Federica Mogherini and Bernard Cazeneuve were on the board of Panzeri’s human rights campaign. Now they’ve quit and he’s in jail.

It was one of the best-connected human rights groups in Brussels, boasting an office a few meters from the British ambassador’s residence and a clutch of top names on its board.

Now it is at the center of an alleged corruption scandal engulfing the European Parliament; those leading patrons have quit and even its own name plate has been removed from the door.

Fight Impunity was founded in 2019 by Pier Antonio Panzeri, a former MEP, to promote the cause of human rights and to bring violators to justice. 

Panzeri and a Fight Impunity and parliamentary staffer, Francesco Giorgi, are both now in custody. So is Giorgi’s Greek MEP girlfriend, Eva Kaili. 

Niccolò Figà-Talamanca, the secretary general of the NGO No Peace Without Justice, which shares the office address on Rue Ducale with Fight Impunity, has been released with an electronic tag, prosecutors said.

In all, police have seized €1.5 million in cash in at least 20 raids on homes, offices and hotel rooms across Belgium, France and Italy as part of an inquiry into alleged corruption and money laundering, apparently involving representatives of Qatar. 

On Monday, another of those arrested as part of the probe, International Trade Union Confederation General Secretary Luca Visentini, said he had received a €50,000 donation toward his campaign for general secretary from the NGO. He has now been released.

“I was not asked, neither did I ask anything in exchange for the money and no conditions whatsoever were set for this donation,” said Visentini, rejecting any allegation of corruption.

When Fight Impunity was founded, Gianfranco Dell’Alba, another ex-MEP, agreed to be a co-founder of Panzeri’s organization to help what he says he believed was a good cause. Like others caught up in the so-called Qatargate crisis, Dell’Alba insists he was duped.

Fight Impunity had seemed “normal” at the time, he told POLITICO. “What happened next, for me, was an enormous shock and enormous surprise.” 

It is not clear how or whether Fight Impunity as an organization may be involved in any questionable schemes, beyond the fact that it sits uncomfortably close to a web of alleged criminality. 

But a picture has emerged of Panzeri building an apparently credible organization that traded on the reputations of EU high-flyers, who he convinced to add their imprimatur to his project. 

Lawyers for the accused did not respond to requests for comment.

How it started

Back in 2019, Panzeri had just lost his seat in the Parliament and his chairmanship of the chamber’s Subcommittee on Human Rights. Looking to keep a foothold in Brussels, he got in touch with Dell’Alba. 

They weren’t friends, said the latter. Panzeri was just “someone that I knew, like, many, many, many others in the bubble,” said Dell’Alba, using the slang for the insular world of Brussels politics. 

Despite this professed lack of closeness, Panzeri asked Dell’Alba to be one of the legal founders of a new NGO that would seek to strengthen global efforts to hold those who commit war crimes and crimes against humanity to account. 

Fight Impunity was formed as an Association Sans But Lucratif (ASBL) on September 25, 2019. Dell’Alba said he was there to make up the numbers. To incorporate this kind of company in Belgium, “you have to be a certain number,” he said. That minimum, according to Belgian law, is two. Four founders are listed on Fight Impunity’s articles of association.

Dell’Alba says he is now a “member” of the NGO, but beyond being there at its formation, he said he had “no role.” He said he never heard mention of the two countries implicated in the influence scandal: Morocco and Qatar. 

Nor did he ever discuss with Panzeri how the organization he founded was being funded. Nor had he been contacted by the police, he said, an assertion the prosecutors’ office refused to discuss because of the ongoing investigation.

“You can be member of an organization knowing what happened publicly and not necessarily know all and every detail of what happened in the back or what happened by the person in charge,” he said.

Behind the scenes, the company wasn’t operating in a normal way. Belgian law requires ASBLs to file accounts to the company court every year. If they go three years without filing, the company can be wound up. According to the court, the three-year-old Fight Impunity “has never filed an account.”

Fight Impunity is also missing from the European Parliament’s transparency register, which requires disclosures from NGOs that want to conduct activities in the Parliament. 

Despite that, Dell’Alba himself has appeared in front of Panzeri’s former human rights subcommittee twice in two years to present Fight Impunity’s annual report on human rights, according to agendas held by the Parliament. 

The current chair of the subcommittee is MEP Maria Arena — who has stepped aside temporarily from this role amid the scandal and whose unnamed adviser’s office was searched by police as part of the investigation. Arena told POLITICO’s EU Influence she thought Fight Impunity was on the register.

Like others interviewed by POLITICO who have been involved in the organization, Dell’Alba said he was convinced by the NGO’s mission. He said: “I sincerely believe that we need a system of accountability for those who perpetrate heinous crime.” 

But he was also drawn in by the quality of the other people involved. According to Fight Impunity’s website, the “honorary” board included former EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, former French Prime Minister Bernard Cazeneuve and former European Migration Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos. They have now resigned in the wake of the arrests. Avramopoulos said Monday he was paid €60,000 between February 2021 and February 2022 by Fight Impunity. 

Another heavyweight listed on the board is Emma Bonino, a senior figure in Italian politics and former foreign minister. 

Dell’Alba and Bonino have a long history. They are also the link between the two organizations headquartered at Rue Ducale 41 in Brussels: Fight Impunity and No Peace Without Justice. Dell’Alba was elected to the European Parliament while in Bonino’s party (called “the Emma Bonino List”) and was her chief of staff when the highly respected Italian politician was appointed minister for European policy from 2006 to 2008. Dell’Alba was the secretary general of No Peace Without Justice from 1998 to 2009. The NGO was started by Bonino.

Bonino is “completely out of the story,” said Dell’Alba. Talking about Panzeri in a recent interview after the Qatargate scandal broke, Bonino said: “I don’t remember him, it may be that I met him a few times when I was in the European Parliament.” Yet she did meet Panzeri, a pretty well-known figure in Italian circles in Brussels, according to one of his tweets. 

In good company

Panzeri was able to quickly build the impression of a serious campaigning NGO by attaching advisers like Bonino with high profiles but seemingly limited roles. It created a critical mass of credibility. 

An aide at the College of Europe, where Mogherini is a rector, told EU Influence that the presence of Avramopoulos and Bonino was a factor in her decision to join. 

“When we launched this initiative, [Panzeri] mentioned to me the fact that there were personalities, European personalities [who were] members of the … board,” said Dell’Alba, in an hour-long phone call with POLITICO. “I believed that I was in good company.” 

Bonino has expressed a similar belief. Another who has said they had the impression of credibility is Anthony Teasdale, who was leading the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) when it jointly organized a human rights conference with Fight Impunity in June. 

The EPRS is an internal EU think tank championed by the Parliament’s most powerful civil servant: Secretary-General Klaus Welle. According to an Italian media report, Welle was preparing to join the board of Fight Impunity next month. Welle’s office didn’t respond to a request for comment.

There’s no suggestion of any wrongdoing by Welle or any of the board members Panzeri recruited. 

As Panzeri’s former supporters abandon him, many say they are unwitting victims.

It’s not the first time Dell’Alba has been tricked, he said. In 2017, he left his job as the Brussels head of the Italian industry lobby Confindustria after €500,000 was sent, on his orders, to a bank account outside the company in response to an email apparently from his boss. It was, he said, a scam. 

“I was the victim of phishing,” said Dell’Alba, adding that he was cleared by the organization and Confindustria was repaid in full through an insurance claim. A spokesperson for Confindustria confirmed this account. 

Dell’Alba made clear that the earlier episode was entirely separate from the Qatar allegations swirling around Panzeri. “This is the past,” he said.

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“The ongoing persecution and human rights violations against the Pamiri minority in Tajikistan reached an alarming scale years ago. But there is almost no one to ring the alarm bell. The Tajikistani authorities stifle virtually all information from the region, while the international community has largely overlooked this serious human rights crisis. It demands immediate attention and action from the international community to safeguard the rights and dignity of the Pamiri people,” said Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 

The ongoing persecution and human rights violations against the Pamiri minority in Tajikistan reached an alarming scale years ago. But there is almost no one to ring the alarm bell

Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia

Tajikistan: Reprisals against Pamiri minority, suppression of local identity, clampdown on all dissent highlights the violations of economic, social and cultural rights resulting from: the crackdown on Pamiri languages, cultural practices, and identities; the heavy presence of security forces from other regions of Tajikistan; violent repression of protest and widespread arbitrary detention; and socioeconomic marginalization faced by the Pamiri Ismaili community in Gorno-Badakhshan. 

Discrimination and securitization 

The central authorities have promoted a culture of prejudice against Pamiris. A state-sponsored narrative depicts them negatively, particularly Ismailis, leading to widespread discrimination. This policy manifests in repressive practices, including suppressing the use of Pamiri languages in media, education, and public life, excluding Pamiris from influential positions within the state administration and security apparatus, and extortion and destruction of local employment opportunities and Pamiri businesses. 

