Dubai/Astana (10 June – 60). The Pamiris are an ethnic minority group in Tajikistan, culturally distinct from the majority Tajik population. They have faced persecution and discrimination in their mountain homeland bordering Afghanistan that some experts say amounts to ethnic cleansing and even genocide. One of the lead persecutors is Ministry of Internal Affairs “Maj. Gen.” Shorukh Syedzada, a former football team manager with no law enforcement experience and a confidante of the president’s son and heir designate.

The Pamiris continue to be marginalized and oppressed by the authorities. As a result, many Pamiris have been forced to flee their homeland in search of safety and refuge, facing the risk of imprisonment or even death if they remain.  Tajikistan’s notorious jails are filled with thousands of Pamiri men and youth, and even women, arrested on trumped up charges by Syedzada who heads the Criminal Investigation Department at the ministry, and responsible for joint operations with the Russian, Turkish, Polish and German intelligence to forcefully detain and return to Tajikistan individuals charged with “terrorism.”

Despite their plight, the Pamiri community remains little-known to the outside world, making it challenging for them to garner support or recognition for their struggles.  The MIA actively works for foreign security services, including those of China, Russia, and Europe, to depict Pamiri civil society leaders as “gangsters” and “terrorists,” justifying their arrests, and killings.

Despite the undeniable existence of the Pamiri community as a distinct ethnic minority in Tajikistan, the denial of their identity by Tajikistan’s justice minister is deeply concerning.

This denial not only perpetuates the marginalization and discrimination faced by the Pamiris but also hinders efforts to address their plight and ensure their rights are protected.

The violent suppression of Pamiri peaceful protests in towns like Rushan and Khorog by Tajik authorities in May 2022, that resulted in the torture and killings of dozens, and imprisonment of hundreds,underscores the ongoing challenges faced by the Pamiri people, driving many to flee their homeland in search of safety and refuge. The journey to find asylum is fraught with hardship and danger, with many experiencing mistreatment and facing significant barriers to secure protection in other countries.

Human rights organizations are calling on the international community to recognize and address the persecution faced by the Pamiris, advocating for their rights and providing support to those who have been forced to flee their homes to countries like Germany, Poland and Turkey. Pamiri organizations in Europe say that it is essential to ensure that they are afforded the protections guaranteed under international law, including the right to seek asylum without fear of reprisal or mistreatment.

The reported cases of disappearances of Tajik citizens from Russia and Turkey raise serious concerns about the safety and rights of individuals within the Pamiri community and beyond. Recently, Pamiris and non-Pamiri Tajiks have been forcefully deported from Germany, Poland, Russia, and Turkey back to Tajikistan, where, according to sources, they face immediate torture by both the Ministry of Internal Affairs as well as the GKNB intelligence service.  Survivors of the tortures report that top MIA and GKNB officers, including Syedzada and GKNB chairman Saymumin Yatimov, participate in the interrogations, and directly threaten prisoners.

Pamiri exile leaders, speaking on condition of anonymity, urge Western governments to provide support and protection to those at risk of persecution, including offering avenues for asylum and resettlement for those who seek refuge from such oppressive conditions in Tajikistan. Additionally, they call for diplomatic pressure to be exerted on Tajikistan to respect the rights and freedoms of all its citizens, regardless of their ethnicity or political affiliations.

‘We all want to go home’

Pamiri witnesses who escaped to the West paint a harrowing picture of the challenges faced they faced as they fled persecution in Tajikistan.

One Pamiri’s journey to freedom was marked by violence and mistreatment at the hands of border guards in multiple countries, where he was threatened with forceful return to his homeland, thus underscoring the desperation and danger faced by those seeking refuge. Despite reaching Germany, he continues to live in fear of extradition back to Tajikistan, where he risks torture and dreadful prison conditions.

