Kiev (15/5 – 60).         

Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not comment of the formation of new tank brigades. The new brigades are equipped with Leopard 2 and Bradley personnel carriers. The exact strength is not disclosed but it will be envisioned the new brigades are deploying the various hotspot.

Well informed sources within the ministry of defense did not comment on the deployment. “We want to avoid speculation”, said a Colonel of the HUR (the military intelligence department).

In the NATO context, the Ukrainian army is a considerable force. Wedged in between the United States, Poland, Turkey (or Türkiye as it is colloquially called) the United Kingdom, the Ukraine is in the top five of NATO generating forces.

Without being an active member of NATO, the Russian war of aggression took a risk to take on NATO. The “security buffer” of NATO surrounding the Russian Federation is an irrational fear of the old Soviet style. The Russians have only contributed to the unification of NATO and the rearmament of Europe.

Besides getting new weapon systems online the EU is reconstituting conscription. Although whispered in the hallways of power, conscription is the new normal.

NATO has as of May 2024, NATO’s combined militaries have around 3.5 million personnel, including troops and civilians. This number has increased over time, with 3.37 million personnel in 2023 and 3.01 million in 2016. The United States had the largest number of active military personnel in NATO with almost 1.33 million men under arms.

Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark stand up forces are about 139,600 with reserve forces drawn up to a million men.

As of April 2024, NATO allies had 12,408 main battle tanks in addition to 1,004,844 armored vehicles and other ground combat vehicles. Türkiye and Greece have the highest number of tanks besides the United States. 2,231 and 1,365 tanks can be fielded by the two NATO states.

NATO allies and partner countries have delivered more than 98% of the combat vehicles promised to Ukraine during Russia’s invasion and war, the military alliance’s chief said Thursday, giving Kyiv a bigger punch as it contemplates launching a counteroffensive.

Ukraine’s allies have sent “vast amounts of ammunition” and trained and equipped more than nine new Ukrainian brigades, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said.

More than 30,000 troops are estimated to make up the new brigades. Some NATO partner countries, such as Sweden and Australia, have also provided armored vehicles.

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The seriousness of the debate can be seen at the UK sponsored conference on AI at Bletchley Park. Following this was the adaptation of the European law on Artificial Intelligence. 28 countries at the summit, including the United States, China, and the European Union, have issued an agreement known as the Bletchley Declaration, calling for international co-operation to manage the challenges and risks of artificial intelligence. Emphasis has been placed on regulating “Frontier AI”, a term for the latest and most powerful AI systems. Concerns that have been raised at the summit include the potential use of AI for terrorism, criminal activity, and warfare, as well as existential risk posed to humanity as a whole.

Having such a platform between the world’s two largest players in AI will be increasingly important as global efforts to regulate AI and manage the associated risks gather momentum. Earlier this year, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a landmark resolution on AI without a vote, capping off a period that saw several global summits being held on issues related to AI, such as the Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) summit at The Hague and the AI Safety summit at Bletchley Park in the United Kingdom.

While these circumstances should not be surprising, the question remains: what can be meaningfully achieved in terms of global governance and arms control for AI? Platforms such as the REAIM summit and AI Safety summit have featured norm-building efforts such as a call to action and declaration, respectively, while the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) discussing the regulation of LAWS at the UN adopted 11 guiding principles in 2019.

Nevertheless, the overall temperature of relations will continue to play a part in how effective subsequent bilateral talks on AI will be. Managing both related and unrelated derailers will be important, especially since it is impossible to fully compartmentalise dialogue on specific issues like AI from the broader state of bilateral relations.Some of the questions ringing loud include the systemic failures of Israel’s intelligence community and its sophisticated early warning systems to detect Hamas’ operational plans in advance, Israel’s prolonged political fragmentation and internal protests that undermined military readiness, and why the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) units deployed in the “Gaza Envelope” were overran.

By William Schrodinger  

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The U.S. military should reassess its force posture in Europe and reduce its reliance on revolving door-style unit rotations, a major think tank’s analysts concluded in a Monday report.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ transnational threat team based their study on official documents, open-source materials and interviews with subject-matter experts.

The report’s authors recommend that the Army abandon the rotational armor brigade deployment model that “eats up … the Army’s force structure and long-term readiness.” Currently, two armor brigades are deployed to Europe. Instead, the report said, the service should permanently station an Armored Brigade Combat Team in Poland to replace one rotational unit and eliminate the remaining rotation altogether.

An Army Times investigation found that tank brigades and enlisted tank crew members were at higher risk of suicide than other soldiers in recent years, due in part to a decade of high operational tempo fueled by such non-combat deployments. The service once had armor brigades in Europe, but they were removed in the early 2010s.

Currently, the Army maintains a large presence of rotational forces in Europe. V Corps’ forward headquarters in Poznan, Poland oversees the three temporarily deployed brigade combat teams, which includes one light infantry brigade in addition to the two armor brigades. Other rotational forces include division headquarters, a combat aviation brigade, fires assets and sustainment units.

