracks crushing everything in their path. Buildings lay in ruins, and the once-thriving city had been reduced to a ghost town.

“We can’t hold them off forever,” one of the soldiers muttered, his voice heavy with exhaustion and despair.

Colonel Ivanov’s jaw tightened, his gaze flickering with a fierce resolve. “We may not be able to win this war,” he said, his voice low but resolute. “But by God, we can make them pay for every inch of ground they take. We will fight on, even if it means sacrificing everything. We will give Putin’s troops hell.”

A murmur of agreement rippled through the ranks as the soldiers squared their shoulders, their eyes burning with defiance. They knew the risks they faced; the odds stacked against them. But they also knew that they were fighting for something greater than themselves—for their country, for their freedom, for the future of Ukraine.

As dawn broke over the horizon, casting a golden light across the ravaged landscape, the Steel Wolves prepared to once again venture into the heart of the battle. They were outnumbered, outgunned, but they refused to back down. For as long as they drew breath, they would continue to fight. And in that moment, amidst the chaos and destruction of war, they found a strength that transcended fear—a bond forged in the crucible of combat, a brotherhood that would endure until the end.

As the sun rose higher in the sky, casting long shadows over the war-torn landscape, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stood before a podium in the heart of the capital city. His voice was firm, his resolve unyielding, as he addressed the nation.

“My fellow Ukrainians,” he began, his words echoing through the streets, “we find ourselves in the midst of a struggle unlike any we have faced before. The forces of tyranny seek to crush our spirit, to extinguish the flame of freedom that burns within each one of us. But we will not cower in the face of oppression. We will stand tall, united in our defiance, and we will fight until our last breath.”

The crowd erupted into cheers, waving Ukrainian flags and chanting slogans of resistance. Among them stood the members of the Steel Wolves, their faces grim but determined.

President Zelensky’s gaze swept over the crowd, his eyes alight with determination. “I have deployed our fearsome special forces team, the Steel Wolves, to strike fear into the hearts of our enemies,” he declared. “They are trained to hunt down and eliminate the Russian invaders with ruthless efficiency. They will be our sword and shield in this dark hour, our beacon of hope in the midst of despair.”

A ripple of applause swept through the crowd as President Zelensky raised a clenched fist in defiance. “To those who seek to conquer us, I say this: you may have the might of an empire at your disposal, but you will never break the spirit of the Ukrainian people. We will fight on, even if the war is lost, to give Vladimir Putin’s troops hell!”

The cheers grew louder, echoing through the streets like a thunderous battle cry. The people of Ukraine had made their choice—to stand and fight, to resist tyranny with every fibre of their being. And as the Steel Wolves prepared to once again venture into the heart of the conflict, they knew that they carried with them the hopes and dreams of a nation.

For in the face of adversity, in the crucible of war, they had found a strength that could not be broken—a strength born of sacrifice, of courage, of an unbreakable bond between brothers-in-arms. And as they marched into the fray, they knew that they would do whatever it took to defend their homeland, to protect the values for which they stood, and to ensure that the flame of freedom continued to burn bright in the land of Ukraine.

The battle ahead would be long and arduous, filled with hardship and sacrifice. But if they stood together, if they fought with every ounce of strength in their bodies, they knew that victory was not only possible—it was inevitable. And so, with heads held high and hearts ablaze with determination, they marched forward into the unknown, ready to face whatever challenges lay ahead.

As the conflict raged on, the Ukrainian Special Operation Force (SOF) proved to be a formidable adversary to Vladimir Putin’s troops. With each passing day, their tactics grew more daring, their strikes more precise, as they inflicted heavy casualties on the advancing Russian forces.

Colonel Yuri Ivanov, the leader of the Steel Wolves, coordinated their operations with ruthless efficiency. Every move was calculated, every target carefully chosen to maximize the impact on the enemy. And as the Russian casualties mounted and their supply lines were stretched thin, the tide of the war began to turn in Ukraine’s favour.

But it was not just their military prowess that struck fear into the hearts of the Russian invaders—it was their unwavering determination, their refusal to back down in the face of overwhelming odds. Despite the grim reality of the situation, the members of the Steel Wolves fought on with a fierce resolve, fuelled by a sense of duty to their country and a desire to protect their loved ones from harm.

As the days turned into weeks and the weeks turned into months, the SOF launched a series of daring raids behind enemy lines, seizing vital strategic positions and disrupting Russian communications. They became ghosts in the night, striking swiftly and silently before melting back into the shadows, leaving chaos and confusion in their wake.

But as the war dragged on, the toll it took on the members of the Steel Wolves became increasingly apparent. They had endured sleepless nights, relentless combat, and the constant threat of death looming over them like a shadow. Yet still, they pressed on, drawing strength from the bonds of brotherhood that united them as one.

And amidst the chaos of war, amidst the smoke and the gunfire and the cries of the wounded, they found moments of camaraderie and solidarity that kept them going through the darkest of times. They laughed together, they cried together, they shared stories of home and family, clinging to the memories that reminded them of what they were fighting for.

But even as they celebrated their victories and mourned their losses, they knew that the war was far from over. The Russian army still loomed on the horizon, their thirst for conquest undiminished by their losses. And so, with hearts heavy but spirits unbroken, the members of the Steel Wolves prepared to face whatever challenges lay ahead, knowing that their fight was far from over.

For as long as they drew breath, they would continue to fight—to give Vladimir Putin’s troops hell and to defend their homeland to the last.

As the conflict escalated, the Ukrainian Special Operation Force (SOF) found themselves at the forefront of the battle, their efforts crucial in slowing down the Russian advance. With each passing day, the SOF’s effectiveness became increasingly evident as they inflicted heavy casualties on the invading Russian forces and seized control of vital strategic positions.

Colonel Yuri Ivanov, the seasoned leader of the SOF, orchestrated their operations with precision and cunning. His tactical brilliance, combined with the unwavering commitment of his men, proved to be a formidable force against the Russian aggressors. Every successful mission further bolstered the morale of the Ukrainian forces and struck fear into the hearts of their adversaries.

But it wasn’t just their military prowess that made the SOF stand out. It was their ingenuity and adaptability in the face of overwhelming odds. As more and more of Vladimir Putin’s weaponry fell into their hands, they quickly learned to repurpose and utilize it against their enemies. Russian tanks became Ukrainian barricades, enemy drones turned into reconnaissance assets, and captured ammunition became the lifeblood of their resistance.

Amid the chaos of war, the SOF became a symbol of hope for the Ukrainian people—a beacon of defiance against the forces of tyranny. Their bravery inspired others to join the fight, swelling the ranks of the resistance and strengthening their resolve to defend their homeland at all costs.

But as the conflict dragged on, the toll it took on the SOF became increasingly apparent. The constant stress of battle, the loss of comrades, and the never-ending cycle of violence weighed heavily on their shoulders. Yet still, they fought on, driven by a sense of duty to their country and a determination to protect their loved ones from harm.

And amidst the devastation of war, moments of camaraderie and solidarity emerged among the members of the SOF. They forged bonds that transcended rank and nationality, finding solace and strength in each other’s presence. In the darkest of times, it was these connections that kept them going, reminding them of what they were fighting for and giving them the courage to carry on.