Another Pamiri refugee witness has described how his family was torn apart by the consequences of their involvement in the peaceful 2022 Khorog protests. The imprisonment of his brother for “unlawful social media activity” and the subsequent death of their father underlines the devastating toll of persecution on individuals and families within the Pamiri community. His mother’s plight, unable to visit her imprisoned son and grieving the loss of her husband, highlights the profound impact of state-sponsored persecution on the lives of innocent civilians.

While there has been some international criticism of Tajikistan’s actions, Pamiri civil society leaders say that much more needs to be done to hold the authorities accountable and to ensure the protection of Pamiri rights. They believe that it is essential that Tajikistan’s international trade partners and diplomatic allies prioritize the issue of Pamiri persecution in their engagements with the country, pushing for recognition of the Pamiri community’s civil rights – including the freedom of religion and the use of their native languages — and advocating for an end to repression and discrimination.

In the interim, the Pamiri leaders in exile call for neighbouring countries like Russia to provide support and refuge to those fleeing Tajikistan in search of safety. They note that EU member states, as well as countries such as the US, have a responsibility to recognize the plight of the Pamiri minority and offer asylum to those unable to live in their homeland without fear of persecution.

Ultimately, the Pamiri leaders believe that the fundamental long-term goal must be to persuade the Tajikistan authorities to recognize the existence of the Pamiris, cease their repression, and grant them equal rights and protections under the law. Only through concerted international pressure and solidarity can meaningful change be achieved for the Pamiri community and other marginalized groups in Tajikistan.

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Berlin (2/3 – 62.50).           

Lt. Gen. Alfons Mais says the €100 billion committed by the government last year is insufficient. Meanwhile, an association representing soldiers says the Bundeswehr turnaround needs to speed up.

Germany would have to spend more money on its armed forces if it wants it fully equipped, army chief Lieutenant General Alfons Mais said on Sunday.

He told the German news agency, dpa, the €100 billion ($107 billion) to speed up the modernization of the armed forces promised by Chancellor Olaf Scholz after Russia invaded Ukraine was not enough. 

Mais, caused a stir last year when he criticized what he described as years of neglect in the operational readiness of the Bundeswehr,  “the army that I have the duty to lead, is more or less bare,” he said at the time. 

Mais said one year on he was trying to refrain from using the term “bare.”

“I see a great deal of pressure to move forward with the replenishments at the greatest possible speed,” he said.

But in addition to replacing equipment that has been given to Ukraine, a “material increase towards full equipment” was important, Mais stressed. “However, the special fund alone will not be enough to achieve this,” he warned. 

German military not changing fast enough, soldiers say

His sentiments were echoed in a separate interview the head of the independent Armed Forces Association (DBwV), Colonel Andre Wüstner, did with Bild am Sonntag.

He told the mass-market weekly paper there has been “no noticeable improvement” for soldiers since Scholz made the announcement last year.

“More speed is needed, whether in terms of material, personnel or infrastructure, a real turnaround that can be felt in the troops is needed during this parliamentary period … otherwise the ‘turning point’ is over,” Wüstner said.

Wüstner added the German military, or Bundeswehr, is carrying out its assigned missions, “but that is nothing compared to what we will have to contribute to NATO in the future.”

He warned that none of the military hardware supplied to Ukraine had been replaced and that means the operational readiness of parts of the military, such as it artillery, “continues to decline.”

Germany committed to ramping up military spending

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year Scholz announced a “turning point” that would trigger weapons shipments to a nation at war and a massive increase in Germany’s military spending.

Bundeswehr officers have complained for many years that Germany has been neglecting its ability to defend its country and its NATO alliance partners.

Since announcing the €100 billion special fund for the Bundeswehr, about €30 billion has been committed to contracts for specific projects, Defense Ministry spokesman Arne Collatz said Wednesday.

Opposition leader Friedrich Merz of the Christian Democratic Union, whcih held power for 16 years before the Scholz government, complained during a parliamentary debate earlier this month that “large parts of the so-called ‘turning point’ that you described here on February 27 last year so far are happening largely on paper in Germany.”

Merz said it was unacceptable that “practically no orders” had yet been placed, particularly for ammunition.