But the short-tour model has consequences, the report’s authors argued. They cost more money in the long-term compared to permanent bases, and they are less integrated into the continent’s culture and defense network. The deployment-based model negatively impacts soldiers, too — the authors said evidence suggests they “separate military personnel from their families,” causing “low morale” that can spawn “discipline issues and increased divorce rates.”

Army spokesperson Col. Roger Cabiness II told Army Times, however, that “forward basing of an ABCT is not a simple task.” Doing so would require diplomatic and legislative approvals both at home and abroad.

Despite efforts to reduce their operational tempo, the Army’s armor units continue to deploy at a high rate to fulfill the Europe requirements. The 4th Infantry Division’s 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team cased its colors Monday, signifying its departure for an eight- or nine-month Europe rotation. The Iron Brigade’s new mission is beginning roughly 16 months after returning to Fort Carson, Colorado from another Europe deployment that wrapped in December 2022.

The report’s authors also recommended that the Air Force station an additional F-16 squadron in Germany; increase anti-submarine warfare capability and air defense forces; bolster stockpiles of prepositioned equipment and ammunition; and continue modernization, cyber, space and security cooperation efforts.

Source: Army Times

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Over the last decade or so, the tendency among China watchers has been to see China’s rise as an endless upward progression. The same thing happened during the Cold War when the Soviet Union actually had feet of clay, but was viewed as a global colossus.

China’s economic and diplomatic successes are significant, but have often been exaggerated while its weaknesses were ignored or underestimated. Only now, amid bad news for China’s economy, have observers awakened to certain realities.

The first reality is that China’s post-COVID economy is sputtering. It faces falling prices amidst stagnant domestic demand for goods, a collapsing real estate market, declining exports and imports, very high government debt.

For a regime relying on domestic strength as the foundation of its foreign policy success, this economic weakness has to be troubling.

Xi Jinping has made internal security the hallmark of his administration. If the economy isn’t delivering growth with equity, political trouble may lie ahead.

That may help explain efforts to reinforce Communist Party discipline in the military, double down on repression in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Tibet, and deal harshly with dissidence among lawyers and human-rights activists. In truth, there’s considerable unrest and uncertainty in the empire.

The second reality lies abroad.

China’s principal partners, Russia and North Korea, are liabilities as well as assets. Putin’s war on Ukraine undermines Chinese diplomacy in Europe and adds to China’s America problems, while North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats bring a dangerous instability to the Korean peninsula.

In Central Asia, China is competing with, and actually out-competing, Russia in relations with the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

In South and Southeast Asia, China inspires both fear and awe.

Most countries accept the need to accommodate China, which is their dominant trade partner. But while China has predominant political influence in Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar (formerly Burma), other nations in the region, including India, Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand, are looking to the U.S. for balance. In fact, polling of citizens and elites in Southeast Asia points to more positive feeling toward the U.S. than China.

Before the Ukraine war, even the closest U.S. allies — Japan, South Korea and Australia — were willing to accommodate China: Japan, by refusing to commit to defending Taiwan in case of war and restraining its military capabilities; South Korea, by forging a close trade relationship and not fully embracing THAAD, a missile defense system aimed at both North Korea and China.

But now, all three have re-committed to tight security ties with the U.S. and each other.

Japan and South Korea concluded their first summit in 12 years in March. Both also joined in the recent Asian summit hosted by President Biden at Camp David, in which participants agreed to respond as one to regional threats — meaning, of course, from North Korea and China.

Korea and Japan are now imposing export controls on high-end computer chips coveted by China. Japan has also embarked on a military buildup aimed directly at China. And Australia and India have followed suit, becoming part of the Quad security dialogue and the AUKUS group.

China’s chief calling card is money, specifically, its Belt and Road Initiative loan program, which has distributed hundreds of billions of dollars, mainly among developing countries. Most Asia-Pacific countries have, in fact, joined BRI.

Some analysts think BRI has proven a very successful effort to meet developing countries’ needs without imposing onerous conditions, in contrast with loans from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. But others see BRI as a debt trap that creates dependence on China, leading to sacrifices of sovereignty such as control of ports.

Serious studies of BRI show it is neither all one nor all the other. But it’s clear that BRI has become a Chinese debt burden, and given China’s economic woes, chances are good Beijing will not be nearly as generous going forward..

Meanwhile, some Chinese actions are undermining BRI appeal.

For example, Southeast Asian neighbors rely on the Mekong River for fishing. But Chinese dams are taking a large bite out of their fishing industry, arousing anger.

Mongolia, long economically dependent on China, is now reaching out to the U.S. for trade, and has just struck a major deal with Google for computer assistance.

Competing territorial claims in the South China Sea have put China at odds with Vietnam and the Philippines. Meanwhile, Vietnam and the U.S. have agreed to form a strategic partnership, and President Biden is scheduled to visit Vietnam Sept. 9.

