Germany’s key role is in helping Central Asia reduce its reliance on Russian and Chinese investments and, more significantly, trade.

Amidst significant geopolitical shifts and Central Asia’s burgeoning economic and political potential, German interest in the region has significantly increased in recent years. Germany, along with the European Union, aims to divest from U.S. strategic hegemony to engage in a multipolar global contest with China and Russia. This recalibration is further informed by Germany’s recent comprehensive National Security Strategy, unveiled on June 14, 2023, which seeks to address German interests in a European landscape deeply impacted by Russia’s incursion into Ukraine.

Germany’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Central Asia operates on two parallel tracks. First, German foreign policy is strongly related to the European regional strategy. The country served as the architect of the European Union’s Strategy for Central Asia, initially adopted in 2007  and subsequently revised in 2019. Second, Germany pursues its individual bilateral imperatives in the region, such as advocating for German-speaking minorities.

The most recent summits and high-level visits with the participation of the German leadership — including those by Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier to Uzbekistan in May 2019 and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in June 2023; Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s visits to Germany in January 2019 and May 2023; German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock’s visits to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in October 2022; the EU-Central Asia Summits in Astana in October 2022 and Cholpon-Ata in June 2023; and the first EU-Central Asia Connectivity Conference in November 2022, in Samarkand — underscore the invigorated dialogue between Germany and Central Asia.

Germany’s Aims in Central Asia

Berlin’s foreign policy toward Central Asia is primarily focused on three areas: countering Russian and Chinese dominance and, ultimately, staving off their total control of the region; fostering economic development, with a particular focus on German goods and services; and navigating the complexities associated with Afghanistan.

First, Germany’s foreign policy seeks to fortify Central Asian nations’ statehood and independence in a shifting post-Soviet landscape increasingly influenced by China. Josef Borrell, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, emphasized the importance of strategic autonomy for both Europe and Central Asia during a summit in Samarkand in November 2022, and noted they could achieve that goal by enhancing connectivity.

Germany’s new National Security Strategy states that “the security environment in Germany is undergoing profound change, and we are at a tipping point, Zeitenwende, or a turning point. With Russia’s threat to European security and China seen as a difficult competitor, a systemic rival, but still an ‘essential partner’, we are redoubling our efforts to keep our country safe and free.” Since 2014, Germany has been instrumental in sustaining the EU’s consensus on sanctions against Russia.

Experts on Central Asia argue that the region occupies a central role in the current geopolitical discord due to its unique location, historical trajectory, institutional configurations, and developmental paradigms. The region itself, however, is among those worst impacted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Central Asian republics, which are surrounded by nations that are subject to Western sanctions (Afghanistan, Iran, China, and Russia), are eager to deepen their global alliances despite grappling with the effects of new, unprecedented sanctions against Moscow.ADVERTISEMENT

German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock observed on the eve of her visit to Central Asia in October 2022 that while the Central Asian republics had long wanted to serve as a link between Russia, China, and Europe, they now feel as if they are wedged between all of the other players and are frightened of becoming a trophy. She made it clear that the visit’s goal was to convey to the Central Asian states that Germany remains actively involved in their struggle to maintain their status as independent states against the backdrop of Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine.

An agreement was made to start a dialogue platform between Germany and the Central Asian states during Mirziyoyev’s May 2023 visit to Germany.

Europe, on the other hand, has pursued a “carrot and stick” strategy, which threatens Central Asia by enforcing secondary sanctions. The recent influx of European envoys to the region, including visits by the European Union Special Envoy for Sanctions Implementation David O’Sullivan and the U.K. Foreign Office Sanctions Director David Reed, show that the West is cognizant of Central Asia’s contribution to the Kremlin’s efforts to evade sanctions. A first wave of sanctions has already affected a number of businesses from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

Germany has been wary of engaging in deep economic collaboration with China since the 2010s. The German stance on Chinese international economic projects serves as a prime illustration: Germany joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and is now its fourth-largest shareholder, but it has opted out of the Belt and Road Initiative. Germany adopted its first-ever China policy in July 2023. It accepts that, as a result of Xi Jinping’s reforms, China has undercut German interests badly. Germany is still attempting to strike a balance between domestic and European perspectives, as well as between industry and politics.