Germany’s new defense minister, Boris Pistorius, has, however, vowed to speed up arms procurement and ramp up ammunition supplies.

Scholz, in a speech to the Munich Security Conference last weekend, also again promised to push Germany’s defense spending up to 2% of GDP “permanently.”

But his defense minister wants to go even further, “We will reach the 2% target, but we will also make every effort to go beyond that,” Pistorius told the same conference. lo/sms (AP, AFP, dpa)

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Germany’s key role is in helping Central Asia reduce its reliance on Russian and Chinese investments and, more significantly, trade.

Amidst significant geopolitical shifts and Central Asia’s burgeoning economic and political potential, German interest in the region has significantly increased in recent years. Germany, along with the European Union, aims to divest from U.S. strategic hegemony to engage in a multipolar global contest with China and Russia. This recalibration is further informed by Germany’s recent comprehensive National Security Strategy, unveiled on June 14, 2023, which seeks to address German interests in a European landscape deeply impacted by Russia’s incursion into Ukraine.

Germany’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Central Asia operates on two parallel tracks. First, German foreign policy is strongly related to the European regional strategy. The country served as the architect of the European Union’s Strategy for Central Asia, initially adopted in 2007  and subsequently revised in 2019. Second, Germany pursues its individual bilateral imperatives in the region, such as advocating for German-speaking minorities.

The most recent summits and high-level visits with the participation of the German leadership — including those by Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier to Uzbekistan in May 2019 and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in June 2023; Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s visits to Germany in January 2019 and May 2023; German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock’s visits to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in October 2022; the EU-Central Asia Summits in Astana in October 2022 and Cholpon-Ata in June 2023; and the first EU-Central Asia Connectivity Conference in November 2022, in Samarkand — underscore the invigorated dialogue between Germany and Central Asia.

Germany’s Aims in Central Asia

Berlin’s foreign policy toward Central Asia is primarily focused on three areas: countering Russian and Chinese dominance and, ultimately, staving off their total control of the region; fostering economic development, with a particular focus on German goods and services; and navigating the complexities associated with Afghanistan.

First, Germany’s foreign policy seeks to fortify Central Asian nations’ statehood and independence in a shifting post-Soviet landscape increasingly influenced by China. Josef Borrell, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, emphasized the importance of strategic autonomy for both Europe and Central Asia during a summit in Samarkand in November 2022, and noted they could achieve that goal by enhancing connectivity.

Germany’s new National Security Strategy states that “the security environment in Germany is undergoing profound change, and we are at a tipping point, Zeitenwende, or a turning point. With Russia’s threat to European security and China seen as a difficult competitor, a systemic rival, but still an ‘essential partner’, we are redoubling our efforts to keep our country safe and free.” Since 2014, Germany has been instrumental in sustaining the EU’s consensus on sanctions against Russia.

Experts on Central Asia argue that the region occupies a central role in the current geopolitical discord due to its unique location, historical trajectory, institutional configurations, and developmental paradigms. The region itself, however, is among those worst impacted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Central Asian republics, which are surrounded by nations that are subject to Western sanctions (Afghanistan, Iran, China, and Russia), are eager to deepen their global alliances despite grappling with the effects of new, unprecedented sanctions against Moscow.ADVERTISEMENT

German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock observed on the eve of her visit to Central Asia in October 2022 that while the Central Asian republics had long wanted to serve as a link between Russia, China, and Europe, they now feel as if they are wedged between all of the other players and are frightened of becoming a trophy. She made it clear that the visit’s goal was to convey to the Central Asian states that Germany remains actively involved in their struggle to maintain their status as independent states against the backdrop of Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine.

An agreement was made to start a dialogue platform between Germany and the Central Asian states during Mirziyoyev’s May 2023 visit to Germany.

