Once more Tajikistan comes on the radar screen. Who will be the next president of Tajikistan? How is the ban on the hijab helping the deradicalization of Tajik society? What is the role of the Chinese and Russian influence? And how is the relationship with the European Union coming along? 

Every year we face a plethora of Tajik issues, for example corruption and drug usage involving officials, now the ban on face veils, or the newest version a ban on black clothes. The desecration of the grave of one of leaders and the promotions of killer squad of the ministry of interiors. 

Despite the ICC dispatches a fact-finding mission on Tajikistan and reports back we need to ask the question what has changed, if anything? So far very little, to near nothing. Observers of the Tajik issue reports an uptick of Chinese involvement, or Russian press gang related issues to force Tajiks to army service in the Ukraine. 

The German foreign ministry is surprisingly mum about the situation in Tajikistan. The trust level is always low. Maybe the new “Iron Lady” will bring changes to the foreign relations debacle with Tajikistan. It’s about time. 

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The president of Tajikistan likes to wrap himself in the robes of Islam.

Literally, in some cases. 

In January 2016, Emomali Rahmon performed a pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca, and took several members of his family along too. His office documented the event by releasing images of the leader covered only in the seamless white garment that must be worn by Muslims performing this rite.

The pictures were doubly striking since the Tajik authorities had for many years been actively repressing pious Muslims. They continue to do so today.

This plays out in absurd ways. From time to time, police will go on the hunt for young men with beards, carting them off to the nearest barber for a shave. Women are chided for wearing the hijab on the grounds that it is not a traditionally Tajik form of dress.

It feels like a paradox for this to be happening in a country where the vast majority of people self-describe as Sunni Muslims. But it isn’t.

What Rahmon’s corrupt and authoritarian regime wants is an antiseptic and lightly worn form of Islam. One that promotes folkish conservatism, compliance and consensus. People may by all means pray and believe, but those things should be confined solely to the mosque. 

And not any mosque at that. In the years after Rahmon paid his visit to Mecca, the government forced the closure of thousands of informally run and unregulated neighborhood mini-mosques dotted around the country. The only permitted places of worship operate under the close scrutiny of the government. State-appointed imams up and down Tajikistan deliver dull, facsimile sermons.

And the regime systematically worked to dilute incoming generations’ familiarity with their own faith.

From 2010, the government started forcing young people studying at Islamic places of learning abroad to return home. Rahmon argued that Tajiks going to foreign Islamic schools, or madrasas, were “not becoming mullahs, but terrorists.”

In 2016, the authorities introduced a ban on private religious schools. Two years after that, it became illegal for children to study the principles of Islam in either mosques or madrasas. The job of teaching about religion was accordingly transferred to state educational institutions. But poorly funded Tajik schools and teachers are ill-equipped to provide basic instruction in subjects like maths and science, let alone religion.

And then, in 2021, the government introduced severe penalties for teaching religion via the internet.

Nusratullo Mirzoyev, the first deputy chairman of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB), justified this cascade of clampdowns as precautionary measures.

“According to studies, 95 percent of young people who joined radical groups and movements got their primary education in private religious schools,” he said.

Even studying the Arabic language was for a time rendered difficult by an informal prohibition. 

The result is a country increasingly populated by the religiously semi-literate. Tajiks are told from birth that they are Muslims, but then purposely denied the right or ability to make sense of that identity.

Conditions could not be more ideal for recruiters from militant organizations like the Islamic State. A 2008 analysis by Britain’s domestic intelligence agency, MI5, concluded that “far from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly.”

“Many lack religious literacy and could actually be regarded as religious novices. Very few have been brought up in strongly religious households,” the analysis argued.

The authors had extremist recruits in the West in mind when they wrote those words. But they are just as valid in Tajikistan, whose government has added a few push factors of its own for good measure.

Anywhere north of 1.3 million Tajiks, mostly men, have been compelled by lack of opportunity in their home country to relocate to Russia. Once there, they endure a life of financial privation and routine humiliations at the hands of police and unscrupulous employers. Their dwellings are typically crowded apartments, hostels and dormitories, or even the very same building sites where they work.

Away from the family unit and shorn of the solidarity provided by tight-knit communities, some vulnerable men in those circumstances – and it should be stressed that the numbers are small in relative terms – are ripe for recruitment. Ample research points to how extremist groups use social networks, personal relationships, and specific sentiments of perceived deprivation or grievances when identifying and enlisting members. 

The Crocus City Hall massacre will not, however, give the Tajik government any pause for thought.

In a speech to mark the Nowruz spring equinox holiday, President Rahmon said that what happened last week was a warning to “all of us, especially parents, to once again devote even more serious attention to the education of children.”

“We should protect teenagers and young people from the influence of such destructive and terrifying groups and movements, and we should not allow our children to harm the good name of the Tajik nation,” he said.

What he means by devoting greater attention to education is not teaching Tajik young people more about Islam. Quite the opposite.

Source: Sub Stack

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Infighting over the succession and growing frustration in the regions could shatter the stability that the Tajik president has been building for so many years.

Next year will mark thirty years of Emomali Rahmon’s presidency in Tajikistan, now the only country in Central Asia that has not seen a change of leadership since the early 1990s. Unsurprisingly, there have been rumors of an imminent transition of power for a decade.

The name of the successor is no secret: it’s Rahmon’s son, thirty-six-year-old Rustam Emomali. But there is no consensus within the president’s large family over the succession. Some of the president’s other children have their own ambitions to run the country, which could upset plans for the transition.

President Rahmon is seventy-one years old, and has reportedly suffered numerous health issues. Arrangements for the transition have long been in place, but events keep getting in the way of its implementation: first the pandemic and its economic fallout, and then the street protests in neighboring Kazakhstan in January 2022, which frightened the Tajik leader and persuaded him it was not a good time to step down. Even Turkmenistan has seen a power transition in recent years. Now Tajikistan is expected to implement its own in 2024.