The Philippines, which had accommodated China under Rodrigo Duterte, has reverted under Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to a strategic partnership with the U.S. in response to Chinese pressure in the South China Sea. Most recently, a heavily armed Chinese coast guard vessel tried to block a Philippines supply boat from reaching a beached ship that marks its claimed territory in Mischief Reef.

The Philippines is opening four additional military bases to the U.S. and resuming joint naval patrols with the U.S. It has rejected a joint patrol invitation from China, which is continuing to claim a vast swath of the South China Sea.

If you look at the world through the eyes of Chinese leaders, you see obstacles on the home front that demand attention and resources — this at the very time a new Cold War looms over Asia, with the U.S. massing allies to contain a presumed Chinese threat.

What Xi Jinping has found, just as Chairman Mao did before him, is that domestic weaknesses constrain Chinese actions abroad.

Chinese leaders will always give priority to security at home over priorities abroad. Xi Jinping’s concept of “comprehensive security” makes that plain.

That perspective should inform the analysis of China hawks in Washington.

Source: News Register

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SINGAPORE/LONDON, Aug 21 (Reuters) – China’s liquefied natural (LNG) gas importers are starting up or expanding trading desks in London and Singapore to better manage their growing and diversified supply portfolios in an increasingly volatile global market.

The beefed-up trading presence of Chinese importers puts them in direct competition with such global heavyweights as Shell (SHEL.L), BP (BP.L), Equinor (EQNR.OL) and TotalEnergies (TTEF.PA) for a market that the International Energy Agency says doubled in value to $450 billion last year.

About a dozen Chinese companies have been expanding trading teams or adding new desks, with privately run ENN Natural Gas (600803.SS) and state-run China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) the latest to plan London offices, and utility China Gas Holdings (0384.HK) setting up a Singapore operation, company officials and traders said.

Chinese gas importers have also boosted long-term LNG contracts with Qatar and U.S. suppliers by nearly 50% since late 2022 to more than 40 million metric tons per year (mtpy), with plans to add more volumes from those two countries, as well as from Oman, Canada and Mozambique, traders and analysts said.

“We’re going to see a paradigm shift in Chinese companies from being total net importers to (being) more international and domestic trading players,” said Toby Copson, Shanghai-based head of global trading for Trident LNG.

Already, state-run PetroChina , Sinopec , Sinochem Group and CNOOC are actively trading volatility to capitalise on their long portfolios, Copson said.

China vies with Japan to be the world’s largest LNG importer, although it’s not clear how much surplus or other volumes Chinese companies might have available to trade.

PetroChina International (PCI), trading arm of PetroChina and China’s largest gas trader with a 100-strong global team in Beijing and four other international offices, imported or traded about 30 million tons of LNG last year.

Zhang Yaoyu, PCI’s global head of LNG trading, declined to comment on the company’s traded volume, but said trading was part of the company’s overall strategy.

“Supply security is still at the heart of our business activities. Trading capability is one of the enablers … to help us better deal with market swings,” Zhang said.

By 2026, Chinese companies are expected to have contracted LNG supplies of more than 100 million tons a year. That could mean a surplus of up to 8 million tons that year, according to consultancy Poten & Partners, or a deficit of 5 million to 6 million tons based on estimates from pricing agency ICIS.

Either way, China’s growing domestic output and more piped gas from Central Asia and Russia provide enough of a fuel base that Chinese gas companies can trade or swap U.S. and other portfolio cargoes when arbitrages open or it makes market sense.

“I could see China becoming a seasonal seller to places like Southeast Asia, South Korea and Japan, as well as into Europe,” said Jason Feer, head of business intelligence at Poten & Partners.

U.S. LNG contracts are done on a free-on-board (FOB), open basis with no restrictions on destination, and consultant Rystad Energy estimates U.S. volume will make up a quarter of China’s long-term contracts by 2030.

Qatar, which will be China’s largest supplier for 2026, however, offers traditional LNG contracts that are restricted to a single destination or country.

BIG PUSH IN A SHIFTING MARKET

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year forced European buyers to raise LNG imports by two-thirds to replace lost Russian piped gas. This created an outlet for companies with available supplies, and Chinese, Japanese and South Korean companies pounced as global LNG prices surged and the value of the market doubled.

European users have also been reluctant to sign long-term contracts because of decarbonisation goals, and Asian gas traders and importers have been sending LNG to Europe during spring and summer to fill storage tanks there, Feer said.

PCI as well signed a deal in May to use Rotterdam’s Gate regasification terminal for 20 years, a first for a Chinese company in Europe.

These openings in the market and a more liberalised domestic gas market have also prompted smaller Chinese gas distributors and importers to expand into the trading space.

China Gas Holdings, for instance, which has signed contracts for 3.7 million tons per year for U.S. LNG, is hiring its first two traders for a new office in Singapore and is looking to secure more contracts, a company executive told Reuters.

