Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan Roman Vassilenko participated in the first ministerial meeting of the Central Asian and G7 countries that took place in an online format. Prospects for cooperation in the fields of regional security, economy, transport, energy and investment, combating global warming and protecting the environment, water management, as well as tourism were discussed at the meeting. In his remarks, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan stressed the importance of expanding trade ties, increasing the involvement of the G7 economies in the region, as well as developing the potential of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route in connecting key industrial centers of Europe and Asia.

Roman Vassilenko further noted that Kazakhstan is committed to joint measures to counter modern global and regional challenges, in particular, solving the emergency in the field of climate, food crisis, and water issues as well as saving the Aral Sea. Kazakhstan’s plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 15% by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 have also been outlined. In addition, the diplomat urged his interlocutors to support the Kazakh initiatives to establish a UN Regional Center for SDGs for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty and to participate in the Regional Climate Summit under the UN auspices in Kazakhstan in 2026. Representatives of the Central Asian countries in their interventions also focused on the importance of increasing cooperation in priority areas for the development of our region. The readiness to develop further dialogue in this format was expressed.

In turn, G7 foreign ministers and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – Vice-President of the European Commission Josep Borrell confirmed their commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Central Asian states in accordance with the UN Charter. They noted that active cooperation between individual G7 members with the Central Asian states is already underway through bilateral and multilateral channels. At the same time, they called for further expansion and deepening of cooperation in the fields of security, infrastructure development, trade and economy.

In particular, mutual interest in improving connectivity was noted, including through the development of regional projects within the framework of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), a major G7 initiative envisaging the attraction of 600 billion US dollars for infrastructure projects around the world until 2027. The delegates also had a substantive exchange of views on the impact of geopolitical turbulence on the countries of Central Asia, including the challenges associated with global instability and disruption of supply chains, as well as ways to overcome them.

Source: EU Reporter

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Belarus and Uzbekistan are interested in the emergence of new cooperation projects. This was stated at the meeting of the prime ministers of the two countries in Bishkek on October 25. A delegation of the Belarusian government is on a working visit to Kyrgyzstan to participate in meetings with colleagues from the SCO, CIS and EAEU. The meetings of the councils of these associations will start on October 26, while bilateral talks are on the schedule today. They discussed with the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan what has been done. The trade in 2023 exceeded last year’s volume of 500 million dollars. Both exports and imports are growing. Joint ventures are emerging. Today, it is important to concentrate work on the areas identified by the two presidents.

Roman Golovchenko, Prime Minister of Belarus:

“First of all, we plan to hold a meeting of the intergovernmental commission. This is our main working body, which should work out a new agenda for expanding cooperation. The second task within the framework of the work of the commission and our contacts is to elaborate or update the roadmap for the development of cooperation between Belarus and Uzbekistan in the coming years, to saturate it with new directions.”

The agreements include the holding of an international medical forum in Minsk and a Forum of Regions in Tashkent in the near future.

Source: TVR BY News

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The most instructive aspect of the meeting was Putin’s explicit acknowledgment of the different roles played by Moscow and Beijing in international politics, say these academics.

GLASGOW: The third Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing recently attracted fewer heads of state or senior officials than the previous forums in 2017 and 2019. There were 11 European presidents and prime ministers at the 2019 forum. But last week’s forum attracted only three.

This is understandable, given that the two-day meeting took place against the backdrop of high tension in the Middle East caused by the conflict between Israel and Hamas as well as the war in Ukraine – both wars which have highlighted differences in views on regional and global order between the West and a number of non-Western countries.

One enthusiastic participant was the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. For Putin, the forum provided an opportunity to meet other leaders without fear of arrest, given his indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes which had kept him away from September’s BRICS summit in South Africa.

While Putin was just one among 20 or so world leaders at the forum, he was photographed at Xi Jinping’s right hand and given a prominent place in proceedings. Delivering a speech at the forum immediately after the Chinese president and staging a press conference for the Russian media before boarding the plane to Moscow, Putin attempted to convey the message of tight cooperation with China.