As the conflict reached its climax, the SOF stood ready to face whatever challenges lay ahead. Theirs was a fight not just for territory or power, but for the very survival of their nation and the values it stood for. And though the road ahead would be fraught with danger and uncertainty, they knew that if they stood together, they could overcome any obstacle and emerge victorious in the end.

For the work of Ukraine’s Special Operation Force (SOF) could not be understated—it was the backbone of the resistance, the vanguard of freedom, and the hope of a nation determined to defy the odds and forge its own destiny.

The origins of the Ukrainian Special Operation Force (SOF) traced back to the dark days of Russian aggression in the Donbas region. Formed in 2015 as a direct response to escalating tensions, this elite unit quickly became a thorn in the side of Vladimir Putin’s ambitions.

Comprised of 2000 highly trained soldiers, the SOF was equipped with the latest weaponry and technology, courtesy of heavy investment from the United States. This support allowed them to stand toe-to-toe with the Russian invaders and defend their homeland with unmatched ferocity.

From the outset of the conflict, the SOF proved their worth on the battlefield. Their guerrilla tactics, ad-hoc counterattacks, and mobile defense strategies disrupted Russian advances and inflicted heavy casualties on their forces. They became a symbol of resistance, a beacon of hope for the Ukrainian people in their darkest hour.

But it wasn’t just on the battlefield where the SOF made their mark. They also waged a relentless campaign against Russian sleeper cells embedded throughout the country. Using their superior intelligence-gathering capabilities, they rooted out and neutralized these threats, striking fear into the hearts of their adversaries.

In an ironic twist of fate for Vladimir Putin, the success of the SOF was made possible by the very country he saw as his greatest adversary—the United States. Heavy investment from Washington provided the Ukrainian forces with the resources they needed to hold their own against the Russian military machine.

As the conflict raged on, the SOF continued to be a thorn in the side of the Russian forces. Their determination, skill, and unwavering commitment to their cause ensured that they would not be easily defeated. And though the road ahead was fraught with danger and uncertainty, they remained steadfast in their resolve to defend their homeland and protect the values for which they stood.

For the Ukrainian Special Operation Force (SOF) was more than just a military unit—it was a symbol of defiance against tyranny, a testament to the courage and resilience of the Ukrainian people in the face of adversity.

The extent of US investment in Ukraine’s defense became increasingly apparent as the conflict unfolded. From 2015 to 2020, Ukraine saw a staggering increase in its defensive budget, bolstered by billions of dollars in aid from the US and the UK, according to reports from the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

But it wasn’t just financial support that Ukraine received. As part of the deal, the US went a step further, offering a CIA-led training program for Ukrainian forces. This program, shrouded in secrecy, aimed to transform the Ukrainian military into a formidable fighting force capable of repelling Russian aggression. According to one trainer involved in the program, the goal was clear: to train soldiers who were prepared to “kill Russians” in defense of their homeland.

The impact of this investment was profound. The Ukrainian military underwent a radical transformation, evolving from a struggling force into a well-equipped and highly trained fighting machine. At its helm stood the Ukrainian Special Operation Force (SOF), a fanatical and devoted group of soldiers who had pledged to fight on even if the war was lost.

In an interview with Vice News, a member of the SOF spoke candidly about their mission. He revealed that the group was prepared to unleash hell on the Russian invaders, using their training and expertise to wreak havoc behind enemy lines. But their mission went beyond just combat—it also involved rooting out Russian sleeper cells that had infiltrated Ukrainian territory before the war even began.

The existence of these sleeper cells added another layer of complexity to the conflict, as Ukrainian forces fought not only against the Russian army but also against clandestine operatives lurking in their midst. But the SOF was undeterred. With unwavering resolve and a relentless determination to defend their homeland, they continued to hunt down and neutralize these threats, striking fear into the hearts of their adversaries.

As the war raged on, the SOF remained a force to be reckoned with—a symbol of Ukrainian defiance against Russian aggression. And though the road ahead was fraught with danger and uncertainty, they stood ready to face whatever challenges lay ahead, knowing that if they drew breath, they would continue to fight for freedom, for justice, and for the future of their nation.

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Russia lost a staggering 1,740 troops in a single day, the highest tally of casualties for Moscow since the start of the invasion in 2022, according to Ukraine.

In the previous 24 hours, Ukraine also claimed Russia had lost 30 tanks and 42 armoured vehicles.

Death toll and military hardware statistics are difficult to assess with both sides giving different or little information.

However, Ukraine‘s armed forces have claimed Russia has so far lost an eye-watering 484,030 men during the course of the ongoing war.

Earlier this month, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) estimated Russia‘s casualties have likely reached 465,000.

French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné recently suggested this figure would be closer to 500,000. The BBC reported that at least 50,000 Russian soldiers had been confirmed dead.

Russia last gave an update on its losses in September 2022, saying 6,000 soldiers had been killed.

Both sides have suffered huge losses in the fighting. Russia is currently advancing in the vicinity of Kharkiv, Ukraine‘s second-largest city.

In recent days, Moscow’s soldiers reportedly took control of nine villages near the city.

Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine‘s military chief, said on Monday: “Units of the defence forces are fighting fierce defensive battles. The attempts of the Russian invaders to break through our defences have been stopped.”

“The situation is difficult, but the defence forces of Ukraine are doing everything to hold defensive lines and positions, (and) inflict damage on the enemy.”

Ukrainian soldiers are still lacking supplies and key ammunition.

Kharkiv regional governor, Oleh Syniehubov, has added: “The enemy is trying to deliberately stretch it (front line), attacking in small groups, but in new directions, so to speak.”

Source: Daily Express

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As Victoria Nuland steps down, she gets real about a world on fire.

Victoria Nuland has long been known as a relentless, even pugnacious, U.S. diplomat, with a strong belief in American power. The approach sometimes got her in trouble, but it rarely held her back.

Nuland recently left the State Department after serving at its highest levels, first as the Biden administration’s undersecretary of State for political affairs, and, for several months, acting deputy secretary of State. She previously was a career diplomat who held an array of roles under presidents both Republican and Democratic; her first posting more than three decades ago was as a consular officer in China.

In an exit interview with POLITICO Magazine, Nuland discussed her time in public service — dismissing chatter that she was passed over for a promotion — as well as her views on where American foreign policy has gone wrong and right.

Notably, she said the United States was not quick enough to realize and prevent the expansionist ambitions of both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.

A longtime champion of Ukraine and the effort to counter Russia, she also warned about the perils of Donald Trump blowing up NATO if he wins back the White House in November.

“Don’t throw it out,” she said of the trans-Atlantic alliance, “because you would never be able to re-create it again.”

The following has been edited for length and clarity:

How’s life on the outside?

Life is wonderful. I am doing a lot of projects that I had put off, seeing a lot of people that I love, and I’m staying involved in ways that are meaningful. I’m speaking on foreign policy issues I care about — whether it is Ukraine or ensuring that the United States leads strongly in the world. I’m getting a chance to prepare for my classes in the fall and work with the next generation of foreign policy leaders. I’ll be at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs.

