Meet Allan J. Lichtman, a historian with a seemingly magical Midas touch who has been calling US Presidential Elections with eerie accuracy since 1984. 

While most political pundits and pollsters scramble to keep up with the tides of public opinion, Lichtman calmly unveils the future, his predictions as steady as a seasoned fortune teller’s gaze into a crystal ball. But how does he do it? Is he a modern-day Nostradamus, gifted with supernatural foresight, or is something deeper at play here?

Lichtman’s method

Lichtman’s method, often shrouded in mystery, is not based on mere guesswork or gut feeling. His secret weapon? A system he devised called ‘The Keys to the White House’. This isn’t your run-of-the-mill analysis but a framework built on 13 true-or-false statements, each designed to capture the underlying currents of a presidential race. 

These ‘keys’ range from the economy’s performance to social unrest and from incumbency advantages to the absence of scandal. If six or more of these keys turn against the party in power, Lichtman predicts it will lose the presidency. This model, grounded in historical data rather than transient public sentiment, has turned Lichtman into a political seer whose predictions cut through the noise of modern-day electioneering. 

Imagine being able to foresee the outcome of elections while others falter, blinded by polling missteps and media frenzy. In a world where digital misinformation has become the norm and where climate change can even skew weather patterns, how can one man stand firm in his ability to forecast something as volatile as American politics? Lichtman’s system doesn’t just defy the odds; it redefines them, offering a clarity that seems almost otherworldly in a time when certainty is a rare commodity.

Lichtman predicted the following elections since 1984 well ahead, publicly using mainstream and credible media.

1984: ‘How to Bet in ’84’

1988: ‘How to Bet in November’ 

1992: ‘The Keys to the White House’

1996: ‘Who Will Be the Next President’

2000: ‘The Keys to Election 2000’

2004: ‘The Keys to the White House’

2008: ‘Forecast for 2008’

2012: ‘Preliminary Forecast for 2012’

2016: ‘Trump is Headed for a Win’

2020: ‘He Predicted Trump’s Win in 2016, Now He’s Ready to Call 2020’

Except for a couple of predictions of the popular vote, he predicted all others with remarkable accuracy. I have met pollsters who could predict an election just a week ahead of the election day. This is easy for experienced and masterful pollsters, campaigners, and political leaders. However, Lichtman, the 13 keys, and the statistical model predict before anyone can comprehend an election campaign. 

High stakes ahead

As Lichtman, at 77 years of age, prepares to unveil his prediction for the 2024 showdown, the stakes are higher than ever. The contest between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris is set to be one of the most polarising in history, with a nation deeply divided and the world watching closely. Will Lichtman’s keys guide him to yet another correct prediction? And if so, what does that say about the nature of power, politics, and the very fabric of American democracy?

This Harvard-educated Professor, who was an expert witness in over 100 civil and voting rights cases and authored 11 books, remains a towering figure in geopolitical discourse. His predictions capture the public’s imagination and influence how we understand the dynamics of elections. While others chase trends, Lichtman leans on a well-honed system that has weathered the storms of political upheaval. 

In a world where even the seasons and weather patterns seem to change unpredictably, Lichtman is a Mozart of political predictions, reminding us that, sometimes, the most profound insights come not from the noise of the moment but from a deeper understanding of history’s patterns, human psychology, leadership decision-making, behaviour, and the sentiments of the public at large. 

So, as we get closer to the next big election, one question looms: will Lichtman get it right again? And if he does, what else might he see that the rest of us are missing? The answers may lie not just in the future but in the very methods Lichtman has perfected over decades – techniques that have turned him into an almost mythical figure in political prediction.

Lichtman’s keys in South Asia

With all due respect to Lichtman’s 13 keys, which have cracked the code of American Presidential Elections for decades, one might wonder how this framework would fare in South Asia’s complex, diverse political landscape. In this region, elections are far from straightforward. 

Think about India, where the election process is a Herculean task, spanning weeks and involving 900 million voters, one million polling booths, all from various backgrounds. How can a system designed to predict outcomes in a political environment like the US handle the wild diversity of South Asia? Here, the influence of religion, the deep roots of caste, the vast stretches of land, poverty, the growing middle class, unemployment, and the varying definitions of charisma and leadership play a role that would challenge even the most sophisticated models.

Yet, for me, despite these challenges, Lichtman’s 13 keys offer more than just a prediction tool – they provide a fascinating lens through which we can analyse elections and the broader dynamics of governance and political strategy in South Asia. 