Rustam has already headed a number of government agencies. Since 2017, he has been mayor of Dushanbe: a post he has combined since 2020 with that of speaker of the upper house of parliament, to whom power would automatically pass if the current president were to step down early.

His supporters argue that as the capital’s mayor, he has improved the city, supported youth initiatives, and started to form his own team of young technocrats. Some are counting on him to carry out at least limited reforms once he is in power, such as those seen in neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Not everyone believes Rustam is ready to take over, however. The future president is an unknown quantity for most Tajiks. All of his public appearances are prerecorded and accompanied by information read out by the broadcaster, meaning that people have not even heard him speak. His nickname on social media is “the great mute.”

More worryingly, the heir apparent has reportedly shot and wounded two people: his own uncle in 2008, and—just last year—the head of the State Committee for National Security, Saimumin Yatimov, supposedly for refusing to carry out orders.

There are those within the presidential family who do not want to see Rustam succeed his father because they fear losing prestigious posts in government and business. They are indignant that there are no relatives within the team he is building. The current president cannot possibly keep everyone happy, and this could threaten the transition, as ambitious clan members prepare to battle it out for the top job in order to retain their privileges.

Rahmon has seven daughters and two sons. The most ambitious of them is generally considered to be the second daughter Ozoda, who has headed up the presidential administration since 2016. She is very experienced, works well with her staff, and has the trust of the security services. Unsurprisingly, given the alleged shooting incident, there is no love lost between Rustam and the country’s main security official Yatimov, who has reportedly been paving the way for Ozoda’s candidacy. In addition, her husband Jamoliddin Nuraliev is also considered a very influential figure, having been deputy chair of the country’s central bank for over seven years.

Another contender for the presidency could be Rahmon’s fifth daughter, Ruhshona, a seasoned diplomat who is well versed in Tajikistan’s political affairs. Her husband is the influential oligarch Shamsullo Sohibov, who made his fortune thanks to his family connection to the president. Together with his brothers, he controls entire sectors of the economy, including transport, media, and banking. Change at the top could deprive the Sohibov clan of both influence and money, so Ruhshona and her husband may well throw their hats into the ring.

They might get the backing of Rahmon’s other children, who also control various sectors of the economy, including air travel (the third daughter, Tahmina) and pharmacies (the fourth daughter, Parvina). There are also plenty of Rahmon’s more distant relatives who owe their fortunes to the president and fear losing their positions under his successor.

Rahmon has relied on the loyalty of various relatives to ensure the stable functioning of his regime. But overly vociferous squabbles within the family could destabilize the situation, and for precisely this reason, Rahmon has tried to temper their ambition. Ruhshona, for example, was sent to the UK as Tajik ambassador to stop her from interfering in the plans for the transition. Her oligarch husband went with her.

Nor is the heir apparent himself outside the fray. There is evidence that Rustam was involved in leaking information to the media about his sister Ozoda’s alleged affair with her driver: something that, in patriarchal Tajikistan, caused serious damage to her reputation. There are also rumors that Ozoda’s main ally Yatimov will be retired from his post as head of the security services and replaced with a close friend of Rustam, Shohruh Saidov.

Right now, international circumstances are conducive to a swift transition. Tajikistan’s relations with its trickiest neighbors, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, are improving. While the Taliban has yet to be recognized as the legitimate Afghan government by Dushanbe, both sides agreed to strengthen economic ties during the first visit to Tajikistan by a delegation from the radical Islamist movement in March this year. Meanwhile, the Tajik government has pledged to resolve the border dispute with Kyrgyzstan—an issue that has led to several armed clashes in the last three years—by spring 2024. Rahmon is clearly trying to hand over a stable country to his son.

The situation at home, however, is more complicated. There is also considerable opposition to Rustam’s candidacy among the regional elites, who have long supported Rahmon in exchange for access to state resources, and are now seeing many of the most lucrative cash flows appropriated by the presidential family. A transition of power could be an opportune moment to express their displeasure.

Events in Gorno-Badakhshan in spring 2022 were a stark warning of the dangers of that displeasure. After the civil war that ravaged the country in the early 1990s, many of its field commanders settled in the region. Over time, they became informal leaders of the local communities, helping to solve problems that the central government was ignoring, sometimes strong-arming local officials into making the required decision. Rahmon ordered several security operations to rid Gorno-Badakhshan of this dual power system, only for it to reemerge further down the line.

Last spring, protests erupted there after a local man was killed by law enforcement officers. The unrest lasted for several months until Rahmon crushed it by force. Many of the activists were killed or imprisoned, while others fled the country, and the region was brought back under Dushanbe’s control. But the anger simmering in the region could boil over again at the first sign of conflict.

For now, the other regions remain loyal to the regime, but that could change after the power transition if the local elites feel they are not getting sufficient state resources.

By directing all the streams of income and control of the country to his own relatives, Rahmon has painted himself into a corner. Infighting over the succession and growing frustration in the regions could shatter the stability that the president has been building for so many years. Power transitions rarely go to plan in Central Asia, and Tajikistan may be no exception.

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“In recent years, I have always emphasized that every family in the country must have a supply of necessary food products for up to two years,” Rahmon noted in his congratulatory message on the occasion of the Sada festival on January 28.  

The head of state emphasized that climate change and deterioration of the socioeconomic situation in the world make this issue especially relevant. 

In this context, making two-year food stocks becomes an important measure to ensure the country’s food security, the president noted. 

The Tajik president’s official website says Emomali Rahmon has emphasized that this decision is based on in-depth analysis of the unpredictable situation in the modern world, including the collapse of old supply chains and constant rise in food prices.  

The president reportedly noted that “everyone must work harder, use land and water efficiently and rationally, produce as much product as possible, contributing to the implementation of the national strategic goal – protection of the country’s food security.”  