It joins ENN, Beijing Gas, Zhejiang Energy and JOVO Energy (605090.SS) in establishing a trading presence in the Southeast Asian energy hub.

“Compared to Japanese firms, Chinese are way more aggressive in expansion, with PCI and Unipec among the best payers offering comparable packages as the global majors,” as they look to fill out trading desks, said a Singapore-based recruiter.

Source: Reuters

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On July 31, 2023, Judge John G. Költle, Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, reportedly ruled in favor of BTA Bank JSC against Triadou SPV SA for over $193 million. 

The court’s decision follows a December 2022 jury verdict that held Triadou liable for embezzlement and illicit enrichment. 

“In addition to the jury’s verdict, the judge, after studying the case file, detailed the rationale for his decision on 66 pages. As a result, the court recognized BTA’s claim against Triadou for trust property and any funds that could be received as a result of the use of BTA funds, as well as satisfied the requirements of BTA in relation to a number of assets of Triadou . 

It is noted that the court recognized the defendant Triadou SPV as a shell company created and controlled by the son-in-law of Mukhtar Ablyazov – Ilyas Khrapunov, which “received more than $ 70 million in money stolen from BTA, which the company invested in real estate in New York and other places in the United States “. 

“As detailed in the court’s findings: ‘Evidence presented in court shows that funds invested on behalf of Triadou in the United States are directly linked to $115.3 million stolen from BTA by Ablyazov through another shell company ,'” the representatives said. “BTA Bank” 

According to BTA Bank, Ilyas Khrapunov claimed to have sold the parent company Triadou SPV to a third party, Philipp Glatz. However, the court concluded that: ” Glatz’s acquisition of Triadou SPV was fictitious , paid for by Ilyas himself, and that Ilyas Khrapunov continued to control Triadou SPV even after the lawsuit began.” 

“The court and jury heard witnesses, including Ablyazov and his accomplices, as well as expert witnesses, who explained the structure of a major fraud committed against BTA. 

The court ruled that the evidence presented by BTA that Ablyazov used BTA’s Corporate Business Department (UKB-6) to steal billions of dollars through “fake loans to offshore companies” is credible and complete , the bank said. 

It is also emphasized that the court came to the following conclusion: 

“Offshore companies that were “clients of the Bank” (UKB-6) were owned or controlled by Ablyazov, and the “loans” issued by him had no economic content. Instead of being transactions between independent parties, the “loans” with the assistance of UKB-6 were intended to conceal the misappropriation of funds by Ablyazov from BTA Bank . 

Ultimately, the court dismissed the testimony of Ablyazov’s accomplices and their alternative explanation of the source of the funds as “not credible.” 

“We were able to prove to the New York judge and jury that Mukhtar Ablyazov defrauded BTA Bank of billions of dollars and laundered stolen money in the United States. This case was an important step in BTA Bank’s efforts to restore justice and was crucial in bringing to justice responsibility of Ablyazov and his accomplices. 

We are grateful for the careful consideration of the evidence by the jury and the United States District Court,” said Matthew L. Schwartz, Managing Partner of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP and BTA Representative. 

Other legal cases of Mukhtar Ablyazov 

Recall that criminal cases have been opened against Ablyazov in Kazakhstan and a number of other countries. 

In December 2020, Mukhtar Ablyazov was sentenced in absentia in Russia to 15 years in prison in the BTA Bank case. A Russian court found that in three years – from 2006 to 2009 – Ablyazov, together with his subordinates, stole 58 billion rubles, that is, 330.3 billion tenge, from the bank. 

And in Kazakhstan, a banker was sentenced in absentia to 20 years in prison – in 2017 he was found guilty of embezzlement. 

In May this year, it was reported that the French Court of Cassation overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal to terminate the trial against Mukhtar Ablyazov in the case of breach of trust and money laundering. 

Expulsion of Ablyazov from France 

In early December 2022, it became known that Mukhtar Ablyazov was deprived of his refugee status in France. At the same time, the French media wrote that Ablyazov could face extradition to Kazakhstan. However, in January 2023, the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan explained that at the moment Kazakhstan does not have an extradition agreement with France . 

In early July, Ablyazov announced that he had received an order from the executive police that he must leave France, where he has been living for several years, within 30 days and go to a country that is ready to accept him. 

A few days later, BTA Bank, citing an unnamed source, reported that Ablyazov had indeed received a document obliging him to leave French territory within 30 days. 

Meanwhile, the Prosecutor General’s Office stated that they did not have reliable information that could confirm or refute the information about the expulsion of Ablyazov from France. It was emphasized that the issues of expulsion of foreign citizens belong to the internal affairs of the country. 

Return of Uncle Ablyazov to Kazakhstan 

We also recall that on July 25 , an accomplice and uncle of Mukhtar Ablyazov, Kuanysh Nurgazin, who voluntarily returned to Kazakhstan, was detained at the Almaty airport . 