In a region where the very definition of being a leader can differ from village to village, Lichtman’s approach could offer a structured way to think about the elements that truly matter in shaping public opinion. Imagine applying this framework not just to foresee electoral outcomes but to understand how governments can maintain stability, enforce checks and balances, and craft political campaigns to resonate across such a vast and varied population.

Lichtman’s keys were more than just a prediction tool – they became the foundation for something I had been working on for seven years. What works in a political campaign? How do you craft a theory that sounds good on paper and delivers results when it matters most? This is no small feat in South Asia, where the stakes are always high and the playing field constantly shifts. Lichtman’s framework, focusing on the fundamental forces that drive political change, offered a way to approach these questions systematically.

Moreover, it challenged me to think about strategy in a way that goes beyond the usual clichés. What works in shaping public opinion? Is it the message, the messenger, or something deeper, something more structural? 

As I reflected on these questions, I realised that while the 13 keys might not be directly applicable to every aspect of South Asian politics, they offer a starting point – a way to begin dissecting the complexities of this region’s political landscape. 

They encourage us to look beyond the surface, ask what drives political change, and recognise that in politics, as in life, the unseen forces often have the most power. With this framework in mind, I embarked on a journey to explore what works in South Asia and build a strategy to navigate its challenges and tap into its unique opportunities. The journey is far from over, but with Lichtman’s keys in hand, the path forward is a bit clearer.

A universal framework 

Seven years ago, a close friend of mine – a political campaign veteran with 40 years of experience who quietly influenced the rise of many leaders – and I embarked on an ambitious journey. 

We set out to craft a theory tailored explicitly to the complexities of South Asian politics, fully aware that what worked in one part of the world might not necessarily apply elsewhere. Our approach was as unassuming as we were, yet it was profound. Through countless hours of discussion, debate, disagreements, and analysis, we shaped a concept that would eventually transform how we viewed political campaigning. 

We were not looking to rewrite the rules; instead, we sought to distil the essence of what drives human behaviour in politics. Our insights became the foundation of what I now believe is a universal framework that can transcend borders and cultures: the interplay of hope, fear, and jealousy.

As I watched elections unfold across the globe – from Taiwan to Pakistan, Bangladesh to the UK, Russia to South Africa, India, and most recently Sri Lanka – I saw patterns emerge. These were not just random electoral outcomes but manifestations of more profound, primal emotions. It became clear that hope, fear, and jealousy were not just abstract concepts but powerful forces that could be harnessed to influence political outcomes. 

Hope drives people to believe in a better future and rally behind a leader who promises change. On the other hand, fear can be a potent motivator, pushing people to act in defence of what they have in order to avoid a perceived threat. Jealousy, often overlooked, stirs up resentment and the desire to level the playing field, whether in economic terms or social status. Together, these emotions create a dynamic that can be both predictable and volatile. 

All above elections I covered extensively for public consumption and some private coverage helped key decision-makers, both in politics and business, with meaningful discourses which led to action. After all, politics shakes business and business shapes politics. When I reflect upon all elections, the hope, fear, and jealousy was universal. 

When leaders tap into hope, they inspire; they offer a vision of what could be, often galvanising those who feel disenfranchised. Leaders like Lee Kuan Yew, Nelson Mandela, and John F. Kennedy instilled hope. In the great Lee Kuan Yew, I saw a leader who was both feared and loved, a rare combination for a leader, and I called it the epitome of leadership. 

The danger of promising hope in a campaign is the credibility of the message of hope. Can a leader honour the commitment of hope? This is a critical question in developing a presidential campaign. In 2016, Donald Trump hit the nail on the head with ‘Make America Great Again’. If he had delivered, would Joe Biden have won the election in 2020? 

When invoked, fear can unify people against a common enemy or perceived danger, whether it’s economic instability, cultural erosion, or an external threat. Meanwhile, jealousy is the undercurrent that can turn the tide unexpectedly. It can lead to movements that demand equality, reject the status quo, or push back against perceived elitism. 

A fear psychosis was at play in the Indian election. There were slogans against Premier Narendra Modi, calling him a dictator, pro-Hindu and anti-Muslim, and a failure, whilst his opponent Rahul Gandhi was projected as a product of nepotism, a danger to the economic and political stability of India. Closer to election day, narratives were about vote counting malpractices to changing election results, and the fear not only crashed the hopes of people but also crashed the stock market. 

But post-election, I witnessed that most of the stories had disappeared. People are getting on with their lives. Why were Indians angry, jealous, and some praying for hope only at election time? Why not in the aftermath? 

When Sheikh Hasina won the election in Bangladesh this year, she lasted only a few months in her seat as the people’s fear broke the threshold, and once peaceful street protests turned violent after the Government forces killed hundreds of student protesters. 

