Central Asian consumer confidence ratios averaging 125.7 points, compared with 47.6 points in the European Union during September

A major macroeconomic survey on consumer confidence (CCI) in the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan has just been released by Freedom Finance Global, a listed financial analytical business in Astana.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, due to the relatively more closed nature of the country compared to other Central Asian republics, does not officially participate in the analysis, although we do provide data. Turkmenistan was not included in this survey due to the local difficulties of compiling consumer data.

Survey Methodology

This new research allows us to assess the dynamics of changes in the indicators, including consumer confidence, inflation assessment and expectations of the population on the dollar exchange rate. The main emphasis is placed on comparing the obtained data with official statistics on inflation (including for individual goods) and Central Bank surveys (if available in the regions).

The research is based on the methodology used for obtaining consumer confidence indices in many countries of the world and adapted to local tasks by specialists of the United Research Technologies Group. The method of data collection is a telephone survey. The survey questionnaire is localised: the survey is conducted in the native language of the respondents.

In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, analysts collected 3,600 questionnaires per wave, in Kyrgyzstan at 1,600 and Tajikistan at 1,200 questionnaires per month, proportionate to the population of the countries under study. The sample in each country is constructed taking into account gender and age quotas in the regions where respondents live (representative by gender, age, income level and place of residence).

Kazakhstan

In August consumer confidence index of Kazakhstan citizens made 100.3 points, which is slightly lower than in July, but higher in formally positive value.

A noticeable decrease by 4.5 p.p. showed the assessment of favourable current conditions for large purchases: in August, only 38.6% of respondents assessed the situation positively, in July this figure was higher 40.7%. Kazakhstanis assessed the possibility of current and future changes in the personal financial situation slightly lower, but this parameter continues to outpace assessments of the economic situation as a whole. It is worth noting the best result for six months on the indicator of the level of expectations of the economic situation in the future. In August, the share of those who expect the economy to deteriorate within five years decreased from 16.9% to 14.8%.

In August, annual inflation expectedly continued its decline to 13.1%. Inflation expectations of respondents also fell, as well as the assessment it fell even more significantly and showed the lowest result for the entire period of the survey, despite the growing expectations of weakening of tenge against the dollar.

Dynamics of inflation expectations of Kazakhstan citizens in the polls of the National Bank of Kazakhstan and the conducted research is contradictory. The share of respondents expecting strong price growth within one and 12 months decreased by 0.9 and 0.6 p.p., respectively.

According to the National Bank’s research, the number of such respondents increased by 2.1 and 6 p.p., which indicates a significant increase in inflation expectations. The same multidirectional dynamics can be seen in the assessment of current inflation.

Most likely, the reason for the discrepancy lies in the sample of respondents: our survey included both urban and rural residents, while in the National Bank’s survey only urban residents. Therefore, there is a difference in the list of goods and services, which, according to respondents, have increased in price. Our respondents are still concerned about the rise in food prices, while those surveyed by the National Bank especially note the high cost of non-food products and paid services.

In August, monthly inflation was 0.7% slightly higher than in the previous three months. But if we look at the structure, we can trace the absence of average price growth for food products. What cannot be said about paid services they showed intensive price growth of 1.9% mom, which is much higher than the monthly average from January to June 0.8% mom. Most likely, this is the reason for the multidirectional dynamics between the two surveys.

If we consider individual goods and services, we can say that the results of the survey are similar to the data of official statistics on inflation. Respondents naturally noticed a seasonal decrease in prices for fruits and vegetables, as well as a monthly drop in prices for household chemicals, sugar, salt and vegetable oil. The share of those who believe that prices for bread and bakery products, confectionery and milk have increased the most has also noticeably decreased. It should be noted that a slowdown in growth rates can be traced for these products relative to the average value of the previous six months.

Among 22 goods and services, for which Kazakhstanis are least likely to notice a rapid rise in prices, only two commodities stand out, showing an acceleration in growth rates. But in fact, it is rather technical, as prices for vegetable oil earlier fell more slowly. The cost of eggs, although they rose in August, fell by an average of 1.1% each month for the previous six months.

On the other hand, people began to notice the rapid growth of prices for clothes and shoes their share rose from 10.3% to 11.7%, while the price increase in August for these goods amounted to 1% against an average of 0.88% in the previous six months.

In the survey of the National Bank, we also note a change in the perception of price increases for the following goods: fruits and vegetables (the share of those who noted a strong increase increased by 21.6 p.p.), milk (down by 19 p.p.) and housing and utilities services (down by 18.7 p.p.). Taking into account a slight increase in milk prices by 0.4% against the average 1.3% for the period from January to July and a drop in prices for fruits and vegetables by 2.1%, such dynamics is reasonable. But at the same time, housing and communal services officially rose in price by 3% in August. Such a strong growth over the past five years was observed only in September 2022.

Monthly dynamics in the two studies among the 30 goods examined was the same for 20 items. Particularly significant differences can be noted for housing and utilities services, cereals and pasta (despite the slowdown in price growth), electronics and household appliances.

Respondents continue to note the increased prices for housing and utilities services the share of such people increased from 12.1% to 12.8%. Taking into account the inertia and delay in receipt of receipts, it is likely to be expected that the share of those noticing a strong increase in prices for housing and utilities services will remain the same. The situation is the opposite for AI-95 petrol. Due to the fact that the brand is not the most popular, the price growth did not particularly affect the share, which decreased from 14.4% to 12.3%. The same situation in the survey of the National Bank, where the share decreased even more significantly: from 20.5 to 12.9%. The growth of AI-95 petrol prices was 3.9% mom amid shortages in the southern regions.

August showed that Kazakhstanis began to worry more about the dollar exchange rate. The share of those who believe that the rate will rise in a year rose from 52.2% to 54.7%. The share of respondents, expecting dollar growth during the month has significantly increased: from 26.6 to 34%. All this was a consequence of a sharp increase in the volatility of the exchange rate in August. Nevertheless, expectations of dollar growth did not transform into inflation expectations of respondents. But the following questions remain open is this phenomenon temporary and will we see an increase in inflation expectations in September?