Source: Asia Plus

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Up-and-down relations between Iran and Tajikistan in the past decade shot up again after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s official visit to Dushanbe on November 8-9, his second trip to the Tajik capital in 18 months.

Raisi’s visit to Tajikistan was symbolically important amid a rapprochement between the countries that overshadowed the relatively standard batch of bilateral agreements that were signed.

During the trip, Raisi and his Tajik counterpart, Emomali Rahmon, announced a historic visa-free travel agreement for their citizens and deals in trade, transportation, and culture, among others.

High-ranking visits have become a regular occurrence between the two countries in the past year — with Iranian Defense Minister Reza Qaraei Ashtiani visiting Tajikistan in October and chief prosecutor Mohammad Jaafar Montazeri leading a judiciary delegation to Dushanbe in June.

But relations haven’t always been rosy between the two Persian-speaking countries, which share close linguistic, cultural, and historical ties as well as a common key ally, Russia.

Ties were marred in the past decade by tensions that saw the severing of investment and export deals, the suspension of direct flights, and the closure of Iranian charity and culture centers in Tajikistan.

Iran angered Tajikistan in 2015 by inviting the head of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) to a conference just months after the party was very dubiously banned and branded a terrorist group by Dushanbe.

Enraging Dushanbe further, IRPT leader Muhiddin Kabiri was photographed being greeted by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei at the event.

The relationship plunged to a new low in 2017 when Tajik state television — a government mouthpiece — accused Iran of financing and ordering political assassinations in Tajikistan after a string of prominent public figures, including politicians and scholars, were killed between 1997 and 2004.

In response, Iran accused Tajikistan of making baseless, blatant lies.

On Again, Off Again

Amid the tensions, Rahmon didn’t attend President Hasan Rohani’s second-term swearing-in ceremony in 2017. But all seemed forgotten when Dushanbe and Tehran started mending ties and Rohani visited Dushanbe in June 2019.

In September 2020, Tajik state TV aired another controversial documentary accusing Iran of financing militant activity in Tajikistan.

Tehran called the claim a “baseless allegation” and warned Dushanbe about “the consequences of behavior” that breaches “the rules of friendly relations.”

The documentary came as the Tajik Supreme Court reportedly jailed some 50 Tajiks — former graduates of Iranian universities — on charges of treason and religious extremism in closed-door trials.

Because the Tajik state media and the judiciary reflect precise government positions on issues, Dushanbe’s motives behind delivering a new blow to its ties with Iran are unclear.

What Does The Future Hold?

Rahmon also failed to attend Raisi’s inauguration ceremony in August 2021, citing a prior engagement. But the two presidents did meet the following month, when Raisi chose Tajikistan as the destination for his first foreign trip as president, coupling it with attendance at a key regional security summit.

Bilateral ties have, since then, increasingly strengthened.

In early 2022, Dushanbe and Tehran announced plans to increase bilateral trade to $500 million in future from just $121 million in 2021. And Rahmon went to Tehran in May 2022 — his first trip to Tehran in nine years, as relations were rekindled.

Ahmet Furkan Ozyakar, a Turkish-based expert on regional politics, said Iran’s “look-toward-the-east policy under President Raisi is…a noteworthy determinant in advancing relations with Dushanbe” amid Iran’s severe economic problems due to Western sanctions over Tehran’s controversial nuclear program.

“In the upcoming months we expect more official meetings between Dushanbe and Tehran at the ministerial level as part of this rapprochement in joint military and security agreements, along with increasing trade capacities,” Ozyakar, a lecturer on international relations at Ataturk University, told RFE/RL.

But given the recent history of the ups and downs between Iran and Tajikistan, some analysts are not as optimistic.

Touraj Atabaki, a prominent Middle East and Central Asia expert, doesn’t rule out the possibility of new “problems” arising in the foreseeable future. Atabaki, professor emeritus at Leiden University, says any major political changes within one of these two countries or international developments could affect relations between Dushanbe and sanctions-hit Iran.

“Tajikistan’s approach to international affairs is different from Iran’s approach on that matter. Challenges in the world arena might either bring them closer or break them apart — challenges like Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine or the current [Israel-Hamas] war, which threatens to spread to the wider West Asia region,” Atabaki told RFE/RL.

Source

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Fast forward to December and not only is 2023 likely to pass without major incidents on the border, but both sides are talking with increased optimism about seemingly concrete progress made in delimitation, with Japarov saying recently that the border might be fully agreed upon by the spring.

That is a significant change in tone.

Tokon Mamytov, a former deputy prime minister and security council secretary in Kyrgyzstan, told RFE/RL that the two governments deserve credit for “overhauling the template” in border talks.

If talks had traditionally become stuck on fixations with different Soviet-era maps — Tajikistan’s preferred boundaries date back to the 1920s while Kyrgyzstan’s are from the 1950s — now there is a “new approach” from the bilateral commission working on delimitation, Mamytov argued.

“They go to the place and look at the border. They ask people who live there about facts on the ground. In this way, the intergovernmental commission is turning agreements between the two heads of states into a reality. Communities living near the border will be able to feel safe again,” Mamytov said.

Is ’90 Percent’ Of The Border Agreed Upon?

It is impossible to discount another Tajik-Kyrgyz flare up along the border.

Nearly 17 months separated the “wars” of May 2021 and September 2022 and, in both cases, the escalation was remarkably rapid.

But few would have expected peace to last so long in the fall of last year.

In the immediate aftermath of the second, deadlier conflict, Kyrgyzstan canceled military training exercises on its territory for the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — a Russian-led regional military bloc — that were scheduled for October 2022 by explaining that Kyrgyz citizens would not accept the presence of Tajik troops on Kyrgyz soil so soon after a conflict that claimed at least 80 Kyrgyz lives and displaced more than 100,000 people.

At talks involving Japarov, Rahmon, and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana, that same month, Rahmon conspicuously failed to greet Japarov.

