CentralAsia (TJ) – Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan Farhod Salim on December 1 held a meeting with the Ambassador of the United States of America Manuel Mikaller.

According to the press service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, key issues of bilateral cooperation between Tajikistan and the United States were discussed.

Issues of regional security, the fight against modern challenges and threats, and the importance of expanding bilateral cooperation were also discussed.

Source: Central Asia Media

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On April 21, 2019 – Easter Sunday – a coordinated series of bombings ripped through Sri Lanka, targeting churches and luxury hotels. Over 260 people were killed, making it the deadliest terrorist attack ever suffered by Sri Lanka. The attack has continued to resonate in Sri Lankan society and politics, as the public demands to untangle questions of responsibility: Why was the attack not prevented, and what can be done to stop the next one?

To understand the context behind the bombings, The Diplomat’s Shannon Tiezzi interviewed Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, a professor of security studies at the Nanyang Technological University who founded Singapore’s International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Based on his interviews with terrorists and extremists in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Indonesia, Philippines and elsewhere, Gunaratna has author a dozen books including his most recent work, “Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Massacre: Lessons for the International Community” published by Penguin-Random House. 

In this email interview, Gunaratna explained the rise of Islamic extremism in Sri Lanka in general, as well as the motivations for this particular attack. He also analyzed the operational failures on the part of the government. “Soon after the end of the war, Sri Lanka experienced an exacerbation of ethnocentric politics that gave rise to a spectrum of ethnoreligious groups,” he said. That created a trend of “radicalization and reciprocal radicalization,” which successive governments seemed uninterested in tackling.

Ultimately, Gunaratna argued, “The Easter Sunday attack took place because Sri Lankan politicians compromised national interests for personal gain.”

The growth of Wahhabism has been a key factor in Islamic extremism around the world. How has this trend played out in Sri Lanka?

Religious violence is a global phenomenon. All faiths – Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, and Sikhism – have been misinterpreted to spread hate and conduct attacks. The teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its breakaway factions, its Asian version Jamaat-e-Islami, as well as Salafi Wahhabism radicalized Muslims and eventually separated Muslims from non-Muslims. Many countries have criminalized these politico-religious organizations and ideologies, banned their literature and books, blocked their online sites, and rehabilitated their preachers. 

The worst act of international terrorism after 9/11, the Easter Sunday massacre in Sri Lanka did not manifest overnight. The Easter Sunday attack was the culmination of Muslim radicalization over three decades in Sri Lanka. Both Sri Lankan political leaders and Muslim religious leaders neglected their responsibility to protect the religious space, a sacred treasure infiltrated and influenced by political radicals and religious fanatics. [Even before the Easter attacks] 11 incidents, including attacking local and traditional Muslims, breaking statues, shooting government informants, and running terrorist training camps, were organized and conducted by leaders and members of Salafi Wahhabism and Jamaat-e-Islami. 

Islamization and Arabization in Sri Lanka was funded by Middle Eastern governments, especially by their religious and educational institutions that gave scholarships to study in Medina. The geopolitical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran empowered these ideologies and doctrines. Funded by charities, religious fanatics spread these narratives under the guise of spreading “pure” or “pristine Islam.” 

After [Saudi Crown Prince] Mohammed bin Salman came to power, he has taken decisive steps to remove hateful content from the school textbooks. Saudi Arabia, where Salafi Wahhabism originated, has imprisoned and started to rehabilitate radical and violent clerics. As such, the ideological and operational threat is moving from the core in the Middle East to the periphery in Asia, Africa, and the Western world. 

The countries to which these vicious doctrines spread from Saudi Arabia in the past, such as Sri Lanka, have not been successful in dismantling the Salafi Wahhabi mosques, madrassahs and their institutions. Similarly, the religious authorities have neglected their responsibility to monitor the activities of these institutions and re-educate their clerics on the need to promote moderation, toleration and coexistence.

You make the point that Islamic extremism was growing alongside, and even in concert with, Buddhist extremism in Sri Lanka. How have groups like the BBS contributed to the overall environment of religious extremism in the country?

Until the Easter Sunday attack, Sri Lankan Islam was considered idyllic. Islam evolved in Sri Lanka side by side with Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism. After Sri Lanka transformed into an open economy in 1977, Sri Lankan Muslims went to work and study in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf. Muslims were culturally Sri Lankan until then. Gradually, the peaceful Islam was supplanted by political Islam. 