“Nurgazin is the nominal director of the BSC LLP controlled by Ablyazov. Through illegal lending to this company, Ablyazov and his accomplices stole the funds of BTA Bank on an especially large scale,” the Prosecutor General’s Office reported at the time. 

For 12 years he hid in Lithuania, where he received refugee status. 

Later, Kuanysh Nurgazin told why he decided to return to his homeland . 

According to Nurgazin, at that time he did not even suspect about Ablyazov’s machinations – he found out about it only after law enforcement agencies began to identify large financial thefts in the bank. 

Source

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ALMATY, July 19 (Reuters) – Kyrgyzstan has not been informed by the United States of possible action against Kyrgyz companies, a senior Kyrgyz official said, after a U.S. paper said Washington was considering such a move to halt Russia using Kyrgyz firms to circumvent sanctions.

The Kyrgyz official said the Central Asian country would view being singled out in any sanctions package as unfair.

The Washington Post reported on Tuesday that U.S. officials were particularly concerned about the role played by Kyrgyzstan in Russian schemes to evade sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine, and to acquire high-tech items such as Chinese drones.

According to the newspaper, the Biden administration is preparing new economic measures to pressure the country to halt the sanctions-busting.

“We would regret it if among the many dozens of countries seeing a much greater trade volume of the banned supplies, some people in Washington decided to pick on Kyrgyzstan,” said the Kyrgyz official who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

“Kyrgyzstan is a free market economy with very limited government resources,” the official added. “We cannot be reasonably expected to police every entrepreneur and approve every transaction.”

He said that the majority of shipments of sanctioned goods never crossed Kyrgyz territory and are done only nominally on behalf of Kyrgyz-registered entities.

“We are in close contact with the relevant US and European authorities who assure us that they fully understand the situation,” the official said.

The former Soviet republic of 7 million hosts a Russian military airbase and is a member of a Moscow-led trade bloc; it also relies heavily on remittances from hundreds of thousands of Kyrgyz migrant labourers working in Russia.

The Kremlin said on Wednesday that Kyrgyzstan was a close partner that benefited from integration with Russia.

“We intend to further develop bilateral relations with Kyrgyzstan, which we value very highly, as well as all formats of our joint integration,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters.

Source: Yahoo

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The United States may soon impose secondary sanctions on Kyrgyzstan for helping Russia procure sensitive technologies for its war effort in Ukraine, The Washington Post reported Wednesday, citing two anonymous U.S. officials familiar with the matter.

The small Central Asian republic saw a “striking” expansion of import-export companies profiting from sales of Chinese and European drones, aircraft parts and bomb circuits to Russia in recent months, said a senior official with detailed knowledge about the transactions.

The Biden administration could impose new economic measures to pressure Kyrgyzstan to halt the sanctions-busting trade of banned goods with Russia as early as this week, according to the WP.

The decision was reportedly reached after “months of fruitless visits” by U.S. and European diplomats to the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek.

Previous U.S. measures included blacklisting Kyrgyzstan-based companies accused of sanctions evasion.

A 250% surge in exports to Russia in 2022 — with items like rifle scopes not previously known as a bilateral trade item — reflects the scale of the Kyrgyz “shadow bazaar,” WP wrote. 

Most of the Russian recipient companies of Kyrgyz-supplied goods also supply Russia’s defense industry, the unnamed U.S. official said.

They alleged that Russia’s intelligence services are involved alongside war profiteers in closely coordinating the Kyrgyz companies’ procurement of sensitive electronics and exports to Russia.

The Kyrgyz Embassy in Washington acknowledged previous reports of sanctions violations but maintained Bishkek’s commitment to adhering to international regulations and cracking down on contraband and other illicit trade.

“Kyrgyzstan and Russia are members of the [Moscow-led] Eurasian Economic Union and, in general, Russia is one of our main trading partners,” it said. “More than a million of our citizens work in Russia.”

Total exports to Russia from Moscow’s regional allies Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan rose by almost 50% to $15 billion last year, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of UN trade data. 

The same countries nearly doubled their imports of U.S. and EU goods from $14.6 billion in 2021 to $24.3 billion last year, WSJ said in May.

“Kyrgyzstan, while small relative to other countries, is a clear example of every factor at play at once to create an unacceptably [sanctions] evasion-friendly environment,” WP quoted one of the U.S. officials as saying.

Source: The Moscow Times

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AKIPRESS.COM – Kyrgyzstan is a close partner of Russia, the countries have advanced integration processes, the Russian Federation intends to develop them further, President Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov told reporters.

RIA Novosti reported Peskov answered the question of whether the Kremlin is following the situation with possible US sanctions against Kyrgyzstan, whether it sees risks for trade and economic relations.