Why leave the Biden administration, really? People said you felt passed over for the deputy secretary of State job. Is that true?

I actually didn’t compete for the deputy secretary of State job. I loved being undersecretary for political affairs. I love working with Secretary [Antony] Blinken. But as you know, I’ve done three years altogether and I’ve done eight months plus in both jobs, and so it was just the right time for me and my family to do something different.

Do you have any regrets from your time in the role?

I think whenever you finish a job like this, you wish you’d been able to do more on more issues. Travel more, touch more people, get more done faster, ensure the U.S. was leading strongly on as many continents as possible, mentor more of the next generation. And you’re always constrained by time, by resources, by the crises that overwhelm the inbox. So you always want to have done more.

Can Ukraine win this war against Russia? And how do you define winning?

Let’s start with the fact that Putin has already failed in his objective. He wanted to flatten Ukraine. He wanted to ensure that they had no sovereignty, independence, agency, no democratic future — because a democratic Ukraine, a European Ukraine, is a threat to his model for Russia, among other things, and because it’s the first building block for his larger territorial ambitions.

Can Ukraine succeed? Absolutely. Can Ukraine come out of this more sovereign, more economically independent, stronger, more European than it is now? Absolutely. And I think it will. But we’ve got to stay with it. We’ve got to make sure our allies stay with it.

And we have to accelerate a lot of the initiatives that were in the supplemental, like helping Ukraine build that highly deterrent military force of the future, like deploying these longer-range weapons to strategic effect, like ensuring that the critical infrastructure and the energy sector are protected, like building up our own defense industrial base and that of our allies and Ukraine’s again, so that we and Ukraine are building faster than Russia and China.

But can it get all its territory back, including Crimea?

It can definitely get to a place where it’s strong enough, I believe, and where Putin is stymied enough to go to the negotiating table from a position of strength. It’ll be up to the Ukrainian people what their territorial ambitions should be. But there are certain things that are existential.

Any deal that they cut in their interest and in the larger global interest has to be a deal that Putin is compelled to stick to. We can’t be doing this every six months, every three years. It has to actually lead to a deal that includes Russian withdrawal.

Putin is a master at what we call rope-a-dope negotiating, where he never actually cuts the deal. It has to be a deal that ensures that whatever is decided on Crimea, it can’t be remilitarized such that it’s a dagger at the heart of the center of Ukraine.

Was it a mistake not to push the Ukrainians harder to go for some sort of negotiated end to the war in 2022, especially the fall of 2022?

They were not in a strong enough position then. They’re not in a strong enough position now. The only deal Putin would have cut then, the only deal that he would cut today, at least before he sees what happens in our election, is a deal in which he says, “What’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable.” And that’s not sustainable.

You’ve had a long career, especially when it comes to Europe. Where did the U.S. go wrong in its understanding of Russia?

With regard to both Russia and China, after the end of the Cold War, the prevailing wisdom among all of us — right, left and center — was that if you could knit Moscow and Beijing into the open and free global order that we had benefited from for so many years, that they would become prosperous, and they would become strong contributing members of that order. And that’s what we tried for a very long time.

That works if you have a leadership that is fundamentally accepting the current system. But once you have leaders who are telling their populations that this system keeps their country down, doesn’t allow it to have its rightful place, that has a territorial definition of greatness, that is bent on economic, political and or military coercion — that’s antithetical to this order, and then our policy has to change.

Did we realize fast enough Putin’s ambitions and Xi Jinping’s ambitions, and did we do enough to ensure that those ambitions stayed inside their own nations and didn’t spill out and coerce others? 20/20 hindsight? Probably not.

How much of it comes down to what particular guy is running the show? I sometimes wonder, could things be different if it wasn’t Putin in charge? If it wasn’t Xi? How much of it comes down to the dude at the top?

In highly centralized societies, which both China and Russia have historically been, without an electoral refresh of the kind that we all go through in the democratic world, it matters hugely, because it’s that human who’s defining what greatness means. It’s that human who’s deciding how to maintain order in that society. It’s that human — allowing them to speak, allowing a free press, allowing protests, allowing alternative political parties — who’s going to shape the options. And that constrains obviously the kind of relationship we can have.

What is the lesson we should learn about foreign policy in general when it comes to the experiences we’ve had in Russia and China?

We should always try to talk both to leaders and to people, to the extent that we’re allowed. We should always offer an opportunity to work together in common interest.

But if the ideology is inherently expansionist, is inherently illiberal, is inherently trying to change the system that benefits us, we’ve got to build protections and resilience for ourselves, for our friends and allies, and particularly for those neighbors of those countries who are likely to be on the front line of that first push.

Where do you see the Israel-Hamas war heading?

Essentially, there are two paths on the table. There is continuing this war with all of the destruction and horror and lack of clarity about how you end Hamas’ reign of terror.

The other path is the route that the administration and allies and partners and a lot of countries in the Gulf are pushing, and a lot of Israelis want, which is: a hostage deal leads to a long-term cease-fire, leads to a better future for Palestinians both in the West Bank and in Gaza, leads to Saudi-Israel normalization and a path to two states, and a region where the ideology and the violence that Hamas is offering is beaten by more opening, more opportunity, more peace, more stability.

Are you saying that because you believe it or because it’s the Biden administration’s position?

I’m saying it because, anything other than that, this is going to happen again and again and again.

If you could go back in time on that one, what, if anything, should the U.S. have done differently?

Beginning with the Trump administration, everybody fell in love with regional normalization as the cure-all for the instability and grievances and insecurity in the Middle East. And that’s a part of it.

But if you leave out the Palestinian issue, then somebody’s going to seize it and run with it, and that’s what Hamas did. I also think that both we and the Israelis knew too little about the terror state that had been established in Gaza.

You’re going to be teaching at Columbia, the epicenter of campus protests over this situation. If you could offer these protesters some advice as someone with significant policymaking experience, what would it be?

Peaceful protest is part of the fabric of who we are and the fact that we allow it, and the Chinese don’t and the Russians don’t, makes us Americans. But when that protest becomes violent, when it impinges on other people’s human rights or denigrates others, then you veer toward coercion.

So, express your views, ask for concrete paths forward. But stay away from violence, make sure that it’s actually indigenous to the campus, that you’re not becoming the tool of outside agitators. And be respectful of alternative views as you expect people to respect your views.

What if you are peaceful? And you say what you want and the people in charge just say, ‘Oh, that’s very nice, thank you,’ and then they ignore you and they keep doing what they’ve been doing for years. How do you do just keep pushing on that front? Do you join the government?

I would certainly say if you care enough to devote all day, every day to political change, come join the folks who are setting policy, commit your life to public service. I didn’t expect that that’s where my life would lead, but it’s been incredibly rewarding.

There are many, many ways to change policy, but being on the inside is not only extremely rewarding, but you can actually get stuff done.

If Trump wins, and leaves NATO or limits America’s role in NATO, does the alliance fall apart? What happens?