Uzbekistan

The consumer confidence index in Uzbekistan was 136.4 points, which indicates a monthly growth of 2.3 p.p. Also, as in the case of Kazakhstan, we can notice a deterioration in assessments and forecasts of personal financial situation and a parallel improvement in assessments and forecasts of the country’s economic situation. Although the Uzbeks, unlike their northern neighbours, gave a more positive assessment of the favourable conditions for large purchases.

While in July the greatest optimism among all components of the satisfaction index was evoked by the indicator of expectations of changes in personal financial situation, in August the sub-index on expectations of the economic situation in the long term took the palm of superiority.

The share of people who believe that their financial situation will significantly improve has sharply decreased from 50.6% to 40.7%. But if the answer “will improve a little” is taken into account, the overall positive result fell slightly: from 71.9 to 70%. Estimates of changes in personal well-being over the last year have also declined, but not so noticeably. In July there were 25.5% of people who noted a significant improvement in this component, and in August their share dropped to 21.5%.

In July, 52.7% of respondents thought that the economic situation in five years will be good, and in August the share of respondents with a positive forecast rose to 58.8%. The situation with the annual forecast is similar: the number of optimists increased sharply from 46 to 55.2%. The number of respondents who said that the situation will significantly improve has not increased significantly over the past year: in August, 21.3% of respondents said so, which is 0.1% higher than in July.

Annual inflation in Uzbekistan in August remained virtually unchanged at 8.96% against 8.94% in July. This indicator is one of the lowest for the last seven years. Over the month, prices rose by 0.54% on average, while inflation expectations of Uzbeks showed a decline.

The share of those expecting strong price growth during the month fell from 20.3% to 17.2%, and during the year from 33.2% to 29.2%. The proportion of respondents who highly estimate price growth over the past year also decreased significantly: from 46.3 to 42.7%, while in the assessment for the month people rather expressed the opposite opinion.

The percentage of those who noticed a perceptible increase in cost over the month rose from 24.3% to 25.4%, which is probably due to July’s monthly deflation of 0.2%. In August, the price increase was already by 0.54%.

In terms of assessing the cost of individual products, the leaders are still meat and poultry: 61.3% of residents noticed an increase in prices for this commodity. Official statistics indicates an increase in the cost of beef (15%), mutton (14%) and poultry (22%). About 30% of respondents chose the following goods: vegetables and fruits, medicines, construction materials, petrol, sugar, salt and vegetable oil.

According to the Agency of Statistics under the President of Uzbekistan, today we see an acceleration of the annual growth of petrol prices over the month they increased by 2.2 p.p., and medicines and medical products by 0.8 p.p. On the other hand, prices for sunflower oil decreased by 19.1% over the last year, and sugar prices increased by only 3.9%, but residents still note the prices for these goods as one of the fastest growing.

On the similar issue of price growth for individual goods and services, the results of the Central Bank of Uzbekistan and Freedom Finance Global surveys were quite similar. Uzbeks noted strong price increases for meat and milk (45%), petrol and fuel (40%), construction materials (33%), footwear and clothing (29%), fruit and vegetables (25%), medicines (25%), eggs (23%), and sugar and chocolate (23%).

On 10 August, the dollar-to-sum exchange rate rose sharply by 3.5% in one day: from 11,667 to 12,075 soum per $1. This situation probably led to a sharp increase in the number of residents who could not answer the question about the change in the dollar exchange rate. At the expense of this, the share of those who now expect the weakening of the soum has paradoxically decreased: from 54.8 to 47.4% in the horizon of a month and from 69.5 to 62.7% in the horizon of a year. The number of optimists who expected the soum to strengthen against the dollar decreased from 8.1 to 6.1% in the month horizon and from 6.5 to 5.9% in the 12-month horizon.

Kyrgyzstan

In Kyrgyzstan, the consumer confidence index stood at 125.4 points, down slightly from July. The fall can be seen in all six sub-indices. The assessment of the current economic situation decreased most strongly by 3.1 points. Expectations of personal financial situation within a year and economic situation within five years have also noticeably worsened by 3 points.

If in July 29.1% of Kyrgyz people assessed the changes in the economy over the past 12 months very positively, in August the share of such people decreased to 25.8%, while the number of pessimists increased from 8.8 to 10.8%.

If we talk about economic expectations within five years, the decrease in the share of such respondents was only 0.2 p.p., but the main change was a decrease in the percentage of cautious optimists from 15.9 to 13.3%. The situation is similar in the issue of expectations of personal financial situation. If the drop in the share of those expecting a significant improvement was 1 p.p., the share of those expecting a slight improvement fell more significantly: by 2 p.p. In general, the sub-indices of Kyrgyzstan showed the most noticeable decline by 3-3.1 points.

Estimates and forecasts of inflation in Kyrgyzstan slightly increased compared to July indicators. Thus, expectations for strong price growth increased by 0.8 p.p. within a month and by 0.5 p.p. within 12 months. Also, the share of those who believe that over the past year prices have grown faster than before has increased by 0.3 p.p. But in the assessment of strong price growth over the last month there is a slight decrease in the share of respondents: from 40 to 39.1%. Annual inflation in Kyrgyzstan continued to decline: from 10.3 to 9.5% in August. It was due to the seasonal fall in fruit prices: by 13.3%. Non-food inflation in Kyrgyzstan remains high and reached 14.6% in August against 14.1% in July and 10.9% 12 months ago.

Among individual goods and services, residents note a strong increase in prices for vegetable oil (56%), fruits and vegetables (54%), cereals and pasta (49%), sugar and salt (48%), meat and poultry (+46%). It can be seen that Kyrgyz people are more concerned about food than non-food products, although official statistics partially disagrees with the opinion of residents, given the 13.3% decrease in the cost of fruit in August. Nevertheless, the annual growth of prices for vegetables continues to remain at 18.2%, having decreased only by 0.6 p.p. in comparison with July. In addition, fruit prices rose so strongly in July (+19.6% mom) that it still influences the opinion of residents.

On the other hand, the prices for bread, cereals and meat on average increased only by 6.7% and 5.5% over the last 12 months, which clearly contradicts the survey results. Although the same rice has increased in price from 86.2 to 142.8 som on average over the last year. Strong growth in the cost of rice is also observed in the rest of Central Asia. Among non-food items, Kyrgyzstani people (20.1%) noticed the most increase in prices for fuels and lubricants, which is not surprising given the 5.5% increase in the price of AI-92 petrol during August.