The Washington Post, citing informed US officials, reported that the Biden administration is preparing economic measures to force Kyrgyzstan to stop exporting sanctioned goods allegedly coming to Russia. What specific measures can be discussed, the publication did not specify. According to the newspaper, preparations for these measures were preceded by “months of fruitless visits” by American and European diplomats to Bishkek.

“In addition to the fact that Kyrgyzstan is our close partner and ally, of course, we are also united by participation in very advanced integration processes,” Peskov said.

He noted that this is “the very integration that brings great benefits to Kyrgyzstan itself”, and Kyrgyzstan “is certainly a beneficiary of the further development of this integration process.”

“We intend to further develop our bilateral relations with Kyrgyzstan, which we highly value, and also all formats of our joint integration,” Peskov concluded.

Source: Akipress

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The idea of a “moderate” Taliban is a grave misconception. The current talk of “moderate” and “ultraconservative” Taliban among western policymakers is fundamentally deceptive. This has created a perception, and perhaps false hope, that if the moderates could do away with Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, the current Taliban Supreme Leader, and his ultra-radical clerics, then they are a group with which the United States could do business. While some senior Taliban leaders have publicly aligned themselves with the domestic and external demands around girls’ education or women’s right to work, this is a matter of strategy and sequencing rather than fundamental differences around the Taliban’s shared puritanic vision, which is the total “Islamic” purification and radicalization of Afghan society, with potential consequences resonating far beyond Afghanistan.

It’s time for the United States to recognize the Taliban for who they are–an extremist, dogmatic group on a “divine” mission to embed their version of Islam in society, in ideological alignment with regional and international Islamist militant groups. The United States must rethink its strategy toward Afghanistan: U.S. officials should see the Taliban for what it is, and start shifting focus now to prevent the group from gaining a stronger foothold in Afghanistan.

Different Strategies, Same Dogmatic Mission

The core Taliban leadership is composed of ultra-conservative Islamists and extremists who believe in a divine mission to purify and “cleanse” Afghan society of what they perceive as corrupt “western” values, including girls’ education, women’s employment and their freedom of movement, and freedom of expression and assembly. The group’s priority is to establish and expand a puritanical theocratic Islamic state in which their interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law, is upheld by fear and force. The Taliban perceive their victory against U.S.-backed forces in August 2021 has given them a divine mandate to advance this cause. Mullah Haibatullah and those around him have consistently referred in their rhetoric to their sacred mission and to consequences in the afterlife for failing to live up to it.

Since taking power, the Taliban’s primary governance objective has been to ensure full compliance with their oppressive policies and the indoctrination of Afghan society. The group has re-established the power and authority of the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice as well as setting up ulama (religious) councils within government departments that directly report to Mullah Haibatullah, and as one analyst put it, to function as the Amir’s eyes and ears, like a nationwide “neighborhood watch”, strengthening and imposing the will of the Amir.

The Taliban are continuing to build their army of supporters to ensure that, in time, their purification mission is embraced by every village across Afghanistan. The Taliban leadership has announced that their priority in the next two years is to establish two to three religious schools, or madrassas, in each of the 364 districts and 34 provincial capitals of Afghanistan.

They have also imposed draconian restrictions on women: banning girls’ education and women’s employment at NGOs. In early April, Taliban issued further decrees banning Afghan female staff working for the UN agencies to come to work, despite confidence and private guarantees this would not happen. These bans were imposed despite an international outcry, not to mention the consequences for their global standing and the immeasurable economic and humanitarian impact on ordinary Afghans.

The Taliban’s leadership cadre has never been moderate, as some have tried to argue, thereby downplayed the egregiousness of the Taliban’s rule. Others have asserted that the current Taliban regime can change – that they are ultimately open to an inclusive government and protecting fundamental human rights if only the international community would give them recognition, money, and more time. In a recent article for the United States Institute of Peace, the authors argued that, due to the failure of diplomatic progress, imposed by unrealistic U.S. expectations and roadmaps, moderate factions within the Taliban have been undermined, further empowering ultraconservatives.

In his book, former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan Abdul Salam Zaeef vehemently rejects such characterizations. He writes: “The thought of dividing them into moderates and hardlines is a useless and reckless aim” and that “the Taliban movement is one based on Islamic ideology, struggling for holy jihad under the principles of ita’at or obedience and samar or listening.”

Those in Kabul, including the Taliban’s First Deputy Leader and Acting Interior Minister Seraj Haqqani, as well as Second Deputy Leader and Acting Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob Mujahid, could put on a moderate face for western consumption as they consolidate power and seek international recognition. Still, these pragmatists should never be mistaken for true moderates.

These senior Taliban leaders are cut from the same cloth as the rest of the core leadership: the ecosystem of ultra-conservative informal schooling, known as Hujra, in Southern Afghanistan and the radical Afghan-led madrassas in parts of Pakistan. In the madrasa system, children as young as seven and eight are raised, often away from their families, and indoctrinated in ultra-conservative Islamic ideology and militancy, especially in the last two decades following the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan.

