These discussions transpired during a telephone conversation between Turkmenistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rashid Meredov, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye, Hakan Fidan.

During the dialogue, the two parties engaged in a comprehensive exchange of views on a range of pertinent issues concerning Turkmen-Turkish cooperation, fostering a constructive discussion environment.

The parties discussed the implementation of bilateral agreements reached at the highest state level, and also considered the possibilities of further increasing the potential of mutual partnership in the political, diplomatic, trade and economic spheres.

Furthermore, the heads of the foreign ministries agreed to maintain regular contacts between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both countries.

Meanwhile, Turkmenistan and Türkiye are strategically fostering the development of their bilateral relations, with both nations engaging in continuous discussions and collaborative initiatives to strengthen diplomatic ties and enhance mutual cooperation.

For example, recently representatives of Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), a state-owned crude oil and natural gas trading company, and Turkmengaz, Turkmenistan’s national gas company, have held a meeting to discuss prospects for exporting Turkmen gas to Europe via Azerbaijan and Türkiye.

Source: Trend

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The World Bank has revised its economic growth forecast for Türkiye for this year upward from a previous 3.2 percent to 4.2 percent.

“Growth is projected to increase to 4.2 percent in 2023 because of resilient household consumption and reduced policy uncertainty,” the bank said in its Europe and Central Asia Economic Update report.

The bank forecasts the Turkish economy to expand by 3.1 percent next year and 3.9 percent in 2025, a downward revision from its previous estimates of 4.3 percent and 4.1 percent, respectively, in June.

“Gradual fiscal consolidation is expected to continue supporting fiscal balances, and the macro-financial stabilization alongside lira depreciation and policy support to exporters is expected to further narrow the current account deficit,” the bank said.

The international lender stressed that the new economic team, under Finance Minister Şimşek and Central Bank Governor Hafize Gaye Erkan, has started normalizing macro-financial policies and outlined more measures in the September Medium Term Program to remedy imbalances in the economy.

Distortive financial regulations are being unwound, including easing maintenance requirements on securities that require banks to hold government bonds and rolling back the FX-protected deposit scheme, alongside fiscal consolidation through tax increases, it noted.

Despite recent prioritizing of policy tightening and disinflation, a pre-election stimulus could increase short-term growth, while aggravating already-elevated external risks, the report warned.

“The outlook faces considerable uncertainty related to the macroeconomic policy stance in the run-up to the March 2024 municipal elections and the phasing out of the FX-protected deposit scheme and heterodox regulations distorting the financial sector,” the bank said.

Source: Hurriyet Daily News

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What are Erdogan and Putin thinking when they meet up in person as they recently did on September 4? What are they looking to gain off each other, if anything, that they can’t through intermediaries? What implicit messages are intended for the world – and their own public? Both hail from relatively closed societies – closed by them – especially at the top, thus very little authentic information is made available. Teasing out the truth requires advanced forms of what used to be called ‘Kremlinology’, reading the signs based on years of observation. Luckily this column has done just that for some decades – adduced from field experience reporting on wars and political shenanigans in the region.

Putin and Erdo met in Sochi on the Russian Black Sea coast to discuss the Ukraine grain deal. Putin emerged saying it’s still no go. Erdogan came away saying progress was made. Since both leaders control their media, they can posture publicly in that way without fear of contradiction at home. So, at the very least, it’s a photo-op and a plus for both. Look how world leaders come to pay homage to your leader, is the message, a form of legitimation. The photo-op occurs at a time when Erdogan has ‘won’ a national election and feels emboldened. Putin is slowly losing grip on Moscow’s empire. Usually, on such occasions, the Kremlin boss likes to keep his visitor waiting as a psy-op maneuver up front. He can’t afford to do that with Erdogan, at this point, because real-world consequences would follow – he knows the Turkish prez is a vindictive guy.

What consequences? Who has more leverage over the other? Well, it’s a pretty balanced situation. Turkey allows a lot of dark money to flow to and from Russia. A crucial source of foreign currency. Turkey gets the benefit of Russian tourism that keeps the hotels and restaurants afloat in the midst of severe inflation/recession. The Kremlin, no doubt, has tons of embarrassing communications by Erdo, his family, his party that Russian snooping apparatus has picked up. But he has proved impervious to such leaks from any quarter, having sailed through several down the years. His followers don’t care. Above all, he knows the Russians prefer him to any squeaky-clean fully pro-Western non-authoritarian leader. He’s a man they can do business with, as the saying goes.