Understanding the human condition 

In the coming years, as we see more elections unfold and more leaders rise and fall, this framework will prove itself time and time again. It’s not about manipulating people; it’s about understanding the fundamental drivers of human behaviour and how they intersect with the political landscape. 

As we delve deeper into how hope, fear, and jealousy work in real life, we can unlock the secrets to winning elections and understanding the complex and often contradictory nature of our societies. The journey of political strategy is as much about understanding human nature as it is about understanding politics, and this is a path worth exploring.

Gautama Buddha’s teachings remind us of something fundamentally human: the presence of anger, jealousy, and delusion within us all. These emotions are not just fleeting feelings but deep-rooted forces that shape how we see the world and, crucially, our leaders. 

Who among us hasn’t felt a pang of jealousy, a surge of anger, or the fog of delusion? These emotions are personal and collective, influencing the masses and steering the direction of entire societies. But how exactly do these primal instincts manifest in the modern world, particularly politics and leadership?

Consider how people lined up for days to buy the latest iPhone in the early days or digital conversations when someone’s views clash with another’s. It’s not just about the product or the opinion – it’s about what lies beneath. Anger fuels those heated online debates, jealousy drives the obsession with having the latest gadget that others flaunt, and delusion clouds the judgement of those who believe that ownership equates to status. This is the human condition and is a powerful force in shaping public opinion.

Harnessing emotions in the political arena 

Now, let’s take this into the political arena. Creating hope is not just possible – it’s a strategy. 

Look at Modi’s campaign in India. Modi didn’t just run for office; he tapped into a deep well of hope within the Indian electorate, offering a vision of stability and prosperity that resonated across the country. His opponent Gandhi too offered a similar narrative, but in politics the campaign does not end with communications, it goes well beyond to alliances, partnerships, and allies, including geopolitical actors. 

Hope can be manufactured, moulded, and directed, and when done effectively, it can lead to sweeping electoral victories. 

But what about anger? That, too, can be stoked and channelled. Think back to the mass protests in Sri Lanka in 2022 or Bangladesh in 2024. In both instances, anger over economic mismanagement, corruption, anti-democratic moves, and a lack of accountability led to regime changes, with leaders fleeing the country. Anger isn’t just an emotion; it’s a catalyst for change, and when it reaches a tipping point, it can be unstoppable.

Fear is another tool that can be wielded with precision. In Taiwan, the fear of geopolitical uncertainty has driven voters and leaders alike to act in ways that protect what they hold dear. The spectre of conflict, losing sovereignty, or economic collapse can create an atmosphere where fear dictates decisions, both in the voting booth and in the corridors of power.

And then there’s jealousy. Can you create jealousy? Absolutely. It’s perhaps the most subtle yet potent of all. When political campaigns highlight the successes of some to contrast the struggles of others, they stir up feelings of envy. Jealousy brews when leaders flaunt their achievements or when governments spotlight the disparities between regions or classes. This quiet but simmering emotion can lead to unrest, demands for equality, and, in some cases, upheaval.

In the end, the emotions that the Buddha spoke of are not just inner battles; they are the very forces that drive political movements, consumer behaviour, and social change. Understanding how to harness these emotions – whether to inspire hope, ignite anger, instil fear, or provoke jealousy – is critical to understanding how the world operates today. It’s not just about predicting outcomes; it’s about shaping them.

The key to a successful political campaign 

Too much fear paralyses a movement. It creates a culture of anxiety and distrust, where people are so overwhelmed by what could go wrong that they lose sight of what could go right. Campaigns that lean too heavily into fear may drive voters to the polls, but they risk alienating them in the long run, creating a legacy of dread rather than progress.

Similarly, an overabundance of hope can lead to disillusionment. Leaders who promise the moon and stars without acknowledging the hurdles set themselves up for failure. Hope, when unchecked, can become a double-edged sword, leading to impossible expectations that, when unmet, turn the very optimism that once energised a campaign into a source of bitter disappointment.

Jealousy, too, is a dangerous emotion when left unchecked. If a campaign stirs up too much envy, it can breed resentment, dividing communities rather than uniting them. A strategy that overplays jealousy may spark initial engagement but also risks creating deep societal rifts that are difficult to heal, ultimately leading to instability rather than solidarity.

This realisation led me to an important conclusion: the key to a successful political campaign isn’t found in the extremes of hope, fear, or jealousy but in their balance. It’s about finding that delicate equilibrium where these emotions intersect, creating an aspirational narrative grounded in reality. A leader who can navigate this intersection – who can inspire hope while acknowledging legitimate fears and subtly addressing the undercurrents of jealousy – has the potential to craft campaigns that resonate deeply with the electorate.