A tiny segment of the Muslims started to developed a distinct identity, asking for their own schools, demanded halal food and embraced Gulf dress codes. A segment of Muslim women started to mimic Gulf culture, wear the black Abaya and even cover their face, and men started to grow long beards and wear the thobe. The most extreme Muslims did not want to associate with non-Muslims and did not want Muslims or their charities to support non-Muslims. Eventually nearly 500 Arab and other foreign preachers arrived in Sri Lanka and radicalized a segment of the Sri Lankan Muslims. 

In response to this shift, Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, ultra-nationalism, and extremism emerged. Of a dozen groups formed, the most vocal and visible was Bodu Bala Sena (BBS). Soon after the end of the war, Sri Lanka experienced an exacerbation of ethnocentric politics that gave rise to a spectrum of ethnoreligious groups. 

At times, the lack of political will to counter both Sinhala Buddhist and Muslim extremist groups created a further divide and polarization of communities. Even in some cases, as seen with the Digana, Dharga, and Ampara anti-Muslim riots, Sinhala Buddhist groups such as BBS, Sinhale and Mahason Balakaya were able to operate with impunity. There have also been biases within successive governments in countering Sinhala Buddhist extremism that created the conditions for Islamism and Muslim extremism to thrive. Ethnocentric political decisions such as the [forced] cremation of COVID-19 dead affected the Muslim population. These decisions are seen as a catalyst for disrupting the cordial relationship between the Sinhalese and Muslims. 

Although the BBS leader Ven Gnanasara was imprisoned, successive governments failed to ban his group, the BBS and similar groups. As a government, Sri Lanka could have done more to fight the rising tide against Muslims. For instance, government should have neither permitted the Myanmarese anti-Rohingya Buddhist monk Wirathu nor the Indian hate preacher Zakir Naik to visit Sri Lanka. These developments led to radicalization and reciprocal radicalization. 

Irrespective of faith, government and religious bodies should take firm action not only against deviant monks, Muslim clerics, and clergy of any denomination but seize their assets. Every year, the government should review and ban religious groups and designate personalities engaged in activities prejudicial to social harmony. 

In an operational sense, how did Islamic State affiliates evolve in Sri Lanka? How did these groups recruit members and grow their ranks?

The ideological foundation of al-Qaida, Islamic State, and other threat groups can be traced back to Salafi Wahhabism’s doctrine of Al Wala Wal Bara or “loyalty to Muslims and hatred to non Muslims.” I have posted a video of Zahran Hashim, the leader of the Easter Sunday attackers referring to Al Wala Wal Bara as his foundational ideology. 

Although the term al Wala (loyalty to Muslims) and separately Wal Bara (disavowal of Muslims) exist separately in the Quran, the phrase “Al Wala Wal Bara” as a collective does not exist either in the Quran or the Hadith. Unfortunately, Muslim religious leaders including in Sri Lanka have not adequately countered this misinterpretation of the Quran that is driving the contemporary wave of exclusivism, extremism, violence, and terrorism. For instance, immediately before pledging allegiance to [Islamic State leader] Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, Zahran says that he is conducting a “heroic martyrdom operation” to please Allah. Ideally they should do a point-by-point rebuttal of these deviations from mainstream Islam. 

Those indoctrinated and radicalized by the politico-religious ideology of Salafi Wahhabism and Jamaat-e-Islami mount attacks in two phases. First, they attack local and traditional Muslims, especially Sufis, who place humanity above religion. In the case of Sri Lanka, Salafi Wahhabis attacked nearly 5,000 homes, businesses, shrines, and graveyards. Second, they attack non-Muslims considered infidels or kafir. In the case of Sri Lanka, they attacked Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist images. 

After denying that religious extremism has spread in their community, a segment of Muslim religious, political and community leaders neglected their responsibility in three areas. First, stopping Salafi Wahhabism, Jamaat-e-Islami, and other foreign ideologies from taking root in Sri Lanka. They have not unequivocally stated that these are foreign ideologies that will harm the cordial relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. Even after the government banned Salafi Wahhabi groups following the Easter Sunday attack, a few Muslim leaders campaigned to delist those groups. 