He’s also, in many ways, their worst nightmare strategically. Erdo has now signed defense pacts with several of the Central Asian countries, from Azerbaijan eastwards. Ankara is displacing Moscow as the security guarantor of Russia’s underbelly across the ‘Stans, reconstituting a pan-Turkic bloc to counter-balance domination by Russia after some three centuries of Kremlin hegemony. Let us not forget the enormity of that challenge to the status quo – if such a bloc gels it can destabilize other Turkic areas in the Russian Federation such as Tatarstan, Astrakhan, Bashkortostan and the like. China and Iran support Putin in his geo-throttling of Central Asia but slowly, inexorably, they’re losing their grip. And the US is finally getting into the game actively, as this column indicated recently via a leaked letter from President Biden to the President of Uzbekistan.

And then there’s Ukraine. Essentially, the Russo-Turkic tug-of-war over Ukraine is a struggle over domination of the Black Sea. Russian control over Crimea being a central peg. Again, a story of centuries – ever since Turkic ally, the Khan of Crimea, lost power to the Kremlin in the 18^th century. These are deep tectonic plates of memory and history and both leaders feel their force when they meet. Putin has suddenly opened disastrous cracks in the Procrustean bed of Russian hegemony by his invasion of Ukraine. It’s an opportunity for Erdogan to write his name in history as the Turkish leader who helped liberate the Crimean Tatar cousins from Moscow’s yoke. And, now, you can understand the full symbolic significance of Zelensky appointing a Crimean Tatar as the Defense Secretary of Ukraine. Ukraine, too, is getting into the game of liberating Crimea from Moscow.

Close to the surface too, no doubt, was the issue of Turkey’s Bayraktar drones. They caused havoc on Russian forces and armor for many months. And then we heard very little about them. Essentially, the Russians had built microwave towers that could detect their signature in advance. They were rendered ineffectual. At the time of the Sochi meeting both leaders surely knew that. But Erdogan also likely knew that Ukraine had identified the towers, perhaps with Turkish help. Recently, at least one tower was destroyed by Ukraine on the Crimea coast and suddenly the Bayraktars were aloft again, hitting targets inland and along the coast. ‘We haven’t seen much of your drones recently,’ Putin might have said, as a humiliating aside. Erdogan might have responded ‘You will.’

Source: Forbes

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At a meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who was visiting Iran for the first time since he assumed his post in June, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi last Sunday stressed the need to stand against the presence of “foreign parties” in the Caucasus, calling for cooperation and negotiation to settle the differences among the conflicting parties. The Iranian president’s strong emphasis on the foreign presence in this region should be understood within a broader context that includes both Tehran’s foreign policy toward the Caucasus and the perception of Turkiye’s role there.

The South Caucasus, which includes three small states, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, has often been prone to instability and tension. What makes the situation more complicated is that these countries are surrounded by larger neighbors, namely Turkiye, Iran and Russia, which have high stakes in the region.

As a consequence of the Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020, which ended with a victory for Azerbaijan over Armenia thanks to Turkiye’s support, Iran’s influence in the region started to fade. Meanwhile, Russia is tied up on the Ukraine front, meaning it now has less influence on developments in the Caucasus. For Iran, one of the main consequences of the Ukraine war is that it has led Moscow to turn away from the Caucasus, throwing off the delicate geopolitical balance in favor of Turkiye.

Moreover, despite having fragile relationships with both Russia and Iran, Turkiye is ultimately a NATO member state that is increasing its role and influence in the Caucasus, which is historically considered as Russia’s backyard. And greater influence in Azerbaijan provides a gateway for Ankara to extend its reach beyond the Caucasus, toward the Caspian Sea and further into Central Asia. Thus, Iran aims to limit Turkiye’s influence and somehow try to reshape the balance in the Caucasus according to its own national interests.

One of the main consequences of the Ukraine war is that it has led Moscow to turn away from the Caucasus

Sinem Cengiz

It is no secret that there is an ongoing strategic rivalry between Iran and Turkiye for power and influence in the Caucasus — and this rivalry has an ethnic dimension that even threatens the borders in this region.