Imagine a campaign that instils hope by offering a realistic vision of the future, acknowledging the challenges ahead but assuring the public that together, they can overcome them. This same campaign would recognise and address the people’s fears, not by amplifying them but by providing concrete solutions and a sense of security. And when it comes to jealousy, the campaign would highlight fairness and equality, ensuring that everyone feels they have a stake in the promised future.

This is the balance every successful campaign strives for. It’s not about manipulating emotions but about understanding and respecting them, and weaving them into a powerful and sustainable narrative. Leaders who master this balance won’t just win elections – they’ll earn the trust and loyalty of the people, creating a foundation for lasting change.

Sri Lanka’s critical moment 

Sri Lanka is on the brink of a pivotal moment in its history as it heads toward the Presidential Election on 21 September to choose its ninth executive president. The atmosphere is charged and the campaigns are steeped in the classic trio of political emotions: hope, fear, and jealousy. Yet, despite the enthusiasm, none of the candidates seems to grasp the critical balance among these forces – a balance that could determine not just victory but the nation’s very future.

I shared this column with Prof. Lichtman for his guidance and a man of wisdom could bring more clarity to the above thought process. 

The 22 million Sri Lankans are yearning for a leader who can steer the country through the next five years and offer clarity amidst the current confusion of party lines, geopolitical sensitivities, and the overwhelming field of 39 presidential candidates. At least six stand out as serious contenders, each trying to outmanoeuvre the other in a race that has become a cauldron of fear-mongering, lofty promises, and envy-stoking.

As the campaign intensifies over the next five weeks, it’s clear that fear is playing a dominant role in the strategies of most prominent candidates. Whether it’s fear of economic collapse, fear of social unrest, or fear of losing national identity, these narratives are being pushed hard, creating a sense of urgency and anxiety among the electorate. But is this the path to victory or a more profound division?

On 21 September, Sri Lankans will not just choose a president; they will select the emotion that will define their future. Will it be a future built on fear, hope, or jealousy – or will one candidate finally strike that elusive middle path, offering a vision that resonates with the full spectrum of human experience? The next few weeks will be critical in determining which of these forces will reign supreme and shape the destiny of this beautiful island nation that I call paradise and my home.

Saliya Weerakoon

The post Hope, Fear and Jealousy appeared first on Tashkent Citizen.

Speculations over what American foreign policy under the potential leadership of Kamala Devi Harris might look like have begun in earnest, now that US president Joe Biden – who announced recently that he would not be seeking re-election – has officially endorsed his vice president as his heir apparent in the race for the presidency. Although many Democratic Party leaders and supporters have joined the president in coalescing behind Harris, the official nominee of the Democrats will only be chosen at their party’s national convention in Chicago next month.

Should Kamala Harris, if confirmed as the Democrats’ standard bearer, triumph over Donald Trump when Americans take to the ballot box this November, what can we expect from the foreign policy of a Harris administration towards the Indo-Pacific region? Would she prove a “weak” leader – as Beijing’s state-backed news outlet Global Times has insisted – whose presidency is unlikely to pose a threat to China?

Shaky Start

Having carved a niche as the state of California’s top law enforcement official and subsequently its junior senator, Harris stepped into the vice presidency with little foreign policy experience. Her initial foray into US diplomacy began with a stumble: her proposal to work with Central American nations to address the root causes of illegal immigration into the United States was quickly lumped with the related issue of the security of America’s southern border, which she – as in the case of a clumsy interview with the US news outlet NBC News – tried unsuccessfully to avoid. Nor did the initial turmoil among her staff do her reputation any favours.

However, things have markedly improved since those rough beginnings, with seasoned Washington operators like Philip Gordon and Rebecca Lissner being enlisted to advise the vice president on foreign policy and national security matters. According to US congressman Adam Smith, the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, Harris’s performance at this year’s Munich Security Conference making a case for America’s role in Ukraine and NATO indicates that she has been “stress-tested” and found credible.

Staying the Course

Given her inexperience as an international leader, it is highly likely that Harris, as US president, would continue the Biden administration’s foreign policy, at least until such time as she has a firmer grasp on world affairs. Under her leadership, the United States is likely to continue supporting Ukraine and NATO while adopting a firm line against Vladimir Putin and Russia. Given her strong stance against Israel’s handling of the Gaza conflict – which she has referred to as a humanitarian catastrophe for innocent civilians – it is possible that her Israel policy may prove less fixed and intransigent than Biden’s. Indeed, she is on record for having called for a “temporary ceasefire” to the Gaza conflict well before her boss publicly did.