Second, Muslim leaders, by failing to work with successive governments to monitor, identify, and dismantle the [radical] mosques, madrassahs, and other institutions, ignored deviant ideologies and doctrines. Unless the religious space is tightly regulated, these deviant teachings and preachings will sooner or later harm cordial intra-Muslim and inter-faith relations. 

Third, Muslim leaders, especially theological leaders, need to re-educate their clerics on the need to promote moderation, toleration, and coexistence. As most of the Islamic State Sri Lanka Branch leaders of the Easter Sunday massacre were clerics, the religious authorities in Sri Lanka should conduct courses and accredit clerics to practice Sri Lankan Islam or Islam contextualized to Sri Lanka. 

It’s been widely reported that the Sri Lanka government had advance notice that an attack was in the works, but failed to stop the Easter bombings. What was behind this failure? Was this a case of operational shortcomings, or were there – as shockingly alleged in a British documentary – political motives?

The Easter Sunday attack took place because Sri Lankan politicians compromised national interests for personal gain. The political leaders did not act decisively against Muslim exclusivism and extremism as the Muslim vote is important for them to remain in power. It is the politicians that failed to preempt the attack by failing to instruct the law enforcement authorities to disrupt and dismantle the terrorist and extremist infrastructure as well as prevent the attack by failing to guide the religious authorities to regulate the religious space.

The Easter Sunday attack was not an intelligence failure but an operational failure. An operational failure means failure to act based on intelligence. On Muslim community radicalization, Islamic State (ISIS), and Zahran Hashim, the Sri Lankan intelligence community produced 337 reports from January 2015 to April 21, 2019, the day of the Easter massacre. Political leaders neglected intelligence reports that explained the threat in great detail. Some bureaucrats who wish to please the politicians did not instruct them to act. 

Even today, some members of the political opposition have created a conspiracy theory that the Easter attack was orchestrated by the Indian intelligence service, Research and Analysis Wing. It was India that provided sound and timely intelligence of the Easter attack. Similarly, the Channel Four documentary on Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday attack falsely alleged that Sri Lankan intelligence was behind the attack, but they have failed to provide a single piece of evidence to substantiate a claim by a bogus asylum seeker. 

In this age of denial of truth and fake news, as soon as an attack happens governments should keep both the stakeholders and the public informed. As public opinion is key, it is too late to wait for the investigations to be completed and the perpetrators charged and prosecuted. 

After the 9/11 attack, the Easter Sunday attack is one of the most investigated attacks. In addition to inquiries and investigations by three fact-finding bodies and three specialist divisions of the Sri Lankan police, INTERPOL, the Australian Federal Police, and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations have interviewed the suspects and scrutinized the recoveries including their phones, laptops and other electronic devices. 

To write “Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Massacre: Lessons for the International Community,” I conducted interviews over a period of one year with the rank and file of the Islamic State, Sri Lanka Branch, as well as Hadiya, widow of Zahran Hashim, the leader; Noufer, chief ideologue and deputy leader; and Milhan, head of the military wing. In addition to speaking to the investigators, I reviewed both the open source and classified reporting pertaining to Muslim community radicalization, ISIS, and Zahran Hashim including the 337 intelligence reports.

In the four years since the attack, Sri Lanka has been subsumed in various other crises: first the COVID-19 pandemic, then a debt default and economic crisis, followed by political instability that saw a new president and prime minister installed. Amid these other competing priorities, has Sri Lanka’s government made any progress in addressing the gaps that allowed the 2019 attacks to succeed?

If Sri Lanka learns the right lessons of the Easter massacre, the country will come out stronger and better. Fortunately, the Sri Lankan intelligence community is helmed by Major General Suresh Salley, an honest and a highly experienced national security practitioner. Furthermore, the second tier of the intelligence community is staffed by dedicated Muslim officers with significant expertise on Muslim radicalization. 

Unfortunately, the Easter Sunday attack is exploited by the political opposition, NGOs and a segment of the church. Rather than waste time, the visionary leaders of the Sri Lankan government and the political opposition should work together to develop a bipartisan approach to national security. Likewise, the NGOs, church and others should work with Muslim bodies – ACJU, DMRCA and Waqf Board – to reverse radicalization by starting rehabilitation. 