In the past few years, empowered by victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan has increased its rhetoric regarding the protection of the Azeris living in Iran. President Ilham Aliyev’s statements identifying the Azeris in Iran as “part of its people” have irked Tehran. Azerbaijan has also launched military drills near the Iranian border, with one of the largest dubbed as “Brother’s Fist,” which also irritated Tehran. For Iran, the border with Azerbaijan is perceived through a security perspective. Iran’s military exercises near the border in 2021 and 2022 should be evaluated in this context, as they were an apparent warning to Baku not to annex key Armenian land.

In addition, Azerbaijan’s deepening relations with Israel in recent years has been one of the main sources of contention between Baku and Tehran. In late March, Azerbaijan opened an embassy in Israel for the first time — a move that followed a rise in military relations between the two countries. Following this, in early April, Azerbaijan expelled four Iranian diplomats, resulting in Tehran’s reciprocal action a month later. Thus, Nagorno-Karabakh became the turning point for Tehran, which is well aware that Azerbaijan’s victory against Armenia could not have been achieved without Turkish and Israeli support and Russia’s inability to prevent Armenia’s defeat. Now, Iran sees a weak Armenia that seeks rapprochement with Turkiye, while an empowered Azerbaijan cultivates closer ties with Israel and Ankara aims to shape the developments in the region in its favor.

Despite the diminishing Russian influence in the region, the US does not seem to want to fill that vacuum. This is due to two factors. The first is that Azerbaijan is not an actor that would rely on the US at the expense of its close ties with Moscow. Secondly, for the US, with its pivot to Asia strategy, the tension-prone Caucasus is not a priority. This automatically leaves the region to two Middle Eastern powers: Iran and Turkiye.

In its latest diplomatic foray into Caucasus politics, Iran endorsed peace talks between Baku and Yerevan

Sinem Cengiz

Within this context, Iran is trying to rely on its diplomatic skills to manage its tacit rivalry with Turkiye. In its latest diplomatic foray into Caucasus politics, Iran endorsed peace talks between Baku and Yerevan. In so doing, it aimed to achieve the following goals: to ease heightened tensions with Azerbaijan, to avoid pushing Baku further toward Israel, to take the mediator role away from Turkiye, and to protect its interests in the Caucasus. For many years, Tehran kept a relatively low profile in this region in order to avoid provoking a Russian reaction. However, it now lacks the leverage that Turkiye, or even Russia, has on Azerbaijan.

The Iranian-Turkish rivalry in the Caucasus also has an economic dimension. Turkiye’s efforts to link up with Central Asia via the Caspian Sea are perceived as a direct challenge to Iranian economic interests. The Zangezur corridor, which is part of a larger project aimed at connecting Baku to Istanbul via Armenian land, is a good example in this regard.

Iran’s continuous emphasis on the “foreign presence” and its warnings against “border changes” and the “blocking of existing transit routes” in the South Caucasus should be read while taking into account all of these dimensions. Thus, Iranian foreign policy toward the region is intertwined with its domestic security and the regional balance of power.

Source: Arab News

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Frankfurt (21/08 – 44.44)

The Kazakh capital, Astana will play host to the first-ever international scientific conference Central Asian Oncology Week on September 6-8, as announced by the Kazakh Healthcare Ministry’s press service.

The leading experts from Central Asia, CIS and non-CIS countries are expected to share the best practices, hold satellite symposiums, and debate reports aimed at promoting and introducing international practice of oncologists in Kazakhstan.

Speakers from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Türkiye, Russia, Belarus, the UK, Germany, the U.S. and South Korea are expected to attend the conference.

It is organized by the National Scientific Oncology Centre and Society of Surgical Oncologists with the support of the Kazakh Healthcare Ministry.

The conference will be held offline as well as online in Kazakh, Russian and English.

Astana will play host to the first-ever international scientific conference Central Asian Oncology Week on September 6-8, 2023.

Source

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For young Uyghurs from China’s Xinjiang region, Istanbul’s East Turkistan Youth Center has been a godsend during a difficult time.  

One 25-year-old who arrived in Turkey in 2016 turned to the center for counseling after struggling with a drug habit.

“When I heard about this center and the support they were providing to Uyghur youth for free, I couldn’t believe my ears,” he said. “Before joining the center, I was involved in negative activities and used drugs like heroin.”

