“The ongoing persecution and human rights violations against the Pamiri minority in Tajikistan reached an alarming scale years ago. But there is almost no one to ring the alarm bell. The Tajikistani authorities stifle virtually all information from the region, while the international community has largely overlooked this serious human rights crisis. It demands immediate attention and action from the international community to safeguard the rights and dignity of the Pamiri people,” said Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 

The ongoing persecution and human rights violations against the Pamiri minority in Tajikistan reached an alarming scale years ago. But there is almost no one to ring the alarm bell

Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia

Tajikistan: Reprisals against Pamiri minority, suppression of local identity, clampdown on all dissent highlights the violations of economic, social and cultural rights resulting from: the crackdown on Pamiri languages, cultural practices, and identities; the heavy presence of security forces from other regions of Tajikistan; violent repression of protest and widespread arbitrary detention; and socioeconomic marginalization faced by the Pamiri Ismaili community in Gorno-Badakhshan. 

Discrimination and securitization 

The central authorities have promoted a culture of prejudice against Pamiris. A state-sponsored narrative depicts them negatively, particularly Ismailis, leading to widespread discrimination. This policy manifests in repressive practices, including suppressing the use of Pamiri languages in media, education, and public life, excluding Pamiris from influential positions within the state administration and security apparatus, and extortion and destruction of local employment opportunities and Pamiri businesses. 

The heavy presence of security forces from other parts of Tajikistan reflects the authorities’ contempt for the Gorno-Badakhshan population. “The word ‘Pamiri’ [for the security forces] means […] separatist, oppositionist, main enemy,” said one of the interviewees. 

The presence of security agencies, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the State Committee for National Security (SCNS), has significantly increased in GBAO. Security forces have set up armed cordons on roads and in city squares, including the capital city of GBAO, Khorugh, patrolled by heavily armed police and military. “The security forces in Khorugh behave like wolves looking after sheep. ‘You should not walk like this; you should not laugh!’” said one of the interviewees. 

Security operations in GBAO include surveillance, intimidation, and the excessive use of force — often justified as combating terrorism and organized crime — accompanied by arbitrary arrests and prosecutions of local informal leaders and ordinary Pamiris, despite a lack of credible evidence.  

“The heavy-handed securitization in Gorno-Badakhshan is beyond any scrutiny. The local population is perceived as hostile by the central government, and people are harassed and discriminated against on a daily basis,” said Marie Struthers. 

The heavy-handed securitization in Gorno-Badakhshan is beyond any scrutiny. The local population is perceived as hostile by the central government, and people are harassed and discriminated against on a daily basis

Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia

2021-2022 crackdown and its aftermath 

Mounting tensions erupted after the killing of prominent Pamiri figure Gulbiddin Ziyobekov in November 2021. Officially described as the result of a shootout with law enforcement, evidence points to an unlawful killing of an unarmed man, which may amount to an extrajudicial execution. In response to a four-day protest in Khorugh, security forces used firearms against a crowd that had been peaceful until that point, killing two protesters and allegedly injuring around a dozen.  

“We escorted the women away […] to a safer location. At that time, a bullet hit me. They were shooting from the entrance of the building, wearing uniforms. Some of them were standing directly in the entrance, some of them were on the second or third floor,” said one protester, describing the indiscriminate use of lethal force by law enforcement officials. 

After false promises to effectively investigate, the authorities instead persecuted informal community leaders, harassed civil society, and intimidated and prosecuted ordinary Pamiris.  

A second outbreak of violence occurred in May 2022 when authorities violently dispersed peaceful protests in Khorugh and Rushan, resulting in the deaths of dozens of Pamiris, including informal leader Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov, shot by unidentified gunmen in a pickup — a likely extrajudicial execution. According to independent reports, 24 civilians died, some during the crackdown and some in alleged retaliatory unlawful killings.  

A subsequent crackdown on civil society followed with the arbitrary detention of more than 200 human rights defenders, dissenters, and influential figures such as journalist and activist Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva and lawyers Faromuz Irgashev and Manuchehr Kholiknazarov. In December 2023, they received 21, 29 and 15-year sentences respectively, in secret trials, with the details of the charges made public only six months later.  

Arbitrary detentions and torture 

The Tajikistani authorities routinely arbitrarily detain, allegedly torture, and engage in other ill-treatment of Pamiris, with reports of coerced confessions and fabricated charges of crimes against “public safety,” “fundamentals of the constitutional order” or “order of administration.” Legal proceedings lack transparency and due process, with many trials lasting only a few days. During the 2021-2022 crackdown, reports of torture and other ill-treatment were common.  

One of the detainees in the aftermath of the May 2022 protests said he was deprived of sleep for two days, beaten with fists and batons and hit on the head with a thick book. 

“When they asked and I did not answer, they wrapped wet tissues around my fingers, then [fixed it with] tape. They put clips and switched something on. The [electric] current was strong. They did it with different fingers. They did it twice every day, four times in all,” he said. 

The international community must urgently raise concerns about the human rights violations faced by Pamiris with the Tajikistani authorities

Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia

“After the 2021-2022 protests in Gorno-Badakhshan, the systemic discrimination against the Pamiri community has become ever more entrenched, resulting in fear, harassment and violation of human rights. The international community must urgently raise concerns about the human rights violations faced by Pamiris with the Tajikistani authorities, in all possible fora not the least international fora, stand in solidarity with the Pamiri people, give protection to those who seek it abroad, and take decisive action to oppose this vicious system in Tajikistan,” said Marie Struthers. 

Source

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The new dress code — the second of its kind in six years — is expected to be made public in the coming days, and a special event is reportedly being planned for the capital, Dushanbe, in August to showcase compliant clothes.

Sulaimon Davlatzoda, the head of the state Committee for Religious Affairs and the Regulation of Traditions, told a press briefing in the capital this week that “a joint task force of the Culture Ministry, the Women’s Committee, and the Religious Affairs Committee is working together to determine what clothes are most compatible with our national values and traditions.”

The new dress code comes after Tajikistan officially issued a ban in June on “clothes alien to Tajik culture,” a term widely used by officials to describe Islamic dress, which they treat as an outward sign of potential religious extremism.

Earlier this week, the Central Asian country’s state-backed Islamic Council of Ulema issued a fatwa — a religious edict — against “black clothes” as well as “tight-fitting and see-through” garments for women. In Tajikistan, the term “black clothes” tends to be a euphemism for the Islamic hijab.

The July 26 fatwa proclaimed that the color of black is not compatible with “our national and geographical characteristics.”

Echoing the government’s long-standing position on female clothing, the fatwa also promoted a national costume for Tajik women, which consists of a dress, trousers, and a kerchief.