All around Sri Lanka, Muslim religious extremism is a persistent threat: to the north, in Kerala and Tamil Nadu; to the west, in Maldives; and to the east, in Indonesia and Philippines,. For instance, luxury hotels and churches in Indonesia and a cathedral in the Philippines, suffered from attacks by al-Qaida and Islamic State affiliates. The Easter attack is not an exception to the global trend of religious fanatics attacking churches and hotels. 

After the return of the Taliban-al-Qaida alliance to Afghanistan, religious extremism remains a formidable threat to Asia. To ensure that religious extremism is kept at bay, there should be constant and consistent efforts to contain and isolate religious exclusivism that leads to extremism, violence, and eventually to terrorism. There should be policies and persistent efforts to integrate Muslims into the Sri Lankan political, economic and social mainstream.  

As a mark of respect to those who perished and survived on Easter Sunday, the Muslim leaders should work with government to control and regulate the religious space. Rather than wait for government to act, Muslim religious leaders should initiate interfaith programs and projects including to create harmony centers to guide the community. Otherwise, the next generation too will witness similar attacks that will inevitably lead to Islamophobia, including anti-Muslim riots. 

To this date, the government and its Muslim partner institutions have not taken decisive action to implement the recommendations of the three fact finding bodies, which includes countering virulent ideologies, banning foreign preachers, restricting access to extremist sites and controlling radical books. On the contrary, driven by political considerations, at the request of a few Muslim leaders, government has delisted Salafi Wahhabi organizations banned after Easter attack. 

More broadly, what can Sri Lanka do to tamp down the growth of religious extremism of all types – and prevent further terrorist violence?

Securing a nation-state from terrorist violence is multifaceted and requires a partnership between government and community. Terrorism is a unique form of violence where the perpetrator attacks civilians to drive terror and fear. The targeting of civilians or the manifestation of terrorism is the result of a prolonged process of religious politicization and radicalization. In that cycle, suspicion leads to prejudice, prejudice to resentment, resentment to hate, hate to anger, anger to incitement, incitement to violence, and violence to terrorism. 

The state responding to terrorism or violence itself is ineffective. Before the end product of terrorism and violence, the threat is manifested as ideological extremism and exclusivism. While the primary responsibility for addressing terrorism and violence is with the government, the primary responsibility for addressing extremism and exclusivism is with the religious and civil partners, including the school and the family. Governments working with their religious and civil partners should address each stage of the threat, starting with exclusivism before it evolves into extremism. In addition to leadership at all levels to engage and empower government and community partners, mitigating the threat requires enacting far reaching legislation, creating robust structures and establishing evolving capabilities. 

First, the Sri Lankan president should establish a Presidential Council of Religious Leaders where the leaders or their deputy leaders meet every month to resolve religious disputes that could lead to violence. 

Second, the Sri Lankan police should create a separate division to monitor hate speech, especially incitement to violence, and take prompt action. 

Third, Sri Lanka should enact legislation to promote ethnic and religious harmony and protect the population from online falsehoods and manipulations, as well as a national security act, an intelligence act, and a counterterrorism act. 

Fourth, after assessing the levels of radicalization, Sri Lanka should commence rehabilitation of those arrested and released after Easter Sunday attack. 

Fifth, Sri Lanka should proscribe ideologies and their institutions. 

Sixth, to promote moderation, toleration, and coexistence, every province should have a harmony committee, every district, a harmony center, every university, a university harmony center, and every school, a harmony club. 

Seventh, appoint ambassadors of peace and champions of harmony and develop interfaith programs and projects in every mosque, temple, Kovil and church. 

Seventh, train and certify religious clerics, especially in other religions, and accredit them. 

Eighth, hold religious leaders and clergy responsible for securing the religious space and make them accountable. 

Ninth, monitor those arrested and released after Easter Sunday attack. 

Tenth, teach comparative religion or religious knowledge at school so that all faiths will be respected. 

The contemporary origins of violence and terrorism can be traced back to ideologies of exclusivism and extremism that reached Sri Lanka from the Gulf and the subcontinent. Almost all the violent and terrorist attacks by misguided Muslims can be traced back to either Salafi Wahhabism and Jamaat-e-Islami. Although a few Salafi Wahhabi organizations and Jamaat-e-Islami’s student wing have been banned, several Salafi Wahhabi organizations and Jamaat-e-Islami’s main organization are still radicalizing and recruiting [in Sri Lanka]. After they are banned, their institutions should be dismantled, their rank and file rehabilitated and reintegrated after their thinking is mainstreamed, and they should be monitored. 