He was keen to remind his audience of Russia’s credentials as a United Nations security council member, together with China, responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. He also noted that he and Xi had discussed both the situation in Gaza and the events in Ukraine, describing these situations as “common threats” which strengthen Sino-Russian “interaction”.

Putin drew particular attention to the high bilateral trade volume between Russia and China, which has reached nearly US$200 billion. This sounds impressive until you remember that the bulk of this trade consists of export of Russian hydrocarbons and other raw materials to China. This is nothing new – in fact trade in hydrocarbons between Russia and China have been boosted by Western sanctions.

Perhaps the most instructive aspect of the visit was Putin’s explicit acknowledgement of the different roles played by Moscow and Beijing in international politics.

Putin described the Russia-dominated Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) – a concept Moscow has promoted as a response to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that would fuse the Eurasian Economic Union with the BRI – as a regional or “local” project. Meanwhile he happily described the BRI as “global” in scale.

For the past decade, Russian policymakers and experts have consistently held up the GEP as symbolising Russia’s equality with China. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has described it as “the creation of a continent-wide architecture”.

Putin’s words, coupled with the lack of any meaningful results of the meeting (bar a contract on food and agricultural products which has yet to be confirmed by Beijing), illustrate the extent to which Russia’s war against Ukraine has deepened the asymmetry between the two powers.

HOLDING BACK?

The lack of genuine progress on the issue of the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline, which will transport gas from Russia’s Yamal gas fields, which used to supply Europe, via Mongolia to China, was further evidence of this asymmetry. Xi was kind enough to express hope that the project could proceed quickly. But he did not outline any concrete steps in that direction.

China’s agreement, if confirmed by a contract, would have been the most clear signal of Beijing’s strategic support for Russia, especially given Gazprom’s shrinking European market. By prolonging negotiations, China seems to be trying to extract specific concessions from Russia, related to the price of gas, possible Chinese ownership of gas fields in Russia, or Beijing’s acquisition of shares in Gazprom.

Meanwhile, in May, China revived the prospect of building the so-called section “D”, enlarging the capacity of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline system, which will bring gas from Turkmenistan via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to China, emphasising China’s other sources of energy supplies.

While continuing to offer Moscow political support and not interfering with Chinese companies’ attempts to take advantage of the exodus of Western companies to increase their presence in the Russian market, Beijing has clearly attempted to prevent any embarrassment related to Russia. A gas contract would have overshadowed the BRI summit and generated a strong reaction in the US and Europe, potentially strengthening China hawks in the West.

Source: Channel News Asia

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On September 26, a meeting of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan was held in the building of the Government of the country under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Tajikistan Kohir Rasulzoda, reports NIAT “Khovar”.

The meeting participants heard reports from responsible persons on the prospects for indicators of socio-economic development of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2025 and the main parameters for 2026-2027.

It was emphasized that the Order of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan was developed, adopted and implemented by the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan in order to qualitatively and timely develop the prospects for the main macroeconomic indicators of the Republic of Tajikistan.

The relevant ministries and departments were instructed to submit to the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan a draft of the main macroeconomic indicators of the Republic of Tajikistan in 2025 and parameters for 2026-2027 by June 1, 2024.

A number of bills were considered at the meeting, including the draft Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Tajikistan”, the draft Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Amendments to the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Public Services”, the Draft Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “ On amendments to the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On other obligatory payments to the budget”, the draft Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On amendments to the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Education” was sent to the Majlisi Namoyandagon of the Majlisi Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan for discussion.

Members of the Government of the country discussed three proposals for the conclusion of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, including the presentation of the conclusion of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan on the draft Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Amendments to the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On State Financial Control in the Republic of Tajikistan”, and sent it for discussion in the Majlisi Namoyandagon Majlisi Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan.