First and foremost, America suffers. Because if you look at every single one of the challenges we have globally, even as we make the security commitment to Europe, it is the European countries who have contributed more to Ukraine — on the security side, on the economic side, etc. It is the European countries who have to adapt their policies toward China if you want to have an impact on China’s eagerness to coerce others. It’s the European countries who we need to help fund the Haiti mission, to help defeat terrorism in Africa, and provide prosperity.

If we are not part of that family, on a daily basis, we are standing alone, our own influence in the world is greatly reduced, and we have no influence over how they choose to spend their energy and resources. And they’re less powerful in doing it without us.

What about this idea that look, we’re the U.S. at the end of the day. We’re the superpower. Whether we’re in NATO or not, people are going to come along with us. Isn’t there something to that argument?

I’ve worked for six presidents, Republicans and Democrats. I always believed that a new president with a fresh mandate from the American people should look at every global problem with fresh eyes, bring new solutions, and should have that opportunity, working with Congress, working with the American people, working with allies and partners.

That’s a different thing than turning your back on bedrock, bipartisan institutions and policies that have protected Americans and advanced our own prosperity and global influence for 70 years.

Why do you want to throw out what’s working and what benefits us for no other reason than you’ve had a fit of pique? Work within the institution to make it work better. Don’t throw it out, because you would never be able to re-create it again.

Does the rest of the world fear the United States?

Is fear what we want from the rest of the world?

Sometimes.

I think what we want from the rest of the world is they see us leading in a manner that advances their own security, advances their own prosperity, creates this community of nations that can handle global problems — whether they are terrorist problems, whether they are health problems, whether they’re environmental problems — and we do it in a primarily self-interested but unselfish way, and we’re creating that community.

They should only fear us if they’re opponents of a largely liberal democratic way of advancing human prosperity. And in that context, if they are viciously invading a neighbor, if they are coercing a little state because they can, then I hope they would fear our reaction and the reaction that we will build with other democracies who want to protect the system that favors freedom.

Do you ever plan to go back into government?

I love what I did for 35 years. I’ve always loved it. And I continue to love it. So in the right circumstances, of course.

Source: Politico

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ALMATY, Kazakhstan — Friends who are old faces and friends in high places: Kazakhstan’s former leader Nursultan Nazarbaev has proven in recent months that he still has both.

Does that mean the 83-year-old is mulling a political comeback?

Kazakh officials loyal to his successor, Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev, are keen to dispel the notion. But the very fact that they are feeling the need to comment on the idea is indicative of the interest — and, in some quarters, alarm — sparked by the ex-president’s recent return to the national news cycle.

The first week of January will mark the second anniversary of the Bloody January unrest that exposed fractures in the elite and, for many, definitively marked the end of the long Nazarbaev era in Kazakhstan.

Since ceding all his remaining positions and titles in the aftermath of the violence that left at least 238 people dead, Kazakhstan’s first president has mostly shunned the limelight.

But in the final months of 2023, Nazarbaev’s name is once more on everybody’s lips.

One public appearance in November was perhaps unavoidable, after his controversial younger brother, Bolat Nazarbaev, passed away. But even then, the grand, elite-packed memorial for a former plumber who grew fabulously rich during the reign of his older sibling turned out to be more like an homage to that same older sibling.

After that appearance came the release of Nazarbaev’s autobiography: My Life: From Dependence To Freedom. The book was not his first, but proved sensational in that the author acknowledged for the first time that he fathered children — sons, no less — by a woman other than his official wife, Sara Nazarbaeva.

Later this month, Nazarbaev addressed the seventh meeting of the Astana Club, his own geopolitical talking-shop initiative that included former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and ex-Afghan President Hamid Karzai among the speakers.

But it was his meeting with Russian leader Vladimir Putin, likely in Moscow on December 19 — which Putin’s press spokesman Dmitry Peskov described as “absolutely private” — that really set tongues wagging and provided the context for comments by Yerlan Koshanov, chairman of the lower house of parliament, on December 27.

“Dual power does not exist today and cannot exist. Today, all decisions are made by the head of state, Toqaev, elected by the overwhelming majority of the people,” said Koshanov, who told journalists that people had “no reason for concern” over Nazarbaev’s activities as a “private citizen.”

Fulfilling Allah’s Task

Toqaev made similar comments about “dual power” in 2019, just months after he stepped into the presidential hot seat as Nazarbaev’s hand-picked, loyalist successor.

Nobody believed him then, and with good reason.

At that time, Nazarbaev was serving as the “lifelong” chairman of the Security Council — a role that raised questions about which of the two was commander in chief. And the former president also chaired the ruling party and enjoyed extensive perks and protections thanks to his constitutionally enshrined status as “elbasy,” or leader of the nation.

Subsequent “de-Nazarbaevification” was seemingly driven by two factors.

Firstly, protesters had signaled right before the January 2022 unrest turned deadly that they had had enough of the authoritarian who dominated Kazakh politics for more than three decades, beginning in Soviet times.

And Toqaev, having been constrained by his predecessor for the best part of three years, probably felt the same, not least because of the way the “dual power” situation had paralyzed the security apparatus, dividing loyalties in the process.

After the deadly January events, the power struggle was laid bare.

In addition to transferring his remaining power to Toqaev, Nazarbaev’s relatives and allies lost powerful and lucrative positions. At least three members of the president’s extended family were jailed on corruption charges. The capital, Astana, also got its old name back after spending three years as Nur-Sultan in Nazarbaev’s honor.

In public, the former president has said only positive things about Toqaev and his policies. But it can be assumed that in private he is less than happy — and probably worried for his family’s future. Notable then was the guest list at the closed-doors memorial for Nazarbaev’s brother, Bolat.

The younger Nazarbaev had been buried four days earlier in the family’s home village of Shamalgan in the Almaty region, more than 1,000 kilometers away.

And if Toqaev’s government was represented at the funeral by Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov — presumably as a courtesy to Nazarbaev — then the faces captured in footage from the Astana memorial luncheon were former officials: ex-police chiefs, prosecutors, defense and education ministers, as well as his ex-lawmaker daughter, Darigha Nazarbaeva.

“It was not easy for us to establish independence,” the former president told his appreciative audience after thanking Toqaev, “a number of heads of state,” officials, and ordinary citizens for their condolences.

“When the Soviet government fell in 1992, 1,500 manufacturing plants were shut down, leaving 2 million people unemployed,” Nazarbaev said. “The store shelves were empty, salaries and pensions were not paid. At a time when there was the question, ‘Will we be a country or not?’ [We] colleagues and comrades came together to lift up the country. In this way, I believe that I fulfilled the task assigned to me by Allah.”

Meet My Other Family

Even some of Nazarbaev’s critics give him credit for dealing with the manifold challenges of early independence.

Opinion is more divided over the subsequent repression that included the killing of opposition figures, the elbasy cult, and the excesses of relatives like Bolat, who allegedly acquired huge tracts of valuable land around the country’s largest city, Almaty, at little or no cost and had millions of dollars in luxury properties around the world.