The very first step is to raise public awareness and specialist understanding within the government that virulent ideologies sooner or later crystalize into violence and terror. Both the return of the Taliban-al-Qaida alliance to Afghanistan and instability in Pakistan present a threat to the South Asian region and beyond. Currently, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is using regional grievances to appeal to the Muslims that are faced with marginalization and persecution. ISKP identified Zahran as one of its knights and paid tribute to Zahran in its propaganda magazine, which is an attempt to inspire more lone wolf attacks and Islamic State-inspired networks. In the backdrop of internal and external challenges, building a unified Sri Lankan identity is the need of the hour to counter this riding tide of religious extremism.

Source: The Diplomat

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AKIPRESS.COM – The National Security Committee of Kazakhstan denied information about the queues of cars on the border with Russia.

“Information is being spread on social networks and messengers about an alleged accumulation of cars on the Kazakh-Russian border, including at the Kurmangazy checkpoint in Atyrau region. No accumulation of cars has been recorded on these sections of the border,” reports the National Security Committee.

It is indicated that checkpoints across the state border are operating as normal, and no restrictive measures have been introduced.

Source: Akipress

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The Russian invasion of Ukraine has yet to see an end. Russia has mobilized everything in its power to overcome Ukraine, including recruiting citizens of Kazakhstan to join its military forces. 

Russia lures Kazakh citizens through digital recruitment advertisements, recently prominent on a number of the country’s internet user pages. Several pop-up ads have started appearing on the internet pages of Kazakh residents, announcing openings for enlistment in the Russian army, with a joining-up bonus of more than USD 5,000. The advert cleverly targets the patriotic soft side of the Kazakhs, displaying flags of the two countries with the slogan “Shoulder to Shoulder”.

A one-time enlistment bonus payment of 495,000 rubles ($5,300) also promises a monthly salary of at least 190,000 rubles (or USD 2,000) and additional, unspecified benefits. Click on  the ad and you are redirected to a website offering potential recruits the opportunity to join the Russian Federation military, for service in the ultra-icy Sakhalin region of Russia.

The site names the “Resource Development Agency”, an organization established by local government in the Sakhalin region, as responsible for the offer. 

Any young buck tempted by this easy money should be aware that under Kazakhstan law it is illegal for a citizen to join any foreign military unit as a paid mercenary. However, the Minister of Information and Social Development of Kazakhstan has yet to comment on the advertisement.

Other ex-Soviet Central Asian country folk have told of the citizens of several partner countries have joined the Russian army or mercenary groups like Wagner. 

Kazakhstan is a former member of the Soviet Union (USSR), now an independent nation. It has traditionally stood as one of Moscow’s closest allies, and both the Soviet nuclear test program and their space program were sited in Kazakhstan.

It is important to note that Astana, capital and seat of Government, has never backed the Kremlin in its invasion of Ukraine; it has indeed frequently called for peace talks between the two countries.

Not only Kazakhstan is targeted for recruitment: Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek citizens are also of interest, given the sizable numbers who migrate each year to Russia in search of work – and the stark miserable condition of local economies – and their job prospects – back home. 

In the first quarter of 2023, 350,000 Tajik citizens migrated to Russia – 100,000 more than in the same period in 2022. More than 630,000 Uzbeks did the same, representing a 72 percent increase over the 366,000 that made the journey in 2022. Nearly 173,000 Kyrgyz nationals made the journey as well. 

Kazakhstan as a nation doing way better than its neighbors in the Central Asia. Its 2021 GDP stood at $197.1 billion, more than double that of Uzbekistan ($69.24 billion), and light-years ahead of Kyrgyzstan ($8.5 billion) or Tajikistan ($8.7 billion). There are fewer Kazakh migrants seeking work in Russia than from other nations in the region.

Central Asian governments have attempted to maintain some semblance of neutrality amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, while a host of difficult questions have arisen for national and regional governments alike, from intense grappling with a legacy of Russian imperial projects and Soviet colonialism to more pragmatic questions of how to manage and shift regional trade networks, when a significant economic partner turns itself into a pariah. 