The fatwa explained that the three-piece was fully in line with the Islamic practice mandating a woman cover her entire body, with the exception of her face, hands, and feet.

‘We Got The Message’

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, who has been in power for more than 30 years, has been criticized by rights groups for clamping down on independent media, political pluralism, and also religious freedom. Religious beliefs and practices that deviate from the state-mandated norm are often seen by the authorities as a threat to Tajikistan’s stability and security.

Tajiks, especially those who wear the hijab, say they believe that the June hijab ban, the latest fatwa, and the upcoming guidelines on women’s clothing are a “needless, excessive step.”

“Black was already banned,” said Munisa, a nurse in a state hospital in a northern city who didn’t want to give her full name. She was referring to the state Religious Committee’s 2017 statement that prohibited wearing black at funerals.

Instead, the statement urged Tajik women to stick to the local tradition of wearing blue to mourn their dead.

“Nothing is new about the hijab ban, either. It’s been [effectively] in place for a decade at least,” Munisa said.

“We got the message already. There’s no need to keep repeating it, with new laws,” the 40-year-old nurse said.

Like many Tajiks, Munisa dismisses the fatwa against tight and see-through dresses as a smokescreen, saying the real target is Islamic dress, which the government considers “alien” and a threat to the secular government. For example, previous bans on miniskirts and plunging necklines have never been enforced.

In predominantly Muslim Tajikistan, a country of nearly 10 million people, the authorities’ campaign against the Islamic head scarf began in 2007 when the Education Ministry prohibited the hijab — and miniskirts — at schools and universities.

The ban eventually expanded to workplaces, and officials and police conducted raids to ensure its compliance.

Many hijab-wearing women faced a tough choice between their religious and cultural beliefs and their careers. Some quit their jobs or studies, while others — like Munisa — swapped their Islamic head scarf for the traditional kerchief.

Tajik men have also fallen afoul of government edicts in the past, with the authorities seeing them as suspect because of their long or bushy beards.

In 2015, a regional police chief in the southern Khatlon Province announced that nearly 13,000 men “with long and unkempt beards” were rounded up in the streets and bazaars over the course of the year and had their beards “brought to order.”

A high-ranking government official warned Tajik bloggers in 2023 that promoting beards might be interpreted as “an expression of solidarity with terrorist groups” and presents “a threat to national security.”

In 2018, the Culture Ministry published The Guidebook To Recommended Outfits In Tajikistan, which outlines acceptable designs, colors, and fabrics for clothing.

While the guidebook encouraged women to wear the Tajik national three-piece costume, for the office it suggested that they wear Western-style clothes, albeit with more modest necklines and hemlines.

It is not clear if the upcoming dress code will supersede the previous guideline.

New Crackdown

Some Dushanbe residents have complained that the recent official ban on “alien” clothes has prompted the authorities to crack down.

In Dushanbe, a group of hijab-wearing women were rounded up on May 22 by law enforcement officers and representatives of the local women’s affairs office and taken to the police station.

One of the women later told RFE/RL’s Tajik Service that their fingerprints and mugshots were taken and they were made to promise not to wear “alien” clothes ever again, before being released the same day.

On May 23, police in the capital’s Shohmansur district briefly detained 13 men with bushy beards and demanded that they shave. Police warned them they “will be arrested if caught again with long beards,” one of the men told RFE/RL.

Source

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Negotiations will begin for both countries on Tuesday in Luxembourg, the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European Union said on X.

The move comes at a critical time for both nations with Ukraine in the middle of an invasion by Russia and Moldova facing a Russian-led insurgence by a breakaway state.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky thanked the European Union for its “robust political will” to begin negotiations with his country despite the current Russian aggression.

“We look forward to next week,” Zelensky said on X. “We congratulate our Moldova friends on this significant step toward our shared European future. We will make the EU stronger together. I am grateful to everyone on our team who worked hard to make this historic step a reality.

“Millions of Ukrainians and indeed generations of our people are realizing their European dream. Ukraine is returning to Europe, where it has belonged for centuries, as a full-fledged member of the European community.”

Moldova President Maia Sandu confirmed on social media that she also signed a decree allowing accession negotiations with the European Union to move forward.

“Becoming an EU member is our path to peace, prosperity and a better life for all citizens,” Sandu said on X. “Wishing our delegation every success as they officially launch negotiations in Luxembourg next week.”

The European Union announced earlier this month that Moldova and Ukraine both met the requirements to join the group. All 27 countries must agree to allow them in. Hungary and its President Viktor Orban are expected to be the main roadblock for both countries.

Orban, who has maintained a close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, had criticized Ukraine for its past corruption.

Source : UPI

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According to the Tajik MFA information department, the parties discussed the prospects for the expansion of cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and Italy in the political, economic, trade, water and energy, environmental protection, transport, tourism and educational sectors.

They reportedly also exchanged views on a number of regional and international issues being of mutual interest, including current threats and challenges, the situation in Afghanistan and the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy says Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister also Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Antonio Tajani welcomed the Foreign Ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to Villa Madama in Rome on March 29 for the 3rd Italy-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting.

“Italy views with great interest the opportunities presented to Italian companies in Central Asia: establishing a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries and strengthening economic and industrial cooperation in the fields of water resources, the environment, and higher education is a priority. For this reason, over 30 of the most important Italian companies and trade associations will attend today’s meeting,” commented Mr. Antonio Tajani

The Italian Government has reportedly promoted the intensification of relations with countries in the region, as demonstrated by the business forums organized with Uzbekistan (in June 2023), Kazakhstan (in January this year) and Tajikistan (last April).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy says these initiatives are in line with the growth diplomacy action carried out by the Ministry and its diplomatic network on the initiative of Minister Tajani.  Business activities with other states in the region are currently being planned. Particular attention is being paid to regional projects in the fields of infrastructure, agriculture, machinery and energy involving all the countries of Central Asia.

Meanwhile, the Tajik MFA information department says that day prior to this meeting, Tajik representatives participated in separate thematic sessions were held on issues of water and energy, transport and education.

Source: Asia Plus

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Xi’s strategy is as meticulous as it is bold. He has purged opposition within his ranks, securing a loyal cadre committed to his vision of Chinese supremacy on the world stage. His deft handling of relationships with giants like the US, India, Japan, and Russia has redefined traditional alliances and rivalries. For those watching, there’s a palpable sense of urgency – a recognition that we are witnessing the dawn of a new global order where China’s influence is inescapable and undeniable.