But a year later and just two weeks after Tashiev aired his frustrations over the direction the talks were taking, both he and his Tajik colleague, Saimumin Yatimov, hailed the signing of Protocol 42. Tashiev said the document “provides a basis for resolving all border issues.”

Yatimov was almost as evocative, noting that the two countries were “aiming to reach a comprehensive and fundamental agreement” as quickly as possible.

There were few details then, but Yatimov was more specific when speaking after further talks on December 2, declaring that the question of a troublesome road linking Vorukh — an enclave of Tajik territory in Kyrgyzstan — and the Tajik border settlement of Khoja Alo was “practically solved.”

Then came the news that the countries had agreed on another 24 kilometers of the border after talks held in the Tajik town of Buston, near the Kyrgyz border.

But it was after talks in Kyrgyzstan’s southern region of Batken on December 12 that the two men claimed their countries had preliminarily agreed on more than 90 percent of their shared border.

That would be a significant achievement.

Only last year, around one-third of the approximately 975-kilometer frontier (Kyrgyz officials claim it is slightly shorter) was still not demarcated.

In an interview with RFE/RL, Dushanbe-based political analyst Sherali Rizoyon said incentives for an agreement were raised by a growing impulse in Central Asia toward regional integration and an uptick in diplomatic activity involving several outside powers.

“Whether on the bilateral or regional level, the problem of state borders prevents the countries of Central Asia benefiting from the new opportunities that are appearing today,” Rizoyon told RFE/RL. “Countries cannot afford to remain hostage to border issues for long — they need to restore mutually beneficial cooperation.”

The ‘Deterrent Component’ And Unclear Russian Role

The word “historic” is overused in Central Asian diplomacy, but it would definitely apply to any agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on their state border.

Although the dispute did not turn violent until independence, analysts note that Tajik and Kyrgyz opinions on where the border begins and ends have been at odds since 1924, when Tajikistan was still an autonomous territory inside the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic and the territory of modern-day Kyrgyzstan had a similar status inside the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.

That makes next year the 100th anniversary of the dispute — and as good a time as any to end it.

But if 2023 has proven a year of genuine progress on border talks, it comes on the back of the tremendous human and material price paid by the two poorest countries in Central Asia.

And a big part of that is the increasingly deadly weapons deployed in the last two conflicts, amid a mini-arms race that has seen Kyrgyzstan secure Turkish Bayraktar drones and Tajikistan receiving equivalent weapons from Iran.

Francisco Olmos, a senior researcher in Central Asian affairs at Spain’s GEOPOL 21 Center, noted the “deterrent component” in the Kyrgyz leadership’s boasts about their recently acquired Bayraktar drones while speaking on RFE/RL’s Majlis podcast in November.

The destructive power of the Bayraktar was also in evidence in last year’s clashes, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), whose investigation published in May 2023 found that forces on both sides had “likely” committed war crimes against civilians.

In an interview with RFE/RL after the release of that report, HRW Senior Crisis and Conflict Researcher Jean-Baptiste Gallopin said the watchdog’s interviews with people on both sides of the border showed that local populations “are tired of these terrifying conflicts and are really yearning for peace.”

At the same time, local communities in Tajikistan’s Sughd Province and Kyrgyzstan’s Batken Province — the scene of most of the violence in recent years — will have their own opinions about what constitutes a good settlement.

Additionally, unrest in Kyrgyzstan over a landmark border agreement reached with Uzbekistan early this year suggests that selling a border agreement to the population is not always easy.

Yet another unknown is Russia, whose failure to prevent large-scale conflict between two of its military allies drew criticism of a Kremlin bogged down in its invasion of Ukraine. Also criticized was the CSTO — a security bloc sometimes framed as Moscow’s answer to NATO.

That trilateral meeting in October 2022 in Astana was more welcomed by Japarov — who unsuccessfully requested Putin’s intervention — than Rahmon, who later launched a tirade focused on Moscow’s shortcomings as a strategic partner.

Putin said after the talks that Russia had offered to retrieve some of its own archival Soviet-era maps to help resolve the dispute.

Since then, Russia has done almost nothing to suggest it is playing a mediatory role.

But on September 20, the Russian Foreign Ministry waded into the diplomatic fallout over Tashiev’s comments, warning against “harsh declarations” that it said could reverse the progress made on the border by the two countries.

“It should be remembered that armed conflicts in the post-Soviet space are beneficial primarily to the collective West, which has its own tendentious goals that have nothing to do with the real interests of Central Asian countries,” the ministry said.

Source: RFERL

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Rahmon’s bid to centralize control includes efforts to silence political opponents, human rights activists, and independent voices. More than a decade ago, Tajikistan’s media environment was relatively diverse and allowed for some criticism and debate, as long as local media avoided reporting on the president and his extensive family. Now, Tajikistan’s media are in their worst state since the violent years of the civil war, journalists told a Committee to Protect Journalists’ representative during a visit to the country late last year and through messaging apps.

Seven journalists were sentenced to lengthy prison terms in retaliation for their work in 2022 and 2023. The United Nations Human Rights Council has criticized “the apparent use of anti-terrorism legislation to silence critical voices” and expressed concern about reports alleging that torture was used to obtain false confessions from prisoners.

In one telling sign of the climate of fear that prevails in Tajikistan, only two among the more than a dozen journalists, press freedom advocates, and experts that CPJ met with were willing to speak on the record.

Some key takeaways from CPJ’s visit:

‘The collapse of independent Tajik journalism’

Prior to 2022, Tajikistan rarely jailed journalists. “For the president [Rahmon], it was important to be able to say we don’t touch journalists,” one local journalist told CPJ.

That changed with the unprecedentedly harsh sentences meted out to the seven convicted in 2022 and 2023 on what are widely seen as charges in retaliation for their work. Four journalists – Abdullo Ghurbati, Zavqibek Saidamini, Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda, and Khurshed Fozilov – received sentences of seven or seven-and-a-half years, Khushom Gulyam eight years, Daler Imomali, 10 years, and Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, 20 years – a development seen by many as a deeply chilling escalation in the years-long constriction of independent media.