After Bloody January, some of Bolat Nazarbaev’s businesses and land were returned to the state, while he was also named and shamed by the authorities as a participant in an illegal cryptomining venture. Yet despite strong public demands, he was not brought to justice before his death.

As November became December, Kazakhs were already discussing another family of the former president, which had been an open secret but was only officially revealed in Nazarbaev’s autobiography. His description of falling in love with Asel Qurmanbaeva (then Asel Isabaeva) — a woman some 40 years younger than him — certainly made for awkward reading.

His only legal wife, Sara Nazarbaeva, responded to her husband’s decision to tie the knot with Qurmanbaeva in an Islamic ceremony, “with nobility,” Nazarbaev wrote, adding that the pair’s three daughters — Darigha, Dinara, and Alia — had also understood.

Qurmanbaeva bore him two sons, his only confirmed male heirs. In an interview with RFE/RL, former diplomat Talgat Kaliev said that Nazarbaev’s book reveal was a bid to publicly legitimize the two boys “[so] it is officially possible to leave something to them…. Otherwise, their destiny would be very challenging.”

Qurmanbaeva — Miss Kazakhstan in 1999 — and Nazarbaev began their relationship when the former was just 19, and she is most often referred to as Nazarbaev’s third wife, with former air stewardess Gulnara Rakisheva reportedly bearing the president two more daughters.

And the elder of Nazarbaev’s two sons, 18-year-old Tauman Nursultan, has already been romantically linked to the daughter of Energy Minister Almasadam Satkaliev.

Responding to rumors that the young pair had married, the Energy Ministry published a statement in April calling the information “inaccurate,” stressing that the minister “does not have and did not previously have any family ties with the first president.”

The ministry’s press department was pressed into action once more last month to deny reports that Satkaliev was among the guests at Bolat Nazarbaev’s memorial.

Putin Meeting

One person who might be sympathetic to Nazarbaev’s complicated situation is divorced Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Putin, after all, is rumored to have fathered at least two children with Alina Kabayeva, a retired Olympic gymnast who was placed under sanctions by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union after Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year.

But there was no shortage of suspicion that the two men were talking about things other than family when they met in Moscow earlier this month.

This was not the first time the two have met since Nazarbaev formally retired from politics, famously declaring himself “just a pensioner.” They had previously met in June 2022, almost immediately after a constitutional referendum promoted by Toqaev that, among other things, removed all the basic law’s references to Nazarbaev as elbasy, a move that, in theory, made him more vulnerable to prosecution.

At the time, Russia’s Nezavisimaya gazeta speculated that Nazarbaev was seeking “assurances for himself and his capital,” and referred to “various estimations” of the octogenarian’s net worth at around $200 billion.

Before that, in late December 2021 — weeks before the unrest in Kazakhstan and two months before Russia launched its full-scale aggression against Ukraine — Nazarbaev and Toqaev held talks with Putin in St. Petersburg with Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka along for the ride.

It was undoubtedly Toqaev, not Nazarbaev, who benefited from the CSTO peacekeeping intervention. But public figures and politicians close to the Kremlin were soon complaining that Toqaev had failed to show gratitude for the mission, after Astana chose to remain neutral in the Ukraine war.

In this light, Nazarbaev’s sudden return to prominence looks like something of a “cliffhanger” for Kazakhstan.

Source: RFERL

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Russian President Vladimir Putin slammed countries that he said were trying to “impose their dominance” and rules on others, saying Wednesday that those that do were “completely ignoring the sovereignty” of other states.

Speaking at a conference on security issues Wednesday, Putin said the world was becoming increasingly unstable and that “new centers of tension are emerging.”

He laid the blame for this new era of turbulence at the door of unspecified “individual countries and associations” — widely understood to refer to Russia’s rivals in the West and NATO — that he said were trying “to preserve, retain their dominance, impose their own rules, completely ignoring the sovereignty, national interests, traditions of other states.”

“All this is accompanied by a build-up of military potential, unceremonious interference in the internal affairs of other countries,” Putin said, “as well as attempts to extract unilateral advantages from the energy and food crises provoked by a number of Western states.”

Ukraine refuses to accept loss of Bakhmut to Russia forces

There was not a whiff of irony from Putin, a leader who over his 23 years in power in Russia has overseen a systematic program of interference in other countries’ internal affairs and sovereignty, most recently, in Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine 15 months ago.

Russian President Vladimir Putin on a screen at Red Square as he addresses a rally and a concert marking the annexation of four regions of Ukraine — Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia — in central Moscow on Sept. 30, 2022.

Before the invasion, there had been numerous instances of Russia interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, ranging from the state-sponsored use of cyberattacks and spread of disinformation to attempts to influence the U.K.’s Brexit referendum in 2016 meddling in the U.S. election of the same year (and, again, in 2020) with Russia denying the charges but earning itself sanctions nonetheless.

Russia has also been accused of supporting both far-right and far-left parties in continental Europe in a bid to destabilize regional politics and, more recently, has launched charm offensives in African and Latin American countries in an effort to influence domestic and foreign policy.

Russia’s interference has also veered into the dangerous realm of chemical weapons and assassination attempts on foreign soil. In 2018, the Kremlin was widely believed to have ordered a nerve agent attack on a former Russian spy in the U.K., an attack that left a British citizen dead.

Military personnel wearing protective suits remove a police car and other vehicles from a public car park as they continue investigations into the poisoning of Sergei Skripal on March 11, 2018 in Salisbury, England.

Again, Russia denied any involvement in the poisoning but, with much evidence supporting the allegation, Western countries imposed sanctions on Russia for the incident which Britain saw was “an assault on U.K. sovereignty.”

Ignoring Ukraine’s sovereignty

It is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year that’s widely seen as one of most egregious instances of “ignoring the sovereignty” of another country in the 21st century, however.

When Russian launched its invasion, Putin tried to justify the move to a domestic audience, saying Russia wanted to “de-Nazify” and “demilitarize” Ukraine, a country that has a Jewish president and is not in NATO.

Still, most onlookers understood that the stated aims hid Moscow’s real intention which was (and is) to overthrow the pro-Western government in Kyiv and regain its influence over the former Soviet republic.

Ukraine has been steadily trending toward its European neighbors for years, despite Russia’s attempts to maintain a pro-Kremlin leadership in the country. A pro-European uprising in Ukraine in 2014 resulted in the overthrow of the then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia’s preferred man in Kyiv.

Yanukovych fled to Russia in the ensuing political crisis, an event that Russia still slams as a “coup” that was orchestrated by the U.S., without presenting evidence. The uprising, or Maidan Revolution as Ukrainians know it, led to the start of armed hostilities between Russia and Ukraine with Russia invading Crimea in March 2014 and fomenting pro-Russian unrest — and an armed separatist movement — in the east of the country.

A giant wall mural showing a map of the Crimean peninsula filled with the flag of the Russian Federation, in Moscow, Russia, on Friday, March 28, 2014.

Russia’s perception of Ukraine and other former Soviet states’ slide toward the West, and its sphere of influence, has troubled Moscow and it has tried to maintain influence over its neighbors by hook or by crook.