Meanwhile, the stage is set in India for a political showdown as the Lok Sabha Elections close. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is poised to secure a third consecutive term with his charisma (for his critics – an engineered charisma) and steadfast leadership. Despite murmurs of an upset from the Opposition Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), Modi’s decade-long tenure has undeniably transformed India into a formidable force on the global stage despite growing dissent, frustrations, and inequality in the constituency. 

Under his watch, India’s economy has flourished and its population of 1.5 billion stands as its greatest asset, driving innovation and growth. As the election results loom, the world watches closely, recognising that India’s trajectory under Modi’s continued leadership could redefine the balance of power in Asia and beyond.

China and India hold the key to unlocking the full potential of Asia, bearing the hopes and aspirations of 4.5 billion people in the region. This is undeniably Asia’s century, a period marked by rapid growth, technological innovation, and unprecedented influence on the global stage. As China leverages its economic clout and India capitalises on its vast human resources, both nations are poised to lead Asia into a new era of prosperity and power. The world can no longer deny these two giants’ pivotal role in shaping Asia’s future and the world. 

Anti-Modi narratives

Focusing on the Indian elections, many predicted an easy victory for Modi, yet doubt crept in during the campaign trail with various narratives at play. A section of Western media and their proxies crafted stories forecasting Modi’s downfall, challenging his bid for a third consecutive term. 

Historically, Western media narratives have often been critical of Asia’s rise and this election cycle was no different. For decades, one of Asia’s finest, Lee Kuan Yew, showcased the hypocrisy of Western media with one-sided narratives and it was the turn of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to turn the heat on the Western press this time.

Hundreds of op-eds and articles from around the globe were critical of Premier Narendra Modi, and the BJP mushroomed during the campaign trail. Some projected Modi as a face and Home Minister Amit Shah as everything else. It would have been a tremendous and balanced story if they had also mentioned the Bush-Cheney and Blair-Mandelson combinations without projecting only in Asia, as these things occur. Politics is universal; no one has a monopoly on the power play.

However, dissent is reasonable as it allows you to recreate your narrative compellingly, if necessary; otherwise some of it can be ignored. Premier Modi and the Opposition leaders, such as Rahul and Priyanka Gandhi and Arvind Kejriwal, all faced cyberbullying and hate from millions of social media critics. 

Dhruv Rathee, a young Indian YouTuber with 20.8 million subscribers, was adored by the anti-Modi section and hated by the Modi lovers. On average, his videos had 15 million views; some reaching 25 million views based on controversial subjects. Some of my colleagues who held independent or anti-Modi sentiments wanted to end Modi rule. Some were fearless and some were fearful. Young Rathee has shown the price of being daring, taking on a “tyrant,” as he narrated. Some enjoy money, some want fame, and some want power. Some want all three.

In our digital age, anti-Modi sentiments were widely disseminated and consumed. However, the impact on India’s 960 million voters will only become apparent in a few days as the world watches to see if these narratives swayed the electorate.

Modi and BJP campaign

The Modi and BJP campaign was bolstered by a decade of tangible successes, earning credibility despite facing numerous challenges and frustrations. Modi was presented as the definitive leader, synonymous with India’s recent economic strides and global presence. 

In contrast, the Opposition’s campaign lacked a singular anchor, relying instead on a collective team effort. Going up against a worldwide brand like Modi, with his track record of economic achievements, demanded a monumental and unified Opposition strategy. As election results loom, the question remains whether this collective effort was enough to challenge the incumbency and sway the electorate.

Modi projected himself as a divine gift to rejuvenate India and secure its rightful place on the global stage. This ‘messiah’ narrative is a familiar trope in political communications, evoking a sense of destiny and inevitability. 

The Opposition needed another charismatic leader or a robust alternative policy, action plan, and narrative to counter such an influential figure. However, Rahul and Priyanka Gandhi, the latest torchbearers of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, were criticised for their lack of imagination and coherence in their campaign. As a result, their efforts struggled to gain traction against Modi’s well-crafted persona and proven track record. 

It is seldom that a leader can blow his own trumpet. You need your allies to project how great you are. However, Modi said he was a godsend and gifted and his team said he was a godsend and gifted. It was missing in the Rahul and Priyanka duo. INDIA leaders like Kumar, Banerjee, Kejriwal, Yadav, Stalin, and Pawar seldom backed an anchor in cohesion. It’s understandable; all the above political brands are too big to sing hosanna for someone else. The fragile egos, personal interests, and political empires do not allow you to be united. Even in sports, all-star teams end up faring poorly. 

Modi, the saviour

Modi’s projection of himself as India’s saviour draws parallels to historical figures like Ashoka, Napoleon, and Alexander the Great, who also cast themselves as divinely-ordained leaders. After his transformative embrace of Buddhism, Ashoka positioned himself as a benevolent ruler destined to bring peace and prosperity to South Asia. Similarly, Napoleon portrayed himself as bringing order and reform to post-revolutionary France. At the same time, Alexander the Great saw himself as a destined conqueror, spreading Greek culture across the known world. 

In the book ‘Discovery of India’ (written in 1946), the great Jawaharlal Nehru (first Prime Minister of India from 1947 to 1964) writes: “Often, as I wandered from meeting to meeting, I spoke to my audience of this India of ours, of Hindustan and of Bharata, the old Sanskrit name derived from the mythical founder of the race. I seldom did so in the cities, for their audiences were more sophisticated and wanted strong fare. But to the peasant, with his limited outlook, I spoke of this great country for whose freedom we were struggling, of how each part differed from the other and yet was India, of common problems of the peasants from north to south and east to west, of the swaraj that only could be for all and every part and not for some. 

“I told them about journeying from the Khyber Pass in the far northwest to Kanyakumari or Cape Comorin in the distant south and how everywhere the peasants put me identical questions, for their troubles were the same – poverty, debt, vested interests, landlords, moneylenders, heavy rents and taxes, police harassment, and all these wrapped up in the structure that the foreign government had imposed upon us – and relief must also come for all. 

“I tried to make them think of India as a whole and even to some little extent of this wide world of which we were a part. I brought in the struggle in China, Spain, Abyssinia, Central Europe, Egypt, and the countries of Western Asia. I told them of the wonderful changes in the Soviet Union and the great progress made in America. The task was not easy, yet it was not so difficult as I had imagined, for our ancient epics, myths, and legends, which they knew so well, had made them familiar with the conception of their country. Some there were always who had travelled far and wide to the great places of pilgrimage, situated at the four corners of India.”