For Abdumalik Kadirov, head of the independent trade group Media Alliance of Tajikistan, 2022 marked “the collapse of independent Tajik journalism.”

Interviewees told CPJ that only two significant independent media voices now remain in Tajikistan: privately owned news agency Asia-Plus and U.S. Congress-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s local service, the Czech Republic-headquartered Radio Ozodi.  

Both regularly face harassment and threats. Their websites have long been subjected to partial shutdowns by local internet service providers – the result of behind-the-scenes orders from state officials, according to local journalists, so that authorities can deny responsibility for the outages.

Asia-Plus has been forced to moderate its content, reducing its political coverage, following a May 2022 threat from authorities to shutter its operations.

A handful of other outlets either avoid political topics entirely, struggle to maintain independence in the face of government repression, or barely function due to lack of funding, multiple sources said. Adding to challenges for journalists are less visible forms of pressure, such as threats of tax fines and surveillance of their work.

“Everything is done indirectly,” one journalist said. “[The authorities] have many levers. They can make it known to a [financially] struggling outlet that it will be hit with huge tax fines, or its management will face criminal charges, and it’s advisable just to lay things down.” Several interviewees said that each media outlet has a “curator” from law enforcement agencies as a reminder that it is being watched, and authorities can threaten rigged tax or other inspections, or even order advertisers to pull their ads.

Particularly since authorities banned the country’s main opposition party in 2015, key independent media have been forced into closure and “dozens” of journalists have chosen exile. A government decree enacted shortly after this requires media outlets to pass an inspection by state security services prior to registration, the head of the National Association of Independent Media of Tajikistan (NANSMIT) Nuriddin Karshiboev told CPJ, with “virtually no new independent media” on the national level being registered since.

Rising fear and self-censorship

The year 2022 had a “devastating” effect on Tajikistan’s already embattled independent media, one journalist said. Several interviewees linked the crackdown on journalists to the authorities’ brutal suppression of protests in the eastern Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region in May-June 2022. Immediately after those protests erupted, authorities arrested 66-year-old journalist and human rights defender Mamadshoeva on charges of organizing the unrest, airing what many believe to be a forced confession days later on state TV.

Four journalists with RFE/RL and its project Current Time TV were attacked after interviewing Mamadshoeva immediately before her arrest, and authorities’ shuttering threat against Asia-Plus was issued over its coverage of events in Gorno-Badakhshan. While most of the other jailed journalists did not cover Gorno-Badakhshan, analysts told CPJ their arrests were in part calculated to have a chilling effect on the press amid the crackdown in that region.

Above all, interviewees said, 2022 entrenched a climate of fear and exacerbated already high levels of self-censorship among journalists. “We don’t know who might be next,” one journalist said. “2022 silenced all of us, not just those who were arrested,” said another. “Journalists fear saying anything.”

Several journalists told CPJ they themselves self-censored more following the events of 2022, which had left increasing uncertainty over “red lines,” the topics that are off limits. “Before it was easier as the red lines were clearer – the president and his family, top state officials, and after 2015, coverage of exiled opposition leaders,” one analyst said. “Now, it’s unpredictable – what you might consider neutral, [the authorities] might not. This unpredictability is the most problematic thing for journalism.”

Others agreed with what Kadirov described as a “dramatic fall” in the number of critical articles and an increasing tendency for local media to avoid domestic politics in favor of “safe” topics such as culture, sport, and some international news.

The convictions of five of the seven jailed journalists in 2022-23 on charges of “participation” in banned political groups allowed authorities to successfully portray independent journalists as “extremists,” several interviewees said. “Society falls for this,” one journalist said, “and members of the public often do not want to speak to journalists, and experts are increasingly wary of doing so.”

The events of 2022 also deepened the sense of alienation between independent journalists and authorities and the public. Where 10 to 15 years ago authorities were forced to reckon with independent media as “a real public watchdog,” noted one analyst, officials now engage less and less with the media, rejecting or ignoring their information requests. Access to information remains “an urgent problem of Tajik journalism,” according to Karshiboev, despite some recent encouraging discussions between authorities and media organizations on how to address the issue.

Decline in international donors

“Tajik media’s biggest problem is finances,” Karshiboev told CPJ. Lacking domestic sources of funding amid a limited advertising market, Tajikistan’s independent media have for years been reliant on international donors, interviewees said. Yet in recent years donor support has significantly declined, particularly since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine. “All Western resources and attention go to Ukraine,” one analyst lamented. Others cited a longer-term “donor fatigue” – donor organizations have lost interest in Tajikistan in particular and Central Asia more widely “because they don’t see any improvement,” one journalist said. A particular blow was the withdrawal of the Soros Foundation, previously a major media donor, from Tajikistan at the end of 2022.

Others argued that the problem was not so much a decline in donor funding as its misdirection – away from critical media and much-needed measures for media defense and toward projects of questionable value. Among other reasons, several argued that the ultimate problem is that international donors know the media is a sore spot for the Tajik government and, as Karshiboev put it, “fear damaging relations if they provide real and effective support to journalism.”

Interviewees said donors may also feel constrained by the West’s limited ability to influence on human rights issues in a country with such strong ties to Russia and China. “The Tajik government has increasingly learnt that it can act badly without any major consequences,” one analyst emphasized to CPJ. The war in Ukraine has exacerbated that dynamic.

“Before, when there wasn’t this standoff between Russia and the West, Tajikistan still looked to the West,” one journalist said. “Now they think: ‘What can the West do’?”  

A bleak outlook

Despite memories of a freer media environment only a generation ago, few of the journalists who spoke to CPJ were optimistic about the prospects for Tajik journalism in the near or mid-term future.