Moreover, Germany has stepped up its diplomatic ties with nations in the Indo-Pacific area in an effort to curtail China’s influence over the past two years. German politicians are engaging in previously unheard-of diplomatic activity in the Indo-Pacific area since 2020, meeting frequently with the leaders of other regional powers.

On April 14, 2023, at the conclusion of the sixth round of the Sino-German Strategic Diplomacy and Security Dialogue in Beijing, then-Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang stated that “carrying out comprehensive exchanges, strengthening strategic mutual trust, and avoiding strategic miscalculations” are the keys to developing bilateral ties between China and Germany. He said China and Germany should cooperate and not be in confrontation, be it a zero-sum confrontation or a bloc confrontation.

Second, Berlin is interested in setting up the conditions for regional economic growth and social welfare improvement, including the prevention of external migration processes. This is primarily done by promoting German products and services. Given the influx of Afghan migrants into the EU, in particular, the current migration problems in Europe demonstrate the necessity of preventive work in neighboring regions.

Germany, which has one of the most developed economies in the world, together with the rest of the EU, became Central Asia’s third-largest trading partner in 2010, behind only Russia and China. And in the ensuing years Germany’s economy interests in the region have only grown. In 2021, the trade turnover between Uzbekistan and the European Union amounted to $3.8 billion – a quarter of which is with Germany. The volume of bilateral trade and export of goods from Uzbekistan to Germany also increased.

In 2022, Germany was the leading trade and economic partner among the EU countries, accounting for almost 26 percent of the total trade volume between Uzbekistan and the EU. Of the total volume of investments received in 2021 in Uzbekistan from EU countries, about 60 percent were German investments, reaching almost $5.5 billion. The country’s government supports Uzbekistan’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the early signing of an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union.

In general, trade turnover between Uzbekistan and Germany increased 2.2 times between 2016 and 2022, from $529.1 million to $1.2 billion; exports increased by 2.4 times, from $36.9 million to $88.9 million; and imports increased by 2.2 times, from $492.2 million to $1.1 billion. Germany’s share of global trade turnover climbed throughout the period from 2.2 percent to 2.3 percent, general exports increased from 0.3 percent to 0.5 percent, and total imports dropped from 4.1  percent to 3.5  percent.ADVERTISEMENT

In exchange for effective economic and political reforms, the EU gave advantages to Uzbekistan under the Generalized System of Preferences-Plus (GSP+) program. And since 2008, Germany has been leading the so-called “Berlin Process” to assist Central Asia with its pressing water management challenges.

Third, due to the Taliban’s refusal to hold talks with Europe, Central Asia is a crucial ally of Germany in relation to Afghanistan. With extensive experience in this area of interaction with the Central Asian states, Berlin has already taken on increased responsibility for planning military and special operations in Afghanistan. For instance, in 2021, Germany evacuated its military and other personnel from Afghanistan with Uzbekistan’s support.

Addressing Structural Issues

To implement its plans for participation in the regional process in Central Asia, Germany must address some structural issues, such as bridging the interregional gap caused by the vast Russian territories that lie between Europe and Central Asia and pose communication challenges, as well as rising competition from China and Russia for markets (particularly in the context of the search for alternative means of trade).

First, Central Asian transport networks are expanding in two significant directions to the west, where Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea are the most important links in the Sino-European trade routes, and to the south, via both land and sea with the development of port communications between Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan and Iran, as well as a railway line connecting Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

In the energy industry, Kazakhstan anticipates the continuation of oil shipments to European markets via the Caspian Sea despite occasional Russia blocking of its main oil pipeline. Turkmenistan sends gas to China and South Asia, while its hydroelectric plans, like those of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are vulnerable to dangers brought on by the situation in Afghanistan.