In August, expectations for weakening of the KGS exchange rate against the dollar changed insignificantly. The share of respondents expecting the dollar to grow during the month increased from 16.7 to 17.6%, and in the horizon of one year such people, on the contrary, became less: from 29.2% in July to 28.8% in August. In general, the dollar appreciated by only 0.5% against the som during August, unlike in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, where the weakening of the national currency was more noticeable. Consequently, the devaluation sentiment of Kyrgyz citizens expectedly remained virtually unchanged.

Tajikistan

Consumer confidence index in Tajikistan in August totalled 140.8 points, having significantly increased compared to July, when the first indicator was 134.5 points. In general, all sub-indices, except for the assessment of favourable conditions for large purchases, showed growth.

The assessment of the current economic situation grew most significantly by 14.1 points. Also, the index of expectations for changes in personal financial situation during the year increased by 11.2 points and the assessment of personal financial situation increased by 7.4 points.

In August, the share of respondents who noted the improvement of the economy over the last year increased sharply: from 40.1 to 54.4%. This increase was possible due to a decrease in the share of cautious optimists and neutral respondents. Also, the share of people expecting a significant improvement in their personal financial situation during the year increased significantly: from 36.8% to 46.7%. However, the share of residents who believe that their financial situation improved in August increased insignificantly: from 24.6 to 31.1%.

Inflationary assessments of Tajikistanis have sharply increased compared to July. Thus, the share of those who noticed a very strong rise in prices over the last month rose from 21 to 34.9%, and in the last 12 months from 26.4 to 37.4%. Inflation data for August are not yet available, but annual inflation in Tajikistan fell from 2.4% in June to 2.3% in July. It is still unclear why August’s sharp rise in inflation occurred.

Tajikistanis note the strongest price growth for such goods as: fruits and vegetables (36.6% of respondents), vegetable oil (35%), bread and bakery products (30.4%), meat, poultry (25.8%), petrol (18%), cereals and pasta (17.7%).

For some goods, the official statistics partially coincides with the data obtained by Freedom Finance Global. For example, rice prices for 12 months rose by 58.4% on average, and the annual growth in fruit prices accelerated from 13.9% (June) to 23.2% (July). The magnitude of the price increase for vegetables also remains relatively large at 14.9%.

In general, the low inflation is rather a consequence of a significant reduction in the price of certain goods, such as flour or vegetable oil, which fell in price by 32% and 30% respectively. The decline in flour prices was made possible after the provision of tax and customs incentives, while the phenomenon of vegetable oil, which, despite such a strong fall, still occupies the leading positions, is probably due to the inertia of the residents’ perception.

In 2020, vegetable oil prices rose by as much as 42.3%, and by a further 20.8% in 2021. And even though there is a 10.6% drop in 2022, prices have risen by a cumulative 54% over these three years.

The expectations of Tajikistan’s residents regarding the exchange rate of the dollar to the somoni have changed slightly. The share of those who expect the national currency to weaken during the year increased from 27.4 to 29.6%, and in the horizon of one month such people became more from 20.4% in July to 20.6% in August. The exchange rate itself remained virtually unchanged over August, just below 11 somoni per $1.

Summary

Overall, the ranking of the four countries has not changed since July: Tajikistan has consolidated its leadership, while Kyrgyzstan has slightly narrowed the gap with Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, continues to show the lowest score, remaining in the positive zone.

In August, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan showed an increase in consumer confidence, while the other two regional neighbours, on the contrary, showed a slight decline in the CCI index. According to the survey results, we noticed a synchronised decline in estimates and forecasts of personal financial situation in all countries except Tajikistan. However, in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan people are more positive about the prospects and current assessment of the economic situation.

Inflation expectations and assessments have noticeably decreased only in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. High inflation in previous months and its long-awaited reduction in the summer had a positive impact on the residents of these countries. However, respondents still note the growth of prices for some types of food products, some of which have actually increased.

Separate surveys of the central banks of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan indicate similarities in the aspect of goods and services that showed the largest price increases. Analysing Kazakhstan, we notice a difference between the National Bank’s surveys and ours in the issue of inflation estimates and expectations. This is probably due to differences in the sample of respondents and a one-time phenomenon when food prices on average showed no increase, while the cost of paid services rose sharply.

In Uzbekistan, on the other hand, annual inflation fell to a six-year low, and the population showed an increase in optimism on this issue. In Kyrgyzstan, inflation expectations and estimates have changed little, and the first indicators remain the lowest in the region. Most likely, the reason is that the country’s historical average inflation rate is relatively low, while the current inflation rate continues to decline and has reached 9.5%. In Tajikistan, data for August have not yet been released, but in July annual inflation was at a low level of 2.3%. The August survey showed a sharp increase in inflation estimates and expectations of Tajikistanis. Next month we may understand the reason for this phenomenon when the inflation data for August and the survey results for September are available.

The dollar’s appreciation in August on world markets affected only the tenge and Uzbek soum, while the exchange rates in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan changed little. Against the background of dollar growth in Kazakhstan and exchange rate volatility, more people began to expect weakening of the tenge. It should be noted that in Uzbekistan the effect was somewhat different: weakening of the sum caused an increase in the number of people who found it difficult to give an answer.

In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, against the background of stable dynamics of the dollar exchange rate, the local population did not show a significant change in expectations to the dollar.

The second wave of the survey of consumer confidence of residents of four Central Asian countries provided an opportunity to compare indicators in dynamics, including together with official data.

One can notice similarities of varying degrees between the survey results and official statistics, Central Bank surveys and exchange rate dynamics. The next waves of the survey will complement the current picture and will be able to provide a more objective assessment, which may be useful for investors, businesses, government and monetary authorities in Central Asia.

Finally, it is interesting to note the consumer confidence points average 125.7 in the four Central Asian countries featured. This compares with 106.1 in the United States for August 2023 and 47.6 points in the EU during September 2023.

