John Hamilton and Sophie Daud gave a lecture on climate change to the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy 2023 cohort.

On 5 September, the Embassy joined a session with the 2023 cohort of the United Nations’ Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia Preventive Diplomacy Academy (UNRCCA) to discuss the crucial topic of climate change.

Our Deputy Head of Mission, John Hamilton, was joined by Sophie Daud, the Chief Executive of the Future Leaders Network a youth-led, non-profit organisation that discovers and develops the next generation of leaders in the UK.

John gave an overview of climate issues facing Central Asia including, dwindling water resources, fast rising temperatures and growing greenhouse gas emissions. Sophie gave an informative insight into the workings of international climate negotiations and how to ensure youth voices can make a difference at the highest levels.

Sophie and John answered a wide range of insightful questions from across the Central Asia region. Their questions demonstrated that this set of future leaders have a deep understanding of the defining challenge of our age.

Source: UK Government

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This year carries unique significance for both countries as it marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, while domestically, the Communist Party of China (CPC) held its 20th National Congress, and Kazakhstan will hold its presidential elections in November. 

Over the past decades, the ties between the two countries have reached unprecedented heights – a permanent comprehensive strategic partnership based on the spirit of mutual trust and benefit as neighboring countries, said Nuryshev. “This is unique for the diplomacy of both countries, and it is an exemplary state-to-state relationship,” he said.

Specifically, the boundary dispute between the two countries has been completely resolved; good cooperation has been established in various fields such as economy and logistics; culture and people-to-people exchanges became the pillars of our friendship and dialogue, and we also support each other in many multilateral mechanisms, the ambassador told the Global Times.

Nuryshev said that Kazakhstan was impressed by the 20th National Congress of the CPC, saying it was enlightening for the development of neighboring countries and even the whole world.

“We are eager to know the next step of China’s development policy, so we read the report carefully. We also look forward to learning more about China’s grand blueprint through the two sessions next year,” Nuryshev told the media.

Chinese President Xi Jinping picked Kazakhstan as the destination of his first foreign trip since the COVID-19 pandemic on September 14 this year, which experts said underscored the fact that he highly values bilateral relations with the Central Asian country and indicates that such a visit will inject new growth momentum for the country.

Xi reiterated that the Chinese government attaches great importance to China-Kazakhstan ties and always supports Kazakhstan in maintaining national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

It is worth mentioning that the meeting between the two leaders was held ahead of the most important domestic political events in both countries – the 20th National Congress of the CPC and the presidential elections in Kazakhstan, according to Nuryshev.

Kazakhstan and China are on the path of modernization and rejuvenation, committed to the same goal of improving people’s well-being, and committed to the strategic task of developing good-neighborly friendship, the envoy said.

“Our two countries were among the first to resolve the border issue, turning our common border into a solid bond of friendship. There are no outstanding questions between us, and all the problems that have arisen have been resolved jointly through friendly negotiations on the basis of mutual benefit,” Nuryshev noted.

Kazakhstan and China are among the earliest states to start cooperation in production capacity and investment, setting a model for coordination within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, he added. 

China is Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner. In the past 30 years, mutual trade has increased more than 70-fold, reaching $25.2 billion in 2021, the Xinhua News Agency reported.

Moreover, Nuryshev expressed hope for a quicker resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict through peaceful negotiations. 

He told the Global Times at the meeting that Russia is also an important strategic partner of Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan has maintained good cooperation with the European Union, Russia and China on many multilateral platforms, as Kazakhstan has always pursued a multivector and balanced foreign policy, Nuryshev reiterated, refuting the smears on Kazakhstan-Russia relations made by some media.

The ambassador said Kazakhstan continues to communicate with both Russia and Ukraine, while providing channels for solutions to the conflict, as it concerns the restoration of a stable economy across the Eurasian continent.

“Amid the current geopolitical complex situation, mutual trust between major powers is drastically declining. That means meetings and consensus between states’ leaders on pressing issues are crucial,” he said.

Nuryshev believes that it is important for China and Kazakhstan to support international initiatives launched by each other, as the two countries share many similar positions on global development and security issues.