Second, the EU sought to lessen its reliance on Russia for energy supplies by importing oil and gas rom elsewhere. Naturally, Central Asia could not take the place of imports from OPEC nations into the EU, but it might greatly reduce the EU’s perpetual “energy hunger.” Oil from Kazakhstan is now being shipped to Germany via the Middle Route. The EU is making investments in Central Asian space stabilization to “fix” the Central Asian nations as producers of energy resources. This is true for all nations who have access to the Russian market and are successfully promoting themselves as alternative investors and raw material suppliers who will gain from Russia’s waning influence.

Third, as of 2018, the Global Gateway Initiative (“Connecting Europe and Asia: building blocks of the EU strategy“), which was later incorporated into the EU Policy for Central Asia in 2019, was already being used by European nations. This endeavor to develop bridges is crucial given the West’s current rift with Russia and its escalating systemic conflict with China.

Germany at the Forefront of EU Central Asia Policy

In general, Germany sets the direction of Central Asia policy for the EU. The area serves as a launchpad for the realization of Germany’s objectives as well as those of the EU. It is safe to say that this region will play a significant part in enhancing Germany’s geopolitical stability, particularly its access to food and energy. This is a situation where everyone benefits, especially the Central Asian states. This collaboration will aid the nations of the region in implementing a strategy of “checks and balances” against China and any other entities interested in filling the expanding vacuum in addition to providing geoeconomic and geopolitical benefits.

To protect its political, military, and other interests, it would appear that Germany’s existing goals in the region should increase Berlin’s geostrategic and geoeconomic capital. Through joint industrial cooperation projects and the export of jointly produced goods to international markets, further institutionalizing contacts, as demonstrated by the Germany-Central Asia discussion format and other examples, will contribute to regional consolidation based on mutual benefit.

Germany’s key role is in helping Central Asia reduce its reliance on Russian and Chinese investments and, more significantly, trade. German technology and knowledge, particularly in areas like digitalization and green economy can help create growth potential for Central Asian exports to China, which will also help reduce Germany’s rapidly expanding trade deficit with China, which reached record levels in 2022 and totaled 298 billion euros.

Source: The Diplomat

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ASTANA – Kazakhstan is committed to continuing a balanced multi-vector pragmatic foreign policy aimed at preventing current signs of geopolitical fragmentation of the international community, Kazakh Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu said at an Aug. 18 meeting with heads of  the United Nations representative offices accredited in the country, reported the Foreign Ministry.

During his visit to the UN Plaza building in Almaty, Nurtleu congratulated on the 30th anniversary of the UN presence in Kazakhstan and highlighted the high level of interaction between the parties during this period.

The minister recalled Kazakhstan’s initiative to establish the UN Regional Center for Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty.

“I believe this center will become a catalyst for achieving sustainable development and prosperity in the region,” he said.

Given that the UN agencies based in Almaty have a regional mandate, the meeting covered issues of regional cooperation within the UN and ongoing projects addressing relevant challenges in Central Asia.

The UN representatives provided updates on the organization’s activities and development priorities, expressing their willingness to support Kazakhstan’s efforts to ensure sustainable development at the regional and national levels.

The UN Plaza building in Almaty was officially inaugurated in 2019 by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. It houses 18 agencies employing more than 120 people.

Source: Astana Times

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Russia’s new 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, the first since 2016, has come into immediate effect. The document updates the priorities, goals, and objectives of the foreign policy activities of Russia and is an important read into the overall national development and other strategies.

In this article, we outline the background and implications for Russia’s relations with Central Asia. Part of this text has been extracted from analysis given by Evgeny Korenev, of the Institute of Actual International Problems of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Overview

Russia’s Central Asian policy is not one way traffic. The development of mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia is also noted as the main priority of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted on April 11 this year.

