Astana, Brussels, Berlin (15 January 2023 – 50).

Twenty senators representing 17 regions and three cities of national significance were elected on January 14 to the Senate, an upper chamber of the Kazakh Parliament, according to the preliminary results announced by the Central Election Commission (CEC).

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced the date of the Senate election during his inauguration ceremony on November 26, 2022, saying that the election is part of a broader program of political renewal of the country’s system of government. President Tokayev signed a decree on measures to implement the pre-election program “Fair Kazakhstan is for everyone and for everyone. Now and Forever.” One of his first orders was to hold elections “with the establishment of the parliament and maslikhatson the basis of the new electoral system, on party lists and single-member districts, by June 2023.

Two weeks into 2023, Senate elections saw 55 candidates competing for 20 seats in the Senate. The elected candidates received the required threshold of more than 50 percent of the electors’ votes, ranging from a minimum of 61.7 percent for the Ulytau Region candidate to a maximum of 90.9 percent for a candidate from the Akmola Region.

Two women made it to the Senate, corresponding to 10 percent of the elected candidates. They represented the North Kazakhstan Region and Almaty.

The voters’ turnout across regions could be monitored online on the CEC website. A quorum, when at least 50 percent of present electors cast their votes in all regions, has been reached by 10:45 a.m., 45 minutes past the start of the election. Preliminary results were announced at 1 p.m.

The final results are to be announced by Jan. 20.

The Senate election is part of a broader program of political renewal of the country’s system of government initiated by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Elections to the Mazhilis, the lower chamber of the Parliament, and maslikhat, local representative bodies, are expected to be held in the first half of 2023. 

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Rüya Bayegan using prime minister Barzani’s right hand – Rania Majeed – to elbow her way back to KRG?

Ankara, Erbil (4/1 – 45).

Rüya Bayegan, the CEO of BGN International and its Turkey-based subsidiary Bayegan Group, was once considered an instrumental member of the petrochemical industry in Turkey. However, as of at least October 2022, Bayegan and her husband, Ercüment Bayegan, have been under investigation by Turkish authorities on allegations of fraud, document forgeries and tax evasion as a result of their role in the disastrous Yurtgas scandal.

The recent contract between BGN International with the Indonesian state owned oil and gas company Pertamina raises questions in Jakarta with various government supervisory agencies.

In June 2022 the magazine Upstream reported the Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission, the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), has reportedly launched an investigation into possible graft relating to the historic procurement of liquefied natural gas by national oil company Pertamina.

In an attempt to prove Rüya Bayegan utility to the Turkish government and dampen her fall from grace, it appears that Bayegan is turning to long familiar partners in Kurdistan.

Bayegan Group/BGN has a history of operating in Kurdistan, but little information is available in the public domain. Turkish energy policy heavily features the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and as a former extension of Turkish economic objectives, Bayegan has proven to be a useful proxy there for politics as well as business.

Local sources note that Bayegan, and BGN/Bayegan Group, have intentionally obscured their relationships inside of Kurdistan’s government to maintain unincumbered access to the local oil and gas markets. It stands to reason that the KRG, which has garnered a reputation of being rife with “corruption, cronyism, and nepotism”, would also seek to downplay its relationship with external players benefitting from such a structure.

When Prime Minister Barzani took office, he vowed to address these issues, instating individuals in relevant positions in the more notorious of ministries, to include the Ministry for Natural Resources. However, when his appointee – Kamal Atroshi – became too focused on implementing anticorruption measures, Barzani turned his most powerful supporter and ally on him, forcing him out of his job.

In August 2022 the Fikra Forum highlighted that despite the promises of reform Kurdistan business as usual continues in the troubled region.

It is this ally, Prime Minister Barzani’s gatekeeper and close personal confidante, Dr. Rania Majeed (Ranya Majid), with whom Bayegan has maintained a quiet, close relationship. Majeed is known inside of KRG and among government insiders as the “untouchable” and fiercely loyal right hand to Barzani and manages relationships and highest priority objectives on Barzani’s political and personal agendas, to include in the oil and gas and housing sectors. According to Draw Dr. Rania Majeed was appointed in 2019 as the economic advisor to Masrour Barzani as a key appointee of the Kurdish administration tightly controlling the oil revenues to Kurdistan.  

Given that Bayegan is facing civil and potential criminal charges stemming from allegations of tax evasion, forgeries of documents, company names, and addresses, as well as unpaid million-dollar debts, it is no surprise that Kurdistan and Majeed have downplayed their relationship – a public connection between the two would throw their historical and ongoing professional collaborations under extraordinary scrutiny.  