Abdusami Hoten, 30, co-founded the center in 2021 in Istanbul’s Safakoy district – one of the most heavily Uyghur-populated areas of the city – to offer guidance and housing for Uyghur youths.

The 25-year-old, who requested anonymity so as not to harm his future prospects, moved to Turkey to further his education. But he wasn’t able to enroll in classes – he was out of work and his parents’ plans to move from Xinjiang to Turkey fell through.

He became isolated and depressed and lost hope in his future. That’s when he turned to illegal drugs.

Eventually, a friend suggested that he seek help at the center shortly after it opened.

“The center’s primary objective is to educate and assist Uyghur youth who are on the wrong path, such as addiction to gambling, drugs and other substances, and guide them toward reintegrating into society,” said Hoten, a Uyghur who has lived in Turkey since 2016. 

Roughly 50,000 Uyghurs live in Turkey, the largest Uyghur diaspora outside Central Asia. The Turkish government has offered Uyghurs a safe place to live outside Xinjiang, where they face persecution.  

But once in Turkey, some Uyghur youths have encountered unemployment, economic hardship and drug addiction.

“Our wish for the youth is that they can, whether in the society or in a foreign country, avoid becoming a burden to others and instead actively contribute to both society and the Uyghur community, while embracing and preserving their ethnic identity,” Hoten said.

Since its inception, the center has served over 220 people, helping nearly three dozen young people recover from drug addiction, he said.

The 25-year-old has received treatment for his drug use and is learning about herbal medicine to become an herbal doctor.

Hoten has organized classes on psychology and Uyghur history, and other events that have offered new perspectives, the 25-year-old said.

“We received valuable advice from elders, and every week, we had food gatherings, strengthening our bonds like brothers,” he said. “Gradually, our interest in living increased, and we are incredibly grateful for the positive changes.”

Boxing, painting and host talks

A similar community facility for Uyghurs – the Palwan Uyghur Youth Center – was founded in 2019 by Samarjan Saidi, a 34-year-old Uyghur, as a place in Safakoy district for young people to play sports and learn new skills.

The center consists of a boxing club and a separate youth facility that offers courses in painting, arts and crafts, English and the natural sciences. Organizers also host talks and field trips. 

Initially, Saidi wanted to create a family-like environment for Uyghur youths, so he and some friends set up a boxing club in a rented basement. Later, with funding from the U.S.-based Uyghur NextGen Project, they were able to move the boxing club to another facility and set up a youth center. 

The main purpose of the center is to help young people prepare for college by providing guidance that aligns with their interests and talents, Saidi said.

Saidi was born in Qumul and raised in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi. He moved to Denmark in the early 2000s to go to school. After he graduated, he intended to return home and start a business with friends. 

“However, in 2016, some of my friends who had returned home from Europe had their passports confiscated,” Saidi told RFA. “I decided not to return home for the time being.”

That year, Chinese authorities in Xinjiang began collecting passports. Uyghurs had to hand them in to authorities who said they would hold them for safekeeping and would return them for any necessary travel abroad. But that was not the case in most instances.

The situation worsened in 2017, when authorities began arbitrarily arresting both prominent and ordinary Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, sending them to “re-education” camps or prison for participating in “illegal” religious practices or activities deemed “extremist” or a threat to national security.

It was during this time that Saidi and his friends in Europe decided to open the boxing club and pooled their finances.  

“As we made progress, we invited English teachers, which attracted more people to join,” he said. “Even girls requested having a training environment, and one of the girls who was already training in a Turkish club took responsibility for training them.”

‘Warm and friendly environment’

As more youths joined, the center began offering English courses and organized social events, Saidi said.

With a computer and US$25,000 from the Uyghur NextGen Project, Saidi and his colleagues purchased new space for the boxing club and renovated it themselves. They also bought a nearby hair salon and turned it into the Palawan Youth Center. 

“While we may not fully recreate the family environment that we left behind, our main goal is to create a warm and friendly environment as close to it as possible,” Saidi said.

When two youths wanted to learn how to play traditional Uyghur instruments like the dutar, a long-necked two-stringed lute, and promote Uyghur culture through music, organizers found a Uyghur musician to provide instruction. They did the same for a young woman who wanted to learn how to draw.

The center also hosts art displays to showcase the works of its members, summer picnics and talks given by Uyghur professionals. 