That said, Moscow also intends to pay more attention to its allies, in accordance with the recently updated Foreign Policy Concept. At the same time, Russia is not going to impose the development path on other countries or interfere in their internal affairs. On the contrary, it will work to prevent attempts at colour revolutions and other outside interference in the affairs of the region. What significance these and other provisions of the Concept will play for the development of cooperation between Russia and Central Asia,

In late March 2023, a new Foreign Policy Concept of Russia was approved by decree of Russian President Putin. Against the backdrop of a serious degradation of relations with the West, the document places special emphasis on the development of Eurasian integration. There is also attention about a Russian pivot to the East. The idea enshrined in the Concept deals with the need to build a Greater Eurasian integration space, and significantly increases the geopolitical significance of the Central Asian region.

Despite the fact that the region is mentioned in the text only once and is not designated in the Concept as a separate regional direction of the foreign policy of Russia, several provisions of the document, to one degree or another, relate to Central Asia. Here, we concentrate on the trade aspect.

The Greater Eurasian Partnership

Much attention in the Concept is paid to Russia’s turn to the East and the formation of a broad integration contour: the Greater Eurasian Partnership. To achieve the greatest effect, it is planned to combine the potential of all Eurasian states and the most important regional structures of Eurasia, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and ASEAN, to interface the development plans of the EAEU and China’s Belt & Road Initiative.

The Eurasian Economic Union includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. This is a free trade area with additional agreements with Iran, Serbia and Vietnam with others pending negotiation.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation includes eight member States (China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), four Observer States interested in acceding to full membership (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia) and six “Dialogue Partners” (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Turkiye). In 2021, the decision was made to start the accession process of Iran to the SCO as a full member, while Egypt, Qatar, as well as Saudi Arabia, became dialogue partners. Proposed new dialogue partners include Bahrain, the Maldives, Myanmar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. The SCO is a Eurasian grouping tasks with regional security, trade and related connectivity issues and includes the United Nations as an Observer.

ASEAN includes the southeast Asian nations of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam and is a Free Trade bloc. It has additional agreements with much of East Asia including FTA with China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Japan.

Part of the Greater Eurasian Partnership is planned to integrate, in part, with the EAEU, using the economic potential of the bloc including cooperation with those countries that are not currently included in it, such as Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Therefore, in the Central Asian space, one can expect an intensification of interaction between Russia not only with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but also with other countries of the region.

In general, in its Concept, Moscow seeks to view the integration processes in the Eurasian space as multidimensional, involving completely different, including new, formats of multilateral relations between Russia and the states of the Central Asian region. This means launching on a permanent basis the Russia-Central Asia summit at Heads of State level, the first meeting of which was held in October 2022 in Astana. Russia, which has natural regional advantages, has not previously used such mechanisms. Now, the Concept plan has introduced a more institutionalized approach.

Connectivity

Central Asia is very important in terms of implementing large-scale projects in the transport and logistics sector in the Eurasian space.

The Concept refers to the need to improve the infrastructure of the International North-South Transport Corridor (India-Iran-Russia) and the Middle Corridor (China-Central Asia-Europe) A significant part of this route, about 2,800km passes through Kazakhstan.

This significantly increases the importance of the country as one of the largest Eurasian transit centres. In addition, one of the most important tasks outlined in the document is to strengthen cooperation in the Caspian Sea zone, which requires the intensification of Russia’s relations with Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.

Focus East, Not West

The publication of the new Russian Foreign Policy Concept marks the end of a certain stage in a protracted revision of traditional foreign policy guidelines, many of which have remained unchanged since the 1990s. Now Moscow is placing its main focus in Eurasian geopolitics, and not towards the West. In these circumstances, the relations of Russia with the states of Central Asia in the field of security and economy will play an extremely important role.

By building constructive and full-scale interaction with partners and allies in Central Asia, Russia can gain an advantage in shaping its vision of a large Eurasian integration project. In order not to miss the initiative, it is necessary to start implementing those ambitious provisions that are enshrined in the new version of the Foreign Policy Concept of Russia.