“It is yet to be seen if the Kurdish administration continues to engage with questionable business partners to enrich themselves or not”, said a senior official in Ankara.

The recent contract between BGN International with Indonesian state owned oil and gas company, Pertamina raises questions in Jakarta with various government supervisory agencies.

Bayegan- Kurdish relationship

Bayegan and Majeed have shared a longstanding business relationship, mutually benefitting from their exclusive arrangements. It is through this relationship – and Majeed’s ability to influence the energy industry at her whim –  that Bayegan is able to access products before others in the industry.

Recently, It was reported that the KRG’s oil ministry offered Bayegan additional spot volumes previously designated for other trading partners. BGN International’s director Emin Imanov was quoted as stating that the company was offered and agreed to purchase these barrels. The price of BGN’s purchase remains undisclosed. 

Rania Majeed’s energy influence 

Given the important role the energy sector plays in KRG politics, it’s no surprise that Barzani has installed his number two as a gatekeeper for oil contracts. Barzani specifically requested that Majid serve as an advisor within the Ministry of Natural Resources in order to act a direct and trusted line of information within one of the most critical to his success as prime minister. 

Majeed serves as the primary interlocutor for the KRG’s energy relations with key stakeholders, ranging from internal decision-makers in the sector to external advisors and leaders. Together with RT Bank director Hamela Gardi and the director general of contracts and companies at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Dr. Ghazala, Majeed holds the keys to the proverbial kingdom, and has the latitude to dictate who end up among KRG’s energy partners.

A source in the Ministry of Natural Resources echoed a sentiment published in an article about Majeed’s influence, “no oil minister can encroach on the power of these three women in Barzani’s cabinet.”  

When previous Minister for Natural Resources Kamal Atroshi began pushing for transparency in the ministry, Majid intervened and sought to obstruct and undermine Atroshi’s efforts, resulting in Atroshi’s resignation in May 2022.  Majid also reportedly influenced Atroshi’s decision to change oil payment dates for invoices from 15 days to three months in 2020. 

Source: Cairo Herald

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After being elected as president, Raisi thawed the ice between Tajikistan and Iran by making his first official presidential trip to Dushanbe; he became the first Iranian president to fly to Tashkent over the last two decades. He also met with Kazakh, Turkmen and Kyrgyz presidents on various occasions. Following these meetings, Iran signed a series of MoUs to encourage cooperation in trade, cultural exchange, agriculture and manufacturing with Central Asian countries.

One of the most important reasons for Iran’s turn to Central Asia is its growing isolation. At the global level, the deadlock in the nuclear negotiations with the US, and the EU’s announcement of new sanctions on Iran due to its military aid to Russia further increased the complexity of its relations with Western countries.

At a regional level, Turkiye’s recent de-escalation with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and especially Israel in the Middle East changed the regional balance of power and threatened Tehran’s ambitions in the region. While strengthening Azerbaijan-Turkiye ties and growing cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel are further limiting Iran’s political capabilities and isolating it within the region.

Iran’s turn to Central Asia breaks its isolation, counterbalances Turkiye’s growing power in Central Asia, and increases its political power through its proxies such as the Fatemiyoun Brigade in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, increasing cooperation with Central Asian states will pave the way for Iran’s accession to the EAEU and the SCO, which is vital for regime survival to counter Western sanctions and political isolation. Iran has already been accepted as the newest member of the SCO in September, and its membership will likely be effective as of April 2023.

READ: Iran asks Iraq to disarm groups in Kurdistan

Central Asian countries play a crucial role in being a transit hub between the EU and China. The disruption of the northern corridor through Russia due to the war on Ukraine, creates opportunities for Tehran to attract cargo from the northern corridor and increase its strategic role through Eurasia trade.

Every tonne of goods that passes through Iranian territory costs approximately $100, close to the cost of a barrel of oil, which can bring significant economic benefits to the country.

In spite of these motivations for cooperation, there are limitations. First of all, despite the constructive political statements made by Central Asian presidents, there is considerable confusion about Iran at the public level. A Central Asia Barometer (CAB) poll conducted last May and June suggests that 52 per cent of Tajiks do not have an idea about Iran’s stance towards their country. This ratio for Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan is 47 per cent, 30 per cent, 29 per cent, respectively. More importantly, the sum of those who view Iran in a “Very Unfavorable” and “Somewhat Unfavorable” manner is 41 per cent in Kazakhstan and 34 per cent in Kyrgyzstan.