During the meeting, questions were also discussed about the concept of personnel policy of the internal affairs bodies of the Republic of Tajikistan for the period until 2043 and about the position and standard structure of the apparatus of the chairman of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, regions, the city of Dushanbe, cities, districts, self-government bodies of towns and villages, as well as the final number of civil servants of local executive bodies of state power.

After considering the issues on the agenda of the meeting of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Prime Minister of the country gave specific instructions to ministries and government departments, executive authorities of regions, cities and districts to timely implement the instructions of the next meeting of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan.

Other instructions were also given to conduct the autumn-winter campaign at the proper level, sufficiently reserve essential goods, and increase the production and export of agricultural products.

Source: Avesta TJ

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On September 5, 2023, the 14th meeting of the Coordination Council for Emergency Situations of the CSTO member states will be held in the city of Minsk with the participation of the heads of rescue departments, which will be attended by the delegation of the Republic of Tajikistan led by the Chairman of the CoES, Colonel-General of Police R. Nazarzoda.

During the meeting, the parties will discuss issues of strengthening interaction mechanisms on issues of preventing and responding to emergency situations under the auspices of the CSTO. Participants will also sum up the results of the exercises “Skala-2023” and “Safe Arctic-2023”, consider the results of the Council’s activities during the reporting period and approve a plan of joint activities for the next year.

From September 1 to 6, the Republic of Belarus is hosting a special training exercise for rescue units of the CSTO countries “Skala – 2023”, in which rescuers from the CoES of Tajikistan take part. Also, teams from the republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation are taking part in the exercise. CSTO rescuers will develop skills in jointly responding to radiation accidents in destroyed buildings, eliminating accidents involving sources of ionizing radiation in road, rail and air transport, and will also carry out rescue operations in areas of destruction of building structures and at heights.

Conducting these exercises helps to increase the level of coherence and coordination of the actions of rescue forces of the CSTO member states, scientific and technical support and multi-level specialized training.

As part of the events, the delegation of the Republic visited fire rescue unit No. 30 and fire rescue unit No. 23 of the city of Minsk. They got acquainted with the material and technical base of the units. We looked at the conditions of service of the workers of the Minsk garrison, as well as emergency rescue vehicles and equipment in service with rescuers, the Museum of Firefighting and Emergency Rescue, and the Educational Center for Life Safety of the University of Civil Protection of the Ministry of Emergency Situations.

Source: KCHS News

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AKIPRESS.COM – Delegation from Uzbekistan led by Deputy Minister of Investment, Industry and Trade Oybek Khamrayev visited Brussels to participate in the 17th meeting of the Uzbekistan – EU Subcommittee on Economy, Trade and Investments, UzA reported.

A roundtable discussion took place as part of the meeting, where the parties considered the development of economic diplomacy, particularly attracting investments, expanding the geography of exports, and strengthening new logistics routes from Europe to Uzbekistan and back.

The guests were presented with Uzbekistan’s investment, resource, and industrial potential, as well as the conditions created in the country for business development.

Bilateral meetings were held with the leadership of several companies, such as CC7 Europa, EDF, Picanol, and others.

Source: Akipress

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ASTANA – Vice President of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), Askar Shakirov, outlined Kazakhstan’s position on key issues on the international agenda at the 30th annual session of the OSCE PA on June 30 – July 4 in Vancouver, Canada, reported the press service of the Kazakh Senate on July 3.  

Hundreds of parliamentarians from North America, Europe and Central Asia are addressing security and cooperation challenges, focusing on cybersecurity issues, prevention of terrorism and violent extremism, including searching for optimal ways to improve the OSCE’s functionality during a period of crisis in international relations.

Shakirov co-authored a resolution on future generations, calling for the promotion of active participation of youth in governance and important decision-making within the Sustainable Development Goals.

The session will continue until July 4, when it will culminate with the adoption of the Vancouver Declaration and the election of assembly officers, including a new president.