Further analysis of Russia’s relations with the impacted Eurasian countries can be viewed here:

• Iran  
• Kazakhstan
• Kyrgyzstan 
• Turkmenistan
• Uzbekistan
• The Eurasian Economic Union
• ASEAN
• Merging the EAEU, CIS, SCO and BRICS

Summary

Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept is highly focused on Central Asia and a new commitment in turns of institutionalizing this along with Eurasia has been made. This is multi-formatted, with the Russia-Central Asian annual Heads of State summit and of course the even wider Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s reach.

There also appears a longer-term strategy to introduce the Eurasian Economic Unions’ Free Trade capabilities to a wider group, including members of the SCO. Iran has a FTA with the EAEU, while India is close to finalizing one.

Not mentioned specifically in the context of Central Asia, but certainly implied elsewhere in the Concept is the developing BRICS and BRICS plus and their potential evolution into a larger Free Trade Area. Bangladesh, Egypt, and the UAE have all recently joined as de facto members. Another 13 countries are discussing this.

Other signs that Russia intends to improve its international trade and investment connectivity lie with the Russian Foreign and Trade Ministers embarking on a flurry of activity in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Latin America. We understand that part of these visits has included the updates of Russia’s Bilateral Investment Treaties with countries within these regions, a sure sign that Moscow intends to increase and facilitate mutual trade and investment with countries on a worldwide basis.

If so, what will eventually emerge will be rather more than a Greater Eurasian Partnership, it will be a huge, increasingly integrated global phenomena. Central Asia however will be close to the beating heart of this, and Moscow will keep its other organs close.

Source : Rusia Briefing

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Deputy Prime Minister – Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan Murat Nurtleu paid a working visit to Brussels and held talks with high-ranking representatives of the European Union to discuss the current agenda of bilateral and multilateral cooperation and promising areas for its further development, Tengrinews.kz reports citing the ministry .

As noted, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – Vice President of the European Commission Josep Borrell warmly welcomed the first visit of Murat Nurtleu as head of the Kazakh Foreign Ministry to the EU capital.

During the meeting, the diplomats reviewed a wide range of multifaceted relations between Astana and Brussels under the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Kazakhstan and the EU. The regular nature and increased dynamics of political dialogue at the highest and high levels, a noticeable increase in economic cooperation and the volume of European investments were noted.

As specified, the parties paid special attention to discussing practical steps to develop cooperation in the fields of energy, transport and logistics, digitalization, civil aviation, production and use of critical raw materials. Measures were considered to strengthen cooperation in the development of education and science, advanced technologies and innovations .

During the meeting, Borrell underlined the firm commitment of European diplomacy to further expand and strengthen cooperation with Astana through the implementation of a number of specific measures and projects that will respond to the significant untapped potential of cooperation.

“We are closely following the modernization of your country and support President Tokayev’s large-scale political reforms aimed at building a Just Kazakhstan. This year, the European Union and Kazakhstan celebrate the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations, and during this time we have laid a strong foundation for partnership,” the High Representative said. EU.

According to the agency, the interlocutors exchanged views on topical issues on the international agenda, including regional security, cooperation in Central Asia and the situation in Afghanistan. The parties also discussed measures to mitigate the possible negative consequences of European sanctions for the Kazakh economy.

At a meeting with the Chief Advisor to the President of the European Council for Foreign Policy Simon Mordu, the Minister noted the productive visit of President Charles Michel to Astana in October 2022 and the success of his first meeting with the leaders of Central Asian countries.

The interlocutors stressed that these events gave a powerful impetus to the further strengthening of bilateral and interregional cooperation. The parties are working on preparing a second meeting in this format in the near future, which is designed to continue the process of deepening interregional cooperation between Central Asia and the EU.

During the visit, which took place in a business like and constructive atmosphere, the minister presented Borrell and Mord with high state awards – the Dostyk orders of the first and second degrees, respectively – for their significant contribution to strengthening and developing cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the EU.

In general, Nurtleu’s visit to the capital of the European Union made it possible to outline priority areas for cooperation, discuss specific measures and steps to further deepen relations between the parties.

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