“Kazakhstan and China continue to carry out close cooperation under the framework of multilateral organizations such as the UN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and the Central Asia-China model. The SCO and CICA are complementary rather than contradictory and not competitive as some media have claimed,” said the ambassador.

Kazakhstan will hold presidential elections on November 20, and a legislative election is set to be held in Kazakhstan in early 2023, which means that, according to Nuryshev, all the major political organs will be updated by the first half of 2023. He said he believes the newly elected Kazakh president will continue to be committed to the development of the China-Kazakhstan friendship.

The diplomat, who has been in China for a total of 19 years, said he hoped to work with Chinese counterparts to push bilateral cooperation to a new height, and make the new decade a “golden chapter” in the history of bilateral cooperation just like the past 30 years.

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In recent years, China has pursued an increasingly aggressive foreign-policy posture known as “wolf warrior” diplomacy, one that has forcefully staked China’s positions across issues and regions.

But evidence is mounting that this strategy is backfiring. International opinion polls, such as the latest Pew Research Center survey, show that negative views of China is peaking around the world while China’s diplomatic initiatives, such as in Central and Eastern Europe, are failing.

Yet in the wake of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, China has defended its aggressive foreign policy and hinted at its intensification. At first glance, it would seem that China is simply unaware that its diplomacy is malfunctioning. But a closer look reveals that China’s choice has its own logic. Why is China so committed to this style of diplomacy despite the dangers that come with it?

Chinese media refers to this style as “Xiplomacy,” a coined term frequently used in Xinhua News headlines since 2019, short for “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.” It stands for China’s foreign-policy framework under Chinese President Xi Jinping’s leadership and is one of the five key elements of “Xi Jinping Thought,” the other four involving the economy, ecology, military, and rule of law.

At heart, Xi’s diplomacy calls for a more active role for China as a great power on the world stage, including reforming the Western-dominated international order and creating what China calls “true multilateralism.”

Compared to the other key elements, however, Xiplomacy has seen a lackluster performer in Chinese state media. According to the China Media Project, which tracks the number of times each element has been mentioned in the People’s Daily since the beginning of 2022, Xiplomacy appeared less than five times most months, whereas others averaged around 15 times.

The underplaying of Xiplomacy in state media indicates China is aware of its disappointing diplomatic performance. The one other banner phrase that also saw low usage through this year is “Xi Jinping Economic Thought,” which corresponds with China’s weak economic performance. Although China’s diplomatic travails are harder to quantify than slowing growth, the term’s relative absence from state media tells us that the party is not completely blind to the reality.

So why does the party show no intention of reorienting its foreign policy despite being aware of its underwhelming performance? The answer is that Xiplomacy is more about Xi than anything else.

Yang Jiechi, director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission and the highest foreign-policy official in the party, spoke on the study and implementation of Xiplomacy this May, the transcript of which was published in the People’s Daily. The speech was all about Xi. Yang vowed to “take a coordinated approach to the domestic and international imperatives” and “resolutely follow through on General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important instructions on external work and the decisions and plans of the CPC Central Committee.”

This highlight a key characteristic of China’s foreign policy: It is valued only as an extension of its domestic agenda, with the priority to demonstrate loyalty to Xi and his agenda. Beijing’s overreactions to inquiries into COVID-19’s origin, aggressions in the South China Sea, obsessions over border disputes, or military demonstrations in the Taiwan Strait are more motivated by internal politics and what Xi identifies as China’s priorities than effective diplomacy aimed at managing foreign relations.

At its core, Xi’s foreign policy is about boosting citizen confidence in the state by flaunting national strength. The primary audience of China’s foreign policy is domestic, not international.

Xi’s diplomatic philosophy points back to the narrative of the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”—a concept that echoes domestic patriotic sentiment. As China analyst Elizabeth Economy explains, the rejuvenation narrative “evokes memories of the country as the Middle Kingdom demanding tribute from the rest of the world; China as a source of innovation, creating paper, gunpowder, printing, and the compass; and China as an expansive, outward-facing power.” It appeals more to a domestic audience nostalgic for China’s glorious past than for an international audience, some of which might still be traumatized by China’s history as an expansionist power.