Source: Silkroad Briefing

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Remediation work at legacy uranium mining sites in Uzbekistan is under way, bolstered by a €9 million grant from the Environmental Remediation Account for Central Asia (ERA)­ set up on the initiative of the European Union (EU) and managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). This is the second Central Asian state, where such remediation activity under the ERA is taking place.

The grant funds will support work to close the identified mine openings, demolish derelict facilities that were used for uranium ore processing, and to re-cultivate selected waste rock areas at the Yangiabad and Charkesar mines.

The former site is 75 km east of the country’s capital, Tashkent. It has seven mines spread across the mountainous terrain around the town of Yangiabad. Once remediated, this area, known locally as the Uzbek Alps, will be environmentally safe, allowing livelihoods and tourism to flourish.  

The Charkesar-2 mine site is 140 km east of Tashkent and 60 km to the west of the city Namangan in the Fergana Valley. The contaminated area of approximately 25 hectares contains 5 already remediated waste rock dumps and two abandoned mine shafts. The existing water diversion channels on site are dilapidated.

The ERA has now allocated funding to remediate five out of seven high priority sites in Central Asia (three of which are in the Kyrgyz Republic and two in Uzbekistan). As well as the mandatory remediation and demolition works, the ERA-supported activity will help prevent toxic material from dispersing into the river system across the Fergana Valley, home to more than 15 million people.

The ERA was set up in 2015 on the initiative of the EU and is managed by the EBRD. It addresses the legacy of Soviet-era uranium mining in Central Asia. The EU is the ERA’s biggest donor, while contributions have also been made by Belgium, Lithuania, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the United States of America.

Source: EBRD

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Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have agreed on all but seven kilometers of their 1326 km border, but resolving the very last may be hard because they are located near the place where those two countries and Kyrgyzstan meet; and Kyrgyzstan has unresolved border disputes with both the other two (tj.sputniknews.ru/20221201/tajikistan-uzbekistan-granitsa-1053193255.html).

Nonetheless, the progress Tashkent and Dushanbe have reached is impressive and a sign that Tashkent tanis committed to delimiting and demarcating all its borders and that Dushanbe is as well. The chief problem lies with Kyrgyzstan because even when Bishkek is prepared to agree as it did recently with Tashkent, the Kyrgyz population is not.

(On that issue and how border disputes between Kyrgyzstan, on the one hand, and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, on the other, is bleeding back into the Kyrgyz political system, see jamestown.org/program/kyrgyzstan-and-tajikistan-descending-into-chaos-and-full-scale-war/ and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/11/bishkek-permits-kyrgyz-living-in-border.html.)

Until all the border disputes are resolved – and controversies have swirled continuously since 1991 – regional transportation projects are more or less on hold, drug flows and terrorist incursions are constant problems, and national elites will use these conflicts to build their own power bases even at the risk of war 

Source : EurasiaReview

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Kazakhstan celebrates 355 years of arguably one of the greatest Kazakh judges and a master of the word, Kazybek bi (bi – noble judge), who used language to unite the Kazakh people under one ruler and settle cross-border, regional and local disputes. 

Kazakhstan is home to several of the region’s greatest orators and masters of language, but outside Central Asia, their key personalities are largely unknown. One of them is Kazybek bi, who was highly distinguished within his own profession as a judge and peacemaker and as a man who always spoke with clarity, wit and absolute logic.

This is a man who not only witnessed the Dzhungar aggression, a period of peace under the rule of Tauke and the strengthening of relations between Kazakhs and the Russian Empire but also contributed to one of the major law texts that could be considered the foundation of the Kazakh classic code of law dubbed the Zheti Zhargy (Seven Charters).

He was born in 1667 in the coastal area of the Syrdarya River in southern Kazakhstan. His rare life records, preserved oral folk legends and samples of oratorical works show that he was a deeply educated man of his time, knowledgeable of the folklore, traditions, customs and laws of the Kazakh people.

In this decade, over 250 years after Kazybek bi’s death, his legacy is recognized widely among the Kazakh people to the point of him becoming one of the most respected founders of Kazakh traditional law and justice as well as philosophy. The influential contributions of Kazybek bi have stood the test of time. 

What should be remembered about Kazybek bi today?

Kazybek bi as a peacemaker

Kazybek bi’s diplomatic skills helped to amicably settle numerous disputes between Kazakhs and the various aggressors coming onto their territory in the 18th century.

One occasion, in particular, stands out as a fine example of Kazybek bi’s extraordinary strengths as a peacemaker.  

In 1742, he went to negotiate with Galdan Tseren, the huntaiji (ruler) of the Dzhungar Khanate, occupying the territory of today’s western China and eastern Kazakhstan, who had captured the young warlord Sultan Abylay.

The court of bis was a very reputable institution that resolved many disputes at an individual level as well as between the nomadic tribes. A wise bi was highly respected among the people and his decisions were strictly followed. Photo credit: e-history.kz

Few figures could deliver an eloquent speech to powerful rulers without making their blood boil – either with ruthless logic or in the spirit of dignity – quite like Kazybek bi, who told the Dzhungar ruler the following words:

“If a son is born to a father, he is not born to be a slave. If a daughter is born to a mother, she is not born to be a slave. If you are iron, we are coal – we came to melt you. We came to an unfamiliar foreign country to get to know each other. If you do not agree to know us, we came to combat. If you are a leopard, I am a lion – we want to fight or stick together like yellow glue. If you agree, tell me about your situation. If you do not, tell me where to line up for the battle.” 

Through the mediation of Kazybek bi and the help of the Russian authorities, Sultan Abylay, the future khan who united all three zhuzes (alliances of Kazakh nomadic tribes), was rescued from captivity along with 33 towns captured by the Dzhungars.

It is said that Galdan Tseren, after this encounter with Kazybek bi, dubbed him “kaz dauysty Kazybek ” which translates to goose-voiced Kazybek and has the figurative meaning of having a piercing voice.

Kazybek bi’s contribution to lawmaking

In his time, Kazybek bi was regarded as the foremost authority of the law and justice. 

He managed the Middle Zhuz along with his fellow bis – Tole bi from the Great Zhuz and Aiteke bi from the Small Zhuz – under the rule of Tauke Khan and remained an adviser on foreign and domestic affairs later under the khans Samek, Abilmambet and Abylay.