The success rate of the Russian ads in Kazakhstan in terms of recruitment rates is not known, but the risk is clearly evident. It is noteworthy that both China and the USA face comparable difficulties in recruiting “Gen Z” youth. Those ready and willing to join the military recruitment (in the face of dismal employment prospects elsewhere) may be unhealthy, overweight or psychologically unfit.

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The Islamic Emirate has conducted 70 military operations in the past year with the aim of suppressing the Khorasan branch of Daesh group in Afghanistan, officials reported.

According to government-provided numbers, more than a hundred Daesh fighters have been killed in these operations.

The operations of the Islamic Emirate forces intensified against Daesh hideouts in Kabul, Herat, Balkh and other provinces. Ijaz Amin Ahangar, the head of Daesh in the Indian subcontinent, and Qari Fatih, the head of the security department of this group, were reportedly killed as a result of these operations.

In 1401 (solar year), Kabul, Balkh, Badakhshan and Kunduz provinces of Afghanistan were targeted by deadly attacks more than twelve times in total.

Based on available figures, in these attacks 110 people were killed and 270 others were wounded.

In the first three months of 1401 (solar year), most anti-security incidents occurred in Kabul, Balkh and Herat province.

On 30 of Hamal month (solar calendar), 20 students were killed and 30 others were injured in an attack on the Abdul Rahim School in Dasht-e-Barchi area of Kabul.

After that, a monastery in the Dar al-Aman area of Kabul, the International Cricket Stadium, Wazir Akbar Khan Mosque, Herat Grand Mosque, Kaaj Educational Center and Jihadiya Madrasa

in Samangan province were targeted by explosive attacks.

The attack on the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Emirate, in which some of the country’s diplomats were killed, provoked widespread reactions.

In Hoot 18 (solar calendar), Mohammad Dawood, the governor of Balk province, and two others were killed in a suicide attack on his office, and three others were injured.

Following that, five journalists were injured for the first time under the Islamic Emirate’s government in an attack at the Tabayian Culture Center in Mazar-e-Sharif.

Daesh took responsibility for most of these attacks in 1401 (solar year); the group whose presence in Afghanistan has caused concerns for the US and the West.

The head of US Central Command, Michael Kurilla, said that Daesh in Afghanistan will be able to attack American or Western interests outside the country in less than six months “with little to

no warning,” as reported by Star and Stripes.

He made the remarks at a Senate Armed Services Committee, saying that Daesh is rapidly developing the ability to conduct “external operations” in Europe and Asia.

“My commanders estimate that they can do an external operation against US or Western interests in under six months with little to no warning. In a classified session, I would talk about why I made that assessment. It is much harder for them to be able to do that against the homeland,” he said.

This year, diplomatic places also witnessed various attacks.

Various parts of the country have seen attacks by Daesh in the past year.

Among the most significant anti-security incidents are the attacks on the Russian and Pakistani embassies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff, and the officials in Balkh province.

The Pakistani ambassador in Kabul survived the attack on the embassy, but two Russian diplomats were killed in the attack on the Russian embassy.

The residence of Chinese citizens in Kabul was also attacked. On the 21st of Qaws (solar calendar), three attackers targeted a residence of Chinese citizens. In this attack, three people were killed and 18 others were injured.

This attack caused widespread reactions.

According to the claim of the White House, the leader of al-Qaeda was killed in an American drone strike in one of the diplomatic areas of Kabul city.

US President Joe Biden said that on July 31, 2022, Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in Kabul.

“On Saturday at my direction, the United States successfully concluded an airstrike in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed the emir of al-Qaida, Ayman al-Zawahiri. You know, Zawahiri was bin

Laden’s leader. He was with him all that whole time. He was his number two man, his deputy at the time of the terrorist attacks on 9/11. He was deeply involved in the planning of 9/11,” Biden said.

In response to this, Mawlawi Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid, Acting Defense Minister, at a press conference criticized the patrolling of US drones in Afghanistan’s airspace.

Mawlawi Mohammad Yaqoob said at that time that American drones enter Afghanistan through Pakistan.

“Based on my information, they enter Afghanistan from Pakistan and use Pakistan’s airspace,” he said.