The difference between the pragmatists and the core dogmatic group is mainly over strategy and sequencing. The pragmatists’ public show of apparent support for women’s education and work is driven purely by the need to secure international recognition and development assistance. During the 2019-2020 Doha talks, the Taliban strategically played to the demands of Western countries. For example, in a February 2021 Open Letter to the people of the United States of America, the chief Taliban negotiator Mullah Baradar claimed the group was “committed to upholding and guaranteeing all rights of women afforded to them by Islamic law.” Haqqani’s opinion piece for the New York Times was another part of a strategic, orchestrated campaign to present a new face of the Taliban.

These claims belie the reality that ordinary Afghans are facing. There is little to suggest that the Haqqani leadership truly has a “moderate” vision for Afghanistan. The pragmatists’ stand should not be interpreted as a significant internal rift within the Taliban, potentially leading to the group’s fragmentation.

Despite internal jockeying over the Taliban’s strategy and tactical approach, there are no substantive divides regarding their shared ideology. The pragmatists are wholeheartedly committed to the shared elements of their ideology. They also will not defy their Amir, as some might hope. Given how the group’s legitimation system is structured, they cannot afford to lose an open conflict against their Amir and risk being ostracized.

The Taliban’s Legitimacy Structure

In the Taliban’s ideologically-driven hybrid authority structure, with vertical and horizontal features, Amir ul-Muminin (the Commander of Faithful) sits at the top of the vertical command structure, defining direction and policies. The current leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, remains the ultimate source of supreme and divine moral authority. As with the Roman Catholic Pope, when speaking ex-cathedra, Mullah Haibatullah, as the Amir, remains infallible. As such, there is no other credible or legitimate actor within the Taliban who can challenge the leader’s will. At the horizontal level, the ministers and state officials are mainly responsible for managing day-to-day government operations, ensuring policy implementation and, if need be, advising the Amir.

This dual authority structure may explain the differences in practice on some issues across Afghanistan, for instance, in how strictly the restrictive decrees on banning girls’ education is being implemented, rather than signifying differences in value and politics within the Taliban senior leadership as some analysts have pointed out. At the horizontal level, officials enjoy a degree of elasticity, allowing for local variations in practice. The historically decentralized nature of governance in Afghanistan better explains these local variations.

Within this legitimation process, going against the leader means, at the very least, losing face and ostracisation by peers. In response to criticism from the ulama regarding the Taliban’s ban on the education of girls, Mullah Haibatullah, in a public July 2022 statement, warned that criticism of authorities was “not permissible” in Islam. The Amir has quickly framed any criticism and dissent around the use of fitna – a state of political disorder in which people cannot fulfill their duties as Muslims. Fitna can permeate society like a disease, which must be eradicated by all means. This ideology ensures that the Taliban’s sacred agenda faces no disruptions, even minor ones, subsequently allowing them to present their policies as in alignment with the Afghan society and Islam and even as popular. As such, the group has brutally suppressed any dissent to their rule in the broader Afghan society and within their ranks.

More recently, Taliban’s Minister of Higher Education, Neda Mohammad Nadeem, warned that “those undermining the order, either by speech, pen, or in practice, are considered Baghi [the one opposed to a just leader] and Wajeb ul-Qatl [permitted to be killed].”

Time for the US to Rethink its Afghanistan Strategy

From this lens, unsurprisingly, international engagement with the Taliban keeps hitting a brick wall and has mainly proved ineffective, including on women’s rights. The United States and its allies are dealing with a regime on a radical mission, making any meaningful engagement very difficult beyond technical discussion over the delivery of humanitarian aid.

The carrots the international community has proposed so far subject to Taliban’s improved policies towards women – broader engagement and potential development assistance in specific areas – such as salaries for teachers or in the healthcare sector – is of secondary importance for the Taliban core leadership. They are driven and motivated by a puritanic mission and elements of a shared ideology. Indeed, they would rather see the Afghan population starve to death than undermine this mission.

It’s time for western policymakers to be realistic about the potential security threat the Taliban pose and the group’s commitment and ability to prevent the use of Afghan territory for international terrorism. On the third anniversary of the U.S.-Taliban deal, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price once again confirmed that “the Taliban have not fulfilled their commitment… while they have taken some unsatisfactory steps regarding certain terrorist groups in Afghanistan, it is well known that the Taliban sheltered then al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, which flies in the face of the agreement.” On July 31, 2022, a U.S. drone strike killed the al-Qaeda leader, Aiman al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden’s successor, in the heart of Kabul. He was reportedly hosted and sheltered by the notorious Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s First Deputy Leader and Acting Interior Minister, and one of the so-called “moderate” Taliban.

