Kiev (15/5 – 60).         

Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not comment of the formation of new tank brigades. The new brigades are equipped with Leopard 2 and Bradley personnel carriers. The exact strength is not disclosed but it will be envisioned the new brigades are deploying the various hotspot.

Well informed sources within the ministry of defense did not comment on the deployment. “We want to avoid speculation”, said a Colonel of the HUR (the military intelligence department).

In the NATO context, the Ukrainian army is a considerable force. Wedged in between the United States, Poland, Turkey (or Türkiye as it is colloquially called) the United Kingdom, the Ukraine is in the top five of NATO generating forces.

Without being an active member of NATO, the Russian war of aggression took a risk to take on NATO. The “security buffer” of NATO surrounding the Russian Federation is an irrational fear of the old Soviet style. The Russians have only contributed to the unification of NATO and the rearmament of Europe.

Besides getting new weapon systems online the EU is reconstituting conscription. Although whispered in the hallways of power, conscription is the new normal.

NATO has as of May 2024, NATO’s combined militaries have around 3.5 million personnel, including troops and civilians. This number has increased over time, with 3.37 million personnel in 2023 and 3.01 million in 2016. The United States had the largest number of active military personnel in NATO with almost 1.33 million men under arms.

Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark stand up forces are about 139,600 with reserve forces drawn up to a million men.

As of April 2024, NATO allies had 12,408 main battle tanks in addition to 1,004,844 armored vehicles and other ground combat vehicles. Türkiye and Greece have the highest number of tanks besides the United States. 2,231 and 1,365 tanks can be fielded by the two NATO states.

NATO allies and partner countries have delivered more than 98% of the combat vehicles promised to Ukraine during Russia’s invasion and war, the military alliance’s chief said Thursday, giving Kyiv a bigger punch as it contemplates launching a counteroffensive.

Ukraine’s allies have sent “vast amounts of ammunition” and trained and equipped more than nine new Ukrainian brigades, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said.

More than 30,000 troops are estimated to make up the new brigades. Some NATO partner countries, such as Sweden and Australia, have also provided armored vehicles.

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What are Erdogan and Putin thinking when they meet up in person as they recently did on September 4? What are they looking to gain off each other, if anything, that they can’t through intermediaries? What implicit messages are intended for the world – and their own public? Both hail from relatively closed societies – closed by them – especially at the top, thus very little authentic information is made available. Teasing out the truth requires advanced forms of what used to be called ‘Kremlinology’, reading the signs based on years of observation. Luckily this column has done just that for some decades – adduced from field experience reporting on wars and political shenanigans in the region.

Putin and Erdo met in Sochi on the Russian Black Sea coast to discuss the Ukraine grain deal. Putin emerged saying it’s still no go. Erdogan came away saying progress was made. Since both leaders control their media, they can posture publicly in that way without fear of contradiction at home. So, at the very least, it’s a photo-op and a plus for both. Look how world leaders come to pay homage to your leader, is the message, a form of legitimation. The photo-op occurs at a time when Erdogan has ‘won’ a national election and feels emboldened. Putin is slowly losing grip on Moscow’s empire. Usually, on such occasions, the Kremlin boss likes to keep his visitor waiting as a psy-op maneuver up front. He can’t afford to do that with Erdogan, at this point, because real-world consequences would follow – he knows the Turkish prez is a vindictive guy.

What consequences? Who has more leverage over the other? Well, it’s a pretty balanced situation. Turkey allows a lot of dark money to flow to and from Russia. A crucial source of foreign currency. Turkey gets the benefit of Russian tourism that keeps the hotels and restaurants afloat in the midst of severe inflation/recession. The Kremlin, no doubt, has tons of embarrassing communications by Erdo, his family, his party that Russian snooping apparatus has picked up. But he has proved impervious to such leaks from any quarter, having sailed through several down the years. His followers don’t care. Above all, he knows the Russians prefer him to any squeaky-clean fully pro-Western non-authoritarian leader. He’s a man they can do business with, as the saying goes.