On the 9th of Sunbula (solar calendar), the current Afghan government held a military parade at Bagram base, which was once thought to be the largest American base. Several air and ground units, including the one the government refers to as the Fedayan unit, paraded.

Meanwhile, some citizens of the country said that the security events in the country in 1401 were less than in previous years.

“The security situation was better than during the previous government. But there is robbery in Kabul city, which means the security is not fully ensured,” said Waheed, a resident of Kabul.

Border tensions were high in 1401.

The Islamic Emirate forces clashed twice with Iran, once with Uzbekistan, and eight times with Pakistan.

The clashes between the Islamic Emirate’s forces and the Pakistani guards, especially at the Spin Boldak-Chaman crossing, caused casualties on both sides.

Source : Tolo

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It’s been an eventful year in Central Asia. Kazakhstan kicked off 2022 in dramatic fashion with nationwide protests, followed by unrest a few months later in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan and in July in Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan faced off, violently, along their unsettled border, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan made peace on theirs (though not without domestic complaints in Kyrgyzstan and the mass arrest of dissenters). Meanwhile, the Russian invasion of Ukraine cast a pall over the year, heightening anxieties across the former Soviet Union and forcing the states of Central Asia to walk a careful diplomatic tightrope between Russia and the rest.

To discuss all this and more, The Diplomat’s Catherine Putz spoke with Bruce Pannier. Pannier started covering Central Asia as a journalist in 1995. He now authors RFE/RL’s Central Asia in Focus newsletter and hosts the Majlis podcast.

This year alone, Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev has faced nationwide protests, pushed through a constitutional referendum, and, surprising no one, come out on top in a snap presidential election. How would you assess the strength and stability of Tokayev’s government now, at the end of 2022, in comparison to early January?

I think Tokayev’s grip on power is still tenuous. He benefited from several prominent Russians talking publicly about seizing part or all of Kazakhstan before and after the February war on Ukraine. Tokayev’s moves to distance Kazakhstan from Russia after February brought him some needed support at home.

The issues that brought people out onto the streets in early January remain unresolved. Their protests sought changes to the way Kazakhstan was run under Nazarbayev. I do not yet see that very much has changed in the way Kazakhstan is governed. Tokayev is promising changes, but words won’t be enough for much longer.

We also do not know the situation with whoever it was that tried to oust Tokayev during the January protests. Some people, like the former KNB boss Karim Masimov, are in custody, but if Nazarbayev supporters were behind an attempted coup, how many of them are still free? And what damage could they still cause?

Two hundred and thirty-eight people were killed and thousands of family members and friends are looking for answers that the government is not giving.

Meanwhile, labor strikes for higher wages continue. Infrastructure, certainly Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure, is crumbling. And that will require billions of dollars to solve.

Tokayev won the snap presidential election in November, but it was the usual staged event, and he actually received fewer votes in 2022 than he did when he was elected in 2019. Fewer people voted in 2022, which is sign many people did not see any purpose in casting a ballot. Tokayev easily won but the second highest number of votes went to “none of the candidates,” more than 5 percent of total votes, more than 400,000 people. That’s a vote against Tokayev’s government.

Tokayev needs to show progress in tackling the big socioeconomic issues in Kazakhstan and he also needs to do it in a unique way that shows a clear departure from the policies of the past.

In the wider post-Soviet world, in 2022 we saw Russia finally make good on its threats and invade Ukraine. The war continues. How has the war in Ukraine affected how Central Asian people, and Central Asian governments, view Russia?

Russian influence in Central Asia since the 19th century has been backed up by fears Russia would use force to get what it wants. That fear is now greatly diminished. 

With the exception of Turkmenistan, all the other Central Asian states have seen hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens arriving, fleeing their homeland, many dodging the draft. The myth of superpower big brother has been smashed, for now. 

We see it in the way Central Asian leaders no longer kowtow to Russian President Vladimir Putin. We see it in the discussions Central Asian people are now having about their history as a colony of Russia, forced to adopt Russian customs and the Russian language.

Central Asia’s people and governments have lost respect for Russia and the more the Central Asian states develop relations with other countries, particularly Islamic countries, the less respect and fear they will probably have for Russia.

Russia has strong connections to Central Asia and no matter the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia and Central Asia will still be tied together in many ways. But relations between Russia and the states of Central Asia will be more equal than they have been in more than 100 years.