The heavy presence of security forces from other parts of Tajikistan reflects the authorities’ contempt for the Gorno-Badakhshan population. “The word ‘Pamiri’ [for the security forces] means […] separatist, oppositionist, main enemy,” said one of the interviewees. 

The presence of security agencies, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the State Committee for National Security (SCNS), has significantly increased in GBAO. Security forces have set up armed cordons on roads and in city squares, including the capital city of GBAO, Khorugh, patrolled by heavily armed police and military. “The security forces in Khorugh behave like wolves looking after sheep. ‘You should not walk like this; you should not laugh!’” said one of the interviewees. 

Security operations in GBAO include surveillance, intimidation, and the excessive use of force — often justified as combating terrorism and organized crime — accompanied by arbitrary arrests and prosecutions of local informal leaders and ordinary Pamiris, despite a lack of credible evidence.  

“The heavy-handed securitization in Gorno-Badakhshan is beyond any scrutiny. The local population is perceived as hostile by the central government, and people are harassed and discriminated against on a daily basis,” said Marie Struthers. 

The heavy-handed securitization in Gorno-Badakhshan is beyond any scrutiny. The local population is perceived as hostile by the central government, and people are harassed and discriminated against on a daily basis

Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia

2021-2022 crackdown and its aftermath 

Mounting tensions erupted after the killing of prominent Pamiri figure Gulbiddin Ziyobekov in November 2021. Officially described as the result of a shootout with law enforcement, evidence points to an unlawful killing of an unarmed man, which may amount to an extrajudicial execution. In response to a four-day protest in Khorugh, security forces used firearms against a crowd that had been peaceful until that point, killing two protesters and allegedly injuring around a dozen.  

“We escorted the women away […] to a safer location. At that time, a bullet hit me. They were shooting from the entrance of the building, wearing uniforms. Some of them were standing directly in the entrance, some of them were on the second or third floor,” said one protester, describing the indiscriminate use of lethal force by law enforcement officials. 

After false promises to effectively investigate, the authorities instead persecuted informal community leaders, harassed civil society, and intimidated and prosecuted ordinary Pamiris.  

A second outbreak of violence occurred in May 2022 when authorities violently dispersed peaceful protests in Khorugh and Rushan, resulting in the deaths of dozens of Pamiris, including informal leader Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov, shot by unidentified gunmen in a pickup — a likely extrajudicial execution. According to independent reports, 24 civilians died, some during the crackdown and some in alleged retaliatory unlawful killings.  

A subsequent crackdown on civil society followed with the arbitrary detention of more than 200 human rights defenders, dissenters, and influential figures such as journalist and activist Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva and lawyers Faromuz Irgashev and Manuchehr Kholiknazarov. In December 2023, they received 21, 29 and 15-year sentences respectively, in secret trials, with the details of the charges made public only six months later.  

Arbitrary detentions and torture 

The Tajikistani authorities routinely arbitrarily detain, allegedly torture, and engage in other ill-treatment of Pamiris, with reports of coerced confessions and fabricated charges of crimes against “public safety,” “fundamentals of the constitutional order” or “order of administration.” Legal proceedings lack transparency and due process, with many trials lasting only a few days. During the 2021-2022 crackdown, reports of torture and other ill-treatment were common.  

One of the detainees in the aftermath of the May 2022 protests said he was deprived of sleep for two days, beaten with fists and batons and hit on the head with a thick book. 

“When they asked and I did not answer, they wrapped wet tissues around my fingers, then [fixed it with] tape. They put clips and switched something on. The [electric] current was strong. They did it with different fingers. They did it twice every day, four times in all,” he said. 

The international community must urgently raise concerns about the human rights violations faced by Pamiris with the Tajikistani authorities

Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia

“After the 2021-2022 protests in Gorno-Badakhshan, the systemic discrimination against the Pamiri community has become ever more entrenched, resulting in fear, harassment and violation of human rights. The international community must urgently raise concerns about the human rights violations faced by Pamiris with the Tajikistani authorities, in all possible fora not the least international fora, stand in solidarity with the Pamiri people, give protection to those who seek it abroad, and take decisive action to oppose this vicious system in Tajikistan,” said Marie Struthers. 

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In 2009, 18-year-old Zaira Bopkhoeva from Ingushetia was abducted by a local resident named Khalid. Two years earlier the girl who was under 16 at the time had already been kidnapped by another man. According to tradition, she was considered “tainted” and therefore forced to marry the perpetrator, but the marriage did not work out and Zaira returned home.

The second time, Bopkhoeva’s mother would not leave her daughter with her abductor and demanded that Khalid let her go. But Zaira’s return after a night spent in the man’s house angered her relatives on her deceased father’s side. Seven male relatives took the girl to the forest, beat her, and then forced her to marry Khalid.

Her mother-in-law was strongly against Zaira. She sent her son to a distant village and kept the girl locked in one of her rooms almost all the time. At the same time, Zaira’s health began to worsen: occasionally contacting her mother, she complained of dizziness, nausea, numbness in her lower jaw and difficulty breathing.

Soon the girl who had been healthy before her marriage started having seizures and in February 2010 she was hospitalised. At the hospital, Zaira was diagnosed with poisoning from an unknown drug. According to doctors, oxygen was not supplied to the brain for a long time, and Bopkhoeva fell into a coma. In this condition, the girl was returned to her mother’s home.

Zaira Bopkhoeva is another victim of one of the widespread practices of child and forced marriages in the North Caucasus, particularly in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan. In 2018, the ECHR awarded her mother 20,000 euros in compensation because the Russian authorities failed to investigate the circumstances of the incident.

The AD REM project of lawyers and human rights defenders has published a report: the first Russian study of this problem, within the framework of which the authors conducted interviews with female residents of these republics who suffered from forced or early marriages, as well as with local experts and specialists — representatives of government and non-profit organisations, lawyers, advocates and psychologists. A total of 31 women from 23 to 42 years old and 15 experts were interviewed.

The researchers were unable to interview underage girls who were victims of early marriages because traditionally they are more strictly controlled and it is virtually impossible to obtain permission for interviews from relatives, which is motivated by “disagreement with interference in the internal affairs of the family and explained by fear of spreading information about what happened.”

Kidnapping, poverty, and patriarchal traditions. Reasons for early and forced marriages

Child and forced marriages from the point of view of international law are regarded as one of the modern forms of slavery, which primarily affects women. Russia still has not taken all mandatory measures noted in the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

For example, Russia’s Criminal Code narrowly defines rape and sexual offences as coercion with the use or threat of violence or taking advantage of the “helpless state of the victim”, while marital rape is not criminalised at all. According to a note to Article 134 of the Criminal Code, an adult accused of “sexual intercourse” with a child under the age of 16 may escape punishment “if it is established that this person and the offence committed by him have ceased to be socially dangerous in connection with his marriage to the victim(s).” Russia also lacks a system of protection for victims of violence, as well as shelters and support services for victims to turn to.

I remember just walking home through the village from the shop. A car stopped… They said they had decided to unite our fate. And they said, “Get in the car.” I remember my legs went numb. I was scared because I knew they were stronger physically, and I looked around hoping that someone would see that help was needed and that someone would stand up for me. There was no one around. I don’t know why, but at that moment it didn’t occur to me that I could scream [for help]… There were three of them. They all came out, and it turned out that I was blocked. Two in front of me and one behind me. And they said, “Get in the car.” And then I remember how scared I was and I decided that maybe I should do something.

Liana, Dagestan, abducted when she was 14

There are no up-to-date statistics on abductions of girls, but the authors of the report cite the following figures: between 1999 and 2007, over 650 reports of abductions for the purpose of forced marriage were registered in the North Caucasus and only 25 per cent of the cases were prosecuted. In most cases, victims of abductions are afraid to report them openly for fear of public condemnation and the law enforcement agencies, for their part, ignore such reports, even if they are received.

When they took me to the house, the women started to persuade me that he was a wonderful man, that I was so lucky, that he was so handsome, his family was good, that I should agree to marry him. But I didn’t want to and I said: “Well, I’m too young, how can I marry him? I’m small.” They ask, “How old are you?” I said, “I’ll be 18 in two months.” They say, “What do you mean young? You’re just right!”

Larisa, Ingushetia, abducted when she was 17

Researchers note that young people in the North Caucasus, on the one hand, no longer seek to “blindly follow established traditions’’, but on the other hand, they are becoming more religious, which leads to the traditionalisation of gender roles. In this regard, there is a trend towards the younger maternity, which indirectly points to the growing number of early marriages: it is not against Sharia law for minors to marry.

This practice affects girls and boys differently. Statistics are extremely limited, but even from them we can say that girls marry before adulthood ten times more often than boys. In 2021, according to official figures, 4,453 women married before the age of 18 in Russia. However, these figures do not reflect the real number, as often such marriages may not be registered in registries, being limited to religious rites.