He’s also, in many ways, their worst nightmare strategically. Erdo has now signed defense pacts with several of the Central Asian countries, from Azerbaijan eastwards. Ankara is displacing Moscow as the security guarantor of Russia’s underbelly across the ‘Stans, reconstituting a pan-Turkic bloc to counter-balance domination by Russia after some three centuries of Kremlin hegemony. Let us not forget the enormity of that challenge to the status quo – if such a bloc gels it can destabilize other Turkic areas in the Russian Federation such as Tatarstan, Astrakhan, Bashkortostan and the like. China and Iran support Putin in his geo-throttling of Central Asia but slowly, inexorably, they’re losing their grip. And the US is finally getting into the game actively, as this column indicated recently via a leaked letter from President Biden to the President of Uzbekistan.

And then there’s Ukraine. Essentially, the Russo-Turkic tug-of-war over Ukraine is a struggle over domination of the Black Sea. Russian control over Crimea being a central peg. Again, a story of centuries – ever since Turkic ally, the Khan of Crimea, lost power to the Kremlin in the 18^th century. These are deep tectonic plates of memory and history and both leaders feel their force when they meet. Putin has suddenly opened disastrous cracks in the Procrustean bed of Russian hegemony by his invasion of Ukraine. It’s an opportunity for Erdogan to write his name in history as the Turkish leader who helped liberate the Crimean Tatar cousins from Moscow’s yoke. And, now, you can understand the full symbolic significance of Zelensky appointing a Crimean Tatar as the Defense Secretary of Ukraine. Ukraine, too, is getting into the game of liberating Crimea from Moscow.

Close to the surface too, no doubt, was the issue of Turkey’s Bayraktar drones. They caused havoc on Russian forces and armor for many months. And then we heard very little about them. Essentially, the Russians had built microwave towers that could detect their signature in advance. They were rendered ineffectual. At the time of the Sochi meeting both leaders surely knew that. But Erdogan also likely knew that Ukraine had identified the towers, perhaps with Turkish help. Recently, at least one tower was destroyed by Ukraine on the Crimea coast and suddenly the Bayraktars were aloft again, hitting targets inland and along the coast. ‘We haven’t seen much of your drones recently,’ Putin might have said, as a humiliating aside. Erdogan might have responded ‘You will.’

Source: Forbes

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For young Uyghurs from China’s Xinjiang region, Istanbul’s East Turkistan Youth Center has been a godsend during a difficult time.  

One 25-year-old who arrived in Turkey in 2016 turned to the center for counseling after struggling with a drug habit.

“When I heard about this center and the support they were providing to Uyghur youth for free, I couldn’t believe my ears,” he said. “Before joining the center, I was involved in negative activities and used drugs like heroin.”

Abdusami Hoten, 30, co-founded the center in 2021 in Istanbul’s Safakoy district – one of the most heavily Uyghur-populated areas of the city – to offer guidance and housing for Uyghur youths.

The 25-year-old, who requested anonymity so as not to harm his future prospects, moved to Turkey to further his education. But he wasn’t able to enroll in classes – he was out of work and his parents’ plans to move from Xinjiang to Turkey fell through.

He became isolated and depressed and lost hope in his future. That’s when he turned to illegal drugs.

Eventually, a friend suggested that he seek help at the center shortly after it opened.

“The center’s primary objective is to educate and assist Uyghur youth who are on the wrong path, such as addiction to gambling, drugs and other substances, and guide them toward reintegrating into society,” said Hoten, a Uyghur who has lived in Turkey since 2016. 

Roughly 50,000 Uyghurs live in Turkey, the largest Uyghur diaspora outside Central Asia. The Turkish government has offered Uyghurs a safe place to live outside Xinjiang, where they face persecution.  

But once in Turkey, some Uyghur youths have encountered unemployment, economic hardship and drug addiction.

“Our wish for the youth is that they can, whether in the society or in a foreign country, avoid becoming a burden to others and instead actively contribute to both society and the Uyghur community, while embracing and preserving their ethnic identity,” Hoten said.

Since its inception, the center has served over 220 people, helping nearly three dozen young people recover from drug addiction, he said.

The 25-year-old has received treatment for his drug use and is learning about herbal medicine to become an herbal doctor.

Hoten has organized classes on psychology and Uyghur history, and other events that have offered new perspectives, the 25-year-old said.

“We received valuable advice from elders, and every week, we had food gatherings, strengthening our bonds like brothers,” he said. “Gradually, our interest in living increased, and we are incredibly grateful for the positive changes.”