Europe, on the other hand, has pursued a “carrot and stick” strategy, which threatens Central Asia by enforcing secondary sanctions. The recent influx of European envoys to the region, including visits by the European Union Special Envoy for Sanctions Implementation David O’Sullivan and the U.K. Foreign Office Sanctions Director David Reed, show that the West is cognizant of Central Asia’s contribution to the Kremlin’s efforts to evade sanctions. A first wave of sanctions has already affected a number of businesses from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

Germany has been wary of engaging in deep economic collaboration with China since the 2010s. The German stance on Chinese international economic projects serves as a prime illustration: Germany joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and is now its fourth-largest shareholder, but it has opted out of the Belt and Road Initiative. Germany adopted its first-ever China policy in July 2023. It accepts that, as a result of Xi Jinping’s reforms, China has undercut German interests badly. Germany is still attempting to strike a balance between domestic and European perspectives, as well as between industry and politics.

Moreover, Germany has stepped up its diplomatic ties with nations in the Indo-Pacific area in an effort to curtail China’s influence over the past two years. German politicians are engaging in previously unheard-of diplomatic activity in the Indo-Pacific area since 2020, meeting frequently with the leaders of other regional powers.

On April 14, 2023, at the conclusion of the sixth round of the Sino-German Strategic Diplomacy and Security Dialogue in Beijing, then-Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang stated that “carrying out comprehensive exchanges, strengthening strategic mutual trust, and avoiding strategic miscalculations” are the keys to developing bilateral ties between China and Germany. He said China and Germany should cooperate and not be in confrontation, be it a zero-sum confrontation or a bloc confrontation.

Second, Berlin is interested in setting up the conditions for regional economic growth and social welfare improvement, including the prevention of external migration processes. This is primarily done by promoting German products and services. Given the influx of Afghan migrants into the EU, in particular, the current migration problems in Europe demonstrate the necessity of preventive work in neighboring regions.

Germany, which has one of the most developed economies in the world, together with the rest of the EU, became Central Asia’s third-largest trading partner in 2010, behind only Russia and China. And in the ensuing years Germany’s economy interests in the region have only grown. In 2021, the trade turnover between Uzbekistan and the European Union amounted to $3.8 billion – a quarter of which is with Germany. The volume of bilateral trade and export of goods from Uzbekistan to Germany also increased.

In 2022, Germany was the leading trade and economic partner among the EU countries, accounting for almost 26 percent of the total trade volume between Uzbekistan and the EU. Of the total volume of investments received in 2021 in Uzbekistan from EU countries, about 60 percent were German investments, reaching almost $5.5 billion. The country’s government supports Uzbekistan’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the early signing of an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union.

In general, trade turnover between Uzbekistan and Germany increased 2.2 times between 2016 and 2022, from $529.1 million to $1.2 billion; exports increased by 2.4 times, from $36.9 million to $88.9 million; and imports increased by 2.2 times, from $492.2 million to $1.1 billion. Germany’s share of global trade turnover climbed throughout the period from 2.2 percent to 2.3 percent, general exports increased from 0.3 percent to 0.5 percent, and total imports dropped from 4.1  percent to 3.5  percent.ADVERTISEMENT

In exchange for effective economic and political reforms, the EU gave advantages to Uzbekistan under the Generalized System of Preferences-Plus (GSP+) program. And since 2008, Germany has been leading the so-called “Berlin Process” to assist Central Asia with its pressing water management challenges.

Third, due to the Taliban’s refusal to hold talks with Europe, Central Asia is a crucial ally of Germany in relation to Afghanistan. With extensive experience in this area of interaction with the Central Asian states, Berlin has already taken on increased responsibility for planning military and special operations in Afghanistan. For instance, in 2021, Germany evacuated its military and other personnel from Afghanistan with Uzbekistan’s support.

Addressing Structural Issues

To implement its plans for participation in the regional process in Central Asia, Germany must address some structural issues, such as bridging the interregional gap caused by the vast Russian territories that lie between Europe and Central Asia and pose communication challenges, as well as rising competition from China and Russia for markets (particularly in the context of the search for alternative means of trade).