But far as the Indo-Pacific goes, it is unlikely that Harris would stray from extant US policy. As noted, many Chinese seem to think that Harris would prove weaker than Biden in dealing with China. As a US senator, she co-sponsored a bill promoting human rights in Hong Kong and supported another on the rights of Uyghurs in Xinjiang; in both cases, the bills included sanctions against those deemed responsible for human rights abuses.

China

As vice president, Harris has underscored America’s support – “consistent with [the US’s] long-standing policy” – for Taiwan’s self-defence and decried Chinese intimidation and coercion against Philippine vessels in the waters surrounding the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.

In an interview with CBS News last year, Harris advocated a firm stance against China, calling for “de-risking” from Beijing – a policy that aims to reduce the extent to which the US and Western economies depend on China. “It’s not about pulling out [from China], but it is about ensuring that we are protecting American interests, and that we are a leader in terms of the rules of the road, as opposed to following others’ rules”, Harris explained in that interview.

Harris’s remarks on China strongly hint at the influence of Rebecca Lissner, who currently serves as deputy national security adviser to the vice president. In her 2020 book An Open World: How America Can Win the Contest for Twenty-First-Century Order (co-authored with Mira Rapp-Hooper), Lissner argues that China constitutes America’s “chief antagonist” to an open world through Beijing’s determined efforts at forming exclusive territorial and technological blocs. Against such opposition, Lissner advocates a new vision and approach for America, one that allows it to de-risk itself while working with like-minded allies and rebuilding what she considers outmoded international institutions to set rules that ensure and enhance global openness. Lissner is adamant that the United States and the West should not pursue regime change around the world, but counter authoritarian competitors by preventing the rise of closed spheres of influence and preserving open access to the global commons.

Such an openness strategy is also in line with Harris’s criticism of the Trump administration’s inconsequential efforts to engage North Korea and rein in its nuclear ambitions, which do not close Northeast Asia off as much as create undue uncertainty and apprehension in the region. This is not to imply that Lissner’s ideas would form the blueprint for foreign policy under a Harris administration. At the very least, it suggests that Beijing’s hopes of a weak and unfocused America under Harris may be premature, perhaps even unfounded.

ASEAN

Under Harris, the United States is also likely to stay the course taken by Biden in its ties with ASEAN and Southeast Asia, a region hotly contested by both Beijing and Washington. But whether Harris would do better than Biden at reassuring and improving the region’s perceptions of America remains to be seen. According to a 2024 annual survey conducted by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, when asked who they would prefer to align with in the ongoing China-US rivalry, slightly more Southeast Asian respondents reportedly sided with the Chinese (50.5%) than with the Americans (49.5%). That said, a Harris-led America would presumably play the kind of international leadership role ASEAN desires of the United States than a Trump-led one is likely to furnish. While ASEAN leaders would no doubt redouble their efforts to keep a mercurial and capricious Donald Trump happy and engaged (were he to return as US leader), a President Harris is more likely to show up for ASEAN meetings in person – the high-mark of ASEAN summitry success – than a President Trump ever did or would.

Southeast Asians have had a couple of opportunities to see Kamala Harris up close. At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in August 2021, Harris, in her capacity as US vice president, visited Singapore and Vietnam to strengthen her nation’s security partnerships and to expand economic cooperation with two of America’s critical Indo-Pacific partners. Attending the 2023 ASEAN summit held in Jakarta in Biden’s stead, Harris – in her fifth visit to the Southeast Asian region – engaged with leaders of the ASEAN member states as well as Australia, China, Japan and South Korea. Notably, as a senator, Harris was active in legislating against human rights abuses in Myanmar – a concern she has repeatedly raised during her visits to Southeast Asia. Welcomed or otherwise, ASEAN could expect a greater focus on Myanmar from a Harris administration than it ever did from the Biden – and, for that matter, the Trump – administrations.

Conclusion

Should a Harris foreign policy adopt the contours and course of a grand strategy akin to what Lissner has counselled, it would probably surprise no one if China – still designated as America’s chief antagonist – were to resume its age-old accusation against America over the latter’s ostensible “Cold War” fixation with alliances and partnerships aimed at (in Beijing’s view) encircling and counterbalancing China. In this regard, it is unclear whether Harris might tap into her part-Indian heritage – her late mother was from Tamil Nadu – to enlist India (as a member of the Quad) in checking an assertive China: she has come across as ambivalent towards India. All things considered, the prospect of a Harris presidency is not the worst thing that could happen for the Indo-Pacific region.