I quote him again: “Sometimes I reached a gathering, a great roar of welcome would greet me. ‘Bharat Mata Ki Jai’ – ‘Victory to Mother India’. I would ask them unexpectedly what they meant by that cry: who was this ‘Bharat Mata,’ Mother India, whose victory they wanted? My question would amuse them and surprise them, and then, not knowing exactly what to answer, they would look at each other and me. I persisted in my questioning. At last, a vigorous Jat, wedded to the soil from immemorial generations, would say it was the ‘dharti,’ the good earth of India, that they meant. What earth? Their particular village patch, or all the patches in the district or province, or in the whole of India? And so question and answer went on till they would ask me impatiently to tell them all about it. 

“I would endeavour to do so and explain that India was all this that they had thought, but it was much more. The mountains and the rivers of India, and the forests and the broad fields, which gave us food, were all dear to us, but what counted ultimately were the people of India, people like them and me, who were speared out all over this vast land. ‘Bharat Mata,’ Mother India, was essentially these millions of people, and victory to her meant victory to these people. You are parts of this ‘Bharat Mata,’ I told them, you are in a manner to yourselves ‘Bharat Mata,’ and as this idea slowly soaked into their brains, their eyes would light up as if they had made an extraordinary discovery.”

Rahul and Priyanka, the great-grandchildren of the great Jawaharlal Nehru, were leading the anti-Modi campaign. The above paragraph could have been their campaign narrative, but it was Modi’s campaign line for the last 10 years – and for the next five years, if he succeeds in securing a third successive term on 4 June. 

Religio-political wars

‘Bharat Mata’ was the underlying campaign theme for Modi 3.0, which took Nehru’s ‘Bharat Mata’ concept to a different level. Nehru was widely regarded for his stand for secular India but there are severe questions and critics of Modi’s path for India – weaponising Hinduism for political power. In India, approximately 80% of the population by religion are Hindus and 14% are believers of Islam as per the 2011 census. As per census reports, a 1951 to 2011 comparison shows a 5% reduction of Hindus and in the same period a 45% growth of believers of Islam. 

The religious political wars have become the norm again; even the rise of Muslim political leadership in the United Kingdom has been the talk of the town recently, with Sadiq Khan holding onto the Mayorship of London since 2016. In Indonesia, vote bank politics are shaping up, with Islam as a shield; in Russia, the orthodox church plays a role in politics; and in the US, Christian nationalism is on the rise. 

Unfortunately, over centuries, humankind has been divided by religion. Instead, can religion unite people? Can a rejuvenated Bharat show the way for tolerance, diversity, and harmony to the world? 

In the last 30 years, India rebranded its main cities from colonial names to national names. Today, Bombay is Mumbai, Calcutta is Kolkata, Madras is Chennai, Bangalore is Bengaluru, Poona is Pune, and Banaras is Varanasi. If Modi succeeds in securing his third successive term on 4 June, will we see Bharat instead of India? Bharat will be Modi’s Ashoka moment. If that occurs, this will be one of the most significant brand changes in humanity’s history.

Xi and the ‘Chinese dream’

Like Modi, Xi crafted a narrative positioning himself as the chosen one, uniquely destined to lead China into a new era of greatness. Xi didn’t rely solely on revolutionary or economic credentials like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping. Instead, he blended these legacies, portraying himself as the leader who could fulfil China’s historic rejuvenation mission.

Just as Ashoka, Napoleon, and Alexander the Great used the mantle of destiny to consolidate their power, Xi presented himself as the harbinger of a ‘Chinese dream’ – a vision of national renewal and global prominence. Through sweeping reforms, an assertive foreign policy, and strategic purges within his party, Xi solidified his position, projecting an image of stability and certainty.

These modern leaders harnessed historical narratives of messianic leadership in China and India, crafting personas destined to elevate their nations. Modi and Xi’s stories underscore a timeless political truth: when a leader casts themselves as a divinely favoured saviour, it becomes a formidable task for any opposition to mount a practical challenge without an equally compelling vision or figurehead. As a result, their nations stand at the forefront of Asia’s rise, shaping the region’s destiny in profound and lasting ways.

Enter Arvind Kejriwal

In China, the one-party rule under Xi ensures a controlled political landscape. However, in India’s vibrant democracy, winning a third successive term is an uphill battle for any leader. Modi’s stature and the BJP’s well-oiled political machinery present formidable challenges. Yet, amidst this daunting scenario, INDIA began to find momentum in the middle of the campaign. 

Emerging against all odds, this coalition started to resonate with voters, presenting a united front capable of challenging Modi’s dominance. Its late surge introduced an element of unpredictability, with many fearing an upset. The alliance’s ability to galvanise support and craft a compelling narrative in the final stages underscored the dynamic and resilient nature of Indian democracy, where even the most entrenched leaders can face significant challenges.

Not many would agree with me, but the Arvind Kejriwal fiasco and his subsequent jail term significantly disrupted INDIA’s momentum. Suddenly, amid a carefully orchestrated campaign, the focus shifted entirely to Kejriwal. This unplanned and unwarranted incident highlights how fragile political campaigns can be. 

In the high-stakes arena of political campaigning, unexpected events can swiftly derail even the most well-planned strategies. INDIA, which had begun to find its footing and generate genuine enthusiasm, was blindsided by the controversy surrounding Kejriwal. Instead of pushing forward with its collective message, it was forced into a defensive position, grappling with damage control and standing for Kejriwal.

Power struggle on the cards

If Kejriwal survives his legal battles and Modi secures another victory, the political arena is set for a dramatic power struggle. Kejriwal, driven by boundless ambition and armed with a reputation for grassroots activism, could challenge the leadership of Rahul and Priyanka Gandhi within the Opposition. His relentless focus on anti-corruption (but he is booked for corruption now) and governance reforms resonates strongly with urban middle-class and disenfranchised voters, positioning him as a compelling alternative to Modi. 

This rise would inevitably clash with the Gandhis, who have long been the faces of the Congress Party and national politics. As Kejriwal’s influence grows, a fierce battle for dominance within the Opposition is likely to unfold, with his soaring ambitions threatening to overshadow the traditional leadership of the Gandhis. This internal struggle could redefine the dynamics of Indian politics, with both sides vying for the mantle of a chief challenger to Modi’s BJP.

‘Messiah’ narrative

The ‘messiah’ narrative is not confined to Asia. Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency in 2017 was a masterclass in creating a narrative more significant than life itself. With his ‘Make America Great Again’ slogan, he cast himself as the saviour of a nation that, in his telling, had lost its way. This powerful, emotionally-charged message resonated deeply with many Americans who felt left behind by the political establishment.