It is worth mentioning that Russia has lost wars and suffered severe setbacks in the past and has been able to reconstitute itself and rise from the ashes, so to speak. Russia is weakened by the war it unleashed in Ukraine, and it might be that the war in Ukraine ends with a battered Russia unable to threaten anyone. But that probably won’t last for too long.

The Kyrgyz-Tajik border was the scene of terrible violence this year (and last), while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan made marked progress on their border (though not without political difficulties in Kyrgyzstan). What is different about these two borders — the Kyrgyz-Tajik border and the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border — and what explains increased tension on one but negotiated progress on the other?

The difference is that Uzbekistan has always been able to enforce what happens along its border with Kyrgyzstan, and there was little Kyrgyzstan could do about it. Uzbekistan’s population is roughly five times larger than Kyrgyzstan’s, and Uzbekistan has the largest military in Central Asia. 

Uzbek troops have occupied small areas in Kyrgyzstan several times since 1991. Uzbek troops were occupying the Ungar-Too site in 2016 when Islam Karimov died (Ungar-Too was recognized as Kyrgyz territory under the recent border agreement).

There was never much Kyrgyzstan could do about it. The Kyrgyz military and border guards never even tried to attack Uzbek troops on Kyrgyz soil. So Kyrgyz officials must be pleased this particular section of the border with Uzbekistan is settled, even if Kyrgyz citizens living by the Kempir-Abad, now the Andijan reservoir, are not.

Tajikistan is different. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are approximately the same size in terms of territory and Tajikistan’s population is somewhere over 10 million while Kyrgyzstan’s population is just over 7 million. Kyrgyzstan has been willing to fight for territory along the unmarked sections of the frontier with Tajikistan, probably seeing that it is more evenly matched with Tajikistan than it is with Uzbekistan.

From the Tajik side it is worth mentioning that I can see where it might not be in Tajik President Emomali Rahmon’s interest to settle the border issue with Kyrgyzstan. Every time there is a conflict on the Kyrgyz border, his popularity among many at home gets a bump. 

And the tense border gives the Tajik government a reason to maintain increased troops level in northern Tajikistan, where Rahmon has been generally unpopular since he first became leader in 1992. Rahmon’s opponent in the 1994 presidential election was Abdumalik Abdullajanov, a native of Khujand (Leninabad), who received more than 35 percent of the vote in a rigged election. And there was an assassination attempt on Rahmon in Khujand in April 1997.

Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan faced particularly acute difficulties in the last year in their autonomous regions — the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) and the Republic of Karakalpakstan, respectively. Acknowledging the uniqueness of each case, why do these two regions pose such challenges to Dushanbe and Tashkent?

I think it bothers the central governments that there are regions within their countries that have a special status. If Karakalpaks in Uzbekistan and Pamiris in GBAO can have some sort of autonomy, will other ethnic groups in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan want the same someday? 

There are economic reasons at play in both cases also. Karakalpakstan is where Uzbekistan’s large gas fields are located and GBAO is the road link to China, and there is almost surely some mineral wealth in the mountains of GBAO.

But Karakalpakstan and GBAO were recognized as distinct administrative areas during the Soviet era and it will be difficult to change the way things have been for the last 100 years.

What are you watching most closely in Central Asia as we head into 2023?

What happens to regional cooperation in Central Asia as Russia’s influence in the region is reduced due to the Kremlin’s preoccupation with its debacle in Ukraine?

Central Asian regional cooperation was increasing since Shavkat Mirziyoyev became Uzbekistan’s president in 2016, but that was happening against the backdrop of an established balance of foreign influences in the region.

Russia cannot provide all the things to the Central Asian states that it has been doing for the last 30 years and now the Central Asian states are looking elsewhere to fill in gaps in trade, financing, and security and they are often looking at the same potential sources.

The situation is a bit reminiscent of the early years of independence when the five Central Asian countries were competing for the attention of the outside world. Sort of “pick me as a friend/partner, I’m better than my neighbors.”

That sort of mentality works against regional unity. If, for an example, an Arab country shows more interest investing in Uzbekistan than Kazakhstan, does this hurt Kazakh-Uzbek ties?

The post Discussing an Eventful 2022 in Central Asia With Bruce Pannier appeared first on Tashkent Citizen.