See Seng Tan is President and CEO of International Students Inc. (ISI) in the United States and concurrently Research Adviser at RSIS and Senior Associate at the Centre for Liberal Arts and Social Sciences (CLASS) at NTU.

See Seng Tan

The post What Might a Harris Foreign Policy Bring? appeared first on Tashkent Citizen.

As Victoria Nuland steps down, she gets real about a world on fire.

Victoria Nuland has long been known as a relentless, even pugnacious, U.S. diplomat, with a strong belief in American power. The approach sometimes got her in trouble, but it rarely held her back.

Nuland recently left the State Department after serving at its highest levels, first as the Biden administration’s undersecretary of State for political affairs, and, for several months, acting deputy secretary of State. She previously was a career diplomat who held an array of roles under presidents both Republican and Democratic; her first posting more than three decades ago was as a consular officer in China.

In an exit interview with POLITICO Magazine, Nuland discussed her time in public service — dismissing chatter that she was passed over for a promotion — as well as her views on where American foreign policy has gone wrong and right.

Notably, she said the United States was not quick enough to realize and prevent the expansionist ambitions of both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.

A longtime champion of Ukraine and the effort to counter Russia, she also warned about the perils of Donald Trump blowing up NATO if he wins back the White House in November.

“Don’t throw it out,” she said of the trans-Atlantic alliance, “because you would never be able to re-create it again.”

The following has been edited for length and clarity:

How’s life on the outside?

Life is wonderful. I am doing a lot of projects that I had put off, seeing a lot of people that I love, and I’m staying involved in ways that are meaningful. I’m speaking on foreign policy issues I care about — whether it is Ukraine or ensuring that the United States leads strongly in the world. I’m getting a chance to prepare for my classes in the fall and work with the next generation of foreign policy leaders. I’ll be at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs.

Why leave the Biden administration, really? People said you felt passed over for the deputy secretary of State job. Is that true?

I actually didn’t compete for the deputy secretary of State job. I loved being undersecretary for political affairs. I love working with Secretary [Antony] Blinken. But as you know, I’ve done three years altogether and I’ve done eight months plus in both jobs, and so it was just the right time for me and my family to do something different.

Do you have any regrets from your time in the role?

I think whenever you finish a job like this, you wish you’d been able to do more on more issues. Travel more, touch more people, get more done faster, ensure the U.S. was leading strongly on as many continents as possible, mentor more of the next generation. And you’re always constrained by time, by resources, by the crises that overwhelm the inbox. So you always want to have done more.

Can Ukraine win this war against Russia? And how do you define winning?

Let’s start with the fact that Putin has already failed in his objective. He wanted to flatten Ukraine. He wanted to ensure that they had no sovereignty, independence, agency, no democratic future — because a democratic Ukraine, a European Ukraine, is a threat to his model for Russia, among other things, and because it’s the first building block for his larger territorial ambitions.

Can Ukraine succeed? Absolutely. Can Ukraine come out of this more sovereign, more economically independent, stronger, more European than it is now? Absolutely. And I think it will. But we’ve got to stay with it. We’ve got to make sure our allies stay with it.

And we have to accelerate a lot of the initiatives that were in the supplemental, like helping Ukraine build that highly deterrent military force of the future, like deploying these longer-range weapons to strategic effect, like ensuring that the critical infrastructure and the energy sector are protected, like building up our own defense industrial base and that of our allies and Ukraine’s again, so that we and Ukraine are building faster than Russia and China.

But can it get all its territory back, including Crimea?

It can definitely get to a place where it’s strong enough, I believe, and where Putin is stymied enough to go to the negotiating table from a position of strength. It’ll be up to the Ukrainian people what their territorial ambitions should be. But there are certain things that are existential.

Any deal that they cut in their interest and in the larger global interest has to be a deal that Putin is compelled to stick to. We can’t be doing this every six months, every three years. It has to actually lead to a deal that includes Russian withdrawal.

Putin is a master at what we call rope-a-dope negotiating, where he never actually cuts the deal. It has to be a deal that ensures that whatever is decided on Crimea, it can’t be remilitarized such that it’s a dagger at the heart of the center of Ukraine.

Was it a mistake not to push the Ukrainians harder to go for some sort of negotiated end to the war in 2022, especially the fall of 2022?

They were not in a strong enough position then. They’re not in a strong enough position now. The only deal Putin would have cut then, the only deal that he would cut today, at least before he sees what happens in our election, is a deal in which he says, “What’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable.” And that’s not sustainable.

You’ve had a long career, especially when it comes to Europe. Where did the U.S. go wrong in its understanding of Russia?