Source: Astana Times

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It’s been an eventful year in Central Asia. Kazakhstan kicked off 2022 in dramatic fashion with nationwide protests, followed by unrest a few months later in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan and in July in Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan faced off, violently, along their unsettled border, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan made peace on theirs (though not without domestic complaints in Kyrgyzstan and the mass arrest of dissenters). Meanwhile, the Russian invasion of Ukraine cast a pall over the year, heightening anxieties across the former Soviet Union and forcing the states of Central Asia to walk a careful diplomatic tightrope between Russia and the rest.

To discuss all this and more, The Diplomat’s Catherine Putz spoke with Bruce Pannier. Pannier started covering Central Asia as a journalist in 1995. He now authors RFE/RL’s Central Asia in Focus newsletter and hosts the Majlis podcast.

This year alone, Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev has faced nationwide protests, pushed through a constitutional referendum, and, surprising no one, come out on top in a snap presidential election. How would you assess the strength and stability of Tokayev’s government now, at the end of 2022, in comparison to early January?

I think Tokayev’s grip on power is still tenuous. He benefited from several prominent Russians talking publicly about seizing part or all of Kazakhstan before and after the February war on Ukraine. Tokayev’s moves to distance Kazakhstan from Russia after February brought him some needed support at home.

The issues that brought people out onto the streets in early January remain unresolved. Their protests sought changes to the way Kazakhstan was run under Nazarbayev. I do not yet see that very much has changed in the way Kazakhstan is governed. Tokayev is promising changes, but words won’t be enough for much longer.

We also do not know the situation with whoever it was that tried to oust Tokayev during the January protests. Some people, like the former KNB boss Karim Masimov, are in custody, but if Nazarbayev supporters were behind an attempted coup, how many of them are still free? And what damage could they still cause?

Two hundred and thirty-eight people were killed and thousands of family members and friends are looking for answers that the government is not giving.

Meanwhile, labor strikes for higher wages continue. Infrastructure, certainly Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure, is crumbling. And that will require billions of dollars to solve.

Tokayev won the snap presidential election in November, but it was the usual staged event, and he actually received fewer votes in 2022 than he did when he was elected in 2019. Fewer people voted in 2022, which is sign many people did not see any purpose in casting a ballot. Tokayev easily won but the second highest number of votes went to “none of the candidates,” more than 5 percent of total votes, more than 400,000 people. That’s a vote against Tokayev’s government.

Tokayev needs to show progress in tackling the big socioeconomic issues in Kazakhstan and he also needs to do it in a unique way that shows a clear departure from the policies of the past.

In the wider post-Soviet world, in 2022 we saw Russia finally make good on its threats and invade Ukraine. The war continues. How has the war in Ukraine affected how Central Asian people, and Central Asian governments, view Russia?

Russian influence in Central Asia since the 19th century has been backed up by fears Russia would use force to get what it wants. That fear is now greatly diminished. 

With the exception of Turkmenistan, all the other Central Asian states have seen hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens arriving, fleeing their homeland, many dodging the draft. The myth of superpower big brother has been smashed, for now. 

We see it in the way Central Asian leaders no longer kowtow to Russian President Vladimir Putin. We see it in the discussions Central Asian people are now having about their history as a colony of Russia, forced to adopt Russian customs and the Russian language.

Central Asia’s people and governments have lost respect for Russia and the more the Central Asian states develop relations with other countries, particularly Islamic countries, the less respect and fear they will probably have for Russia.

Russia has strong connections to Central Asia and no matter the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia and Central Asia will still be tied together in many ways. But relations between Russia and the states of Central Asia will be more equal than they have been in more than 100 years.

It is worth mentioning that Russia has lost wars and suffered severe setbacks in the past and has been able to reconstitute itself and rise from the ashes, so to speak. Russia is weakened by the war it unleashed in Ukraine, and it might be that the war in Ukraine ends with a battered Russia unable to threaten anyone. But that probably won’t last for too long.