Trump’s unconventional, often irrational approach allowed him to dominate the news cycle and overshadow his opponent, Hillary Clinton. While Clinton campaigned on experience and policy, Trump ran circles around her with his relentless energy and brash rhetoric. His ability to tap into the fears and hopes of voters, combined with a relentless focus on his narrative of national rejuvenation, ultimately won him the day. Despite his unpredictability and contentious style, Trump’s message struck a chord, propelling him to a victory that defied conventional political logic. 

Trump vs. Biden in 2024 will be a great watch. The US needs a strongman at the negotiation table with Xi, Modi, and Putin. If the former President runs, he will inevitably invoke ‘Make America Great Again’ with more vigour than in 2016. The US is not Reagan’s US anymore. It’s easier to talk about the inner core desires of Americans for pride. The pride they grew up with is slowly vanishing by the day.

Politics makes strange bedfellows. It’s not for the faint-hearted. It’s a blood sport. It’s all about the art of possibility. It’s about capturing power and, most importantly, sustaining power. The below from ‘The Panchatantra’ sums up the world: ‘All things in the world live off one another, using many different strategies to do so, some peaceful, others not so peaceful. Think.’

Rulers live off their lands,

Physicians off the sick,

Merchants live off the consumers, 

They learned from fools;

Thieves live off the unwary,

Almsmen off householders;

Harlots off pleasure seekers,

And workers of the whole world.

Snares of many sorts are carefully set;

Day and night, they lie in wait, watchful,

Surviving by sheer strength – fish eating fish. 

Fish eating fish — for survival. Once in power, you would not want to leave. Politics is a microcosm of human life. ‘Messiahs’ are not immortal and there is a downside. The sustainability of the narrative depends on not only the leader’s code of conduct but also his followers and the machinery. 

In the midst of this, Asia is rising. There is hope for the world.

By Saliya Weerakoon

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The four suspected gunmen under arrest are all citizens of Tajikistan, a central Asian nation that was once part of the Soviet Union. Following the Crocus City attack, Russian police started rounding up and deporting workers who are originally from Tajikistan, as well as from Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

The attack, which Russia has blamed on Ukraine, also sparked massive police raids, document checks of migrants as well as harassment towards central Asian immigrants . There are an estimated 10 million labour migrants from central Asia living in Russia, according to the Russian interior ministry. Central Asian migrants have seen Russia’s recent labour shortages, the result of of conscription and the Ukraine war, as an opportunity to find work.

What might change?

Russia’s war in Ukraine has also been an opportunity for these republics to choose a more independent political path, while Vladimir Putin’s attention was elsewhere. A complete break with Russia is unlikely due to geographical proximity and intertwined economies. But there have been some signs that central Asian nations are interested in making their own political decisions without constantly checking with Russia.

One was the refusal of Kazakhstan’s president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in June 2022 to recognise Russia’s annexation of the partially occupied Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk into the Russian Federation. Tokayev also said that Kazakhstan had no intention of helping Russia to circumvent western economic sanctions. The region also did not support Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008. But central Asia republics were more reluctant to condemn the annexation of Crimea in 2014, taking a more neutral position. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine the region has been looking for opportunities to build its relationships with other nations without upsetting Russia.

Leaders of central Asian republics have also shown their disapproval of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in more subtle ways. Most of them, except Turkmenistan, opened their borders to accept thousands of Russian citizens looking for refuge and to escape conscription. This did not go unnoticed in Moscow, where measures to reverse immigration were introduced.

Meanwhile, at home these regional leaders find fewer people who speak Russian and are interested in Russian culture. Polls indicate that many people in central Asia (49% in Kyrgyzstan, 43% in Kazakhstan) blame their current economic problems on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. There have been anti-war protests in Kazakhstan and some entertainment venues are refusing to host Russian stars. Central Asian media outlets have been blocked in Russia for trying to cover the war in Ukraine objectively.

However, at the United Nations general assembly, these states either abstain from voting to condemn Russia’s war in Ukraine or vote with Russia on resolutions, including one on violations of human rights in Crimea.

Historically, Moscow sees its role in the region as a security guarantor, and as a founding member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) which aims to ensure peace and stability in the region. Russian paratroopers arrived in Kazakhstan after Tokayev had requested assistance from the CSTO with the protests that broke out in January 2022. The unprecedented unrest, known as Bloody January, started peacefully but quickly turned violent.

People took to the streets to protest a sharp increase in fuel prices, clashing with police and looting and attacking government property.

Despite the apparent need to restore order, the Kazakh public was disgruntled by such a blatant intervention in the country’s internal affairs. There was a general air of relief when Russian troops left.

Overall, central Asia is walking a fine line between pursuing more independence from Russia and not disturbing the regional balance of power.

One sign of change was a meeting in 2023 between regional presidents, including Sadyr Japarov of the Kyrgyz Republic and Tokayev, with US president Joe Biden in New York and with German chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin. It appears that while central Asian countries were not ready to talk about regional security, they were interested in discussing green energy, climate change, and stabilising Afghanistan.

What the west wants

The west will see this as an opportunity to build alliances and to offset Russian influence, given the area’s strategic importance and abundance of natural resources. By fostering these relationships, western countries can potentially secure energy supplies and promote stability in a region historically dominated by Russia. In return, central Asian republics might seek economic investment and technological development, and potentially support to strengthen their political independence.

As Russia prepares for a long war, there are likely to be further opportunities for central Asia to forge a new relationship with the west, but any shift is expected to be gradual.

Source: The Conversation

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Expert Analysis

“Bringing in Palestine Investment Fund chief Mohammed Mustafa and pushing out the current prime minister Mohammed Shtayyeh is the rearranging of the deck chairs on the Palestinian Titanic. Both men are part of the problem. They are both cronies of Mahmoud Abbas. Neither figure has the power or will to reform the PA. This is not a serious effort to bring better governance to the West Bank, let alone Gaza. The United States must demand more.” — Jonathan Schanzer, FDD Senior Vice President for Research
“The PA has become largely irrelevant and desperately needs to be reformed. Palestinians overwhelmingly reject the authority’s corruption and repression. Replacing one Abbas loyalist with another is not the reform the Palestinians need.” — David May, FDD Research Manager and Senior Research Analyst

PA Failing to Reform

Washington has repeatedly said that a “revitalized” PA should govern Gaza after the war. However, concerns remain over the PA’s ability to govern an independent Palestinian state, especially one ruled in coordination with Hamas. Abbas, who is in the 20th year of a four-year term, has presided over a corrupt and ineffective government that has lost legitimacy among the Palestinian people. The PA also continues to provide controversial welfare payments for Palestinian terrorists or their surviving families, and allows Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist groups to operate in the West Bank without significant limitations.