“During Ramadan, we organize iftar [fast-breaking evening meal] events, preceded by speeches from religious figures and successful individuals,” he said. “We come together to eat, pray and strengthen our bonds during such events.”

Idris Ayas, a staffer who has lived in Turkey for 11 years and has a master’s degree in international law, has worked with young Uyghurs since 2019. 

“In essence, the Palawan Youth Center has not only become a place of learning and growth but also evolved into a welcoming home and family for our Uyghur students,” he said.

Source: RFA News

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ISTANBUL — A Turkish man is under investigation by Istanbul prosecutors over his alleged involvement in organ trafficking connected to a Tokyo-based nonprofit whose director is currently on trial for violating the Organ Transplants Law.

The Turkish man, 59, worked as an organ transplant coordinator for the NPO, called the Intractable Disease Patient Support Association. The NPO’s director, Hiromichi Kikuchi, 63, has been accused of facilitating unauthorized organ transplants overseas.

The Turkish man was temporarily detained in May and has been questioned by prosecutors on a voluntary basis. He admitted to being under investigation Tuesday when he spoke to The Yomiuri Shimbun for the first time in Istanbul.

He was arrested by Ukrainian authorities in 2017 on suspicion of his involvement in organ trafficking involving two Japanese patients, but denied any involvement in illegal transplants when interviewed.

The man said he is a physician and a graduate of Istanbul University. He claimed to have been involved in medical tourism involving foreign patients since 2011, when he was a staff physician, and said he had been involved in more than 200 organ transplants.

In mid-May, Istanbul prosecutors detained him and 13 others on suspicion of involvement in organ trafficking. They were suspected of presenting false documents to public authorities in an attempt to fraudulently obtain approval for operations on behalf of foreigners who wished to undergo transplants.

The nationalities of the patients and donors, as well as the amounts of money involved in the organ trafficking, were not disclosed. However, some of the trafficking and transplants are said to have taken place in Uzbekistan.

Among the 14 people detained was a physician who was arrested with the Turkish man in the Ukrainian case. The Turkish man told The Yomiuri Shimbun that they were released for lack of evidence, but he has been banned from leaving his country, and the investigation is continuing.

The Turkish man also said he was introduced to Kikuchi by a coordinator of a Bulgarian hospital and then began arranging doctors, hospitals and other elements for transplants for Kikuchi.

He said he heard from the coordinator that Kikuchi could bring in 20 to 30 patients a year, so “I thought I could earn $100,000 (about ¥14 million) a year if I was paid $5,000 per patient for arranging things.”

In April 2021, the NPO mediated kidney transplants for two Japanese people in Bulgaria. In December of that year, a Japanese woman received a kidney transplant from a living donor in Kyrgyzstan. The Turkish man arranged a hospital for the transplant performed in Kyrgyzstan, and nearly $15,000 (about ¥2.1 million) was paid to the donor.

The Turkish man admitted that he had arranged a doctor for the transplant performed in Kyrgyzstan, but denied any involvement in the payment to the donor.

Kikuchi pleaded not guilty at his first trial hearing last month.

Source: Japan News

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Four countries have been exchanging views on normalizing ties between Türkiye and Syria, as well as counterterrorism, political process, and humanitarian matters, including the voluntary, safe, and dignified return of Syrians.

The country’s foreign ministers met in Russia’s capital Moscow on May 10 and agreed to form a committee to normalize relations between Türkiye and Syria.

Syria has been mired in a vicious civil war since early 2011 when the Assad regime cracked down on pro-democracy protests with unexpected ferocity.

Source: Yeni Safak

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Rüya Bayegan using prime minister Barzani’s right hand – Rania Majeed – to elbow her way back to KRG?

Ankara, Erbil (4/1 – 45).

Rüya Bayegan, the CEO of BGN International and its Turkey-based subsidiary Bayegan Group, was once considered an instrumental member of the petrochemical industry in Turkey. However, as of at least October 2022, Bayegan and her husband, Ercüment Bayegan, have been under investigation by Turkish authorities on allegations of fraud, document forgeries and tax evasion as a result of their role in the disastrous Yurtgas scandal.

The recent contract between BGN International with the Indonesian state owned oil and gas company Pertamina raises questions in Jakarta with various government supervisory agencies.