“Somewhat Unfavorable” manner is 41 per cent in Kazakhstan and 34 per cent in Kyrgyzstan.

(https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/MYapl/4/)

This considerable confusion at the public level does not necessarily threaten future engagement with Iran, but it may create uncertainty in long-term partnership building.

However, do countries in Central Asia want to deal with a country which is under sanctions from global powers? Also, even though Iran has geopolitical leverage as a transit country, its physical infrastructure is outdated and overused. Because of the Western sanctions and the dominating presence of quasi-government institutions in the economy (Bonyads), international companies avoid investing in the country.

Many may think Iran’s 25-year Strategic Cooperation Agreement with China signed in 2021 can reverse this situation and renew its infrastructure quickly; it would not be a realistic assumption. It appears that China’s main motivation is bartering discounted oil in exchange for cheaper customer goods. Also, the Middle Corridor, which runs through Central Asia, the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkiye, is rapidly developing as an alternative route with more capabilities to build better infrastructure more quickly.

In spite of the challenges, Iran is lively to continue to pursue greater ties with Central Asia, especially as its ports gain in strategic importance as the bulk of global trade shifts towards Eastern Asia, and as Russia’s war on Ukraine continues to rage. For Tehran, these ties are the best way to overcome sanctions and forge new paths of income.

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In recent years, China has pursued an increasingly aggressive foreign-policy posture known as “wolf warrior” diplomacy, one that has forcefully staked China’s positions across issues and regions.

But evidence is mounting that this strategy is backfiring. International opinion polls, such as the latest Pew Research Center survey, show that negative views of China is peaking around the world while China’s diplomatic initiatives, such as in Central and Eastern Europe, are failing.

Yet in the wake of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, China has defended its aggressive foreign policy and hinted at its intensification. At first glance, it would seem that China is simply unaware that its diplomacy is malfunctioning. But a closer look reveals that China’s choice has its own logic. Why is China so committed to this style of diplomacy despite the dangers that come with it?

Chinese media refers to this style as “Xiplomacy,” a coined term frequently used in Xinhua News headlines since 2019, short for “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.” It stands for China’s foreign-policy framework under Chinese President Xi Jinping’s leadership and is one of the five key elements of “Xi Jinping Thought,” the other four involving the economy, ecology, military, and rule of law.

At heart, Xi’s diplomacy calls for a more active role for China as a great power on the world stage, including reforming the Western-dominated international order and creating what China calls “true multilateralism.”

Compared to the other key elements, however, Xiplomacy has seen a lackluster performer in Chinese state media. According to the China Media Project, which tracks the number of times each element has been mentioned in the People’s Daily since the beginning of 2022, Xiplomacy appeared less than five times most months, whereas others averaged around 15 times.

The underplaying of Xiplomacy in state media indicates China is aware of its disappointing diplomatic performance. The one other banner phrase that also saw low usage through this year is “Xi Jinping Economic Thought,” which corresponds with China’s weak economic performance. Although China’s diplomatic travails are harder to quantify than slowing growth, the term’s relative absence from state media tells us that the party is not completely blind to the reality.

So why does the party show no intention of reorienting its foreign policy despite being aware of its underwhelming performance? The answer is that Xiplomacy is more about Xi than anything else.

Yang Jiechi, director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission and the highest foreign-policy official in the party, spoke on the study and implementation of Xiplomacy this May, the transcript of which was published in the People’s Daily. The speech was all about Xi. Yang vowed to “take a coordinated approach to the domestic and international imperatives” and “resolutely follow through on General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important instructions on external work and the decisions and plans of the CPC Central Committee.”

This highlight a key characteristic of China’s foreign policy: It is valued only as an extension of its domestic agenda, with the priority to demonstrate loyalty to Xi and his agenda. Beijing’s overreactions to inquiries into COVID-19’s origin, aggressions in the South China Sea, obsessions over border disputes, or military demonstrations in the Taiwan Strait are more motivated by internal politics and what Xi identifies as China’s priorities than effective diplomacy aimed at managing foreign relations.

At its core, Xi’s foreign policy is about boosting citizen confidence in the state by flaunting national strength. The primary audience of China’s foreign policy is domestic, not international.

Xi’s diplomatic philosophy points back to the narrative of the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”—a concept that echoes domestic patriotic sentiment. As China analyst Elizabeth Economy explains, the rejuvenation narrative “evokes memories of the country as the Middle Kingdom demanding tribute from the rest of the world; China as a source of innovation, creating paper, gunpowder, printing, and the compass; and China as an expansive, outward-facing power.” It appeals more to a domestic audience nostalgic for China’s glorious past than for an international audience, some of which might still be traumatized by China’s history as an expansionist power.

