Speculations over what American foreign policy under the potential leadership of Kamala Devi Harris might look like have begun in earnest, now that US president Joe Biden – who announced recently that he would not be seeking re-election – has officially endorsed his vice president as his heir apparent in the race for the presidency. Although many Democratic Party leaders and supporters have joined the president in coalescing behind Harris, the official nominee of the Democrats will only be chosen at their party’s national convention in Chicago next month.

Should Kamala Harris, if confirmed as the Democrats’ standard bearer, triumph over Donald Trump when Americans take to the ballot box this November, what can we expect from the foreign policy of a Harris administration towards the Indo-Pacific region? Would she prove a “weak” leader – as Beijing’s state-backed news outlet Global Times has insisted – whose presidency is unlikely to pose a threat to China?

Shaky Start

Having carved a niche as the state of California’s top law enforcement official and subsequently its junior senator, Harris stepped into the vice presidency with little foreign policy experience. Her initial foray into US diplomacy began with a stumble: her proposal to work with Central American nations to address the root causes of illegal immigration into the United States was quickly lumped with the related issue of the security of America’s southern border, which she – as in the case of a clumsy interview with the US news outlet NBC News – tried unsuccessfully to avoid. Nor did the initial turmoil among her staff do her reputation any favours.

However, things have markedly improved since those rough beginnings, with seasoned Washington operators like Philip Gordon and Rebecca Lissner being enlisted to advise the vice president on foreign policy and national security matters. According to US congressman Adam Smith, the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, Harris’s performance at this year’s Munich Security Conference making a case for America’s role in Ukraine and NATO indicates that she has been “stress-tested” and found credible.

Staying the Course

Given her inexperience as an international leader, it is highly likely that Harris, as US president, would continue the Biden administration’s foreign policy, at least until such time as she has a firmer grasp on world affairs. Under her leadership, the United States is likely to continue supporting Ukraine and NATO while adopting a firm line against Vladimir Putin and Russia. Given her strong stance against Israel’s handling of the Gaza conflict – which she has referred to as a humanitarian catastrophe for innocent civilians – it is possible that her Israel policy may prove less fixed and intransigent than Biden’s. Indeed, she is on record for having called for a “temporary ceasefire” to the Gaza conflict well before her boss publicly did.

But far as the Indo-Pacific goes, it is unlikely that Harris would stray from extant US policy. As noted, many Chinese seem to think that Harris would prove weaker than Biden in dealing with China. As a US senator, she co-sponsored a bill promoting human rights in Hong Kong and supported another on the rights of Uyghurs in Xinjiang; in both cases, the bills included sanctions against those deemed responsible for human rights abuses.

China

As vice president, Harris has underscored America’s support – “consistent with [the US’s] long-standing policy” – for Taiwan’s self-defence and decried Chinese intimidation and coercion against Philippine vessels in the waters surrounding the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.

In an interview with CBS News last year, Harris advocated a firm stance against China, calling for “de-risking” from Beijing – a policy that aims to reduce the extent to which the US and Western economies depend on China. “It’s not about pulling out [from China], but it is about ensuring that we are protecting American interests, and that we are a leader in terms of the rules of the road, as opposed to following others’ rules”, Harris explained in that interview.

Harris’s remarks on China strongly hint at the influence of Rebecca Lissner, who currently serves as deputy national security adviser to the vice president. In her 2020 book An Open World: How America Can Win the Contest for Twenty-First-Century Order (co-authored with Mira Rapp-Hooper), Lissner argues that China constitutes America’s “chief antagonist” to an open world through Beijing’s determined efforts at forming exclusive territorial and technological blocs. Against such opposition, Lissner advocates a new vision and approach for America, one that allows it to de-risk itself while working with like-minded allies and rebuilding what she considers outmoded international institutions to set rules that ensure and enhance global openness. Lissner is adamant that the United States and the West should not pursue regime change around the world, but counter authoritarian competitors by preventing the rise of closed spheres of influence and preserving open access to the global commons.

Such an openness strategy is also in line with Harris’s criticism of the Trump administration’s inconsequential efforts to engage North Korea and rein in its nuclear ambitions, which do not close Northeast Asia off as much as create undue uncertainty and apprehension in the region. This is not to imply that Lissner’s ideas would form the blueprint for foreign policy under a Harris administration. At the very least, it suggests that Beijing’s hopes of a weak and unfocused America under Harris may be premature, perhaps even unfounded.