Boxing, painting and host talks

A similar community facility for Uyghurs – the Palwan Uyghur Youth Center – was founded in 2019 by Samarjan Saidi, a 34-year-old Uyghur, as a place in Safakoy district for young people to play sports and learn new skills.

The center consists of a boxing club and a separate youth facility that offers courses in painting, arts and crafts, English and the natural sciences. Organizers also host talks and field trips. 

Initially, Saidi wanted to create a family-like environment for Uyghur youths, so he and some friends set up a boxing club in a rented basement. Later, with funding from the U.S.-based Uyghur NextGen Project, they were able to move the boxing club to another facility and set up a youth center. 

The main purpose of the center is to help young people prepare for college by providing guidance that aligns with their interests and talents, Saidi said.

Saidi was born in Qumul and raised in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi. He moved to Denmark in the early 2000s to go to school. After he graduated, he intended to return home and start a business with friends. 

“However, in 2016, some of my friends who had returned home from Europe had their passports confiscated,” Saidi told RFA. “I decided not to return home for the time being.”

That year, Chinese authorities in Xinjiang began collecting passports. Uyghurs had to hand them in to authorities who said they would hold them for safekeeping and would return them for any necessary travel abroad. But that was not the case in most instances.

The situation worsened in 2017, when authorities began arbitrarily arresting both prominent and ordinary Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, sending them to “re-education” camps or prison for participating in “illegal” religious practices or activities deemed “extremist” or a threat to national security.

It was during this time that Saidi and his friends in Europe decided to open the boxing club and pooled their finances.  

“As we made progress, we invited English teachers, which attracted more people to join,” he said. “Even girls requested having a training environment, and one of the girls who was already training in a Turkish club took responsibility for training them.”

‘Warm and friendly environment’

As more youths joined, the center began offering English courses and organized social events, Saidi said.

With a computer and US$25,000 from the Uyghur NextGen Project, Saidi and his colleagues purchased new space for the boxing club and renovated it themselves. They also bought a nearby hair salon and turned it into the Palawan Youth Center. 

“While we may not fully recreate the family environment that we left behind, our main goal is to create a warm and friendly environment as close to it as possible,” Saidi said.

When two youths wanted to learn how to play traditional Uyghur instruments like the dutar, a long-necked two-stringed lute, and promote Uyghur culture through music, organizers found a Uyghur musician to provide instruction. They did the same for a young woman who wanted to learn how to draw.

The center also hosts art displays to showcase the works of its members, summer picnics and talks given by Uyghur professionals. 

“During Ramadan, we organize iftar [fast-breaking evening meal] events, preceded by speeches from religious figures and successful individuals,” he said. “We come together to eat, pray and strengthen our bonds during such events.”

Idris Ayas, a staffer who has lived in Turkey for 11 years and has a master’s degree in international law, has worked with young Uyghurs since 2019. 

“In essence, the Palawan Youth Center has not only become a place of learning and growth but also evolved into a welcoming home and family for our Uyghur students,” he said.

Source: RFA News

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Four countries have been exchanging views on normalizing ties between Türkiye and Syria, as well as counterterrorism, political process, and humanitarian matters, including the voluntary, safe, and dignified return of Syrians.

The country’s foreign ministers met in Russia’s capital Moscow on May 10 and agreed to form a committee to normalize relations between Türkiye and Syria.

Syria has been mired in a vicious civil war since early 2011 when the Assad regime cracked down on pro-democracy protests with unexpected ferocity.

Source: Yeni Safak

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Rüya Bayegan using prime minister Barzani’s right hand – Rania Majeed – to elbow her way back to KRG?

Ankara, Erbil (4/1 – 45).

Rüya Bayegan, the CEO of BGN International and its Turkey-based subsidiary Bayegan Group, was once considered an instrumental member of the petrochemical industry in Turkey. However, as of at least October 2022, Bayegan and her husband, Ercüment Bayegan, have been under investigation by Turkish authorities on allegations of fraud, document forgeries and tax evasion as a result of their role in the disastrous Yurtgas scandal.

The recent contract between BGN International with the Indonesian state owned oil and gas company Pertamina raises questions in Jakarta with various government supervisory agencies.