A monument in Atyrau to the three Kazakh prominent bis who established the foundation of Kazakh code of laws. From left to right: Kazybek bi, Tole bi, Aitekek bi. Photo credit: bugin.kz

He masterfully solved local disputes based on his knowledge of legal and historical precedents. His decisions were fair and he was known as “a true reasoner.” 

He is also regarded as a key contributor to the creation of the Zheti Zhargy, a code of law drawn up from traditional rules of Kazakhs’ everyday life and requirements of the time, which was used by the Kazakh people until the mid-19th century.

At the foundation of the Zheti Zhargy are the principles of adat (local customary practices) and sharia (Islamic law). There were sections on property and land, family-marriage relations with the rights and obligations, the law on punishment for various crimes, including the payment of qun (compensation for grave crimes) and the law on widows, which regulated the rights of orphans and widows.

His contribution to the unification of Kazakhs under one khanate

To understand Kazybek bi’s contribution to the unification of the Kazakh Khanate, it is important to remember that in the 18th century, the Kazakh tribes and zhuzes living on the territory of Kazakhstan were somewhat divided and they were constantly under attacks from Dzhungars.

In such circumstances, Kazakh bis played a significant role in maintaining order on the territories of zhuzes they managed. The khans closely listened to the bis because they had the ability to influence the people.

Kazybek bi often talked about issues that engaged the public, such as the big questions regarding morality, ethics and justice. His speeches were noted for their aphoristic nature and many of his sayings went into folklore as proverbs and sayings. He used language to express the highest truths on unity, dignity, peace and tolerance.

Serving under Abylay Khan, Kazybek bi supported the unification of the Kazakhs under one centralized rule.

“One for the fact that a disunited country is bad. Two for the fact that grown men being at odds is bad,” said Kazybek bi, preaching for unity at all levels of society. 

According to historical records, he died in 1764 at the foothills of the Semizbuga mountain on the territory of the modern Karagandy Region. He is buried in Turkistan in the Khoja Akhmet Yassawi mausoleum.

Source : TheAstanaTimes

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As connectivity of Southeast Asia and the Middle East with Central Asia and the Caucasus hinges on Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Trans-Afghan Railway Line, if completed, will serve as a lifeline for an integrated Eurasia.

Initially, a conception of Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to diversify trade and supply routes of his landlocked Central Asian country, Trans-Afghan Railway Line has ever since become a dream of all stakeholders in the region for boosting connectivity.

“Termez-Mazar-e-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar Railway is our common future. When the construction of this route is completed, we will create the closest, cheapest and safest corridor connecting Pakistan to Central Asia,” Mirziyoyev said during his visit to Islamabad in 2020. Uzbekistan’s major purpose behind the project was to gain access to Pakistan’s Karachi Port, Port Qasim and Gwadar Port for its trade outreach to Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. Pakistan and Afghanistan found it more amenable to their economic revival plans.

Source : DailyTimes

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In recent years, China has pursued an increasingly aggressive foreign-policy posture known as “wolf warrior” diplomacy, one that has forcefully staked China’s positions across issues and regions.

But evidence is mounting that this strategy is backfiring. International opinion polls, such as the latest Pew Research Center survey, show that negative views of China is peaking around the world while China’s diplomatic initiatives, such as in Central and Eastern Europe, are failing.

Yet in the wake of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, China has defended its aggressive foreign policy and hinted at its intensification. At first glance, it would seem that China is simply unaware that its diplomacy is malfunctioning. But a closer look reveals that China’s choice has its own logic. Why is China so committed to this style of diplomacy despite the dangers that come with it?

Chinese media refers to this style as “Xiplomacy,” a coined term frequently used in Xinhua News headlines since 2019, short for “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.” It stands for China’s foreign-policy framework under Chinese President Xi Jinping’s leadership and is one of the five key elements of “Xi Jinping Thought,” the other four involving the economy, ecology, military, and rule of law.

At heart, Xi’s diplomacy calls for a more active role for China as a great power on the world stage, including reforming the Western-dominated international order and creating what China calls “true multilateralism.”

Compared to the other key elements, however, Xiplomacy has seen a lackluster performer in Chinese state media. According to the China Media Project, which tracks the number of times each element has been mentioned in the People’s Daily since the beginning of 2022, Xiplomacy appeared less than five times most months, whereas others averaged around 15 times.

The underplaying of Xiplomacy in state media indicates China is aware of its disappointing diplomatic performance. The one other banner phrase that also saw low usage through this year is “Xi Jinping Economic Thought,” which corresponds with China’s weak economic performance. Although China’s diplomatic travails are harder to quantify than slowing growth, the term’s relative absence from state media tells us that the party is not completely blind to the reality.

So why does the party show no intention of reorienting its foreign policy despite being aware of its underwhelming performance? The answer is that Xiplomacy is more about Xi than anything else.

Yang Jiechi, director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission and the highest foreign-policy official in the party, spoke on the study and implementation of Xiplomacy this May, the transcript of which was published in the People’s Daily. The speech was all about Xi. Yang vowed to “take a coordinated approach to the domestic and international imperatives” and “resolutely follow through on General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important instructions on external work and the decisions and plans of the CPC Central Committee.”

This highlight a key characteristic of China’s foreign policy: It is valued only as an extension of its domestic agenda, with the priority to demonstrate loyalty to Xi and his agenda. Beijing’s overreactions to inquiries into COVID-19’s origin, aggressions in the South China Sea, obsessions over border disputes, or military demonstrations in the Taiwan Strait are more motivated by internal politics and what Xi identifies as China’s priorities than effective diplomacy aimed at managing foreign relations.

At its core, Xi’s foreign policy is about boosting citizen confidence in the state by flaunting national strength. The primary audience of China’s foreign policy is domestic, not international.

Xi’s diplomatic philosophy points back to the narrative of the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”—a concept that echoes domestic patriotic sentiment. As China analyst Elizabeth Economy explains, the rejuvenation narrative “evokes memories of the country as the Middle Kingdom demanding tribute from the rest of the world; China as a source of innovation, creating paper, gunpowder, printing, and the compass; and China as an expansive, outward-facing power.” It appeals more to a domestic audience nostalgic for China’s glorious past than for an international audience, some of which might still be traumatized by China’s history as an expansionist power.