ASEAN

Under Harris, the United States is also likely to stay the course taken by Biden in its ties with ASEAN and Southeast Asia, a region hotly contested by both Beijing and Washington. But whether Harris would do better than Biden at reassuring and improving the region’s perceptions of America remains to be seen. According to a 2024 annual survey conducted by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, when asked who they would prefer to align with in the ongoing China-US rivalry, slightly more Southeast Asian respondents reportedly sided with the Chinese (50.5%) than with the Americans (49.5%). That said, a Harris-led America would presumably play the kind of international leadership role ASEAN desires of the United States than a Trump-led one is likely to furnish. While ASEAN leaders would no doubt redouble their efforts to keep a mercurial and capricious Donald Trump happy and engaged (were he to return as US leader), a President Harris is more likely to show up for ASEAN meetings in person – the high-mark of ASEAN summitry success – than a President Trump ever did or would.

Southeast Asians have had a couple of opportunities to see Kamala Harris up close. At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in August 2021, Harris, in her capacity as US vice president, visited Singapore and Vietnam to strengthen her nation’s security partnerships and to expand economic cooperation with two of America’s critical Indo-Pacific partners. Attending the 2023 ASEAN summit held in Jakarta in Biden’s stead, Harris – in her fifth visit to the Southeast Asian region – engaged with leaders of the ASEAN member states as well as Australia, China, Japan and South Korea. Notably, as a senator, Harris was active in legislating against human rights abuses in Myanmar – a concern she has repeatedly raised during her visits to Southeast Asia. Welcomed or otherwise, ASEAN could expect a greater focus on Myanmar from a Harris administration than it ever did from the Biden – and, for that matter, the Trump – administrations.

Conclusion

Should a Harris foreign policy adopt the contours and course of a grand strategy akin to what Lissner has counselled, it would probably surprise no one if China – still designated as America’s chief antagonist – were to resume its age-old accusation against America over the latter’s ostensible “Cold War” fixation with alliances and partnerships aimed at (in Beijing’s view) encircling and counterbalancing China. In this regard, it is unclear whether Harris might tap into her part-Indian heritage – her late mother was from Tamil Nadu – to enlist India (as a member of the Quad) in checking an assertive China: she has come across as ambivalent towards India. All things considered, the prospect of a Harris presidency is not the worst thing that could happen for the Indo-Pacific region.

See Seng Tan is President and CEO of International Students Inc. (ISI) in the United States and concurrently Research Adviser at RSIS and Senior Associate at the Centre for Liberal Arts and Social Sciences (CLASS) at NTU.

See Seng Tan

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In autumn, Ukraine will receive and start using American F-16 multi-role fighters, the training of Ukrainian pilots for them has already begun, confirmed the head of European diplomacy Josep Borrell. Volodymyr Zelensky called the US agreement on the transfer of F-16s to Ukraine a “historic moment”, and US President Joe Biden called it a “colossal risk” for Russia. How can the supply of Western fighters affect the course of hostilities? What advantages does the F-16 have in comparison with Russian attack aircraft and fighters? And what difficulties await the Ukrainian military when using these aircraft? The Russian service of Radio Liberty, together with experts, prepared a review of these aircraft .

What planes will Ukraine get?

The General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon (“Fighting Falcon”) is an American single-engine multirole fighter. If the old Soviet aircraft can perform only one function – a bomber or a fighter, then the F-16 is versatile: it can perform various tasks and carry both air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons. The F-16 is in service with many countries: in 2023, there are about 2,200 active fighters of this type worldwide .

The F-16 was developed back in the late 70s of the last century and since then has been upgraded many times: the aircraft’s engines and airframe design have been changed. This divides the F-16 produced into several main series: the first A / B series (single / two-seat version) was replaced in 1984 by the C / D series, and it was replaced by the E / F series in the late 90s.

At the same time, F-16s are divided into “blocks” – their numbering changed as new technologies were introduced into the aircraft that did not require structural changes. So, the modification of C / D began with block 25, and E / F – with block 60. As new blocks were released, the radar, electronic systems and avionics were improved in the aircraft. The most modern version at the moment is Block 70/72.

Most likely, Ukraine will receive the F-16AM Block 20 MLU , which are in service with Denmark, Belgium, Norway and the Netherlands, experts believe. This version of the F-16 has undergone a deep internal modernization and in almost all characteristics, except for the appearance and radar, corresponds to a more modern modification – the F-16C / D Block 50/52. However, there is one drawback in the previous version: despite the modernization of avionics and the electronic data transmission system, the radars of the Belgian and Danish F-16s remained old.

The F-16 is not a stealth aircraft, but it is less noticeable on enemy radars than the MiG-29, which are now in service with the Ukrainian army. The F-16 is capable of reaching speeds of up to 2,500 kilometers per hour and climbing to a height of 16-17 kilometers, can detect targets at a distance of up to 150 kilometers and track ten objects simultaneously.

Missiles for F-16

F-16s are adapted to carry a wide range of different types of ammunition. Thomas Tainer, an independent military expert and former Italian army soldier, believes that Ukraine will first need air-to-air missiles, not to shoot down Russian warplanes, but to destroy cruise missiles and Iranian kamikaze drones.