In Search of Palestinian Unity

The West Bank-based terrorist organization Hamas dismissed Shtayyeh’s resignation and said that it “only makes sense if it comes within the context of national consensus arrangements for the next phase.” Hamas is expected to participate in talks with other Palestinian factions in Moscow from February 29 through March 2. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Envoy for the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov invited as many as 14 Palestinian groups, including Fatah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, from various Middle Eastern countries to participate.

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In Tajikistan, over 20% of the population lives in poverty, and millions of citizens have emigrated to Russia to find work. Meanwhile, a feudal elite under President Emomali Rahmon has ravaged the country with corruption, nepotism, and massive drug smuggling of Afghan heroin to Russia and Europe.

Although Rahmon’s successor and son, Rustam Emomali, has been increasingly in the headlines, adopting a presidential look, his stiff and awkward appearance reveals a man seemingly afraid of his shadow. Sources inside the country’s security apparatus report that he is in conflict with his powerful sisters, including Ozada, the head of the presidential office. Experts on Tajikistan in Russia and the West are surprisingly in agreement when it comes to assessing Rustam: He is not ready to assume his country’s leadership, but his greed is matched by his ruthless nature. This makes him a danger to his sisters as they and their supporters vie for control of drug smuggling corridors and lucrative sectors of the economy, such as mining.

President Rahmon sees no other option, in a patriarchal society, than to name his playboy son, enamored by fast cars and football, as his successor. Experts expect the appointment of Rustam to be made sometime this year. A former Russian intelligence officer with knowledge of the regime dynamics noted, “Rustam is mocked by many Tajiks, who refer to him as “the mute” for his public shyness, and he has little credibility.”

The officer, who requested anonymity in order to speak freely, noted that besides Rustam’s older sister, Ozada, the most qualified individual to assume the presidency is Rustam’s arch-enemy, Gen. Saymumin Yatimov, head of the country’s secret service, the GKNB. Yatimov is a seasoned diplomat and ruthless enforcer of Rahmon’s rule. The officer noted, “Yatimov is a crafty spy chief who knows where all the Rahmon family skeletons are buried, and for this Rustam sees him as a threat. It is not clear if Yatimov will allow Rustam to force him into retirement. There are indications that Yatimov will not go quietly.”

Regardless of who inherits the presidential office, they will face a dire economic situation. Skyrocketing food prices and shortages of medical aid are well-documented. To make matters worse, during Tajikistan’s harsh winters, there are frequent electrical power outages, leaving citizens to freeze in their unheated homes. Tajikistan’s best and brightest workers have emigrated in search of better lives, and vast numbers of manual laborers have sought work outside the country, taking jobs that ordinary Russians would prefer to leave to others.

Corruption, damn corruption! 

The country is stifled by cronyism and suffocating under elite corruption and state economic capture by a deep state. Every significant position in the government or industry is up for sale – from state prosecutor to banker, from high-ranking military officer to corporate executive. Failure to pay the Rahmon family, in particular Rustam, the required percentage of the proceeds of corruption or even from honestly earned revenue can result in losing one’s job, one’s company, or one’s life.

The kidnapping, torture, and execution of the well-known banker Shuhrat Ismatulloev of Orienbank is one case in point. Sources in Russia revealed that he had fallen out of favor with the Rahmon regime and was “disappeared” as a result. Ismatulloev was one of the regime’s most trusted money launderers and also cryptocurrency traders. He knew too much, according to a Russian source familiar with those arrested for his killing, noting, “This elite banker to The Family possibly wanted out from the sordid world of international crime and corruption, from laundering drug money, and from engaging in illicit high-value financial transactions with the sanctioned Iranian regime. But in Tajikistan, once you’re an insider you can never leave the elite club.”

With Russia’s economy growing and its military achieving new and impressive results on the Ukrainian battlefield, and China building ever-deeper ties with Central Asian states, expert observers are asking whether Tajikistan’s boat can be lifted as well. While other Central Asian states like Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan are strengthening their regional economic and political ties, the question remains whether the Rahmon regime’s pervasive corruption and brittle ruling system will leave Tajikistan behind, the poor stepchild of a thriving Central Asian family?

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Dushanbe 25/2 (35.71).

The social networking activity of “influencer” Ismoil Mahmadzoir is causing a stir within the country’s political and security corridors. His grandfather President Emomali Rahmon is planning his succession, which has triggered quiet maneuvering within elite factions, including Mahmadzoir’s relatives. Nobody is clear about how becomes the next president of Tajikistan. The daughters jockeying for the top job besides the grandson.

Video of a bland speech by Tajikistan’s long-time President Emomali Rahmon was posted late last month on Instagram by Buzkashi_1111, a handle created by Ismoil Mahmadzoir, the 25-year-old son of Firuza Emomali, one of the president’s daughters, who is the country’s No. 1 social media influencer with more than 1.3 million combined followers. His visibility on social media, however, has become a political liability.

The younger Rahmon posts often ostentatiously display his wealth, numerous feature videos showing huge piles of bank shrink-wrapped $100 bills, for example, to the exasperation of those in ruling circles. Flaunt it if you got it, seems the theme of the day.

Their fear is that Mahmadzoir’s flaunting of his lifestyle could cause a backlash among less privileged citizens at a time when different factions within Rahmon’s family and advisers are discreetly angling to gain an edge for their side in an unfolding battle to succeed him.

Although Mahmadzoir himself is not a contender to inherit the throne, the favorite is Rustam Emomali, the president’s eldest son, his close relatives are key powerbrokers in the opaque and treacherous succession process.

The U.K. connection

Mahmadzoir’s father, Mahmadzoir Sokhibov, is a construction magnate and top presidential adviser, including on the all-important topic of allocating business concessions to the well-connected. Mahmadzoir’s uncle, is UK-based Shamsullo Sokhibov, head of business conglomerate Faroz and husband of another of Rahmon’s daughters, Rukhshona Emomali.

Both brothers are well-connected to powerful security officials at the ministry of internal affairs and at the State Committee for National Security (SCNS), the national intelligence agency that is known in Russian as the GKNB.

Both Sokhibov brothers are keeping a close eye on the succession process, as is Hasan Asadullozoda, Rahmon’s brother-in-law and owner of one of Tajikistan’s main banks, Orienbank, which oversees major investments in the country. Earlier this year, according to our sources, Asadullozoda began looking for ways to move his capital from Tajikistan, including to the United States.

My Best Friend in Dubai!