Support on social media showcases the popularity of Chinese-style diplomacy at home. The Chinese internet’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, was largely pro-Russia and pro-Russian President Vladimir Putin, much of which mimicked the aggressive tone of Chinese diplomats. Although sentiments on social media could be biased due to censorship, a survey conducted by the Carter Center shows that 75 percent of respondents agree that supporting Russia in its invasion of Ukraine is in China’s national interest, and more surprisingly, support for Russia is correlated with higher education.

Although soft power was embraced by former Chinese leader Hu Jintao, it has somewhat lost its appeal under Xi. This shift is evident in Xi’s speech during the recently concluded 20th Party Congress. According to Reuters, Xi used hard-power terms, such as “security” or “safety,” 89 times in the full work report—up from 55 times in 2017. China does care about its global image, not so much about its appeal to other countries through non-coercive means—soft power—but rather in its ability to influence other countries’ diplomatic decisions through the power it has, such as economic coercion.

As the National Endowment for Democracy’s Christopher Walker explained in Foreign Policy, “the dynamics of soft power—which arise principally from a country’s culture, its political values, and its policies—are misaligned with the incentives of systems based on pervasive state control and repression.” As China grows increasingly authoritarian under Xi, the sources of soft power—civil society, individuals, and the private sector—inevitably suffers.

After failed attempts of growing China’s soft power abroad, Xi has turned to a so-called harder version of soft power: international influence. This is about using power resources—a state’s material and ideational assets—to influence other states’ behaviors. Xi proudly announced in his 20th Party Congress speech that “China’s international influence, appeal, and shaping power have been significantly improved.”

China’s flagship foreign-policy project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), showcases China’s intent to expand its international influence using economic coercion. One salient example is Lithuania, which joined the BRI in 2017.

After Lithuania announced it would open a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius in November 2021, Beijing retaliated by destroying their bilateral trade relationship, causing economic losses worth some $320 million for Lithuanian companies in 2021. Through Lithuania, Beijing hoped to exemplify the harsh consequences facing other BRI countries if they ever misalign with Beijing’s political agenda. In reality, China’s extreme measure was a failed public relations campaign: Not only did it fray China’s relations with other Eastern European countries, but it also further damaged China-European Union relations, with the latter calling for a World Trade Organization case against Beijing’s arbitrary trade restrictions.

China’s pursuit of international influence is also reflected in its diplomatic priorities. In September, Xi visited Central Asia for his first trip overseas since the pandemic began. The choice was deliberate: China has achieved relative success with the BRI in Central Asia. Instead of choosing another BRI region, such as Eastern Europe, which has grown increasingly distant from China due to failed infrastructure promises and China’s support of Russia, China turned to Central Asia, where many in the region view connectivity as a matter of survival, especially facing the economic disruptions of Russia’s war in Ukraine. This economic direness propels Central Asian countries to support China’s political agenda, such as regarding China’s territorial claims to Taiwan, in return for infrastructure investments.

Domestically, the trip was displayed as a successful venture at asserting China’s international influence. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs frames it as “fully show[ing] the strong confidence and influence of President Xi Jinping, and the growing international standing and influence of China.”

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was announced as a new Politburo member at the 20th Party Congress, implying that he is set to replace Yang as director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, the highest ranked official for China’s foreign policy.

As a fervent advocate of “wolf warrior” diplomacy, Wang being promoted affirms the continuation, if not the intensification, of China’s aggressive diplomacy style. But more so, it reinforces the notion that the foreign minister’s primary job is to show off their loyalty to Xi.

To please the central leader, officials are keeping critical feedback and advice from reaching Xi. As journalist Dake Kang explained recently, even China’s once powerful internal system of internal reports, known as Neican, has become dangerously censored under Xi. The broken feedback loop could lead to poor decision-making, a common phenomenon with autocrats, as recently witnessed in Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine.

Facing pressing domestic issues, Xi-centered diplomacy could suffer from tunnel vision and lose its true purpose: managing relationships abroad. Instead of spreading himself too thin, Xi should allocate responsibilities to trained diplomats and informed experts to design and implement a foreign policy that focuses China’s energy outward. But that’s an unlikely possibility in a system that increasingly turns around the whims of a single man.

Source : ForeignPolice

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As a part of the High Commission’s Road map to enhance the engagement with the concurrently accredited Diplomatic Missions based in New Delhi, Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner to India, Milinda Moragoda had an interactive session with the envoys of Middle East, Central Asia and Southeast Asian diplomatic missions at the High Commission premises. 

The Heads of Mission of Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, DPR Korea, Mongolia, Syria, Tajikistan, Lebanon, Kyrgyzstan and Fiji attended this interactive session.

The objective of the engagement was to deepen Sri Lanka’s bilateral relations with the countries concerned and to explore the new areas for cooperation. High Commissioner Moragoda welcomed the group of 11 envoys and assured Sri Lanka’s readiness to work with them closely. 

The High Commissioner briefed them on the recent economic and political developments in the country and thanked the international community for the assistance and encouragement that have been provided during the difficult period. He stated that trade, investment and tourism are the three key sectors that could assist in economic revival of Sri Lanka. The discussion also focused on fisheries, connectivity and people-to-people contacts.

High Commissioner Moragoda further informed that Sri Lanka would celebrate its 75th anniversary of Independence February next year and encouraged the participation of the diplomatic representations at the celebrations scheduled to be held on 4 February 2023 in Colombo. High Commissioner also added that a Credential Ceremony for the newly appointed High Commissioners/Ambassadors is also being arranged around the same period.

This was the seventh engagement that High Commissioner Moragoda has had with the envoys of the New Delhi based diplomatic representations who are concurrently accredited to Sri Lanka. On earlier occasions he had engagements with the envoys from European, Latin American and the Caribbean and African regions.

The High Commission of Sri Lanka in New Delhi functions as the main coordinating point between the concurrently accredited 94 Foreign Missions and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka.  

Source : DailyFT

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People shiver inside their homes after a power-plant failure in Kazakhstan. A village in Tajikistan can’t pump water due to blackouts. Streetlight are used in a “restricted” capacity in the Uzbek capital, Tashkent.