According to him, European countries have tens of thousands of such missiles, and if they are transferred to Ukraine, this will save Europe from having to supply Kyiv with additional expensive air defense systems, such as Patriot. For example, these can be American AIM-9 Sidewinder guided missiles and AIM-120 AMRAAM medium-range missiles , designed to destroy air targets beyond line of sight. The former use the thermal silhouette of the target for guidance, the latter use the radar. To be able to shoot down Russian fighters, Ukraine will need the most modern modification of the AIM-120 AMRAAM.

One of the most important tasks for the Ukrainian army is to neutralize enemy air defenses, and some modifications of the F-16 are designed specifically for it, for example, the F-16CM and F-16DM. The main tool for this task, the AGM-88 HARM missiles, were already delivered to Ukraine in 2022 and were adapted for launches from Soviet fighters in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

But a problem arises: the F-16CM and F-16DM were produced quite a bit, only about 300 aircraft. HARM anti-radar missiles can be used with other F-16s, but they are less protected from enemy interference and electronic warfare systems.

In order to shoot down modern Russian fighters, the Ukrainian army needs AIM-120 missiles of modifications C-5 and C-7 with increased noise immunity, an upgraded radar homing head and an increased firing range. The restriction will remain the same – old-style radars, which, most likely, will be on the F-16 fighters transferred to Ukraine.

Military experts are confident that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will not use the F-16 against enemy troops and military facilities located on the ground. For this, Israeli loitering ammunition (“kamikaze drones”) Harpy would be more suitable, but so far there is no talk of transferring them to Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine will be able to launch missiles from the F-16 that are similar in characteristics to the Storm Shadow cruise missiles already received, and in the future, long-range anti-ship missiles LRASM. They cover a distance of up to a thousand kilometers and can become a serious challenge for the Russian Black Sea Fleet, whose ships are bombarding Ukraine with Kalibr cruise missiles.

Airfields, training of pilots and technicians and other challenges for Ukraine

Despite the extensive range of weapons and good performance, some experts doubt the effectiveness of American fighters in Ukraine.

US Senator and Arms Committee member Jack Reid insists that supplying fighter jets to Ukraine is not a priority, as Ukrainian pilots will not be able to use the full potential of American aircraft due to the activity of Russian aviation and air defense systems. “They fly at low altitude, and rise sharply to drop ammunition. The Ukrainians have already lost several pilots this way,” says Reed.

John Hohn and William Courtney , analysts at the RAND research organization, also believe that getting the F-16 into Ukrainian skies will be quite difficult, as it needs a long and smooth runway. And if Ukraine starts to modernize airfields, Russia will know their location, and they will definitely be attacked.

Another problem is the training of pilots and staff. Peter Layton , an employee of Griffith University and a former member of the Australian Air Force, notes that it is possible to train Ukrainian pilots to fly the F-16 in three months – after that the pilots will be able to take off, stay in the air and land. But it takes a long time to learn how to effectively use a wide range of Western weapons and strike ground targets at low altitudes and in conditions of poor visibility. An unnamed F-16 pilot told CNN that training in all the intricacies of combat on this fighter could take years.

While it is theoretically possible to train pilots in three months, it will take significantly longer to train technicians, according to a recent report by the US Congressional Research Service. F-16 personnel training is conducted in English (so only military personnel with a good knowledge of English can pass it) and takes up to 133 days. But it takes at least a year to become a truly qualified specialist.

The F-16 is quite whimsical in terms of maintenance: for one flight hour there are 16 hours of maintenance with all the necessary equipment and well-organized logistics.

Another significant problem is the cost of armament, which makes the F-16 truly effective. The price of one AIM-120 missile, for example, is more than a million dollars, and the time from the conclusion of the contract to the delivery of the finished product is two years. The report notes that the US can provide AIM-120 from its own stocks, but this imposes certain risks in the event of a direct US conflict with another state.

“As there will be no more in Mariupol”

Ukraine needs F-16s primarily so that its Air Force, in principle, can still take to the air – otherwise, when spare parts for Soviet fighters run out, they will be chained to the ground, Ukrainian experts say.

Even in the basic version, the F-16 will be a huge help in the fight against Russian cruise missiles and Iranian Shahed, Thomas Tyner is sure. “The Russian Aerospace Forces freely dropped dozens of powerful air bombs on Azovstal in Mariupol, because the Ukrainian Air Force and air defense systems were concentrated far away from there,” he says. “Finally, when Ukraine receives a sufficient number of trained pilots, in the future they will be able to quickly teach to fly on more modern versions of the F-16, which are superior in performance to any aircraft that Russia has.”

Source: Current Time

The post F-16 For Ukraine: Advantages and Disadvantages of American Aircraft and Why It May be Difficult for Kyiv to Use Them appeared first on Tashkent Citizen.