As with eastern Ukraine and the two pro-Russian separatist “republics” there that were supported by Moscow, the same playbook was used in Georgia. Russia recognized the “independence” of pro-Russian separatist parts of the country, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in 2008 in a move that led to war, albeit on a much shorter scale than we’ve seen in Ukraine. Georgia still views Russia as occupying 20% of its country. In Moldova, the restive, pro-Russian territory of Transnistria is also seen as a potential target for Russian annexation.

With Ukraine mounting far more resistance than Russia expected, there are fears the conflict could last for years, with immense human and economic cost. Putin said Tuesday that Russia was going through “difficult times” as it continued its military campaign in Ukraine, but said national pride was growing.

Russia blames NATO for insecurity

Russia has seen sanction after sanction imposed on it for its geopolitical meddling and misdemeanors but its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the latest outbreak of war on European territory pushed NATO to act decisively, with Western countries rallying round Kyiv to provide it with military and financial aid to help it defend itself against its neighbor.

Western leaders have repeatedly warned that there are wider securities at stake and that Russia must not be allowed to win in its invasion, fearing that other former Soviet states could be next as Putin is seen to be trying to rebuild a Soviet empire; Putin has publicly lamented the loss of the USSR, calling it one of the greatest geopolitical catastrophes Russia experienced last century.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov looks on, next to Russian President Vladimir Putin, as they wait for the US-Russia summit at the Villa La Grange, in Geneva on June 16, 2021.

Speaking at the same event Wednesday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the West wanted to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia and claimed NATO weapons for Ukraine were being spread beyond the country’s borders.

“The collective West does not hide its intention to inflict a strategic defeat on us. The Kyiv regime is being used as an anti-Russian battering ram, which is being pumped up with NATO weapons. At the same time, part of the Western supplies — and an increasing part — are spreading uncontrollably around the world,” he said, news agency TASS reported.

Source: CNBC

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Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed legislation that bans government officials from using foreign words in official documents and correspondence as well as while carrying out their duties.

“When using Russian as the state language of the Russian Federation, it is not allowed to use words and expressions that do not correspond to the norms of modern literary Russian language,” the law published Tuesday said.

The exception, according to the law, is the use of “foreign words which do not have widely used corresponding equivalents in Russian.”

A list of foreign words that can be used will be compiled by a government commission and will be published separately, the Kommersant business daily reported.

A number of Russian political figures vowed to protect the Russian language from Western influence due to what they called “Russophobia” and “attacks on everything connected with Russia.”

Source: The Moscow Times

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At about 1am on February 24 last year, Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, received a troubling phone call.

After spending months building up a more than 100,000-strong invasion force on the border with Ukraine, Vladimir Putin had given the go-ahead to invade.

The decision caught Lavrov completely by surprise. Just days earlier, the Russian president had polled his security council for their opinions on recognising two separatist statelets in the Donbas, an industrial border region in Ukraine, at an excruciatingly awkward televised session — but had left them none the wiser about his true intentions.

Keeping Lavrov in the dark was not unusual for Putin, who tended to concentrate his foreign policy decision-making among a handful of close confidants, even when it undermined Russia’s diplomatic efforts.

On this occasion, the phone call made Lavrov one of the very few people who had any knowledge of the plan ahead of time. The Kremlin’s senior leadership all found out about the invasion only when they saw Putin declare a “special military operation” on television that morning.

Later that day, several dozen oligarchs gathered at the Kremlin for a meeting arranged only the day before, aware that the invasion would trigger western sanctions that could destroy their empires. “Everyone was completely losing it,” says a person who attended the event.

While they waited, one of the oligarchs spied Lavrov exiting another meeting and pressed him for an explanation about why Putin had decided to invade. Lavrov had no answer: the officials he was there to see in the Kremlin had known less about it than he did.

Stunned, the oligarch asked Lavrov how Putin could have planned such an enormous invasion in such a tiny circle — so much so that most of the senior officials at the Kremlin, Russia’s economic cabinet and its business elite had not believed it was even possible.

“He has three advisers,” Lavrov replied, according to the oligarch. “Ivan the Terrible. Peter the Great. And Catherine the Great.”

Under Putin’s invasion plan, Russia’s troops were to seize Kyiv within a matter of days in a brilliant, comparatively bloodless blitzkrieg.

Instead, the war has proved to be a quagmire of historic proportions for Russia. A year on, Putin’s invasion has claimed well over 200,000 dead and injured among Russia’s armed forces, according to US and European officials; depleted its stock of tanks, artillery and cruise missiles; and cut the country off from global financial markets and western supply chains.

Nor has the fighting in Ukraine brought Putin any closer to his vaguely defined goals of “demilitarising” and “de-Nazifying” Kyiv. Though Russia now controls 17 per cent of Ukraine’s internationally recognised territory, it has abandoned half of the land it seized in the war’s early weeks — including a humiliating retreat from Kherson, the only provincial capital under its control, just weeks after Putin attempted to annex it.

But as the war rumbles on with no end in sight, Putin has given no indication he intends to back down on his war efforts.

At his state-of-the-union address on Tuesday, Putin insisted the war was “about the very existence of our country” and said the west had forced him to invade Ukraine. “They’re the ones who started the war. We are using force to stop it,” he said.

Even as the huge cost of the invasion to Russia becomes apparent to him, Putin is more determined than ever to see it through, people who know him say.

“The idea was never for hundreds of thousands of people to die. It’s all gone horribly wrong,” a former senior Russian official says. With the initial plan in tatters, Putin is searching for new rationales to justify the war effort, insisting he had no choice but to pursue the invasion by any means necessary, current and former officials say.

“He tells people close to him, ‘It turns out we were completely unprepared. The army is a mess. Our industry is a mess. But it’s good that we found out about it this way, rather than when Nato invades us,’” the former official adds.

The Financial Times spoke to six longtime Putin confidants as well as people involved in Russia’s war effort, and current and former senior officials in the west and Ukraine for this account of how Putin blundered his way into the invasion — then doubled down rather than admit his mistake. All of them spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.

The people who know Putin describe a leader who has become even more isolated since the start of the war. “Stalin was a villain, but a good manager, because he couldn’t be lied to. But nobody can tell Putin the truth,” says one. “People who don’t trust anyone start trusting a very small number of people who lie to them.”

‘If you don’t agree with it, you can leave’Last year was not the first time Putin had withheld plans of an invasion from close advisers. When Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, he did not inform his own security council — instead on one occasion gaming out the peninsula’s annexation with his defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, and three top security officials all night until 7am.

Initially, the advisers urged Putin against sending troops into Crimea, according to a former senior Russian official and a former senior US official. “Putin said, ‘This is a historic moment. If you don’t agree with it, you can leave,’” the former Russian official recalls.

When the west, fearful of escalating tensions to a point of no return and jeopardising Europe’s economic ties with Russia, responded with only a slap on the wrist, Putin was convinced he had made the right decision, according to several people who know the president.

In the years after the 2014 invasion, Putin’s inner circle began to shrink further as he became increasingly consumed with what he saw as growing western threats to Russia’s security, the people say. His isolation deepened when the Covid-19 pandemic began in 2020: for fear they could infect a germaphobic Putin, even top officials were forced to spend weeks at a time quarantining for a personal audience.