Many noted that Tajik journalists have become “demoralized” following 2022, that there’s been an uptick in journalists fleeing the country or leaving the profession, and that young people are reluctant to choose journalism as a career.

A marginalized independent media sector is very convenient for the government, said one analyst, “so it is unlikely to get better.” External support, in the form of more pressure and better targeted funding from Western and international donors and governments, was one of few factors capable of pushing developments in a more positive direction, several interviewees said. Kadirov and others believe that authorities’ tight control over traditional media outlets will cause independent journalists to turn more to social media and blogging to publish their reporting, making authorities likely to seek to exert even more control over those forums too.

“I see my mission as maintaining independent journalism – I can’t say in a good condition – but maintaining it at least to wait for better days,” said Kadirov.

CPJ emailed the Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan for comment, but did not receive any replies.

Source: CPJ

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President Emomali Rahmon spoke on December 1 at the plenary session of the twenty-eighth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Dubai, his press service reports.

According to him, water-related natural disasters annually cause great financial and material damage to our country, and in some cases lead to loss of life.

“Tajikistan annually faces floods, landslides, avalanches and other water-related disasters. Pursuing the goal of reducing the negative impact of climate change on the social and economic spheres of the country, the Government of Tajikistan is implementing the National Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change for the period until 2030.” – he said at the summit.

He reminded the participants that Tajikistan’s share in greenhouse gas emissions is small, and the republic ranks 130th in terms of the low volume of such emissions. That is, thanks to the small amount of this waste, Tajikistan occupies a leading position in the world.

Emomali Rahmon emphasized that the Republic of Tajikistan is one of the leading countries in the world in terms of the percentage of “green energy” production.

“Tajikistan produces 98 percent of its electricity from hydroelectric power plants and ranks sixth in the world in terms of the percentage of green energy generated from renewable sources,” he noted. “Our country continues to increase its achievements in this area and intends to double its green energy production capacity in the future “as the main basis for promoting the green economy.”

For these purposes, according to the president, the government of Tajikistan has adopted and is implementing the “Green Economy Development Strategy for 2023-2037,” which is aimed at the efficient use of natural resources and attracting “green” investments and technologies.

He drew the attention of those present to the obvious truth: climate change, first of all, negatively affects sources of water resources. In this context, it was emphasized that the depletion of water resources due to the rapid melting of glaciers is one of the negative indicators of climate change.

As a clear indicator of this process, he mentioned the complete melting of one thousand glaciers over the past decades out of 13 thousand glaciers in Tajikistan, which are the source of 60 percent of the water resources of our region.

In his speech, the Tajik President also focused on our country’s latest initiative aimed at protecting water sources. “At the initiative of Tajikistan, a resolution of the UN General Assembly was adopted to declare 2025 the International Year of Glacier Conservation and March 21 as World Glacier Day, and the International Trust Fund for the Conservation of Glaciers was created,” he noted. The President announced Tajikistan’s decision to make its initial financial contribution to this trust fund. He is convinced that the world community and international organizations will also contribute to the Fund.

Source: Asia Plus TJ

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The first step to solving a problem is admitting that it exists.

Telecommunications regulators in Tajikistan have taken a surprising step in that direction by reportedly admitting this week that a staggering 95 percent of the country’s territory is covered by only outdated 2G mobile connections.

This situation is in no small part due to the State Communications Service itself. In addition to regulating the sector, the service and the people running it are also major market players, albeit in highly nebulous ways that would be unthinkable almost anywhere else in the world.

Last weekend, the regulator announced that it is allowing two mobile telecommunications operators, MegaFon Tajikistan and Tcell, to source internet data through international channels instead of relying, as all ISPs are now required to do, on a state-run data spigot called the Unified Electronic Communications Switching Center, or EKTs in its commonly deployed Russian-language acronym. 

EKTs is operated by joint-stock phone and internet company Tojiktelecom, which is in turn run by the State Communications Service, a body that has been long run by a relative by marriage of President Emomali Rahmon. This in effect has made Tojiktelecom a for-profit monopoly run by a government service designed in theory to protect consumer interests. 

The ostensible purpose of the EKTs is to grant the state powers to fully vet internet traffic, for security reasons, among other things. The most noticeable impact of this arrangement, however, is that Tajikistan has some of the worst internet speeds in the world. The Amsterdam-headquartered company that operates the Beeline brand and Sweden-based mobile phone company TeliaSonera have both pulled out of Tajikistan amid difficulties navigating a market riddled with corruption and arbitrary policy-making. 

It is unclear what has prompted the telecoms regulator to ease the current monopolistic set-up. 

It is known that at least some parts of the ruling family are frustrated with the current situation. In January 2022, President Rahmon’s son and presumed successor-in-waiting, Rustam Emomali, complained about the quality of service provided by mobile companies. Emomali was especially exercised by what he said was the discrepancy between the quality of service advertised and what was actually provided.

Even Rahmon had grounds for being annoyed. A source at one mobile telecommunications company last year told Eurasianet, on condition of anonymity, that they and industry peers were ordered to work on improving the quality of their service after an incident, also in January 2022, in which Rahmon experienced trouble staying online during a Collective Security Treaty Organization virtual summit. Other participants in that online video call included Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. 

“During the meeting, his connection dropped out about seven to 10 times. The president was angered by the quality of the internet and reprimanded the head of the communications service,” the source told Eurasianet.

But that reprimand was evidently not sufficient to unseat that official, Beg Sabur, who is related to Rahmon by marriage, or bring about any significant change. While there has been a marginal improvement in internet speeds since December 2022, the overall trajectory remains dispiriting. 

Source: EurasiaNet

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An independent investigation revealed the secretive daughter of Tajikistan’s president has quietly built a health-care empire that benefits from government largesse, state promotion, and lobbying from her husband, an ambassador for the Central Asian nation.

Parvina Rahmonova is among the many children and other relatives of authoritarian President Emomali Rahmon who have amassed significant wealth or been appointed to senior government positions since he came to power more than three decades ago.