Support on social media showcases the popularity of Chinese-style diplomacy at home. The Chinese internet’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, was largely pro-Russia and pro-Russian President Vladimir Putin, much of which mimicked the aggressive tone of Chinese diplomats. Although sentiments on social media could be biased due to censorship, a survey conducted by the Carter Center shows that 75 percent of respondents agree that supporting Russia in its invasion of Ukraine is in China’s national interest, and more surprisingly, support for Russia is correlated with higher education.

Although soft power was embraced by former Chinese leader Hu Jintao, it has somewhat lost its appeal under Xi. This shift is evident in Xi’s speech during the recently concluded 20th Party Congress. According to Reuters, Xi used hard-power terms, such as “security” or “safety,” 89 times in the full work report—up from 55 times in 2017. China does care about its global image, not so much about its appeal to other countries through non-coercive means—soft power—but rather in its ability to influence other countries’ diplomatic decisions through the power it has, such as economic coercion.

As the National Endowment for Democracy’s Christopher Walker explained in Foreign Policy, “the dynamics of soft power—which arise principally from a country’s culture, its political values, and its policies—are misaligned with the incentives of systems based on pervasive state control and repression.” As China grows increasingly authoritarian under Xi, the sources of soft power—civil society, individuals, and the private sector—inevitably suffers.

After failed attempts of growing China’s soft power abroad, Xi has turned to a so-called harder version of soft power: international influence. This is about using power resources—a state’s material and ideational assets—to influence other states’ behaviors. Xi proudly announced in his 20th Party Congress speech that “China’s international influence, appeal, and shaping power have been significantly improved.”

China’s flagship foreign-policy project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), showcases China’s intent to expand its international influence using economic coercion. One salient example is Lithuania, which joined the BRI in 2017.

After Lithuania announced it would open a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius in November 2021, Beijing retaliated by destroying their bilateral trade relationship, causing economic losses worth some $320 million for Lithuanian companies in 2021. Through Lithuania, Beijing hoped to exemplify the harsh consequences facing other BRI countries if they ever misalign with Beijing’s political agenda. In reality, China’s extreme measure was a failed public relations campaign: Not only did it fray China’s relations with other Eastern European countries, but it also further damaged China-European Union relations, with the latter calling for a World Trade Organization case against Beijing’s arbitrary trade restrictions.

China’s pursuit of international influence is also reflected in its diplomatic priorities. In September, Xi visited Central Asia for his first trip overseas since the pandemic began. The choice was deliberate: China has achieved relative success with the BRI in Central Asia. Instead of choosing another BRI region, such as Eastern Europe, which has grown increasingly distant from China due to failed infrastructure promises and China’s support of Russia, China turned to Central Asia, where many in the region view connectivity as a matter of survival, especially facing the economic disruptions of Russia’s war in Ukraine. This economic direness propels Central Asian countries to support China’s political agenda, such as regarding China’s territorial claims to Taiwan, in return for infrastructure investments.

Domestically, the trip was displayed as a successful venture at asserting China’s international influence. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs frames it as “fully show[ing] the strong confidence and influence of President Xi Jinping, and the growing international standing and influence of China.”

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was announced as a new Politburo member at the 20th Party Congress, implying that he is set to replace Yang as director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, the highest ranked official for China’s foreign policy.

As a fervent advocate of “wolf warrior” diplomacy, Wang being promoted affirms the continuation, if not the intensification, of China’s aggressive diplomacy style. But more so, it reinforces the notion that the foreign minister’s primary job is to show off their loyalty to Xi.

To please the central leader, officials are keeping critical feedback and advice from reaching Xi. As journalist Dake Kang explained recently, even China’s once powerful internal system of internal reports, known as Neican, has become dangerously censored under Xi. The broken feedback loop could lead to poor decision-making, a common phenomenon with autocrats, as recently witnessed in Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine.

Facing pressing domestic issues, Xi-centered diplomacy could suffer from tunnel vision and lose its true purpose: managing relationships abroad. Instead of spreading himself too thin, Xi should allocate responsibilities to trained diplomats and informed experts to design and implement a foreign policy that focuses China’s energy outward. But that’s an unlikely possibility in a system that increasingly turns around the whims of a single man.

Source : ForeignPolice

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