Russia’s new 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, the first since 2016, has come into immediate effect. The document updates the priorities, goals, and objectives of the foreign policy activities of Russia and is an important read into the overall national development and other strategies.
In this article, we outline the background and implications for Russia’s relations with Central Asia. Part of this text has been extracted from analysis given by Evgeny Korenev, of the Institute of Actual International Problems of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry.
Overview
Russia’s Central Asian policy is not one way traffic. The development of mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia is also noted as the main priority of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted on April 11 this year.
That said, Moscow also intends to pay more attention to its allies, in accordance with the recently updated Foreign Policy Concept. At the same time, Russia is not going to impose the development path on other countries or interfere in their internal affairs. On the contrary, it will work to prevent attempts at colour revolutions and other outside interference in the affairs of the region. What significance these and other provisions of the Concept will play for the development of cooperation between Russia and Central Asia,
In late March 2023, a new Foreign Policy Concept of Russia was approved by decree of Russian President Putin. Against the backdrop of a serious degradation of relations with the West, the document places special emphasis on the development of Eurasian integration. There is also attention about a Russian pivot to the East. The idea enshrined in the Concept deals with the need to build a Greater Eurasian integration space, and significantly increases the geopolitical significance of the Central Asian region.
Despite the fact that the region is mentioned in the text only once and is not designated in the Concept as a separate regional direction of the foreign policy of Russia, several provisions of the document, to one degree or another, relate to Central Asia. Here, we concentrate on the trade aspect.
The Greater Eurasian Partnership
Much attention in the Concept is paid to Russia’s turn to the East and the formation of a broad integration contour: the Greater Eurasian Partnership. To achieve the greatest effect, it is planned to combine the potential of all Eurasian states and the most important regional structures of Eurasia, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and ASEAN, to interface the development plans of the EAEU and China’s Belt & Road Initiative.
The Eurasian Economic Union includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. This is a free trade area with additional agreements with Iran, Serbia and Vietnam with others pending negotiation.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation includes eight member States (China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), four Observer States interested in acceding to full membership (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia) and six “Dialogue Partners” (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Turkiye). In 2021, the decision was made to start the accession process of Iran to the SCO as a full member, while Egypt, Qatar, as well as Saudi Arabia, became dialogue partners. Proposed new dialogue partners include Bahrain, the Maldives, Myanmar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. The SCO is a Eurasian grouping tasks with regional security, trade and related connectivity issues and includes the United Nations as an Observer.
ASEAN includes the southeast Asian nations of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam and is a Free Trade bloc. It has additional agreements with much of East Asia including FTA with China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Japan.
Part of the Greater Eurasian Partnership is planned to integrate, in part, with the EAEU, using the economic potential of the bloc including cooperation with those countries that are not currently included in it, such as Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Therefore, in the Central Asian space, one can expect an intensification of interaction between Russia not only with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but also with other countries of the region.
In general, in its Concept, Moscow seeks to view the integration processes in the Eurasian space as multidimensional, involving completely different, including new, formats of multilateral relations between Russia and the states of the Central Asian region. This means launching on a permanent basis the Russia-Central Asia summit at Heads of State level, the first meeting of which was held in October 2022 in Astana. Russia, which has natural regional advantages, has not previously used such mechanisms. Now, the Concept plan has introduced a more institutionalized approach.
Connectivity
Central Asia is very important in terms of implementing large-scale projects in the transport and logistics sector in the Eurasian space.
The Concept refers to the need to improve the infrastructure of the International North-South Transport Corridor (India-Iran-Russia) and the Middle Corridor (China-Central Asia-Europe) A significant part of this route, about 2,800km passes through Kazakhstan.
This significantly increases the importance of the country as one of the largest Eurasian transit centres. In addition, one of the most important tasks outlined in the document is to strengthen cooperation in the Caspian Sea zone, which requires the intensification of Russia’s relations with Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.
Focus East, Not West
The publication of the new Russian Foreign Policy Concept marks the end of a certain stage in a protracted revision of traditional foreign policy guidelines, many of which have remained unchanged since the 1990s. Now Moscow is placing its main focus in Eurasian geopolitics, and not towards the West. In these circumstances, the relations of Russia with the states of Central Asia in the field of security and economy will play an extremely important role.
By building constructive and full-scale interaction with partners and allies in Central Asia, Russia can gain an advantage in shaping its vision of a large Eurasian integration project. In order not to miss the initiative, it is necessary to start implementing those ambitious provisions that are enshrined in the new version of the Foreign Policy Concept of Russia.
Further analysis of Russia’s relations with the impacted Eurasian countries can be viewed here:
- Iran
- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Turkmenistan
- Uzbekistan
- The Eurasian Economic Union
- ASEAN
- Merging the EAEU, CIS, SCO and BRICS
Summary
Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept is highly focused on Central Asia and a new commitment in turns of institutionalizing this along with Eurasia has been made. This is multi-formatted, with the Russia-Central Asian annual Heads of State summit and of course the even wider Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s reach.
There also appears a longer-term strategy to introduce the Eurasian Economic Unions’ Free Trade capabilities to a wider group, including members of the SCO. Iran has a FTA with the EAEU, while India is close to finalizing one.
Not mentioned specifically in the context of Central Asia, but certainly implied elsewhere in the Concept is the developing BRICS and BRICS plus and their potential evolution into a larger Free Trade Area. Bangladesh, Egypt, and the UAE have all recently joined as de facto members. Another 13 countries are discussing this.
Other signs that Russia intends to improve its international trade and investment connectivity lie with the Russian Foreign and Trade Ministers embarking on a flurry of activity in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Latin America. We understand that part of these visits has included the updates of Russia’s Bilateral Investment Treaties with countries within these regions, a sure sign that Moscow intends to increase and facilitate mutual trade and investment with countries on a worldwide basis.
If so, what will eventually emerge will be rather more than a Greater Eurasian Partnership, it will be a huge, increasingly integrated global phenomena. Central Asia however will be close to the beating heart of this, and Moscow will keep its other organs close.
Source : Rusia Briefing