One of the few people to spend extended time with Putin was his friend Yuri Kovalchuk, a former physicist who in the 1990s owned a dacha adjoining the future president’s in the countryside outside St Petersburg.

The secretive Kovalchuk — a banker and media mogul who the US says manages Putin’s personal finances — almost never speaks in public and did not reply to a request for comment.

People who know him say he shares a passion for Russian imperial revanchism with his older brother Mikhail, a physicist whose conspiracy theory-laden rants about US plans to develop super-soldiers and “ethnic weapons” have, on occasion, popped up later in Putin’s speeches.

During the height of the pandemic, Putin was largely cut off from comparatively liberal, western-minded confidants who had previously had his ear. Instead he spent the first few months in his residence at Valdai, a bucolic town on a lake in northern Russia, essentially on lockdown with the younger Kovalchuk, who inspired Putin to think of his historic mission to assert Russia’s greatness, much as Peter the Great had.

“He really believes all the stuff he says about sacrality and Peter the Great. He thinks he will be remembered like Peter,” a former senior official says.

Increasingly, Putin became fixated on Ukraine as his relations soured with its energetic young president Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

One of Zelenskyy’s early moves was to curb the influence of Viktor Medvedchuk, a close friend of Putin’s who headed the largest opposition party in parliament. Whereas former president Petro Poroshenko had used Medvedchuk as a crucial go-between with Moscow, Zelenskyy’s team sought other intermediaries in the belief that his influence on Putin had begun to wane.

But as Putin began drawing up plans for a possible invasion, Medvedchuk insisted that Ukrainians would greet Russia’s forces with open arms.

One part of the plan involved Viktor Yanukovych, a former president who has been in Russian exile since fleeing the 2014 revolution against him. He was to deliver a video message conferring legitimacy on Medvedchuk — and anointing him to rule Ukraine with Russia’s backing.

The vision was starkly at odds with political realities in Ukraine, where the pro-Russian minority that Medvedchuk represented was vastly outnumbered by those who despised him for his ties to Moscow. But it proved seductive for Putin, who authorised payments through Medvedchuk’s party to pay off local collaborators.

There was plenty of scepticism in Moscow. “If Medvedchuk says it’s raining, you need to look out of the window — it’ll be sunny,” says another former senior Russian official. “You have polls, you have the secret services — how can you do anything serious based on what Medvedchuk says?”

However, his assessment was backed up by the Federal Security Service, or FSB, the successor agency to the KGB, which assured Putin victory was certain — and paid large sums in bribes to officials in Ukraine in the hope that this would guarantee success.

“The FSB had built a whole system of telling the boss what he wanted to hear. There were huge budgets given out and corruption at every level,” a western intelligence official says. “You tell the right story up top and you skim off a bit for yourself.”

Dissenting voices in the SVR, Russia’s foreign intelligence agency, and Russia’s general staff attempted to raise doubts. At the security council meeting three days before the invasion, even Nikolai Patrushev, security council secretary and Putin’s longest-standing and most hawkish ally, suggested giving diplomacy another chance.

“He knew what a bad state the army was in and told Putin as much,” a person close to the Kremlin says.

But just as he had in 2014, Putin overruled them, insisting he was better informed.

“Putin was overconfident,” a former senior US official says. “He knows better than his advisers just the way Hitler knew better than his generals.”

The invasion began to unravel almost immediately after Putin set it into motion. Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff, had drawn up a plan to seize the Hostomel airfield outside Kyiv, giving Russian elite paratrooper squadrons a platform from which to attack Zelenskyy’s government headquarters.

Some of Medvedchuk’s collaborators worked as spotters for the advancing Russian forces, painting markings on buildings and highways to direct the invaders to key locations. Others joined in the attack on the government quarter. In southern Ukraine, they helped Russia capture a large swath of territory including Kherson with little to no resistance.

Most of Medvedchuk’s network, however, simply took the money and ran, refusing to join in the invasion — or went straight to Ukrainian authorities and warned them of the instructions they had been given, according to a senior Ukrainian official and former US and Russian officials.

Prewar predictions that Ukraine’s army would collapse had largely been based on the assumption Russia’s air force would quickly establish control of Ukraine’s skies.

Instead, amid widespread disarray among the invaders, Russia’s army shot down a number of its own aircraft in the early days of the invasion. As a result, it ran out of pilots with experience of combat operations involving ground forces who were also prepared to fly, according to two western officials and a Ukrainian official.

“It may not have been double digits, but it’s more than one or two” Russian aircraft shot down by friendly fire, says the former senior US official. “There was a lot of fratricide.”

He adds: “They may not have had pilots with combat experience who were willing to fly over Ukraine and risk their necks in that crazy environment.”

Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence, adds: “It happened. From artillery units, from tanks, and we even saw it from our intercepts of their conversations. They shot down their own helicopters and they shot down their own planes.”

On the ground, Russia’s advances came at the price of huge casualties and did not help it capture any major cities apart from Kherson. By the end of March, the invading forces were in such a poor state that they withdrew from most of central and north-eastern Ukraine, which it portrayed as a “gesture of goodwill”.

The brilliant plan had proved a failure.

“Russia screwed up,” says Skibitsky. “Gerasimov initially didn’t want to go in from all sides like he did. But the FSB and everyone else convinced him everyone was waiting for him to show up and there wouldn’t be any resistance.”

‘A unique war in world history’As the consequences of his invasion became clear, Putin searched for a scapegoat to hold responsible for the intelligence blunders underpinning it. That person was Sergei Beseda, the head of the FSB’s fifth directorate, which is responsible for foreign operations and had laid the groundwork for the invasion by paying off Ukrainian collaborators, according to two western officials.

Initially, Beseda was placed under house arrest, according to the officials. His time in the doghouse, however, did not last long. Weeks later, US officials arrived for a meeting on bilateral issues with their Russian counterparts wondering, after news of Beseda’s detention leaked to the Russian media, whether he would turn up and how the Russians might explain where he was.

Instead, Beseda walked in and said, paraphrasing Mark Twain: “You know, the rumours of my demise are greatly exaggerated,” according to the former US official.

Beseda’s quick comeback demonstrated what advisers see as some of Putin’s biggest weaknesses. The Russian president prizes loyalty over competence; is obsessive about secrecy to a fault; and presides over a bureaucratic culture where his underlings tell him what he wants to hear, according to people who know him.

The steady drumbeat of propaganda around the war and Putin’s demands for loyalty from the elite have only increased the incentive for advisers to tell him what he wants to hear, the people say.

“He’s of sound mind. He’s reasonable. He’s not crazy. But nobody can be an expert on everything. They need to be honest with him and they are not,” another longtime Putin confidant says. “The management system is a huge problem. It creates big gaps in his knowledge and the quality of the information he gets is poor.”

For many in the elite, the stream of lies is a survival tactic: most of Putin’s presidential administration and economic cabinet have told friends they oppose the war but feel they are powerless to do anything about it. “It’s really a unique war in world history, when all the elite is against it,” says a former senior official.