In June 2022 the magazine Upstream reported the Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission, the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), has reportedly launched an investigation into possible graft relating to the historic procurement of liquefied natural gas by national oil company Pertamina.

In an attempt to prove Rüya Bayegan utility to the Turkish government and dampen her fall from grace, it appears that Bayegan is turning to long familiar partners in Kurdistan.

Bayegan Group/BGN has a history of operating in Kurdistan, but little information is available in the public domain. Turkish energy policy heavily features the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and as a former extension of Turkish economic objectives, Bayegan has proven to be a useful proxy there for politics as well as business.

Local sources note that Bayegan, and BGN/Bayegan Group, have intentionally obscured their relationships inside of Kurdistan’s government to maintain unincumbered access to the local oil and gas markets. It stands to reason that the KRG, which has garnered a reputation of being rife with “corruption, cronyism, and nepotism”, would also seek to downplay its relationship with external players benefitting from such a structure.

When Prime Minister Barzani took office, he vowed to address these issues, instating individuals in relevant positions in the more notorious of ministries, to include the Ministry for Natural Resources. However, when his appointee – Kamal Atroshi – became too focused on implementing anticorruption measures, Barzani turned his most powerful supporter and ally on him, forcing him out of his job.

In August 2022 the Fikra Forum highlighted that despite the promises of reform Kurdistan business as usual continues in the troubled region.

It is this ally, Prime Minister Barzani’s gatekeeper and close personal confidante, Dr. Rania Majeed (Ranya Majid), with whom Bayegan has maintained a quiet, close relationship. Majeed is known inside of KRG and among government insiders as the “untouchable” and fiercely loyal right hand to Barzani and manages relationships and highest priority objectives on Barzani’s political and personal agendas, to include in the oil and gas and housing sectors. According to Draw Dr. Rania Majeed was appointed in 2019 as the economic advisor to Masrour Barzani as a key appointee of the Kurdish administration tightly controlling the oil revenues to Kurdistan.  

Given that Bayegan is facing civil and potential criminal charges stemming from allegations of tax evasion, forgeries of documents, company names, and addresses, as well as unpaid million-dollar debts, it is no surprise that Kurdistan and Majeed have downplayed their relationship – a public connection between the two would throw their historical and ongoing professional collaborations under extraordinary scrutiny.  

“It is yet to be seen if the Kurdish administration continues to engage with questionable business partners to enrich themselves or not”, said a senior official in Ankara.

The recent contract between BGN International with Indonesian state owned oil and gas company, Pertamina raises questions in Jakarta with various government supervisory agencies.

Bayegan- Kurdish relationship

Bayegan and Majeed have shared a longstanding business relationship, mutually benefitting from their exclusive arrangements. It is through this relationship – and Majeed’s ability to influence the energy industry at her whim –  that Bayegan is able to access products before others in the industry.

Recently, It was reported that the KRG’s oil ministry offered Bayegan additional spot volumes previously designated for other trading partners. BGN International’s director Emin Imanov was quoted as stating that the company was offered and agreed to purchase these barrels. The price of BGN’s purchase remains undisclosed. 

Rania Majeed’s energy influence 

Given the important role the energy sector plays in KRG politics, it’s no surprise that Barzani has installed his number two as a gatekeeper for oil contracts. Barzani specifically requested that Majid serve as an advisor within the Ministry of Natural Resources in order to act a direct and trusted line of information within one of the most critical to his success as prime minister. 

Majeed serves as the primary interlocutor for the KRG’s energy relations with key stakeholders, ranging from internal decision-makers in the sector to external advisors and leaders. Together with RT Bank director Hamela Gardi and the director general of contracts and companies at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Dr. Ghazala, Majeed holds the keys to the proverbial kingdom, and has the latitude to dictate who end up among KRG’s energy partners.

A source in the Ministry of Natural Resources echoed a sentiment published in an article about Majeed’s influence, “no oil minister can encroach on the power of these three women in Barzani’s cabinet.”  

When previous Minister for Natural Resources Kamal Atroshi began pushing for transparency in the ministry, Majid intervened and sought to obstruct and undermine Atroshi’s efforts, resulting in Atroshi’s resignation in May 2022.  Majid also reportedly influenced Atroshi’s decision to change oil payment dates for invoices from 15 days to three months in 2020. 

Source: Cairo Herald

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