With regard to both Russia and China, after the end of the Cold War, the prevailing wisdom among all of us — right, left and center — was that if you could knit Moscow and Beijing into the open and free global order that we had benefited from for so many years, that they would become prosperous, and they would become strong contributing members of that order. And that’s what we tried for a very long time.

That works if you have a leadership that is fundamentally accepting the current system. But once you have leaders who are telling their populations that this system keeps their country down, doesn’t allow it to have its rightful place, that has a territorial definition of greatness, that is bent on economic, political and or military coercion — that’s antithetical to this order, and then our policy has to change.

Did we realize fast enough Putin’s ambitions and Xi Jinping’s ambitions, and did we do enough to ensure that those ambitions stayed inside their own nations and didn’t spill out and coerce others? 20/20 hindsight? Probably not.

How much of it comes down to what particular guy is running the show? I sometimes wonder, could things be different if it wasn’t Putin in charge? If it wasn’t Xi? How much of it comes down to the dude at the top?

In highly centralized societies, which both China and Russia have historically been, without an electoral refresh of the kind that we all go through in the democratic world, it matters hugely, because it’s that human who’s defining what greatness means. It’s that human who’s deciding how to maintain order in that society. It’s that human — allowing them to speak, allowing a free press, allowing protests, allowing alternative political parties — who’s going to shape the options. And that constrains obviously the kind of relationship we can have.

What is the lesson we should learn about foreign policy in general when it comes to the experiences we’ve had in Russia and China?

We should always try to talk both to leaders and to people, to the extent that we’re allowed. We should always offer an opportunity to work together in common interest.

But if the ideology is inherently expansionist, is inherently illiberal, is inherently trying to change the system that benefits us, we’ve got to build protections and resilience for ourselves, for our friends and allies, and particularly for those neighbors of those countries who are likely to be on the front line of that first push.

Where do you see the Israel-Hamas war heading?

Essentially, there are two paths on the table. There is continuing this war with all of the destruction and horror and lack of clarity about how you end Hamas’ reign of terror.

The other path is the route that the administration and allies and partners and a lot of countries in the Gulf are pushing, and a lot of Israelis want, which is: a hostage deal leads to a long-term cease-fire, leads to a better future for Palestinians both in the West Bank and in Gaza, leads to Saudi-Israel normalization and a path to two states, and a region where the ideology and the violence that Hamas is offering is beaten by more opening, more opportunity, more peace, more stability.

Are you saying that because you believe it or because it’s the Biden administration’s position?

I’m saying it because, anything other than that, this is going to happen again and again and again.

If you could go back in time on that one, what, if anything, should the U.S. have done differently?

Beginning with the Trump administration, everybody fell in love with regional normalization as the cure-all for the instability and grievances and insecurity in the Middle East. And that’s a part of it.

But if you leave out the Palestinian issue, then somebody’s going to seize it and run with it, and that’s what Hamas did. I also think that both we and the Israelis knew too little about the terror state that had been established in Gaza.

You’re going to be teaching at Columbia, the epicenter of campus protests over this situation. If you could offer these protesters some advice as someone with significant policymaking experience, what would it be?

Peaceful protest is part of the fabric of who we are and the fact that we allow it, and the Chinese don’t and the Russians don’t, makes us Americans. But when that protest becomes violent, when it impinges on other people’s human rights or denigrates others, then you veer toward coercion.

So, express your views, ask for concrete paths forward. But stay away from violence, make sure that it’s actually indigenous to the campus, that you’re not becoming the tool of outside agitators. And be respectful of alternative views as you expect people to respect your views.

What if you are peaceful? And you say what you want and the people in charge just say, ‘Oh, that’s very nice, thank you,’ and then they ignore you and they keep doing what they’ve been doing for years. How do you do just keep pushing on that front? Do you join the government?

I would certainly say if you care enough to devote all day, every day to political change, come join the folks who are setting policy, commit your life to public service. I didn’t expect that that’s where my life would lead, but it’s been incredibly rewarding.

There are many, many ways to change policy, but being on the inside is not only extremely rewarding, but you can actually get stuff done.

If Trump wins, and leaves NATO or limits America’s role in NATO, does the alliance fall apart? What happens?

First and foremost, America suffers. Because if you look at every single one of the challenges we have globally, even as we make the security commitment to Europe, it is the European countries who have contributed more to Ukraine — on the security side, on the economic side, etc. It is the European countries who have to adapt their policies toward China if you want to have an impact on China’s eagerness to coerce others. It’s the European countries who we need to help fund the Haiti mission, to help defeat terrorism in Africa, and provide prosperity.