Not for the first time, the cold season is throwing Central Asia’s energy shortages into sharp relief and giving hurting populations more reasons to be angry with their governments during an economic crunch.

“The shortages are caused largely by mismanagement,” Alisher Khamidov, an expert based in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek who consults on development projects, told RFE/RL. “There are huge losses of electricity, up to 40 percent in some of these countries, because the grid networks are so outdated and governments have not renovated them in years.”

Nothing Left To Spare?

In Safarmoh Bobohonova’s village 10 kilometers from the Tajik city of Kulob, daytime electricity came to a halt when scheduled blackouts began in October.

But that was the least of her problems, she told RFE/RL’s Tajik Service. “The water pump needs electricity to work. And so we haven’t had water for a month,” Bobohonova said.

In settlements around Tajikistan — although not in the big cities — annual blackouts are growing longer from week to week and are forcing residents to turn to coal.

Yet amid across-the-board inflation, coal prices have spiked 20 percent this year — a situation that traders told RFE/RL had been exacerbated by increases in road tolls levied by an omnipotent toll-collecting company.

But it is Central Asia’s most energy-rich country that has provided the most stunning evidence of the energy collapse this winter.

Ekibastuz, a city of 150,000 people in northern Kazakhstan, sits close to two of Central Asia’s largest coal mines and just 15 kilometers from a power station that supplies around 15 percent of the country’s energy.

Yet the smaller, privately owned power station that supplies the city itself and is now almost 70 years old broke down on November 27, just as temperatures plunged to -30 degrees Celsius.

In the days since the crash, footage has shown residents preferring to stand by fires instead of freezing in their apartments or face a crush to try and get an electric heater.

Residents of the northeastern city of Oskemen have also reported central-heating issues. A representative of the power station told RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service that plans to expand the station to meet growing demand were interrupted by geopolitical fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with a Russian supplier unwilling to supply parts for the rebuild.

Four of the five Central Asian countries — gas-rich, information-scarce Turkmenistan being the exception — have suffered power shortages in the last month.

Uzbekistan witnessed rare — if small — provincial protests over power shortages two years ago, and the shortages are looking similarly acute this year.

In the first half of November, a key fertilizer plant in the agriculture-rich Ferghana region ended production nearly two months ahead of schedule due to gas shortages, employees of the Ferganaazot company complained to RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service.

In Tashkent, the state company responsible for street lighting in the capital explained that nighttime illumination of central streets would be “restricted” from November 16. “We hope residents and guests of Tashkent will understand the temporary inconveniences in the…night and will also take an active part in solving the common problem of using electricity rationally and optimally,” the Toshshaharnur company said.

While Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan look to thermal power plants for the biggest share of their energy mix, in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan hydropower plays an important role in keeping the lights on.

That makes the volume of glacier-fed reservoirs adjoined to hydroelectric power stations like Toktogul in Kyrgyzstan and Nurek in Tajikistan a perennial worry for the region’s two poorest governments.

But an expert interviewed by RFE/RL’s Tajik Service argues that Tajik electric company Barqi Tojik did not have that excuse this season, suggesting that the rolling blackouts in villages this year reflected Dushanbe’s priorities. “Industrial plants receive electricity in unlimited volumes and we know that electricity is being exported to Afghanistan,” economist Abdurahmon Hakimzade said. “We should satisfy the people of Tajikistan with electricity first.”

Russia’s Offers, Renewables Drive

For the two countries with larger populations and bigger budgets — Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan — energy diversification is a visible priority.

As Ekibastuz froze, Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev was on a visit to Paris, where Kazakhstan and France signed agreements including a nearly $2 billion deal for a wind farm in Kazakhstan’s southern Jambyl region — a part of the country where the power deficit is particularly pressing.

Tashkent has also embarked on a renewables drive and signed deals worth $12 billion with Saudi Arabia in August that included plans for the world’s largest wind farm and other green energy projects.

And Russia, a thorny but long-standing energy partner for the region, does not want to feel left out. Prior to the Kremlin launching an unprovoked, full-scale war in Ukraine in February, Moscow’s Rosatom had offered to build nuclear power stations in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

But while Rosatom has yet to fall directly under Western-led sanctions, the war has added more than an element of uncertainty to those potential mega-projects.

Earlier this week, the presidential administrations of Russia and Kazakhstan confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin had proposed a “three-sided gas union” with Astana and Tashkent during a November 28 meeting with Toqaev in Moscow.

Neither country has thus far given any indication that it wishes to join such a union.

For both states, gas shortages are a straitjacket, not least because they interrupt potentially lucrative trade with China, the region’s biggest purchaser of natural gas.

In June, Sanzhar Zharkeshov, the chief of Qazaqgaz, Kazakhstan’s natural-gas company, warned officials and lawmakers that exports would not be viable next year unless there were radical changes in the sector.

One of the biggest problems, he said, were low domestic gas prices that make extraction unappealing.

This is the same argument made by the Kazakh Energy Ministry, which has complained that low tariffs for heating give power providers — especially private ones — limited incentives to overhaul outdated infrastructure.

But Khamidov, the consultant, says the fatal unrest in Kazakhstan this January ignited by an overnight spike in the cost of liquified petroleum gas (LPG) is an example of why Central Asian leaders will be very cautious about any proposals to increase energy prices for its citizens.

“Governments find it more convenient maintaining Soviet-era centralized subsidies because this keeps people calm, even if the infrastructure is falling apart,” Khamidov said.

On January 25, parts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan — the three surviving members of the conjoined Central Asia Power System, a Soviet-legacy super-grid — all suffered blackouts in an event that some observers linked to excess demand from a boom in regional cryptocurrency mining.

Source : TheIndianExpress

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The regional event attracted 30 bright minds from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to contemplate the future at the sidelines of the Samarkand EU-Central Asia Connectivity Conference: Global Gateway high-level regional conference.

The Youth Dialogue created a platform to make the voices of young people heard from five Central Asian countries.

Young delegates were divided into four thematic areas and expressed their opinions and suggestions on expanding the opportunities and actions in the areas of digitalization, climate change, gender equality, and access to education throughout the region.