An independent investigation by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) has found that the little-known daughter of Tajikistan’s president, Parvina Rahmonova has built a medical empire that is generously supported by the state with finance and PR, and her husband, who is ambassador to Turkey, provides her with lobbying services.

Unlike several of Rahmon‘s other children, however, Rahmonova maintains a nearly invisible public profile. She rarely appears in publicly available family photographs and she is not mentioned by name on the website of Tajikistan’s embassy in Turkey, where her husband, Ashraf Gulov, has served as ambassador since 2021.

Behind the scenes, however, Rahmonova controls a company that in a six-year span has become a dominant force on Tajikistan’s pharmaceutical market with the help of the firm’s political connections.

Since its founding in 2017, the company, Sifat Pharma, has secured millions of dollars in government tenders while building a network of nearly 20 pharmacies in Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe. And when the Tajik government bought EU-produced ventilators and medication during the COVID-19 pandemic, Rahmonova’s company served as the middleman.

Rahmonova’s business has also received fawning coverage on government-controlled television in Tajikistan, while the company’s founding ceremony was promoted by the Health Ministry.

While Rahmonova’s role as Sifat Pharma’s sole owner is not publicly acknowledged by state officials, media, or entities, the story is different behind closed doors. During business gatherings in Dushanbe, the director of a Sifat Pharma subsidiary often highlights that the firm is owned by the president’s daughter.

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon (center) stands with family members in an undated photo. His fifth daughter, Sifat Pharma owner Parvina Rahmonova, stands second from the right.

Investigations further revealed:

• Sifat Pharma General-Director Sherali Kholov is among the shareholders of the International Bank of Tajikistan, which a previous investigation by RFE/RL’s Tajik Service found had links to the brother of Rahmonova’s ambassador husband;
• Another executive with a Sifat Pharma subsidiary tells competitors not to bid for government tenders in which the firm is participating, according to two entrepreneurs active in the same sector;
• Rahmon himself helped facilitate a partnership between his daughter’s company and a French pharmaceutical firm;
• A Sifat Pharma subsidiary owned by the daughter of Rahmonova has also won government contracts.

In late September 2017, at a stately, columned building not far from the Tajik presidential residence in Dushanbe, officials and guests entered through an arc of pink and white balloons to celebrate the opening of Sifat Pharma.

Speaking at the event, the country’s first deputy health minister at the time, Saida Umarzoda, said the company will have a “prominent role in providing the population with high-quality medicines” and in developing the country’s pharmaceutical sector, according to an account of the event, which was also covered by national and local news agencies, posted on the ministry’s website.

The company had already signed cooperation agreements “with the ministries of health and pharmaceutical industries of Belarus, India, and Iran in order to provide the population of Tajikistan with medicines that conform to international standards,” the Tajik Health Ministry said.

It was a heady start for a company that had been incorporated less than five months earlier.

Sifat Pharma was registered on May 2, 2017, with Rahmonova — the Tajik president’s fifth daughter — listed as the sole founder. Rahmonova remains the company’s lone shareholder to this day.

Photographs of the event do not show Rahmonova in attendance, nor did the Health Ministry mention her name, though her father-in-law, former Energy and Industries Minister Sherali Gul, did attend.

Sifat Pharma’s opening ceremony in September 2017 was promoted on the website of the Tajik Health Ministry.

Promotion on a state website is not the only help Rahmonova’s company has received from the government.

From its incorporation through August 2023, Sifat Pharma has won $5.5 million in government contracts to supply medicine to the Health Ministry and a range of state medical entities, according to state procurement records and reviews.

Two of Sifat Pharma’s subsidiaries — a medical-clothing factory called Sifat Sanoat and a medical services company called Tibbi Tojik — have won more than $326,000 in government tenders, the records show.

The total value of Rahmonova’s empire is difficult to quantify. Tajikistan does not publish records on the amount of taxes companies pay to the government, and officials’ income and asset declarations of the kind her husband would have to submit as an ambassador are not publicly available.

In 2019, the head of Tajikistan’s state Civil Service Agency said that Tajik society “is not ready” for the obligatory asset and income declarations for officials and their relatives to be made public.

“Whenever the level of society’s thinking and understanding is equal to that of Western society, we will definitely solve the problem,” the official, Juma Davlatzoda, told RFE/RL’s Tajik Service at the time.

But according to Sifat Pharma’s own website, it currently operates 18 pharmacies in Tajikistan, all but two located in Dushanbe.

Customs records showed Sifat Pharma has imported at least $3.2 million in goods — mostly medicine — since 2018, the earliest available data RFE/RL was able to find. That figure is likely considerably higher, as many of the shipment records do not indicate the value.

Rahmonova’s company has also received a helping hand from the man at the very top.

In November 2019, President Rahmon met with French entrepreneurs and investors during an official visit to France to discuss what his office described as “opportunities for the expansion of commercial and economic relations.”

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon (left, gesturing) at a meeting of the Tajik-French Business Council in Paris on November 17, 2019. As a result of the meeting, Rahmon’s daughter’s company, Sifat Pharma, signed an agreement with a French partner.

As a result of the event — at which Rahmon delivered a speech and presentation on investment opportunities in Tajikistan — Sifat Pharma was among the Tajik companies that signed cooperation agreements, partnering with the French pharmaceutical company Laboratoire Innotech.

Months later, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, it was Rahmonova’s company that the Tajik government turned to when it acquired ventilators and medication.

In April 2020, Rahmon’s government allocated some 11 million somoni (around $1.1 million at the time) for the purchase of 27 ventilators from the German company Lowenstein Medical Technology as well as other medicine to combat COVID-19. The chosen middleman for this procurement was Sifat Pharma, according to news reports citing the Health Ministry at the time.

Lowenstein Medical Technology did not respond to e-mailed questions about the ventilators and their cost, and did not return phone messages left with the company.