At times like this, you realise that nobody needs you. (Crying.) You are nobody, and you don’t have a name. We had six people stolen from our cousins, girls. And none of the sisters were brought home by the older men. They said they should let them live there like that.

Khashtbi, Chechnya, abducted when she was 14

The concepts of “child marriage” and “forced marriage” — that is, without the consent of one or both partners, using physical or psychological violence — are closely linked and often include the abduction of the young woman. This is another tradition that is often still violent.

Islamic figures now regard abduction as an inadmissible form of marriage; it is actually forbidden under the Sharia. However, even in this case, girls can still be regarded “as an object not endowed with the right of independent choice”. Thus, in 2007, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Dagestan decided that in local mosques, the Sharia marriage nikah in case of abduction will not be concluded without the consent of the bride’s parents.

The reason for early or forced marriage can also be the poverty of a girl’s family, especially if it has many children: parents or other relatives simply want to get rid of an extra mouthful. One of the women interviewed told the researchers that her family had received a large kalym for her, i.e. in such cases it is actually a bride sale. The girls and young women themselves may not even resist because they are made responsible for the well-being of their family.

I felt it would be easier for my parents if I got married. I am the eldest in the family and we just had another [sister who became a] student. As a student, my parents couldn’t support me any more. It was too far to travel [to study], and it turns out that [providing for] two female students would be more difficult… And also these insecurities of mine to be a good girl for my parents, to please them at last… It was a kind of humanitarian aid to my parents, I understand it today… I wanted to help them this way.

Zarema, Ingushetia, forced marriage at 19

“I was studying and I was approached by a wealthy man who was eight years older than me, it was a good option from my parents’ point of view… We saw each other once. We were made to meet like that in public. I didn’t want to get married. But then it so happened that my parents took a big kalym from him without telling me, and only then they informed me.

Larisa, Ingushetia, forced marriage at 17

In Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, patriarchal attitudes are strong, which means that women’s lives are under constant strict control, especially in the sexual sphere. A woman’s “immoral” behaviour, according to society, leads to the “dishonouring” of the whole family and is therefore severely punished. The family tries to get a girl married as soon as possible, fearing that she may “defame” her family by socialising with men.

Hence the practice of “honour” killings, which still occurs in these republics. In this connection, a kidnapped girl is almost never returned by her relatives, as she is considered to be “unclean.” Moreover, in the case of kidnapping, the victim herself is still blamed. This is often the case with rape victims, who are either killed or married off to their rapist.

“When they brought me into the hospital, my feet were covered in blood. Only the doctor came in and saw, she immediately said: ‘She was raped.’ I didn’t even say anything, her tears were flowing…” the report quotes the story of a girl from Ingushetia who was abducted at the age of 17. “I went and told everything. I wrote a statement. Then Zaur’s relatives became alarmed. My relatives beat me up, but they did nothing to him… Then the older men started coming to ask me to marry Zaur. My father was against it, but my male relatives said: ‘She should either go to the grave or get married. She is no longer a girl.’ They also blamed me. I was given away for him, and I didn’t even know that I was married off… No one even asked me if I wanted to marry him or not.”

Svetlana Anokhina, a journalist and founder of the Marem Human Rights Project, which helps abused women in the North Caucasus, said that last year they received 33 appeals from girls who were about to be forcibly married off. In the first half of 2024, they have already received 21 such appeals.

“This is threat to all girls who live with their parents. It’s just that sometimes we don’t really notice it, because there is no direct threat that matchmakers are about to come,” stresses the human rights activist. “But it should be understood that when we talk about forced marriage, it does not mean that the parents have a knife to the throat — the whole system of upbringing of a girl assumes that one day she will be shown a man whose wife she will become.”

The main reason for this, Anokhina explains, is the belief of traditional society that a woman is born only to maintain her innocence, to marry, to be a good wife and daughter-in-law, and to bear children. That is why they try to marry her off quickly, so that she does not ‘disgrace’ the family, so that her name does not appear in some gossip — all this spoils her ‘market value’. Islamic figures, the journalist notes, also mostly say that the girl should be raised strictly and taken out of school early so that she does not come into contact with boys there.

“Why should she sit at home then, she should be married off quickly,” Anokhina explains. “And if a girl has a soft character, she doesn’t even resist. Sometimes they even say, ‘Well, what do you mean forced? I didn’t want to, but my parents said: “Come out, get married.” So I agreed.’ Many do not even have a thought to protest. For them it’s the norm: to marry a man they don’t know, because everyone around them says it should be like that. What they are experiencing, we cannot know. We only find out when they run away.”

I was very afraid of my father, I wasn’t even friends with any of the boys. To be honest, I was afraid to come home after everything, I thought he would kill me.

Khashtbi, Chechnya, abducted when she was 14

They thought as I was already 19, that I could go down a bad path, that I could go the wrong way, socialise with guys, leave and then come back. That would’ve been such a shame for them.

Zarema, Ingushetia, abducted at 19

As a rule, if a girl was raped as a child, it was only discovered when she got married — and then she was killed, a social worker from Ingushetia said in a conversation with researchers.

“There was a case when a grandfather raped his five-year-old granddaughter. The father killed her and they buried her,” she said. “That was years ago now, probably about ten years ago. And he [the grandfather] said such a thing that she sat on his lap. That is, she seduced him by the fact that she, a child of five, was very fond of walking with him and sitting on his lap… He took the child’s attention as seduction.”

Violence in the new family, lack of education, and health problems. Consequences of early and forced marriages

Early marriage also harms girls later in marriage. Often violence continues in the husband’s family, both on his part and on the part of his relatives. It manifests itself in different forms: economic, physical, psychological and sexual.

Girls and young women who marry early usually have to interrupt their education, and rarely can continue it afterwards; sometimes they do not even have a full school education. In the husband’s family, they are responsible for taking care of the household, serving his relatives, giving birth to and bringing up children.

“If a girl manages to keep her job or her studies, it’s a great deal of luck. Sometimes Chechen, Dagestani and Ingush women say to us: ‘What are you talking about? I study and work, I have my own car and my own business,’” says Svetlana Anokhina. “And then I ask one question: ‘If one day your husband or parents say to you: “That’s it, it’s over”, [you can’t do it anymore] what will happen?’ And when they shut up, it becomes clear that these are privileges and freedoms that do not belong to them, they are granted to them and can be taken away at any time.”

Even if an early-married girl manages to get a job, it will almost certainly be unofficial and rather low-paid. Even so, the money she earns is usually managed by her husband or his family.

I was working in the market, trading… He didn’t work… I had to earn money, bring food, boil it, leave it, sew, and many more to go to the market the next day… I walked around in horrible clothes… He controlled my financial flow that I earned… It was insulting at some point, but overall I thought it was the right thing to do.

Suzanna, Chechnya, early marriage at 17

Almost all women interviewed for the study spoke about humiliation and pressure from their spouse, mother-in-law or other relatives. They are burdened with all the housework, are constantly controlled, and are actually deprived of freedom, not allowing them to see their parents. Almost half of the respondents (14 out of 31) spoke about physical violence on the part of their husbands: they are slapped, kicked, objects thrown at them, pushed, strangled and so on.

When I ordered this wall, of course he beat me up that without his permission, his knowledge, I could afford to order this kitchen wall.

Ruket, Ingushetia, abducted when she was 15

When you are already married, that’s it… it’s already like a prison where there are no rights, only responsibilities. You become a housewife, a cook, a cleaner and everything related to that, and there is no passion and happiness in marriage.

Zalina, Ingushetia, abducted when she was 17

Four of the women interviewed directly admitted that their husbands raped them; some of the others implied it indirectly, mentioning that they were not interested in sex life and did not want to have intimate contacts with their spouse. Rape of girls who are married early or forced into marriage is common: girls may simply not be ready for sex or may dislike the spouse.

This is confirmed by the stories of the Marem applicants, as cited by Svetlana Anokhina, the founder of the human rights project.

• A girl from Chechnya was married off at the insistence of her mother, who said that if she refused, she would be beaten. While she was married, her husband complained to his parents that she was cold towards him, but she simply disliked him. The girl ran away. Only then was she allowed to get a divorce.
• A girl from Dagestan was married off at the age of 15. Her husband beat her so badly that she lost her child. She was allowed to get a divorce, but in the end she was locked up in her parents’ house, beaten and not even allowed to get a passport. The girl had a choice: either stay at home as a free maid or remarry. She chose the other way – and escaped with the help of Marem.
• Another Chechen woman was married off early. She gave birth to two children and divorced a few years later – her ex-husband did not give her children back and her father also forbade her to take them. She has no support at home, on the contrary, she is beaten and forced to remarry. Her family demands that she just forgets about her children and starts living from scratch.
• The family of another Dagestani girl moved from the republic to Moscow. There, the girl ran away from her brothers and mother. They are looking for her and threaten to take her back to Dagestan, lock her up at home and marry her off.
• Another applicant from Chechnya was married off at the age of 16 to a man much older than her, who raped her during the marriage. She fled but then returned because of her parents’ illness, she was remarried. “But we took her away,” says Anokhina.