First, Central Asian transport networks are expanding in two significant directions to the west, where Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea are the most important links in the Sino-European trade routes, and to the south, via both land and sea with the development of port communications between Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan and Iran, as well as a railway line connecting Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

In the energy industry, Kazakhstan anticipates the continuation of oil shipments to European markets via the Caspian Sea despite occasional Russia blocking of its main oil pipeline. Turkmenistan sends gas to China and South Asia, while its hydroelectric plans, like those of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are vulnerable to dangers brought on by the situation in Afghanistan.

Second, the EU sought to lessen its reliance on Russia for energy supplies by importing oil and gas rom elsewhere. Naturally, Central Asia could not take the place of imports from OPEC nations into the EU, but it might greatly reduce the EU’s perpetual “energy hunger.” Oil from Kazakhstan is now being shipped to Germany via the Middle Route. The EU is making investments in Central Asian space stabilization to “fix” the Central Asian nations as producers of energy resources. This is true for all nations who have access to the Russian market and are successfully promoting themselves as alternative investors and raw material suppliers who will gain from Russia’s waning influence.

Third, as of 2018, the Global Gateway Initiative (“Connecting Europe and Asia: building blocks of the EU strategy“), which was later incorporated into the EU Policy for Central Asia in 2019, was already being used by European nations. This endeavor to develop bridges is crucial given the West’s current rift with Russia and its escalating systemic conflict with China.

Germany at the Forefront of EU Central Asia Policy

In general, Germany sets the direction of Central Asia policy for the EU. The area serves as a launchpad for the realization of Germany’s objectives as well as those of the EU. It is safe to say that this region will play a significant part in enhancing Germany’s geopolitical stability, particularly its access to food and energy. This is a situation where everyone benefits, especially the Central Asian states. This collaboration will aid the nations of the region in implementing a strategy of “checks and balances” against China and any other entities interested in filling the expanding vacuum in addition to providing geoeconomic and geopolitical benefits.

To protect its political, military, and other interests, it would appear that Germany’s existing goals in the region should increase Berlin’s geostrategic and geoeconomic capital. Through joint industrial cooperation projects and the export of jointly produced goods to international markets, further institutionalizing contacts, as demonstrated by the Germany-Central Asia discussion format and other examples, will contribute to regional consolidation based on mutual benefit.

Germany’s key role is in helping Central Asia reduce its reliance on Russian and Chinese investments and, more significantly, trade. German technology and knowledge, particularly in areas like digitalization and green economy can help create growth potential for Central Asian exports to China, which will also help reduce Germany’s rapidly expanding trade deficit with China, which reached record levels in 2022 and totaled 298 billion euros.

Source: The Diplomat

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On June 20, after meeting with Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier announced Germany’s recent endorsement of Kazakhstan’s efforts to create alternative trade routes and transport corridors to Europe while bypassing Russia. Steinmeier declared that such measures would further prevent the Kremlin’s ability to evade sanctions via Kazakhstan (Svoboda, June 20). However, Moscow’s moves to redirect trade through a new corridor that would circumvent Kazakhstan pose a challenge to Astana’s ambitions (see EDM, 5 July).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, both local governments, neighboring foreign states and international institutions have invested much effort and money in designing and then building regional and intercontinental trade routes. Regardless of where they originate, all of these plans are inextricably tied to the sponsors’ geopolitical as well as economic interests. Consequently, they invariably have become elements of bilateral, regional and international contestation. These plans have long served to bring together Asian, European and Central Asian states, including Afghanistan and the former Soviet republics (Unescap.org, accessed July 19).

Throughout history, Central Asia has been at the crossroads of civilizations and trade routes. Its strategic location has attracted the attention of various empires and powers seeking to control the potentially lucrative corridors between Asia, Europe and the Middle East. As a significant part of the Great Silk Road, Kazakhstan’s cities not only served as transshipment points for commodities traveling from China to Europe but also actively participated in joint production and trade, as well as the interchange of cultural values ??and ideas (Russian.people.com.cn, November 29, 2013; EL, March 18, 2017).