By October 2021, an official Tajik investment brochure identified Sifat Pharma as one of three “key” companies in the country’s pharmaceutical sector.

Since Rahmon secured his grasp on power in Tajikistan in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union, his children, as well as their spouses and in-laws, have amassed considerable wealth and political influence in the nation of some 10 million.

He has appointed three of his nine children to high-ranking government posts, most notably his eldest son, 35-year-old Rustam Emomali, who serves as chairman of the parliament’s upper chamber and the mayor of Dushanbe — and is widely seen as the president’s favored successor. In his current post in parliament he would become interim president should his father step down.

Media controlled by Rustam Emomali has also promoted his sister Rahmonova’s business interests.

The television station Dushanbe TV carried a fawning, nearly 20-minute report profiling Sifat Sanoat, which is owned by Rahmonova and is listed by Sifat Pharma as a subsidiary. The report praised Sifat Sanoat, which manufactures medical clothing such as lab coats and hospital gowns, for the quality of its production and its role as a job provider. (It is unclear exactly when the report was broadcast, but a copy was uploaded to YouTube in 2022.)

Dushanbe TV is controlled by the municipal government of Dushanbe that Emomali runs as mayor of the capital. Attempts to reach the network for comment were unsuccessful.

Rustam Emomali (left), chair of the Tajik parliament’s upper chamber and the mayor of Dushanbe, is widely seen as the favored successor to his father, President Emomali Rahmon (right).

In the report, Sifat Sanoat’s director, Hokimsho Idiev, called on other entrepreneurs to create jobs in the country. “I think that the national sense of all entrepreneurs should be awakened and they should contribute to the implementation of the policy of the president. At least in the field of creating jobs,” Idiev said.

But two businesspeople working in the same sector claimed in interviews with RFE/RL’s Tajik Service that Sifat Sanoat was pressuring competitors not to seek out state tenders. Both of the individuals, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to fears of retribution, said that Idiev had told them to refrain from competing for tenders to produce medical clothing. “I wanted to bid for the contract. I called [Idiev] for advice. He told me: ‘Don’t try for this tender because it’s ours.’ After this conversation, I decided not to bid,” one of the entrepreneurs said. The director of another company also said Idiev had “asked” them “not to take part” in state tenders for medical clothing. One of these individuals said that during business gatherings in Dushanbe, Idiev often introduces Sifat Sanoat as “the company of the president’s daughter.” Idiev did not respond to a request for comment.

In the report aired by Dushanbe TV, Idiev said Sifat Sanoat “provides services for medical colleges and Dushanbe road-management agencies.” State procurement records reviewed by RFE/RL show that Sifat Sanoat has won $142,500 worth of government contracts since March 2019.

Sifat Sanoat also has received lobbying assistance from a senior government official: Rahmonova’s husband, Rahmon’s ambassador to Turkey.

In July 2022, the Tajik state news agency Khovar reported that a delegation of Turkish entrepreneurs traveled to Tajikistan “with the initiative and assistance” of Gulov, whom Rahmon appointed as his envoy to Turkey the previous year.

The visit — based on the report, at least — proved fruitful for Gulov’s well-connected wife.

As a result of the visit, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Rahmonova’s medical-clothing company Sifat Sanoat and the Turkish equipment manufacturer Dundarlar, according to the Khovar report, which included a photo featuring the Sifat Sanoat logo and showed women sewing medical clothing.

Gulov did not respond to a request for comment sent to the Tajik Embassy in Turkey.

Gulov had previously used his ambassadorship to encourage bilateral commercial ties in his wife’s line of business.

Ashraf Gulov, the Tajik ambassador to Turkey, has promoted bilateral trade in the pharmaceutical sector in which his wife’s company is a market leader in Tajikistan.

In November 2021, Gulov hosted a webinar on the “partnership of Tajik and Turkish companies in the medical and pharmaceutical industry,” according to a news release posted on the website of the Tajik Embassy in Turkey.

The news release said the discussion included “the importance of developing cooperation” in these fields, though the embassy did not post a video or transcript of the event. A screenshot showing numerous participants, however, shows that attendees included Sifat Pharma’s general director, Sherali Kholov.

Kholov’s business links extend not only to Rahmonova, but to other relatives of Gulov as well. Kholov, whom the Tajik presidential website described as a “patriotic entrepreneur” and praised for building a Dushanbe kindergarten, is the owner of the International Bank of Tajikistan, which has partnered in two companies with Gulov’s brother, Jamshed.

According to the website of the Tajik Embassy in Turkey, Gulov and his wife have five children, though the embassy does not mention Rahmonova by name or the fact that she is the Tajik president’s daughter.

Records from Tajikistan’s corporate registry show that a daughter of the couple has since joined her mother’s health-care empire, founding a company that Sifat Pharma lists as a subsidiary and which has received state contracts.

In February 2018, the company Sifat Tabobat was incorporated in Tajikistan, with its lone shareholder listed as Ramziya Gulova, one of Gulov and Rahmonova’s daughters. At the time, Gulova was a first-year university student. That company, which has since been renamed Tibbi Tojik, is among the four companies that Sifat Pharma lists as subsidiaries.

State procurement records show that Tibbi Tojik, whose corporate registration describes it as a medical-services company, has won $184,000 in state contracts since 2022.Its state clients include the central hospital in the northern Gafurov district and the state anti-epizootic center in Dushanbe.

There is little public information about Gulova. But public documents reviewed by RFE/RL indicate that she studied at the Russian-Tajik Slavonic University in Dushanbe in recent years.

A student publication at the university from April 2018 reported that Rahmonova and Ashraf Gulov had attended a campus event at which “one of the major achievements” was the selection of Gulova as one of the event’s moderators.

Sifat Pharma’s Jamshed Hamidov (left) signs an agreement with Laboratoire Innotech International on November 17, 2019, during President Emomali Rahmon’s visit to France.

Source : RFERL

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