Crisis centres, education and criminal liability for perpetrators. Overcoming the practice of early and forced marriage

In general, girls and young women who have been forcibly married do not go anywhere, believing that if they have not been helped by their own family, they can hardly count on the support of strangers. The authorities, both regional and federal, do little to protect victims of violence.

For example, in Chechnya and then Ingushetia, fines were introduced for kidnapping for marriage, but this did not eradicate the problem: some of the women interviewed for this study were kidnapped after the ban had been lifted. In addition, because of the notorious fear for the “honour” of the family, a girl’s relatives may marry her off to her abductor anyway.

In the beginning, at least they made you pay, and if someone didn’t have the opportunity to pay, it was a deterrent,” said an expert from Ingushetia who spoke to the researchers. – Although it is a small sum, 200,000 roubles. As a rule, the religious representatives who are supposed to demand compliance with this law say: ’Oh, he’s poor, he won’t be able to pay. Let’s not touch him.

The authors highlighted a number of recommendations that could help overcome the practice of early and forced marriage.

• Criminal liability for forcing minors to marry and compulsory state registration of all marriages.
• Free legal aid, redress and rehabilitation for victims of such marriages.
• A system of multi-disciplinary crisis centres, shelters, crisis flats where free emergency assistance can be provided to victims, especially in remote and rural areas.
• Advocacy to overcome customs that are harmful to girls’ development and health.
• Improving the literacy of underage girls themselves to be able to defend their rights, with a particular focus on protection from violence.
• Train law enforcement and court officials to more effectively enforce laws already in place to protect girls from abduction and forced marriage.

Human rights activist Svetlana Anokhina emphasises that the fight against violence against women should not start with the problem of forced marriages. “It is necessary to first realise, including at the legislative level, that a woman is a person. But as we see from the cases of numerous escapes of girls, the state itself is not on the side of the runaway girl, but on the side of those who persecute her,” she says. – The law enforcers consider the girl to be the property of her family. If a runaway can be forcibly seized and returned, how can you fight the fact that she is being forcibly married off?

The human rights activist emphasises that this is not a problem of the North Caucasus alone, but “systemic coordinated work of all law enforcement agencies throughout the country”. According to her, many times they have heard from law enforcers that they have an unspoken order: “Do not get involved in Caucasian cases”.

“Traditional values: if you are a girl, you are not a human being. They can put you in jail, they can marry you off by force, but they can’t let you go free if you run away, and the police won’t protect you,” Anokhina said.

Source

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The new dress code — the second of its kind in six years — is expected to be made public in the coming days, and a special event is reportedly being planned for the capital, Dushanbe, in August to showcase compliant clothes.

Sulaimon Davlatzoda, the head of the state Committee for Religious Affairs and the Regulation of Traditions, told a press briefing in the capital this week that “a joint task force of the Culture Ministry, the Women’s Committee, and the Religious Affairs Committee is working together to determine what clothes are most compatible with our national values and traditions.”

The new dress code comes after Tajikistan officially issued a ban in June on “clothes alien to Tajik culture,” a term widely used by officials to describe Islamic dress, which they treat as an outward sign of potential religious extremism.

Earlier this week, the Central Asian country’s state-backed Islamic Council of Ulema issued a fatwa — a religious edict — against “black clothes” as well as “tight-fitting and see-through” garments for women. In Tajikistan, the term “black clothes” tends to be a euphemism for the Islamic hijab.

The July 26 fatwa proclaimed that the color of black is not compatible with “our national and geographical characteristics.”

Echoing the government’s long-standing position on female clothing, the fatwa also promoted a national costume for Tajik women, which consists of a dress, trousers, and a kerchief.

The fatwa explained that the three-piece was fully in line with the Islamic practice mandating a woman cover her entire body, with the exception of her face, hands, and feet.

‘We Got The Message’

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, who has been in power for more than 30 years, has been criticized by rights groups for clamping down on independent media, political pluralism, and also religious freedom. Religious beliefs and practices that deviate from the state-mandated norm are often seen by the authorities as a threat to Tajikistan’s stability and security.

Tajiks, especially those who wear the hijab, say they believe that the June hijab ban, the latest fatwa, and the upcoming guidelines on women’s clothing are a “needless, excessive step.”

“Black was already banned,” said Munisa, a nurse in a state hospital in a northern city who didn’t want to give her full name. She was referring to the state Religious Committee’s 2017 statement that prohibited wearing black at funerals.

Instead, the statement urged Tajik women to stick to the local tradition of wearing blue to mourn their dead.

“Nothing is new about the hijab ban, either. It’s been [effectively] in place for a decade at least,” Munisa said.

“We got the message already. There’s no need to keep repeating it, with new laws,” the 40-year-old nurse said.

Like many Tajiks, Munisa dismisses the fatwa against tight and see-through dresses as a smokescreen, saying the real target is Islamic dress, which the government considers “alien” and a threat to the secular government. For example, previous bans on miniskirts and plunging necklines have never been enforced.

In predominantly Muslim Tajikistan, a country of nearly 10 million people, the authorities’ campaign against the Islamic head scarf began in 2007 when the Education Ministry prohibited the hijab — and miniskirts — at schools and universities.

The ban eventually expanded to workplaces, and officials and police conducted raids to ensure its compliance.

Many hijab-wearing women faced a tough choice between their religious and cultural beliefs and their careers. Some quit their jobs or studies, while others — like Munisa — swapped their Islamic head scarf for the traditional kerchief.

Tajik men have also fallen afoul of government edicts in the past, with the authorities seeing them as suspect because of their long or bushy beards.

In 2015, a regional police chief in the southern Khatlon Province announced that nearly 13,000 men “with long and unkempt beards” were rounded up in the streets and bazaars over the course of the year and had their beards “brought to order.”

A high-ranking government official warned Tajik bloggers in 2023 that promoting beards might be interpreted as “an expression of solidarity with terrorist groups” and presents “a threat to national security.”

In 2018, the Culture Ministry published The Guidebook To Recommended Outfits In Tajikistan, which outlines acceptable designs, colors, and fabrics for clothing.

While the guidebook encouraged women to wear the Tajik national three-piece costume, for the office it suggested that they wear Western-style clothes, albeit with more modest necklines and hemlines.

It is not clear if the upcoming dress code will supersede the previous guideline.

New Crackdown

Some Dushanbe residents have complained that the recent official ban on “alien” clothes has prompted the authorities to crack down.

In Dushanbe, a group of hijab-wearing women were rounded up on May 22 by law enforcement officers and representatives of the local women’s affairs office and taken to the police station.

One of the women later told RFE/RL’s Tajik Service that their fingerprints and mugshots were taken and they were made to promise not to wear “alien” clothes ever again, before being released the same day.

On May 23, police in the capital’s Shohmansur district briefly detained 13 men with bushy beards and demanded that they shave. Police warned them they “will be arrested if caught again with long beards,” one of the men told RFE/RL.

Source

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Speculations over what American foreign policy under the potential leadership of Kamala Devi Harris might look like have begun in earnest, now that US president Joe Biden – who announced recently that he would not be seeking re-election – has officially endorsed his vice president as his heir apparent in the race for the presidency. Although many Democratic Party leaders and supporters have joined the president in coalescing behind Harris, the official nominee of the Democrats will only be chosen at their party’s national convention in Chicago next month.

Should Kamala Harris, if confirmed as the Democrats’ standard bearer, triumph over Donald Trump when Americans take to the ballot box this November, what can we expect from the foreign policy of a Harris administration towards the Indo-Pacific region? Would she prove a “weak” leader – as Beijing’s state-backed news outlet Global Times has insisted – whose presidency is unlikely to pose a threat to China?

Shaky Start

Having carved a niche as the state of California’s top law enforcement official and subsequently its junior senator, Harris stepped into the vice presidency with little foreign policy experience. Her initial foray into US diplomacy began with a stumble: her proposal to work with Central American nations to address the root causes of illegal immigration into the United States was quickly lumped with the related issue of the security of America’s southern border, which she – as in the case of a clumsy interview with the US news outlet NBC News – tried unsuccessfully to avoid. Nor did the initial turmoil among her staff do her reputation any favours.

However, things have markedly improved since those rough beginnings, with seasoned Washington operators like Philip Gordon and Rebecca Lissner being enlisted to advise the vice president on foreign policy and national security matters. According to US congressman Adam Smith, the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, Harris’s performance at this year’s Munich Security Conference making a case for America’s role in Ukraine and NATO indicates that she has been “stress-tested” and found credible.