If we are not part of that family, on a daily basis, we are standing alone, our own influence in the world is greatly reduced, and we have no influence over how they choose to spend their energy and resources. And they’re less powerful in doing it without us.

What about this idea that look, we’re the U.S. at the end of the day. We’re the superpower. Whether we’re in NATO or not, people are going to come along with us. Isn’t there something to that argument?

I’ve worked for six presidents, Republicans and Democrats. I always believed that a new president with a fresh mandate from the American people should look at every global problem with fresh eyes, bring new solutions, and should have that opportunity, working with Congress, working with the American people, working with allies and partners.

That’s a different thing than turning your back on bedrock, bipartisan institutions and policies that have protected Americans and advanced our own prosperity and global influence for 70 years.

Why do you want to throw out what’s working and what benefits us for no other reason than you’ve had a fit of pique? Work within the institution to make it work better. Don’t throw it out, because you would never be able to re-create it again.

Does the rest of the world fear the United States?

Is fear what we want from the rest of the world?

Sometimes.

I think what we want from the rest of the world is they see us leading in a manner that advances their own security, advances their own prosperity, creates this community of nations that can handle global problems — whether they are terrorist problems, whether they are health problems, whether they’re environmental problems — and we do it in a primarily self-interested but unselfish way, and we’re creating that community.

They should only fear us if they’re opponents of a largely liberal democratic way of advancing human prosperity. And in that context, if they are viciously invading a neighbor, if they are coercing a little state because they can, then I hope they would fear our reaction and the reaction that we will build with other democracies who want to protect the system that favors freedom.

Do you ever plan to go back into government?

I love what I did for 35 years. I’ve always loved it. And I continue to love it. So in the right circumstances, of course.

Source: Politico

The post She Was at the Top of the State Department. Now She’s Ready to Talk appeared first on Tashkent Citizen.

Shares surged past $70 in early trade, giving the firm a market value of more than $9bn. They ended the day at about $58, still up more than 16%.

The long-awaited moment will inject more than $200m into Trump Media & Technology Group and hands the former president a stake worth more than $4bn.

Analysts say that is far more than the firm’s performance warrants.

Trump Media’s Truth Social, a Twitter-like service, brought in just $3.3m in revenue in the first nine months of last year and lost nearly $50m.

It says 8.9 million accounts have been created since the platform launched to the general public in 2022 as an alternative to mainstream sites such as Facebook, but it is not clear how many are active.

By comparison, the recently-listed Reddit currently has a market value of about $11bn. It boasts more than 70 million users and brought in $800m in revenue last year.

Kristi Marvin, chief executive of SPACInsider, compared Trump Media – which trades under the ticker DJT for Mr Trump’s initials – to a meme stock, in which prices are untethered from the business prospects.

Interest in Trump Media has also been fuelled by individual investors, as opposed to Wall Street firms, many of them apparently Trump supporters.

“Everybody expected to trade a little bit crazy today, which it has,” she said. “The real question is how does it trade a week from now, two weeks from now and nobody really knows.”

The deal to list Trump Media was first announced in 2021.

The move was accomplished via what is known as a SPAC, a merger with a publicly listed shell company, Digital World Acquisition Corp, which was expressly created to buy a company and take it public.

The deal was delayed by government investigations and other hurdles, but regulators cleared it earlier this year and Digital World shareholders voted in favour last week.

Ahead of the listing on the Nasdaq exchange, Trump Media officials called it a “pivotal moment” for the firm – and the wider media landscape.

“As a public company, we will passionately pursue our vision to build a movement to reclaim the Internet from Big Tech censors,” said Trump Media chief executive Devin Nunes, a former congressman.

“We will continue to fulfil our commitment to Americans to serve as a safe harbour for free expression and to stand up to the ever-growing army of speech suppressors.”

The debut comes at a critical moment for Mr Trump, who has been scrambling for cash to pay legal penalties and owns more than half of the firm’s shares.

He is currently barred from selling his holdings for about six months, making it difficult for him to tap the windfall immediately.

The company’s board, which is stocked with allies including one of his sons, could potentially change that rule, but analysts have said they think that would be unlikely to happen immediately.

If Mr Trump were to sell a significant chunk of his shares, it could hurt the share price.

Investors face other risks as well, tied to Mr Trump’s political fortunes and his 2024 presidential campaign.

A loss might be expected to hurt the share price, but a win could have the opposite effect, especially if it generated further demand from buyers hoping to curry favour with Mr Trump, said Michael Ohlrogge, a law professor at New York University.

However, Prof Ohlrogge said the current share price is “far, far elevated above what anyone would consider its fundamental value”.

Source: BBC

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