Support on social media showcases the popularity of Chinese-style diplomacy at home. The Chinese internet’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, was largely pro-Russia and pro-Russian President Vladimir Putin, much of which mimicked the aggressive tone of Chinese diplomats. Although sentiments on social media could be biased due to censorship, a survey conducted by the Carter Center shows that 75 percent of respondents agree that supporting Russia in its invasion of Ukraine is in China’s national interest, and more surprisingly, support for Russia is correlated with higher education.

Although soft power was embraced by former Chinese leader Hu Jintao, it has somewhat lost its appeal under Xi. This shift is evident in Xi’s speech during the recently concluded 20th Party Congress. According to Reuters, Xi used hard-power terms, such as “security” or “safety,” 89 times in the full work report—up from 55 times in 2017. China does care about its global image, not so much about its appeal to other countries through non-coercive means—soft power—but rather in its ability to influence other countries’ diplomatic decisions through the power it has, such as economic coercion.

As the National Endowment for Democracy’s Christopher Walker explained in Foreign Policy, “the dynamics of soft power—which arise principally from a country’s culture, its political values, and its policies—are misaligned with the incentives of systems based on pervasive state control and repression.” As China grows increasingly authoritarian under Xi, the sources of soft power—civil society, individuals, and the private sector—inevitably suffers.

After failed attempts of growing China’s soft power abroad, Xi has turned to a so-called harder version of soft power: international influence. This is about using power resources—a state’s material and ideational assets—to influence other states’ behaviors. Xi proudly announced in his 20th Party Congress speech that “China’s international influence, appeal, and shaping power have been significantly improved.”

China’s flagship foreign-policy project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), showcases China’s intent to expand its international influence using economic coercion. One salient example is Lithuania, which joined the BRI in 2017.

After Lithuania announced it would open a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius in November 2021, Beijing retaliated by destroying their bilateral trade relationship, causing economic losses worth some $320 million for Lithuanian companies in 2021. Through Lithuania, Beijing hoped to exemplify the harsh consequences facing other BRI countries if they ever misalign with Beijing’s political agenda. In reality, China’s extreme measure was a failed public relations campaign: Not only did it fray China’s relations with other Eastern European countries, but it also further damaged China-European Union relations, with the latter calling for a World Trade Organization case against Beijing’s arbitrary trade restrictions.

China’s pursuit of international influence is also reflected in its diplomatic priorities. In September, Xi visited Central Asia for his first trip overseas since the pandemic began. The choice was deliberate: China has achieved relative success with the BRI in Central Asia. Instead of choosing another BRI region, such as Eastern Europe, which has grown increasingly distant from China due to failed infrastructure promises and China’s support of Russia, China turned to Central Asia, where many in the region view connectivity as a matter of survival, especially facing the economic disruptions of Russia’s war in Ukraine. This economic direness propels Central Asian countries to support China’s political agenda, such as regarding China’s territorial claims to Taiwan, in return for infrastructure investments.

Domestically, the trip was displayed as a successful venture at asserting China’s international influence. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs frames it as “fully show[ing] the strong confidence and influence of President Xi Jinping, and the growing international standing and influence of China.”

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was announced as a new Politburo member at the 20th Party Congress, implying that he is set to replace Yang as director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, the highest ranked official for China’s foreign policy.

As a fervent advocate of “wolf warrior” diplomacy, Wang being promoted affirms the continuation, if not the intensification, of China’s aggressive diplomacy style. But more so, it reinforces the notion that the foreign minister’s primary job is to show off their loyalty to Xi.

To please the central leader, officials are keeping critical feedback and advice from reaching Xi. As journalist Dake Kang explained recently, even China’s once powerful internal system of internal reports, known as Neican, has become dangerously censored under Xi. The broken feedback loop could lead to poor decision-making, a common phenomenon with autocrats, as recently witnessed in Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine.

Facing pressing domestic issues, Xi-centered diplomacy could suffer from tunnel vision and lose its true purpose: managing relationships abroad. Instead of spreading himself too thin, Xi should allocate responsibilities to trained diplomats and informed experts to design and implement a foreign policy that focuses China’s energy outward. But that’s an unlikely possibility in a system that increasingly turns around the whims of a single man.

Source : ForeignPolice

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