Staying the Course

Given her inexperience as an international leader, it is highly likely that Harris, as US president, would continue the Biden administration’s foreign policy, at least until such time as she has a firmer grasp on world affairs. Under her leadership, the United States is likely to continue supporting Ukraine and NATO while adopting a firm line against Vladimir Putin and Russia. Given her strong stance against Israel’s handling of the Gaza conflict – which she has referred to as a humanitarian catastrophe for innocent civilians – it is possible that her Israel policy may prove less fixed and intransigent than Biden’s. Indeed, she is on record for having called for a “temporary ceasefire” to the Gaza conflict well before her boss publicly did.

But far as the Indo-Pacific goes, it is unlikely that Harris would stray from extant US policy. As noted, many Chinese seem to think that Harris would prove weaker than Biden in dealing with China. As a US senator, she co-sponsored a bill promoting human rights in Hong Kong and supported another on the rights of Uyghurs in Xinjiang; in both cases, the bills included sanctions against those deemed responsible for human rights abuses.

China

As vice president, Harris has underscored America’s support – “consistent with [the US’s] long-standing policy” – for Taiwan’s self-defence and decried Chinese intimidation and coercion against Philippine vessels in the waters surrounding the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.

In an interview with CBS News last year, Harris advocated a firm stance against China, calling for “de-risking” from Beijing – a policy that aims to reduce the extent to which the US and Western economies depend on China. “It’s not about pulling out [from China], but it is about ensuring that we are protecting American interests, and that we are a leader in terms of the rules of the road, as opposed to following others’ rules”, Harris explained in that interview.

Harris’s remarks on China strongly hint at the influence of Rebecca Lissner, who currently serves as deputy national security adviser to the vice president. In her 2020 book An Open World: How America Can Win the Contest for Twenty-First-Century Order (co-authored with Mira Rapp-Hooper), Lissner argues that China constitutes America’s “chief antagonist” to an open world through Beijing’s determined efforts at forming exclusive territorial and technological blocs. Against such opposition, Lissner advocates a new vision and approach for America, one that allows it to de-risk itself while working with like-minded allies and rebuilding what she considers outmoded international institutions to set rules that ensure and enhance global openness. Lissner is adamant that the United States and the West should not pursue regime change around the world, but counter authoritarian competitors by preventing the rise of closed spheres of influence and preserving open access to the global commons.

Such an openness strategy is also in line with Harris’s criticism of the Trump administration’s inconsequential efforts to engage North Korea and rein in its nuclear ambitions, which do not close Northeast Asia off as much as create undue uncertainty and apprehension in the region. This is not to imply that Lissner’s ideas would form the blueprint for foreign policy under a Harris administration. At the very least, it suggests that Beijing’s hopes of a weak and unfocused America under Harris may be premature, perhaps even unfounded.

ASEAN

Under Harris, the United States is also likely to stay the course taken by Biden in its ties with ASEAN and Southeast Asia, a region hotly contested by both Beijing and Washington. But whether Harris would do better than Biden at reassuring and improving the region’s perceptions of America remains to be seen. According to a 2024 annual survey conducted by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, when asked who they would prefer to align with in the ongoing China-US rivalry, slightly more Southeast Asian respondents reportedly sided with the Chinese (50.5%) than with the Americans (49.5%). That said, a Harris-led America would presumably play the kind of international leadership role ASEAN desires of the United States than a Trump-led one is likely to furnish. While ASEAN leaders would no doubt redouble their efforts to keep a mercurial and capricious Donald Trump happy and engaged (were he to return as US leader), a President Harris is more likely to show up for ASEAN meetings in person – the high-mark of ASEAN summitry success – than a President Trump ever did or would.

Southeast Asians have had a couple of opportunities to see Kamala Harris up close. At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in August 2021, Harris, in her capacity as US vice president, visited Singapore and Vietnam to strengthen her nation’s security partnerships and to expand economic cooperation with two of America’s critical Indo-Pacific partners. Attending the 2023 ASEAN summit held in Jakarta in Biden’s stead, Harris – in her fifth visit to the Southeast Asian region – engaged with leaders of the ASEAN member states as well as Australia, China, Japan and South Korea. Notably, as a senator, Harris was active in legislating against human rights abuses in Myanmar – a concern she has repeatedly raised during her visits to Southeast Asia. Welcomed or otherwise, ASEAN could expect a greater focus on Myanmar from a Harris administration than it ever did from the Biden – and, for that matter, the Trump – administrations.

Conclusion

Should a Harris foreign policy adopt the contours and course of a grand strategy akin to what Lissner has counselled, it would probably surprise no one if China – still designated as America’s chief antagonist – were to resume its age-old accusation against America over the latter’s ostensible “Cold War” fixation with alliances and partnerships aimed at (in Beijing’s view) encircling and counterbalancing China. In this regard, it is unclear whether Harris might tap into her part-Indian heritage – her late mother was from Tamil Nadu – to enlist India (as a member of the Quad) in checking an assertive China: she has come across as ambivalent towards India. All things considered, the prospect of a Harris presidency is not the worst thing that could happen for the Indo-Pacific region.

See Seng Tan is President and CEO of International Students Inc. (ISI) in the United States and concurrently Research Adviser at RSIS and Senior Associate at the Centre for Liberal Arts and Social Sciences (CLASS) at NTU.

See Seng Tan

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The international human rights organization Freedom House called Tajikistan one of the “most repressive” countries in the world in 2023.

In its new report, the organization gave Tajikistan just 5 points out of 100. Freedom House’s annual report “Freedom in the World – 2024. The Growing Damage of Unfair Elections and Armed Conflicts” was published on February 29.

“The level of freedoms in Tajikistan decreased by two points in 2023 due to ongoing actions to suppress freedom of expression and discrimination against the Pamiri minority,” said Catherine Groth, Middle East and North Africa research analyst at Freedom House.

“It had a bad effect”

She sent her opinion on the situation in Tajikistan in writing to the editorial office of Radio Ozodi. According to her, over the past ten years – from 2013 to 2023 – a sharp decline in the level of freedom can be observed in Tajikistan.

“This situation is bad for political rights and civil liberties and is the result of the leadership of autocratic President Emomali Rahmon, who has been in power since 1992,” Groth explained.

Officials in Tajikistan have not yet expressed their opinion on the report, but in the past they have always reproached human rights organizations for biased and one-sided coverage of the issue.

For example, the authorities deny the existence of political prisoners from among the opposition and their supporters, as well as well-known bloggers and journalists, claiming that they were punished for the crimes committed. Although the convicts themselves, their relatives and supporters consider the criminal cases against them to be politically motivated.

Freedom House researchers say that since the crackdown on protesters in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region in 2022 and the arrest of dozens of people, including at least eight journalists and bloggers, attacks on civil liberties have been on the rise.

“Journalists and bloggers who have expressed their views in writing and orally have been harassed and threatened by the authorities. Several journalists have been arrested and imprisoned for long periods in the past year, and the authorities continue to suppress and censor the free press,” the report said.

According to the authors of the report, such pressure on the press has led to the fact that even ordinary citizens in Tajikistan are now trying to be careful in expressing their opinions in order to avoid persecution.

“Additional Measures to Suppress the Pamiris”

Catherine Groth also stressed the deterioration of the situation of national minorities, in particular the Pamir diaspora. She points out that “in 2023, the Pamiri community faced even harsher discrimination, and the authorities took additional measures to suppress the Pamiris.”

Officials in Tajikistan have previously said they disagree with the position of international organizations that portray the Pamiris as a national and religious minority.

“The Muslims of the Pamirs are followers of the Ismaili sect in Islam and a religious minority widely persecuted in Tajikistan. In 2023, they faced severe restrictions on their religious freedoms. Authorities restricted the places where they prayed and fined several people for organizing prayers inside their homes. In addition to this restriction of religious freedoms, Pamiri activists and ordinary citizens have faced arbitrary arrest and harassment, and even more Pamiris have fled for fear of persecution,” Catherine Groth added.

In August 2023, the authorities confirmed that they had banned five NGOs in Gorno-Badakhshan in the past six months, and the reason for this decision, they said, was that these organizations had “links to criminal groups.”

As part of the operation to suppress protests in the region, the Tajik government said that these measures were taken in order to strengthen the “factor of strengthening security,” and called the arrests “a way to prevent crimes against public order and officials of the Ministry of Defense.” However, Pamiri activists and opponents of the Tajik government say the purpose of the operation was to suppress dissidents and dissatisfied citizens with the government’s policies.

Freedom House says Russia’s two-year-old war in Ukraine has affected all of Central Asia.