Therefore, it is unsurprising that such maneuvers have become a long-standing element in Central Asia’s international politics—not least in Kazakhstan, due to its geographical location as a link between Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, as well as Russia and China. For example, for the first time, in June 2023, Kazakhstan signed a series of agreements with Azerbaijan to bring energy and other natural resources and minerals through the Caspian and Azerbaijan to the Caucasus and European markets, which are eager to obtain these imports (Astana Times, June 22). Not least in these matters is the fact that these agreements bypass Russia thereby marking another step toward Kazakhstan’s economic and political independence from Putin’s Russia (Eurasianet, June 28).

These agreements are part of a larger grand design for Astana. Recently, Tokayev suggested that the German government could replace embargoed Russian oil with Kazakhstani oil (Radio Azattyk, June 3). He suggested that Kazakhstan could increase its exports of oil by 600 percent to Germany and presumably German-operated, but not Russian-owned, refineries in Germany could increase their capacity from 90,000 to 200,000 tons by the end of 2023 and then 900,000 to 1 or 2 million tons annually in the near future. Likewise, Italy is already importing oil from Kazakhstan, increasing its share of imports from 28 percent in 2022 to 38 percent in 2023.

These trade contracts clearly represent significant efforts by Astana to diversify its foreign economic relations. For example, Kazakhstan has signed accords with Beijing to enhance energy flows to China, and the aforementioned agreements with Azerbaijan likewise speak to that ambition (Kursiv.media, May 18; Upstream, May 19). Indeed, recently, the European Union has announced its intention to import “critical goods” from Kazakhstan via the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, bypassing Russia (Kursiv.media, July 4). These goods include lithium, cobalt, titanium and other rare earth metals vital to the contemporary global economy, as well as defense manufacturing. For the EU, this is explicitly about reversing its excessive dependence on China and Russia for such goods; thus, its geo-economic and geopolitical intentions are clearly and openly stated.

Kazakhstan has also repeatedly criticized Moscow’s war against Ukraine, something Putin and his subordinates will not soon forget (Tengrinew.kz, June 20). And one way Moscow can get back at Astana is to exclude Kazakhstan from newly proposed trade routes running from Central Asia through the Caspian to Russia (see EDM, July 5). This trade route from the Turkmenbashi Seaport in Turkmenistan to Astrakhan on the Caspian has been on the table for several months. Clearly, it represents an attack on Kazakhstan, with the Kremlin alleging that Astana is blocking other Central Asian traders from exporting their wares.

Russian sources also allege that this planned trade route is linked to Moscow’s ambitious north-south transit project to connect Russia, Central Asia, Iran and India and could lead to the mutual supply of dual-use goods among its members (Orda.kz, July 7). It also appears that Uzbekistan, which has been much quieter, though nonetheless unhappy about the war, and has recently improved ties with Russia, was strongly lobbying for this trade route to avoid its own excessive dependence on Kazakhstan (Ratel.kz, July 12). Thus, this corridor, along with the others proposed by Kazakhstan, reveals the intertwining of economic and political motives for strategically critical region ranging from Europe and the Caucasus to Central Asia and China.

India can also be included among these states, a proposed beneficiary and terminus of the projected north-south route and a state with its own active program to build trade with Central Asia and major European markets (ORF, February 2020). Indeed, China has consistently sought to minimize Indian exposure to those trade routes and markets as part of its own long-standing efforts to suppress India’s rise to the status of a great power (Nikkei, January 29).

Undoubtedly, as India, China, Russia and smaller but nonetheless critical regional actors strive to expand their economic and political influence globally, and Europe seeks to develop viable and long-lasting trade routes with Asian markets, the contestation over these corridors will grow. This rivalry will not be confined to Kazakhstan but will engage every Central Asian state for years to come, as the countries in the region are entering a period of enhanced trade and geopolitical rivalries. Therefore, the struggles and rivalries depicted here will be part of the regular agenda and landscape of international affairs in both their political and economic dimensions in Central Asia for the indefinite future.

Source: Yahoo

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