The Kyrgyz-Tajik border was the scene of terrible violence this year (and last), while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan made marked progress on their border (though not without political difficulties in Kyrgyzstan). What is different about these two borders — the Kyrgyz-Tajik border and the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border — and what explains increased tension on one but negotiated progress on the other?

The difference is that Uzbekistan has always been able to enforce what happens along its border with Kyrgyzstan, and there was little Kyrgyzstan could do about it. Uzbekistan’s population is roughly five times larger than Kyrgyzstan’s, and Uzbekistan has the largest military in Central Asia. 

Uzbek troops have occupied small areas in Kyrgyzstan several times since 1991. Uzbek troops were occupying the Ungar-Too site in 2016 when Islam Karimov died (Ungar-Too was recognized as Kyrgyz territory under the recent border agreement).

There was never much Kyrgyzstan could do about it. The Kyrgyz military and border guards never even tried to attack Uzbek troops on Kyrgyz soil. So Kyrgyz officials must be pleased this particular section of the border with Uzbekistan is settled, even if Kyrgyz citizens living by the Kempir-Abad, now the Andijan reservoir, are not.

Tajikistan is different. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are approximately the same size in terms of territory and Tajikistan’s population is somewhere over 10 million while Kyrgyzstan’s population is just over 7 million. Kyrgyzstan has been willing to fight for territory along the unmarked sections of the frontier with Tajikistan, probably seeing that it is more evenly matched with Tajikistan than it is with Uzbekistan.

From the Tajik side it is worth mentioning that I can see where it might not be in Tajik President Emomali Rahmon’s interest to settle the border issue with Kyrgyzstan. Every time there is a conflict on the Kyrgyz border, his popularity among many at home gets a bump. 

And the tense border gives the Tajik government a reason to maintain increased troops level in northern Tajikistan, where Rahmon has been generally unpopular since he first became leader in 1992. Rahmon’s opponent in the 1994 presidential election was Abdumalik Abdullajanov, a native of Khujand (Leninabad), who received more than 35 percent of the vote in a rigged election. And there was an assassination attempt on Rahmon in Khujand in April 1997.

Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan faced particularly acute difficulties in the last year in their autonomous regions — the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) and the Republic of Karakalpakstan, respectively. Acknowledging the uniqueness of each case, why do these two regions pose such challenges to Dushanbe and Tashkent?

I think it bothers the central governments that there are regions within their countries that have a special status. If Karakalpaks in Uzbekistan and Pamiris in GBAO can have some sort of autonomy, will other ethnic groups in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan want the same someday? 

There are economic reasons at play in both cases also. Karakalpakstan is where Uzbekistan’s large gas fields are located and GBAO is the road link to China, and there is almost surely some mineral wealth in the mountains of GBAO.

But Karakalpakstan and GBAO were recognized as distinct administrative areas during the Soviet era and it will be difficult to change the way things have been for the last 100 years.

What are you watching most closely in Central Asia as we head into 2023?

What happens to regional cooperation in Central Asia as Russia’s influence in the region is reduced due to the Kremlin’s preoccupation with its debacle in Ukraine?

Central Asian regional cooperation was increasing since Shavkat Mirziyoyev became Uzbekistan’s president in 2016, but that was happening against the backdrop of an established balance of foreign influences in the region.

Russia cannot provide all the things to the Central Asian states that it has been doing for the last 30 years and now the Central Asian states are looking elsewhere to fill in gaps in trade, financing, and security and they are often looking at the same potential sources.

The situation is a bit reminiscent of the early years of independence when the five Central Asian countries were competing for the attention of the outside world. Sort of “pick me as a friend/partner, I’m better than my neighbors.”

That sort of mentality works against regional unity. If, for an example, an Arab country shows more interest investing in Uzbekistan than Kazakhstan, does this hurt Kazakh-Uzbek ties?

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