Tajikistan’s economy remains heavily dependent on the income of migrant workers in Russia. As a result of the border conflicts between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the level of hostility between the border population has sharply increased and the security of the residents of both states is suffering. Negotiations between Dushanbe and Bishkek continued throughout 2023, although the level of diplomatic relations between the two countries remained at a low level until the end of the year.

Source: Pamir Inside

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Mary Lawlor, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, said that the dissolution of human rights NGOs signals a deteriorating environment for civil society and human rights defence in Tajikistan. She reiterated that Tajikistan must reconsider its attitudes towards civil society and view human rights defenders as allies instead of enemies.

Earlier in November 2023, Tajikistan Minister of Justice announced that 700 NGOs in the country had been liquidated over an 18-month period.

UN Special Rapporteur Mary Lawlor said, “Human rights defenders in Tajikistan working on so-called ‘sensitive’ issues have been reportedly subjected to threats and intimidation.”

“Human rights defenders working on so-called sensitive issues, including freedom from torture, the right to housing and compensation for requisitioned land, minority rights, freedom of belief and good governance, political rights, and particularly the right to free and fair elections have been reportedly subjected to threats and intimidation,” the Special Rapporteur said.

“Some of those NGOs had been in operation for over 20 years,” the UN expert continued. “This decision also affects those working on early intervention on disability issues, expanding access to education, supporting victims of domestic violence, protecting the environment and promoting public access to land.”

Some organisations were forced to close following unrest in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) in 2022. Official statistics show that after these events, the courts ordered many public organisations to shut down while several other organisations self-dissolved. It is reported that in GBAO, of 300 registered organisations in early 2022, only around 10% can continue operating.

Several NGOs decided to self-dissolve after their directors were repeatedly summoned to the Department of Justice or local executive authorities. They were then reportedly placed under pressure or coerced into shutting down their organisations ‘voluntarily.’

“Interfering with the activities of NGOs and forcing civil society organisations to cease activities will have a serious knock-on impact on a whole range of human rights in Tajikistan,” Lawlor said. “I call on the government to reverse these closures.”

Source

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Rahmon’s bid to centralize control includes efforts to silence political opponents, human rights activists, and independent voices. More than a decade ago, Tajikistan’s media environment was relatively diverse and allowed for some criticism and debate, as long as local media avoided reporting on the president and his extensive family. Now, Tajikistan’s media are in their worst state since the violent years of the civil war, journalists told a Committee to Protect Journalists’ representative during a visit to the country late last year and through messaging apps.

Seven journalists were sentenced to lengthy prison terms in retaliation for their work in 2022 and 2023. The United Nations Human Rights Council has criticized “the apparent use of anti-terrorism legislation to silence critical voices” and expressed concern about reports alleging that torture was used to obtain false confessions from prisoners.

In one telling sign of the climate of fear that prevails in Tajikistan, only two among the more than a dozen journalists, press freedom advocates, and experts that CPJ met with were willing to speak on the record.

Some key takeaways from CPJ’s visit:

‘The collapse of independent Tajik journalism’

Prior to 2022, Tajikistan rarely jailed journalists. “For the president [Rahmon], it was important to be able to say we don’t touch journalists,” one local journalist told CPJ.

That changed with the unprecedentedly harsh sentences meted out to the seven convicted in 2022 and 2023 on what are widely seen as charges in retaliation for their work. Four journalists – Abdullo Ghurbati, Zavqibek Saidamini, Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda, and Khurshed Fozilov – received sentences of seven or seven-and-a-half years, Khushom Gulyam eight years, Daler Imomali, 10 years, and Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, 20 years – a development seen by many as a deeply chilling escalation in the years-long constriction of independent media.

For Abdumalik Kadirov, head of the independent trade group Media Alliance of Tajikistan, 2022 marked “the collapse of independent Tajik journalism.”

Interviewees told CPJ that only two significant independent media voices now remain in Tajikistan: privately owned news agency Asia-Plus and U.S. Congress-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s local service, the Czech Republic-headquartered Radio Ozodi.  

Both regularly face harassment and threats. Their websites have long been subjected to partial shutdowns by local internet service providers – the result of behind-the-scenes orders from state officials, according to local journalists, so that authorities can deny responsibility for the outages.

Asia-Plus has been forced to moderate its content, reducing its political coverage, following a May 2022 threat from authorities to shutter its operations.

A handful of other outlets either avoid political topics entirely, struggle to maintain independence in the face of government repression, or barely function due to lack of funding, multiple sources said. Adding to challenges for journalists are less visible forms of pressure, such as threats of tax fines and surveillance of their work.

“Everything is done indirectly,” one journalist said. “[The authorities] have many levers. They can make it known to a [financially] struggling outlet that it will be hit with huge tax fines, or its management will face criminal charges, and it’s advisable just to lay things down.” Several interviewees said that each media outlet has a “curator” from law enforcement agencies as a reminder that it is being watched, and authorities can threaten rigged tax or other inspections, or even order advertisers to pull their ads.

Particularly since authorities banned the country’s main opposition party in 2015, key independent media have been forced into closure and “dozens” of journalists have chosen exile. A government decree enacted shortly after this requires media outlets to pass an inspection by state security services prior to registration, the head of the National Association of Independent Media of Tajikistan (NANSMIT) Nuriddin Karshiboev told CPJ, with “virtually no new independent media” on the national level being registered since.

Rising fear and self-censorship

The year 2022 had a “devastating” effect on Tajikistan’s already embattled independent media, one journalist said. Several interviewees linked the crackdown on journalists to the authorities’ brutal suppression of protests in the eastern Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region in May-June 2022. Immediately after those protests erupted, authorities arrested 66-year-old journalist and human rights defender Mamadshoeva on charges of organizing the unrest, airing what many believe to be a forced confession days later on state TV.

Four journalists with RFE/RL and its project Current Time TV were attacked after interviewing Mamadshoeva immediately before her arrest, and authorities’ shuttering threat against Asia-Plus was issued over its coverage of events in Gorno-Badakhshan. While most of the other jailed journalists did not cover Gorno-Badakhshan, analysts told CPJ their arrests were in part calculated to have a chilling effect on the press amid the crackdown in that region.

Above all, interviewees said, 2022 entrenched a climate of fear and exacerbated already high levels of self-censorship among journalists. “We don’t know who might be next,” one journalist said. “2022 silenced all of us, not just those who were arrested,” said another. “Journalists fear saying anything.”

Several journalists told CPJ they themselves self-censored more following the events of 2022, which had left increasing uncertainty over “red lines,” the topics that are off limits. “Before it was easier as the red lines were clearer – the president and his family, top state officials, and after 2015, coverage of exiled opposition leaders,” one analyst said. “Now, it’s unpredictable – what you might consider neutral, [the authorities] might not. This unpredictability is the most problematic thing for journalism.”

Others agreed with what Kadirov described as a “dramatic fall” in the number of critical articles and an increasing tendency for local media to avoid domestic politics in favor of “safe” topics such as culture, sport, and some international news.

The convictions of five of the seven jailed journalists in 2022-23 on charges of “participation” in banned political groups allowed authorities to successfully portray independent journalists as “extremists,” several interviewees said. “Society falls for this,” one journalist said, “and members of the public often do not want to speak to journalists, and experts are increasingly wary of doing so.”

The events of 2022 also deepened the sense of alienation between independent journalists and authorities and the public. Where 10 to 15 years ago authorities were forced to reckon with independent media as “a real public watchdog,” noted one analyst, officials now engage less and less with the media, rejecting or ignoring their information requests. Access to information remains “an urgent problem of Tajik journalism,” according to Karshiboev, despite some recent encouraging discussions between authorities and media organizations on how to address the issue.

Decline in international donors

“Tajik media’s biggest problem is finances,” Karshiboev told CPJ. Lacking domestic sources of funding amid a limited advertising market, Tajikistan’s independent media have for years been reliant on international donors, interviewees said. Yet in recent years donor support has significantly declined, particularly since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine. “All Western resources and attention go to Ukraine,” one analyst lamented. Others cited a longer-term “donor fatigue” – donor organizations have lost interest in Tajikistan in particular and Central Asia more widely “because they don’t see any improvement,” one journalist said. A particular blow was the withdrawal of the Soros Foundation, previously a major media donor, from Tajikistan at the end of 2022.

Others argued that the problem was not so much a decline in donor funding as its misdirection – away from critical media and much-needed measures for media defense and toward projects of questionable value. Among other reasons, several argued that the ultimate problem is that international donors know the media is a sore spot for the Tajik government and, as Karshiboev put it, “fear damaging relations if they provide real and effective support to journalism.”

Interviewees said donors may also feel constrained by the West’s limited ability to influence on human rights issues in a country with such strong ties to Russia and China. “The Tajik government has increasingly learnt that it can act badly without any major consequences,” one analyst emphasized to CPJ. The war in Ukraine has exacerbated that dynamic.