To build his brand as a social media influencer, Mahmadzoir posts on Facebook, TikTok and five Instagram accounts. Post by Ismoil8, his handle at the account with the largest following, plays up his standing as a trendy fashionista, his role as president of the national Judo Federation of Tajikistan, and his frolics in Dubai. Managing a company called IM Group, he is frequently seen with his friend Osama Ahmed Abdullah Al Shafar, who holds a seat on the UAE’s 40-member Federal National Council, which helps prepare all proposed legislation in the monarchy.

Al Shafar, a former president of the UAE Cycling Federation, is a member of the management committee at the Swiss-based Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI). Al Shafar is also active on Instagram, where he mentioned his “dear friend” Igor Makarov, a billionaire Russian-Turkmen energy magnate, president of Areti International Group and energy adviser to former Turkmen president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov (IO, 26/04/22). The United Kingdom has hit Makarov with financial sanctions and travel bans over allegedly providing Moscow with important economic and strategic assistance. As a result, various national cycling federations have called for his expulsion from the UCI, where he is also a management committee member.

Photo: On his various social media accounts, Ismoil Mahmadzoir shows himself with his grandfather, Tajik’s President, but also with $100 bills, in Dubai, and in his role as judo federation president. © ismoil8/Instagram – rayison_tj/Instagram – @ismoilim8/Twitter

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Reflecting on the Soviet Union’s collapse 32 years ago and attempting to draw any sort of conclusion is often a matter of perspective. In his new book, “Moscow’s Heavy Shadow: The Violent Collapse of the USSR,” Dr. Isaac McKean Scarborough, an assistant professor of Russian and Eurasian Studies at Leiden University, writes of the collapse from one of the Soviet Union’s most distant peripheries — Dushanbe. In doing so, he highlights a perspective not often taken into account in Western understanding of the collapse, charting how Moscow’s reforms — glasnost and perestroika — played out in the far-flung Tajik context and ultimately resulted in rapid change, economic collapse, and violence, as they did elsewhere.

But the violence did not end with the collapse in Tajikistan. As Scarborough told The Diplomat’s Catherine Putz, “In Tajikistan, moreover, this collapse was made longer and more visceral by the civil war that followed, and I think we need to keep in mind that for the majority of the citizens of Tajikistan, there is no clear line between the two. The collapse of the USSR became the civil war; one moved smoothly and quickly into the other.”

In the following interview, Scarborough explains the state of affairs in Soviet Tajikistan in the years leading up to the collapse, discusses the effects of reforms on the Tajik economy, the republican government’s reliance on and loyalty to Moscow, and how Tajikistan continues to wrestle with the unresolved tensions of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Your book “Moscow’s Heavy Shadow: The Violent Collapse of the USSR” focuses on the collapse of the USSR from one of its most distant peripheries: Soviet Tajikistan. In this corner of the Soviet Union in 1985 as Moscow was starting to push reforms you note that  “Tajikistani politicians and average citizens alike” viewed the Soviet economic and political system with a “modicum of satisfaction.” For readers who may be surprised by that assessment, can you explain what you mean?

I think there is a general feeling in the West that life in the USSR was fundamentally bad – poor, dirty, devoid of modern amenities – and that most Soviet citizens essentially wished for the Soviet system to collapse. But this really wasn’t the case. Although significantly falling behind European or American standards of living, life in most parts of the USSR was in fact quite decent by the 1970s and 1980s. As the economic historian Robert Allen has shown, for example, if compared to almost any country outside of Europe or the “West,” the economic outcomes achieved by Soviet citizens in this period are amongst the world’s best. Dissatisfaction, then, was driven not by actual economic degradation – but rather by the sense that life was no longer improving by the late 1970s in ways that it previously had.  And in Moscow, or Leningrad, or perhaps Kiev, this was true: Soviet economic life had reached a certain plateau, beyond which the state seemed unable to provide much more in terms of goods, or services, or basic entertainment.

For people in Tajikistan, however, this saturation point had not yet been reached. Life into the mid-1980s was continuing to improve, and the basic amenities of life, such as refrigerators, or cars, or air conditioning units, or children’s theaters, were still spreading and providing tangible and real improvements to standards of living. There were, of course, endemic problems – from the lack of housing available in cities to the cotton monoculture retarding economic growth to Tajikistan’s pitifully low standing in the USSR – but there was no denying that life was all the same getting better, year after year. And this, I think, is what drove the general sense of sanguinity: it wasn’t that things couldn’t have been better – they certainly could have been – but that as it was, the system worked, and there was no obvious reason to change it.

How were Gorbachev’s reforms — glasnost and perestroika — carried out in Tajikistan? What were some of the initial economic and political consequences of the reforms?

One key distinction that should be made between “perestroika” and “glasnost” is that these were legally quite different processes, although in retrospect we tend to clump the two together. Perestroika, in the sense of economic reforms meant to restructure the Soviet Union’s enterprises and consumer sector, was made up of a series of laws that changed the rules governing state-owned production and private enterprises. Glasnost, on the other hand, constituted a more amorphous series of changes – legal amendments changing the legislative system in Moscow, but also informal directives and administrative shifts in policy and tone that were aimed at fomenting criticism of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and promoting social change. 

Perestroika’s legal backing meant that changes to production and enterprise activity were unavoidable, and the leadership of the Tajik SSR had no choice but to implement them across Tajikistan. Loyal to Moscow, they did so very thoroughly, which led to factories lowering production (to save roubles), private businesses being founded, and, by 1989, the initial signs of recession. 

With glasnost an administrative policy, however, there was much more room for local interpretation. Individuals like Kahhor Mahkamov, the leader of the Communist Party of Tajikistan in the late 1980s and a generally conservative figure, used this to their advantage, avoiding any criticism of the state and promoting their own candidates in the new electoral system. When change did occur in terms of political liberalization, it was often the result of direct intervention from Moscow: when Gorbachev’s advisor Aleksander Yakovlev visited Dushanbe in 1987 and caused a local Communist Party shakeup, for example, or when he later helped to push through Tajikistan’s Law on Language in 1989. But the overall situation in Tajikistan by 1989 and early 1990 was both paradoxical and confusing: on the one hand, perestroika’s reforms had led to economic change and even inflation and recession, while on the other the republican government was avoiding glasnost as much as possible and trying to pretend like life was continuing as before.  

In Chapter 5, you discuss the unexpected and bloody riots that took place in Dushanbe in February 1990 and remark that “the idea that the events could have been spontaneous or uncontrolled is frequently dismissed outright.” I see parallels to that in modern Tajikistan, and elsewhere in Central Asia. Why do you think it’s so difficult to digest the idea that a situation, or a series of cascading events, might not have some specific hand behind them?