Similarly, the regional affiliate of the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) has carried out dozens of attacks targeting Shia and other minorities, demonstrating the Taliban’s inability to quell the threat from ISK. General Michael Kurilla, the commander of U.S. Central Command told lawmakers in March this year that ISK in Afghanistan could target U.S. and other Western countries’ interests in the next six months. His assessment was that the group is recruiting and expanding rapidly inside Afghanistan.

Underneath the relative calm, there is trouble brewing. It’s a matter of time before the country once again becomes a breeding ground for international terrorism and radical Islamic movements. It doesn’t help that since taking power the group has alienated the vast majority of Afghans and diverse ethnic and tribal groups from the political process. This can have implications for future domestic conflict.

Some pundits have played down the threat posed by the Taliban, pointing out that the group has not expressed ambitions to expand its mission beyond Afghanistan’s borders. That might be the case for now, but three factors increase security risks beyond Afghanistan.

First, the Taliban’s victory and return to power resonated with militant Islamic groups far beyond Afghanistan. Their return to power is a blueprint for other Islamist groups in the region whose aim is to topple and replace regimes through violence. Immediately after the Taliban victory in August 2021, Tahreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader Noor Wali Mehsud, renewed his oath of allegiance to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in a statement, describing their win over the United States as a “victory” for the “entire Muslim ummah” (or worldwide community of Muslims).

Second, the Taliban’s attempts to further radicalize Afghan society and undermine modern legal frameworks and institutions may provide a blueprint for other religious groups in the region. Taliban leader Mullah Haibatullah recently spoke about the legal framework in Pakistan being contradictory to Islam, indirectly justifying TTP’s attempt to topple the existing structures. The radical policies of the Taliban will inspire other groups and may have global ramifications.

Third, the Taliban might not be in the position or have the ambition to lead the flag of “global Jihad” against the West and within the region. However, this should not be interpreted as their unwillingness to empower and enable the country and regional-specific militant groups and movements to expand their ultra-conservative mission. There is ideological alignment on a shared jihadist project, with several regional militant groups seeking to implement a Shariah-compliant political order through force.

Several experts aptly documented the ideological alignment between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP. Since the Taliban military takeover in August 2021, TTP has intensified its attacks and wreaked havoc across Pakistan, killing hundreds of state officials, police, army soldiers, religious minorities, and civilians. Similarly, Tajikistan has persistently raised, especially in recent months, concerns about potential militant incursions, not only by Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)–a terrorist group with close links to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, to set up an Islamic’ caliphate’ in Central Asia–but also by other purported jihadi outfits.

In the medium to long term, the Taliban could further forge and consolidate the alliance with militants in South and Central Asia to try to destabilize the region and beyond. Afghanistan is an incubator for many of these militant groups. It may only be a matter of time before Afghan soil is used to stage another international terrorist attack. For example, TTP is already using Afghan territory to launch attacks inside Pakistan.

Others have argued that the Taliban is using the existence of militant groups, including TTP, IMU, East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and al-Qaeda, as a short-term strategy to gain political leverage against its neighbors and the world. However, the Taliban’s track record of supporting ideologically-aligned militant groups has been historically consistent. In 2001, they did not turn against al-Qaeda or hand over Osama Bin Laden to ensure their survival. Why would they do it now? At the same time, why would the group break its relations with transnational Islamist groups such as TTP, IMU, and al-Qaeda, given their shared mission? The group historically has been willing to take extreme risks to maintain their commitment to foreign jihadis in Afghanistan, despite significant international pressure.

What are the policy options for the United States and its allies? While the United States must continue to engage with the Taliban on humanitarian issues, this engagement should be limited if the Taliban’s repressive policies remain unchanged. As the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction warned in yesterday’s congressional hearing, U.S. humanitarian aid to Afghanistan requires greater oversight to ensure resources are not diverted to the Taliban or other terrorist groups.

Recognizing that the Taliban’s mission could further radicalize Afghanistan and have implications for the region and the world, political and financial support to counter the Taliban’s dangerous and dogmatic mission should be at the heart of U.S. outreach efforts. The United States should also more effectively engage with non-Taliban Afghans, both political and civil society groups.

Meanwhile, the Taliban’s narrative and ideology must be consistently and vocally challenged by Muslim leaders and scholars. This dangerous vision for society, particularly their complete erasure of women, must not be normalized. Prominent Pakistani Mufti Taqi Usmani’s recent letter to Mullah Haibatullah urging him to reconsider his position on girls’ education is encouraging. Turkish President Erdogan’s stance on the Taliban’s oppressive policies towards women was also a positive step. The United States and other western countries should support consistent and coordinated messaging on these issues from the Islamic world’s leaders and religious leaders inside Afghanistan.

In its engagement with the Taliban, the international community may find an occasional ally within the group on a few issues. While this may seem reassuring, it does not provide inroads to changing the Taliban’s radical outlook and behavior. What is needed now instead is a coherent foreign policy that contains the threat the Taliban poses to freedom and stability in Afghanistan, the wider region, and beyond.

Source : Just Security

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