A small number, including former climate special representative Anatoly Chubais, have quietly resigned. One former senior official who now heads a major state-run company went so far as to apply for an Israeli passport while still in his post, and started making plans to leave the country, according to two people close to him.

As the war continues to sputter, the scale of Russia’s miscalculation has begun to dawn on Putin, prompting him to seek out more information from people at lower levels, people who know him say. A cohort of ultranationalist bloggers who are critical of the military establishment have held at least two closed-door meetings with Putin since last summer; some were guests of honour at a ceremony to annex the four Ukrainian provinces in September.

On occasion, Putin has used information from his informal channels to trip up senior officials in public. Last month, Denis Manturov, a deputy prime minister, told Putin the government had signed contracts with Russian aviation factories to produce new aircraft, one of the industries worst hit by the difficulty of procuring components under the sanctions. Putin replied: “I know the factories don’t have contracts, the directors told me. What are you playing the fool for? When will the contracts be ready? Here’s what I’m talking about: the factory directors say they don’t have contracts. And you’re telling me it’s all on paper.”

Putin’s newfound scepticism, however, is limited by his unwillingness to admit the invasion was a mistake in the first place, the people say. Some of the liberal officials who oppose the war have attempted to convince him to end it by pointing out the economic damage the sanctions are likely to wreak on Russia’s economy.

But Putin tells them “he has already factored in the discounts”, another former senior Russian official says. “He says, ‘We pay a huge price, I get it. We underestimated how difficult it could be.’ But how can you convince a crazy man? His brain will collapse if he realises it was a mistake,” the person adds. “He doesn’t trust anyone.”

Asked about the discrepancy between the defence ministry’s statements and complaints from fighters at the front about poor equipment in December, Putin paraphrased a character from his favourite TV show, the Soviet espionage drama Seventeen Moments of Spring: “You can’t trust anyone. Only me.” Then he chuckled.

Existential fight continuesPutin’s state-of-the-union address on Tuesday demonstrated his determination to “solve the tasks before us step by step” as he insisted Russia’s war would go on until a victorious end.

The remarks underscored how existential the fight has become for Putin as the threat he sees from a hostile west consumes him. Putin spent comparatively little time discussing Ukraine itself, instead focusing his ire on the US, which he accused of trying to “destroy” Russia and use “national traitors” to break it up.

The speech marked his first return to nuclear rhetoric since last autumn, when he made veiled warnings to “use all the means at our disposal” in defence of Russia’s conquests and suggested Russia could carry out a nuclear first strike.

Those threats worried western countries sufficiently that the US, UK, and France, Nato’s three nuclear powers, delivered a joint message to Russia vowing to retaliate with conventional weapons if Putin decided to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, according to the former US and Russian officials.

According to two people close to the Kremlin, Putin has already gamed out the possibility of using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine and has come to the conclusion that even a limited strike would do nothing to benefit Russia.

“He has no reason to press the button. What is the point of bombing Ukraine? You detonate a tactical nuke on Zaporizhzhia,” says a former Russian official, referring to the Ukrainian-held capital of a province Putin has claimed for Russia. “Everything is totally irradiated, you can’t go in there, and it’s supposedly Russia anyway, so what was the point?”

Instead, Putin said Russia would suspend its participation in New Start, the last remaining arms treaty with the US governing the countries’ nuclear arsenals. The suspension was the most concrete step Putin has taken on the escalation ladder since the war began: Jens Stoltenberg, Nato’s secretary-general, said “the whole arms control architecture has been dismantled.”

This time, however, Putin made no threats to actually use nuclear weapons — which analysts interpreted as a sign he had begun to realise Russia’s limitations.

“The war’s been going on for a year. Putin has been saying he’s fighting the west, not Ukraine, for a long time. You can’t just keep talking about it, you need to take steps to demonstrate something tangible,” says Abbas Gallyamov, a former Putin speechwriter. “Otherwise in his paradigm it’s going to look like the west is wiping the floor with Russia and [he] can’t say anything in response.”

Putin’s calculation, people close to the Kremlin say, is that Russia is more committed to the war than the west is to Ukraine, and resilient enough to see out the economic pain. Senior Republicans have openly questioned how long the US can go on supporting Ukraine to the same extent and the party retains a realistic chance of capturing the White House in 2024.

In ramping up military support for Ukraine, western officials are mindful anything less than a crushing defeat for Russia risks failing to deal with the problem.

“We need to ask ourselves: How do we want to this end up? Do we want to end up in a situation when Putin will survive and he will have more time?” says an EU foreign minister. “Something like the lull between the first and second world war.”

Putin, by contrast, is betting that he can see through that strategic turbulence, people who know him say. Instead of insisting that most Russians are unaffected by the war, as the Kremlin did in its early months when life largely went on as normal, Putin has adopted mobilisation rhetoric, urging all of society to unite behind the invasion.

The scenes at a patriotic rally on Wednesday underscored how far Putin had come down that road in just a few years. At Moscow’s Luzhniki Stadium, where the World Cup final was held five years ago, a soldier rapped about “the difficult hour we did not anticipate” alongside Russia’s military choir and the parents of people killed fighting for Russia made speeches to a huge flag-waving crowd. The rally’s hosts welcomed a group of children “saved” by the Russian army in Mariupol, a city in south-eastern Ukraine it razed to the ground last spring.

Then Putin appeared, shook hands with a select group of soldiers, and told Russians to take inspiration from them. “The motherland is our family,” Putin said. “The people standing up here are deciding to defend the most valuable and dear thing they have — our family. They are fighting heroically, courageously, bravely.”

Russian independent media reported that tens of thousands of state employees and students were paid small sums or forced to attend. The fact the Kremlin evidently did not think it could fill a stadium to support Putin without forcing people to go suggests officials know how difficult mobilising society around the war will be.

“Even in his own mind, he realises it’s not going to happen soon. It’s going to be a costly, lengthy process,” the former US official says. “He’s got, he thinks, the time — he’s 70 — and the resources, the oil and gas money to achieve it. And that’s what he’ll be remembered for: gathering the Russian lands the way Peter the Great did.”

But the alternative, one former senior Kremlin official says, may be too difficult for Putin to contemplate.

“It’s scary to think what happens if this ends in a disastrous defeat for Russia,” the former official says. “That means disastrous mistakes were made and the man behind it needs to exit this life, whether it’s via a bullet, cyanide, or something else. And if there’s no justice in this world, then nobody gets to have it,” he adds.

“It’s like when two chess players are playing. One of them is losing and bashes the other one over the head with the chessboard. Does that mean he won? No, it’s just an act of desperation.”

Additional reporting by Henry Foy in Brussels and Anastasia Stognei in Riga

Russia at war: a two-part seriesHow Putin’s technocrats steadied Russia’s economyOnce thought of as reformers, the president’s economic confidants have ended up as enablers of an invasion they warned against

A country Learning to Live without ImportsRather than provoking a collapse, international sanctions are causing a steady degradation of the country’s productive capacity.

Source: Informed

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