There’s an understandable temptation, I think, both in Tajikistan and elsewhere (and in fact in the West, too), to find a simple and identifiable cause of political violence or negative political outcomes. And it’s always much simpler to point to particular “bad actors,” or “organizers,” or “outside forces” directing the actions of crowds, rather than to pick apart the motivations of the many people involved and the ways in which their actions came together to instigate violence. This also helps to avoid giving legitimacy to the motivations of those involved, which is emotionally easier – we don’t generally want to justify violence, or to ascribe violent motives to average citizens. So instead of considering how economic recession or the loss of jobs can lead to frustration, mass action, and ultimately violence in a collective way, we blame some unseen individuals. Someone lied to the rioters, someone misled them – they themselves are not to blame, nor do we have to deal with their actual motivations or frustrations.

Immediately after the February 1990 riots, this was the dominant discourse in Dushanbe about the riots: from all sides, politicians found it much simpler, emotionally preferable, and politically more useful to blame each other or outsiders than to ask the rioters why they had been on the square, or how the violence had begun. But by refusing to ask these questions, they unfortunately not only failed to undermine the roots of conflict, but in practice tipped the situation even closer to the edge.

Tajikistan’s Soviet leadership seemed to be in denial that the union was collapsing, but ultimately declared independence as did the other republics. What was the root of the Tajikistani leadership’s reluctance to let its connection to Moscow go? And in what ways did that shape the circumstances which gave rise to the civil war?

A number of years ago, Buri Karimov, the former head of Tajikistan’s State Planning Committee (Gosplan) was kind enough to grant me a long interview in Moscow. I asked him then how he had experienced the move to Russia in the early 1990s after his loss of political power during the February 1990 riots – to which he just shrugged. “We were already here every week,” he said, explaining that government work in Dushanbe essentially meant coordinating nearly everything through Moscow; there wasn’t much for him to adjust to afterwards.

I think this is very representative of how the leadership in Dushanbe viewed their positions of power: as an extension of Moscow’s. Because of the place of the Tajik economy in the Soviet Union as a provider of raw materials (primarily cotton, of course), the state relied even more than most republics on centrally organized financial flows. Institutionally, there was also a clear culture of deference to Moscow – much more than in other small Soviet republics, such as Lithuania, where the historian Saulius Grybkauskus, for example, has done important work demonstrating the local party’s independence and sense of local identity. But the Communist Party of Tajikistan and government leaders in Dushanbe could hardly conceive of operating outside of the Soviet remit – it just didn’t compute.

This didn’t change even after the collapse of the USSR, as the new president of Tajikistan, Rahmon Nabiev, continued to defer to Moscow and largely failed to develop important elements of statehood, including any semblance of a military. No one, in fact, seemed to have developed a clear notion of what the independent Tajikistani state should look like at that point – a muddled situation that created additional space for populist mobilization in the face of non-existent state capacity to oppose it.

In some ways, your book serves as a prologue for the Tajik Civil War — we see the advent of some of the major players and the roots of the conflict to come. How does the history as you’ve laid it out, contrast with the narrative in modern Tajikistan about the civil war?

Curiously enough, there is less of an active debate about the civil war in Tajikistan than might be expected, a few decades after it ended. During and immediately after the civil war in the mid-to-late 1990s, there were a number of memoirs/political treatises published by those involved in the war, which were often largely focused on blaming the opposing side for the war’s initiation and extremes. In the years after 2000, moreover, some very important work was done by Tajikistani scholars to delve into the structural and social causes of the war, and I would highlight the work of the historian Gholib Ghoibov and the journalist Nurali Davlat, upon which I draw extensively. For the most part, though, the narrative has gone fallow since then, leaving an incomplete discussion about the causes, start, and course of the war – but one that tends, in some ways similar to my own work, to situate the war in its immediate context of perestroika, reform, and Soviet collapse. Which exact factors – Gorbachev’s reforms, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the breakdown of political authority – then led to war are argued over to this day, but most people in Tajikistan, I think, would also associate the war with this period immediately prior. 

So in many ways where my work may differ, I think, is more with the established Western narratives of the Tajik Civil War. These tend to look for causes either in earlier history – for example, in the experiences of forced resettlement and larger socialization in Tajikistan’s south from the 1930s to the 1950s – or in the “particularities” of life in Tajikistan, from its relative religiosity to local norms of honor and masculinity. By returning to the historical and archival record of the years immediately before the civil war and first months of war itself, however, I found that these elements of unusualness were neither terribly present nor particularly helpful in terms of explaining politicians’ behavior or the reactions of the people who then participated in violence. As Ted Gurr has argued, it can be quite tempting to appeal to “aggressive instincts” or elements of otherness to explain one or another example of political violence, but in practice war is largely the result of human commonalities across time and geography.  In the case of the Tajik Civil War, I found that the common experience of Soviet collapse and populist mobilization led to violence – in fact as it did in many other parts of the former USSR. I’m hopeful that this is a story that will resonate with people in Tajikistan, who know far better than I the cost of this violence.

How can this history help us understand modern Tajikistan?

Like much of the former USSR, I think, Tajikistan is still living out the consequences of the Soviet collapse, in the sense that not all the final choices seem to have yet been made about what the proper status quo ante should be. In Tajikistan, moreover, this collapse was made longer and more visceral by the civil war that followed, and I think we need to keep in mind that for the majority of the citizens of Tajikistan, there is no clear line between the two. The collapse of the USSR became the civil war; one moved smoothly and quickly into the other. The civil war then defined the country’s political order in both the 1990s during the conflict and in later decades, notwithstanding the formal end to the war in 1997. Violence in fact continued for many years in a variety of forms, and the state’s moves to first incorporate former opposition fighters into the government after 1997 and then remove most of them in the following years meant that the resolution of the conflict started in 1992 stayed immediate for decades.

Where this has left Tajikistani society today, I think, is in a continuing quandary about how to deal with the unresolved tensions of the late 1980s and early 1990s. There has essentially been no opportunity to collectively decide on matters like language policy, or city development, or the privatization of industry, or broad economic modernization, and there remains a great deal of debate and disagreement on all levels about these matters. Should Dushanbe be rebuilt in steel and glass in an attempt to remove the vestiges of colonial Soviet material culture? Should Russian be encouraged in Tajikistani schools as a way of helping the country’s labor migrants in Russian workplaces? When people tell the stories of their lives since 1992 in Tajikistan, it comes out rushed and running together – “in a single breath” (na odnom dykhanii), as they say in Russian. Tajikistanis haven’t had time to breathe since 1992, let alone to answer these questions or to try to comprehend everything that has changed since the collapse of the USSR. 

Source: The Diplomat

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