“Before, when there wasn’t this standoff between Russia and the West, Tajikistan still looked to the West,” one journalist said. “Now they think: ‘What can the West do’?”  

A bleak outlook

Despite memories of a freer media environment only a generation ago, few of the journalists who spoke to CPJ were optimistic about the prospects for Tajik journalism in the near or mid-term future.

Many noted that Tajik journalists have become “demoralized” following 2022, that there’s been an uptick in journalists fleeing the country or leaving the profession, and that young people are reluctant to choose journalism as a career.

A marginalized independent media sector is very convenient for the government, said one analyst, “so it is unlikely to get better.” External support, in the form of more pressure and better targeted funding from Western and international donors and governments, was one of few factors capable of pushing developments in a more positive direction, several interviewees said. Kadirov and others believe that authorities’ tight control over traditional media outlets will cause independent journalists to turn more to social media and blogging to publish their reporting, making authorities likely to seek to exert even more control over those forums too.

“I see my mission as maintaining independent journalism – I can’t say in a good condition – but maintaining it at least to wait for better days,” said Kadirov.

CPJ emailed the Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan for comment, but did not receive any replies.

Source: CPJ

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The massive mobilization and sustained pressure jolted the Sri Lankan presidency of the previously all-powerful Gotabaya Rajapaksa, prompted mass resignations from the government at the time, and solidified existing spaces and created new spaces for dissent and discussions on much-needed reforms. Sri Lanka is facing an exceptional political and economic crisis that has sparked months-long protests across the country.

The new leadership under President Ranil Wickremesinghe struggles with the economic situation and seemingly failed to uphold basic human rights and pursue accountability for grave crimes towards the people of Sri Lanka.

Months since the popular uprising ousted Sri Lanka’s president in July 2022, Sri Lankans are bearing the brunt of its economic crisis. Tax hikes, subsidy cuts, and heightened living costs provide bitter medicine for a population that thus far lacks confidence in its government.

Despite troubling trends of authoritarianism, democratic backsliding, and ethnomajoritarianism sweeping across Sri Lanka, key moments in recent history have united diverse groups in a show of peaceful pushback. These events have enabled the most recent wave of citizen mobilization, which has the potential to significantly transform Sri Lanka.

SRI LANKA’S HISTORY OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM

This recent upswell of mobilization builds on Sri Lanka’s rich history of political activism attributed to multiple actors, including victims’ groups and civil society organizations from across Sri Lanka, trade unions, and political parties. Activism has focused on a range of issues, including civil and political rights as well as socioeconomic issues on which street protests, legal challenges to public statements, and political debates have been used to press for progressive reforms.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, opposition groups, civil society, trade unions, and victims of political violence worked to oppose state-sponsored violence and enforced disappearances. These efforts include the powerful work of the Mothers’ Front, whose members mobilized in raising awareness of enforced disappearances and pushing for accountability. This mobilization came at huge personal cost to the participants, with many protesters facing sustained harassment and violence. For instance, after the country’s civil war, which ended in 2009, the families of disappeared victims have held continuous protests for more than 1,900 days. Other issues have also received attention including farming and fishing communities whose members’ livelihoods were affected by disastrous government policies, communities opposing government-initiated land grabs, and teachers and trade union members who opposed attempts to militarize higher education, among many other causes. These and many other protests have contributed to a rich history of opposition mobilization in Sri Lanka.

Authoritarian practices and impunity under former president Mahinda Rajapaksa (who was in office from 2005 to 2015 and is the older brother of current President Gotabaya Rajapaksa) sparked new levels of activism by victims of political repression, civil society, and opposition groups. These critics of the government called out the atrocities committed during the civil war and creeping authoritarianism such as threats to freedom of the press and the wrongful impeachment of the country’s chief justice who dared to rule against the Rajapaksa government. Democratic backsliding during this period prompted groups to coalesce under a common cause, leading to movements such as the National Movement for a Just Society, which demanded regime change.

Notably, the first movement to unify both Tamil and Muslim citizens during Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s presidential tenure was a February 2021 march from Pottuvil in eastern Sri Lanka to Polikandy in the north. Thousands united to march and demand equality and justice for minority communities. The protesters faced surveillance and intimidation and defied court orders to cease and desist.

As protests in Sri Lanka have evolved, so have government efforts to quell dissent with violence, intimidation, and other tactics including arbitrary restrictions. For example, during the height of the coronavirus pandemic, public health challenges were used to suppress protests. Scenes of protesters violently attacked and dragged to military-run quarantines were widely broadcast, sending a chilling message to potential protesters. The government also used broad regulations under the guise of pandemic control measures to stop opposition rallies. Yet these attempts failed to deter activists as protesters stayed resolute in their opposition to the government.

THE LATEST CRISIS

Much of the recent crisis can be blamed on Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s presidency and his family, with several family members holding multiple government portfolios. The Rajapaksa family has dominated Sri Lankan politics for several decades, carving out a massive constituency among the majority Sinhalese community by espousing populist ethnomajoritarianism and touting the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a separatist group that was involved in Sri Lanka’s nearly three-decade-long civil war. Even after losing the January 2015 presidential election while facing allegations of corruption and nepotism, Mahinda Rajapaksa returned to politics later that year as a member of parliament. Since winning a seat in the August 2015 parliamentary elections, he has, with the help of family members, built a new political party (the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna or the Sri Lankan People’s Front) and entrenched the Rajapaksa family as the most powerful political family in Sri Lanka.

In the wake of the devastating Easter Sunday terrorist attacks that rocked Sri Lanka in 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa emerged as a presidential candidate, projecting himself as a strong leader capable of restoring security, stability, and economic growth. Within months, he was elected president by a margin of more than 1 million votes, despite having held no prior elected office and facing allegations of serious human rights violations linked to the civil war.

Many of his policies have had catastrophic effects on Sri Lanka’s democracy and economy. For example, the 2019 tax cuts he enacted significantly reduced government revenues, hindering Sri Lanka’s ability to purchase essential items such as food, medicine, gas, and fuel. Further, a ban on chemical fertilizer in 2021 harmed the agricultural sector and food security, leaving many Sri Lankans to struggle with securing meals and their livelihoods. The ban also impacted the country’s tea trade and other industries. The pandemic and subsequent lockdowns also shriveled the economy, which is heavily dependent on the tourism sector. Government mismanagement on a range of other areas has contributed to high inflation and has compounded the crisis, leading to uncertainty, instability, and new triggers for violence.

Sri Lanka has experienced decades of unrest, violence, and uncertainty punctuated by a lengthy civil war, several humanitarian disasters, and a constitutional coup in 2018. However, the country was still ill-prepared for the current crisis; thousands of citizens have been affected, and many are struggling to find essential items and manage long power cuts brought on by fuel shortages, problems that have disrupted essential services, education, and people’s livelihoods. In a sad indictment of the dire conditions, multiple people died after collapsing following long waits under the hot sun for basic goods and services. There are also increasing concerns about the impact of malnutrition and medication shortages on Sri Lankans.

Amid this unprecedented crisis, Sri Lankans’ political activism has reawakened, prompting months-long peaceful protests. Rallies have protested shortages of essential items and long queues to obtain such items, the skyrocketing cost of living, and the disruptive power cuts. After several weeks of peaceful protests, however, violence erupted on March 31, 2022. On this day, a peaceful protest outside the private residence of Gotabaya Rajapaksa turned violent, resulting in mass arrests and prompting an ongoing police investigation. The government responded by declaring a state of emergency and imposing a curfew. Despite these measures, the energy of the protests did not dissipate; thousands continued to peacefully protest, resulting in the largest outpouring of civil disobedience in recent times. The protesters continued with their demands of a systemwide change in Sri Lanka including political accountability, transparency in governance, the resignations of the Rajapaksa family from government posts, and an end to corruption. In response, the cabinet resigned en masse on April 3. For a time, however, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who still holds the presidency, and then prime minister Mahinda Rajapaksa remained in office, resulting in renewed calls for them to leave their posts.

The Rajapaksas’ refusal to heed these calls for their resignations and the country’s deteriorating economic situation further energized protesters. On April 9, protesters launched the largest protest site at Galle Face Green in the heart of Colombo. The occupied area was renamed “GotaGoGama,” reinforcing the demonstrators’ demand for the president’s resignation. After now being occupied for more than seventy-five days and counting, the GotaGoGama campaign has become the epicenter of the protest.

In Sri Lanka’s larger history of protests, this mobilization is remarkable for its diversity, perseverance, and relatively peaceful methods (except for some instances of violence largely sparked by government supporters, including deadly attacks on protesters on May 9). Much of the energy and creativity of the protests can be attributed to youthful participants, yet the protests have attracted demonstrators from a wide range of ages, including some in their eighties and nineties. The movement also has united members regardless of ethnicity, religion, class, gender, sexual orientation, and profession, all demanding that the Rajapaksas resign. The protests also have displayed an unprecedented level of organization, with food, water, and healthcare being provided by well-wishers and space being made for creative forms of resistance like public discussions, a library, legal aid, street dramas, and memorials for past violence.