In June 2022 the magazine Upstream reported the Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission, the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), has reportedly launched an investigation into possible graft relating to the historic procurement of liquefied natural gas by national oil company Pertamina.

In an attempt to prove Rüya Bayegan utility to the Turkish government and dampen her fall from grace, it appears that Bayegan is turning to long familiar partners in Kurdistan.

Bayegan Group/BGN has a history of operating in Kurdistan, but little information is available in the public domain. Turkish energy policy heavily features the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and as a former extension of Turkish economic objectives, Bayegan has proven to be a useful proxy there for politics as well as business.

Local sources note that Bayegan, and BGN/Bayegan Group, have intentionally obscured their relationships inside of Kurdistan’s government to maintain unincumbered access to the local oil and gas markets. It stands to reason that the KRG, which has garnered a reputation of being rife with “corruption, cronyism, and nepotism”, would also seek to downplay its relationship with external players benefitting from such a structure.

When Prime Minister Barzani took office, he vowed to address these issues, instating individuals in relevant positions in the more notorious of ministries, to include the Ministry for Natural Resources. However, when his appointee – Kamal Atroshi – became too focused on implementing anticorruption measures, Barzani turned his most powerful supporter and ally on him, forcing him out of his job.

In August 2022 the Fikra Forum highlighted that despite the promises of reform Kurdistan business as usual continues in the troubled region.

It is this ally, Prime Minister Barzani’s gatekeeper and close personal confidante, Dr. Rania Majeed (Ranya Majid), with whom Bayegan has maintained a quiet, close relationship. Majeed is known inside of KRG and among government insiders as the “untouchable” and fiercely loyal right hand to Barzani and manages relationships and highest priority objectives on Barzani’s political and personal agendas, to include in the oil and gas and housing sectors. According to Draw Dr. Rania Majeed was appointed in 2019 as the economic advisor to Masrour Barzani as a key appointee of the Kurdish administration tightly controlling the oil revenues to Kurdistan.  

Given that Bayegan is facing civil and potential criminal charges stemming from allegations of tax evasion, forgeries of documents, company names, and addresses, as well as unpaid million-dollar debts, it is no surprise that Kurdistan and Majeed have downplayed their relationship – a public connection between the two would throw their historical and ongoing professional collaborations under extraordinary scrutiny.  

“It is yet to be seen if the Kurdish administration continues to engage with questionable business partners to enrich themselves or not”, said a senior official in Ankara.

The recent contract between BGN International with Indonesian state owned oil and gas company, Pertamina raises questions in Jakarta with various government supervisory agencies.

Bayegan- Kurdish relationship

Bayegan and Majeed have shared a longstanding business relationship, mutually benefitting from their exclusive arrangements. It is through this relationship – and Majeed’s ability to influence the energy industry at her whim –  that Bayegan is able to access products before others in the industry.

Recently, It was reported that the KRG’s oil ministry offered Bayegan additional spot volumes previously designated for other trading partners. BGN International’s director Emin Imanov was quoted as stating that the company was offered and agreed to purchase these barrels. The price of BGN’s purchase remains undisclosed. 

Rania Majeed’s energy influence 

Given the important role the energy sector plays in KRG politics, it’s no surprise that Barzani has installed his number two as a gatekeeper for oil contracts. Barzani specifically requested that Majid serve as an advisor within the Ministry of Natural Resources in order to act a direct and trusted line of information within one of the most critical to his success as prime minister. 

Majeed serves as the primary interlocutor for the KRG’s energy relations with key stakeholders, ranging from internal decision-makers in the sector to external advisors and leaders. Together with RT Bank director Hamela Gardi and the director general of contracts and companies at the Ministry of Natural Resources, Dr. Ghazala, Majeed holds the keys to the proverbial kingdom, and has the latitude to dictate who end up among KRG’s energy partners.

A source in the Ministry of Natural Resources echoed a sentiment published in an article about Majeed’s influence, “no oil minister can encroach on the power of these three women in Barzani’s cabinet.”  

When previous Minister for Natural Resources Kamal Atroshi began pushing for transparency in the ministry, Majid intervened and sought to obstruct and undermine Atroshi’s efforts, resulting in Atroshi’s resignation in May 2022.  Majid also reportedly influenced Atroshi’s decision to change oil payment dates for invoices from 15 days to three months in 2020. 

Source: Cairo Herald

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