With pressure mounting and government officials fearing that a continuous hartal (strike) would bring the country to a standstill, a state of emergency was declared yet again on May 6, soon after the previous state of emergency had been revoked. As was already evident from the demonstrations in April, the state of emergency did not deter the many who continued to peacefully protest. On May 9, supporters of Mahinda Rajapaksa attacked the peaceful protesters, unleashing new waves of violence. The violence targeting the protesters subsequently spread to other areas, causing several deaths alongside looting and the torching of properties belonging to members of parliament from the ruling party. The violence did not abate, despite Mahinda Rajapaksa’s abrupt resignation from his post as prime minister, one of the protesters’ key demands. A national curfew was soon imposed, but it took several days for the tensions to subside.

The peaceful protests’ descent into violence was worrying for multiple reasons. Mobs took over streets and neighborhoods, raising concerns about the inability of the police and military to guarantee order amid the state of emergency and curfew. Investigations have since led to the arrests of several perpetrators including those who attacked peaceful protesters and those involved in the subsequent deadly violence across Sri Lanka. These arrests have also prompted questions about the potential culpability of key government officials, former officeholders, and those responsible for maintaining law and order.

Following Mahinda Rajapaksa’s resignation, Sri Lanka had neither a prime minister nor a cabinet for three days. The president was isolated, and the opposition remained divided. The country’s deepening political, economic, and security crisis was alarming. On May 12, seasoned politician Ranil Wickremesinghe was appointed prime minister, and some individuals allegedly linked to the crisis were subsequently appointed to the new cabinet, sparking questions about the new government’s legitimacy.

DIVERSE FORMS OF PUSHBACK

Sri Lankan politics has evolved in recent years beyond traditional street protests. Nowadays, protests include diverse initiatives such as litigation, public statements, debates, art, theater, and social media campaigns. For example, social media have injected new levels of energy and creativity into protests and helped increase engagement among participants from all age groups and geographic areas.

Citizens’ use of public interest litigation has also grown in recent years, with many activists filing cases to challenge proposed amendments to Sri Lanka’s constitution and legislative proposals as well as unjust and arbitrary government practices. Public interest litigation has also informed broader debates among policymakers and ordinary people, raising awareness on important contemporary issues through, among other things, social media updates on developments in relevant courtrooms and the implications of related rulings.

Some instances where public interest litigation and other forms of pushback have shaped debates and have propelled change are worth noting. In 2012, the Supreme Court, which had been considered pro-regime, struck down the Divineguma Bill, which attempted to consolidate executive power and remove checks and balances on governance. In a move now widely seen as government retaliation, the then chief justice was unceremoniously and swiftly impeached. Yet the move united a diverse range of activists and ultimately helped form a broad-based opposition that defeated then president Mahinda Rajapaksa in the country’s 2015 presidential election.

This is not the first time these figures have been at the forefront of political transitions in Sri Lanka. The country’s 2018 constitutional crisis, which involved an undemocratic power grab by Mahinda Rajapaksa and the arbitrary ouster of the sitting prime minister, also united political parties, civil society, trade unions, and academics, sowing political chaos in Sri Lanka. In a rare moment of unity, many took to the streets to challenge this development and litigated their cause in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. Weeks of activism and litigation resulted in a historic judgment: the Supreme Court ruled that the actions of the sitting president were unconstitutional and brought an end to the crisis in December 2018 with the resignation of Mahinda Rajapaksa as prime minister and the reinstatement of Wickremasinghe to the post.

More recent examples also capture moments when different forms of protest forced powerful Sri Lankan government officials to change course. In 2020, a diverse range of actors united against the Twentieth Amendment proposal to amend the country’s constitution, a move that was designed to further consolidate the powers of the presidency and weaken independent institutions. These critics filed legal challenges in the Supreme Court. Activists also used protests, social media campaigns, and political debates to express their dissent, forcing the government to introduce several changes. Despite having a majority in the parliament, the ruling party was forced to incorporate several revisions to the amendment.

Protesters also responded in 2021 to the proposed Colombo Port City Economic Commission Act with vociferous opposition, as many critics saw the proposed legislation as another government attempt to cede control of Sri Lankan assets to external actors without accountability or transparency. Activists again took to the streets to show their dissent and challenged the proposed legislation in the Supreme Court. Opposition to the legislation was fueled by China’s increasing footprint in Sri Lanka, which protesters perceived as a threat to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and economic wellbeing. The legal challenges and debates around the bill generated awareness among Sri Lankans of the problems inherent in the proposed measure and prompted the government to amend its terms and enact the law with changes.

These are a few examples when different forms of pushback chipped away at authoritarian practices. As these examples show, such political activism must also be considered in the context of Sri Lanka’s fragmented political parties and weak trade unions. The shortcomings of these groups coincided with the emergence of new entities and groups for protesting government actions, such as citizen-led initiatives and youth mobilization.

POTENTIAL FOR TRANSFORMATION IN SRI LANKA

These months-long peaceful protests reflect the resilience and creativity of Sri Lankan citizens. In a matter of weeks, a powerful government collapsed, and a previously untouchable political family was forced into hiding. Amid the bleakness engulfing Sri Lanka, the power of citizen mobilization and resistance has captured global attention and injected much-needed energy, ideas, and perspectives into the Sri Lankan opposition. These protests have also redefined the role of citizens and their relationship to the state.

But many challenges remain for protest groups, including intergroup suspicions, deeply entrenched and polarized political viewpoints, and societal fissures. While these protests have highlighted the need to address minority rights and a reckoning for past wrongdoing linked to the war, these questions are perceived by some people as secondary to today’s crisis. Thus, while the present crisis offers a promising opening for future social movements, there is also much to aspire to.

Additionally, the change of government in May 2022 coupled with protest fatigue has contributed to a decline in the number of protesters. While some people have adopted an accommodating stance toward the new prime minister, many others including younger protesters still argue that change can only occur if Gotabaya Rajapaksa resigns as president and systemwide change happens. They see the new government as a continuation of the old guard and a lifeline for the Rajapaksas and their supporters. These dynamics will continue to affect the direction of the protests, help determine whether they can be sustained, and have a bearing on their effectiveness.

Regardless of the setbacks and uncertainties, Sri Lankan citizens have an opportunity to build on this moment and create a new vision for their country. They can address structural inequalities and violence while demanding social and economic justice, political accountability, and a new culture of governance. This task will not be easy, nor will the results be immediate. However, the changes brought about in the last few weeks give hope that sustained, innovative, and inclusive citizen mobilization has a chance to transform Sri Lanka.

Source : Carnegie Endowment

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London (15/11 – 67)

The streets in Colombo, Sri Lanka, erupted into celebration on July 13, 2022 after weeks of peaceful protests forced then-President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee the country. Rajapaksa, long implicated in war crimes when he was defense secretary, had presided over an economic catastrophe amid allegations of widespread corruption and impunity.

But a year later, despite some superficial changes, there is no sustained improvement in the country’s economic situation that impinges many people’s human rights. The acute shortage of fuel that was the most visible feature of the economic crisis has eased. But more than six million people – nearly 30 percent of the population – are food-insecure and require humanitarian assistance, according to the United Nations. Seventeen percent of children under age five have stunted growth.

A year after Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka remains in crisis. The new leadership under President Ranil Wickremesinghe struggles with the economic situation and seemingly failed to uphold basic human rights and bring accountability to the country.

Meanwhile, the new president, Ranil Wickremesinghe, has used the police and military to crack down on protests. While the previous government had announced a moratorium on the use of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act, Wickremesinghe used the law to detain student protest leaders.

A revised counterterrorism law proposed by the new administration would have handed sweeping powers to the police, the military, and the president and created a set of new speech-related offenses. The government was forced to pause the legislation amid widespread outrage, but authorities are nevertheless using other laws to clamp down on free speech.

The government also continues to pursue abusive policies against minorities, such as “land grabs” in the north and east, targeting Tamil and Muslim-owned land, including places of worship, on a variety of pretexts.

Tamils seeking to memorialize people who died in Sri Lanka’s 1983-2009 civil war are subject to intimidation and banning orders. Relatives of victims of enforced disappearance, who are campaigning for truth and accountability, are kept under surveillance by the intelligence agencies. Minorities in the north and east face restrictions on expression and association far greater than in the rest of the country.

Sri Lanka remains in an economic, political, and human rights crisis. President Wickremesinghe should recognize that upholding rights and pursuing accountability for grave crimes is essential to addressing the country’s problems.

Source: Human Rights Watch

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