As a specialist in Land management and Cartography, I was strongly aware of the environmental problems of Central Asia and the impact of climate change on the region. The meeting allowed me to present the Aral Sea Disaster issues from my own perspective by using GIS technologies and give solutions to restore the economy and environment of the region. The main issue our team put on the table regarding the sea region was the unreasonable use of clean water (waste) because of irrigation. The suggestion that we made is to make a policy on the prevention of the waste of water (adapting the practice of Singapore on water tanks). Secondly, as global warming progresses and the direct sunlight level in the drought areas of the Aral Sea basin is high. Hence, we can work with GIS technologies to identify places with a high level of ultraviolet light (from the Sun) to build solar panels on them. It can serve the whole region with a cheaper power source and environmentally friendly way of energy. 

The event was attended by high-level speakers, as well as EU Ambassador to Uzbekistan Charlotte Adrian, who noted that the EU firmly advocates the promotion of a culture of diverse participation of young people in policy-making processes. “We must ensure that young people have equal access to opportunities. Only then will Central Asia be able to maximize its potential,” she said. 

A fruitful conference continued by announcing the EU-funded DARYA project, implemented by the European Training Foundation (ETF) in partnership with stakeholders in Central Asia and EU member states. The official launch of the DARYA project was held in Astana Nov. 22. The objective is about the importance of deepening cooperation in the field of education and the implementation of the first regional vocational education project.

Youth of Central Asia with organizers.

Afterward, Deputy Director-General for International Cooperation and Development Marjeta Jager discussed our points at the event at her meeting with the ministers, and hopefully, work has already started giving its first results by signing the Declaration on Children, Youth, and Climate Action. It marks Uzbekistan, the host country, as the first CIS country, to uphold relevant priorities identified by children and youth.

It was impressive to see how young people are willing to make a contribution and act towards building a sustainable future in the region and the whole world. Not only we had an impactful conversation about the vital topics of our region but we became close friends during that time too. The main aim of the meeting was indeed to gather together all young minds of the region to exchange ideas and to prevent the brain drain of Central Asia.  

The author is Nazerke Baktygerey, 22, a graduate and Cartographer at Alau Solutions LLP with great motivation towards using the GIS to solve environmental and social problems.

Source : AstanaTimes

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The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is a large-scale economic cooperation initiative between several former Soviet states. It aims to create a shared market similar to the European Union and intends to accomplish this by coordinating economic agendas, removing non-tariff trade barriers, and aligning the laws and regulations of its five members — Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan is an observer state, while neither Tajikistan nor Turkmenistan is a member.

The EAEU is also in the process of negotiating free trade agreements with a number of countries, including India, Egypt, and Thailand, and has signed such agreements with Iran and Vietnam. The EAEU’s trade turnover surpassed $73 billion last year, with the Russian ruble serving as the primary currency, accounting for 72 percent of all payments.

However, the economic impact of the union on the Russian economy is minor, and Russia’s trade volume with the EAEU is significantly lower than its trade volume with the rest of the world.

On the other end of the spectrum, it is abundantly clear that the EAEU does not provide sufficient economic benefits to Kazakhstan, the union’s second-largest economy. Although the trade volume between Kazakhstan and other EAEU members has not increased significantly since 2014, the country has become more reliant on Russian exports and imports. In Kazakhstan, increasing tariff rates for non-EAEU members while allowing duty-free imports from Russia has resulted in trade diversion and negative economic consequences for the country.

Furthermore, Kyrgyzstan has one of the highest remittance-to-GDP ratios in the world, and the number of Kyrgyz immigrant workers going to Russia increased significantly in 2014. As a result, the government became more susceptible to Russian demands to join the EAEU and did so within a year. So far, Uzbekistan appears to be content to remain outside the union, but Tashkent did attain observer status in 2021.

The Russian mindset behind the union’s formation was ultimately driven by geopolitical concerns rather than economic ones. With the EAEU, Russian President Vladimir Putin arguably sought to reestablish Russia’s dominance in Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence, which had been lost with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Based on the motivations of other members, a union with Russia provided political support, cheaper energy, and security guarantees. This is demonstrated by Russia’s intervention in the Second Karabakh War in favor of Armenia, unconditional support for Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus, and the recent Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) intervention in Kazakhstan.

However, recent international sanctions actually rendered the EAEU far more economically beneficial to Russia than ever before. Kazakhstan, for example, has been conducive to avoiding sanctions and importing banned products. As it is, Russia needs the EAEU more than ever and will do its best to keep these countries on its side.

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This is exactly why, following the EAEU summit in Yerevan, Armenia, in October, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin emphasized the need for a unified oil, gas, and electricity market among the member countries due to hikes in energy prices. Mishustin highlighted that creating such a common energy market will benefit all members and shield their citizens from rising energy prices. 

Will such incentives keep Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan consolidated within the union and attract Uzbekistan to consider pursuing full membership? While Russian political and military influence is dwindling, will a Russian-designed economic union survive in changing geopolitics? The answer comes partially down to the Central Asian governments’ unique stances and it’s helpful to look at other Russian-dominated regional organizations, too.

For example, during the most recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting, the worsening border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was very unsettling for Putin, as both countries are members of the CSTO. Many in Bishkek accused Moscow of backing Tajik President Emomali Rahmon despite Moscow’s inability to take action and calm the conflict. As a result, Kyrgyzstan refused to participate in the latest CSTO military drills in Tajikistan. The refusal to participate is a clear demonstration of Moscow’s dwindling influence in Central Asia.ADVERTISEMENT

As a result of Russian leaders’ irredentist rhetoric and their implied territorial claims over northern Kazakhstan, many Kazakhs view Russia with suspicion. Even after the CSTO intervened in Kazakhstan in January 2022, seen as clear Russian backing of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the Kazakh government has pursued a more vigorous opposition than expected to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

However, even if the Kyrgyz and Kazakh governments seem less willing to pursue more integration with Russia and Uzbekistan never joins the EAEU, Russia is too powerful for any Central Asian leader to overlook. At the end of the day, the capacity of Central Asian states to fend off geopolitical risks from Russia is limited, and an impending attempt to decouple from Russia will almost certainly have profound implications.

In such a situation, public opinion matters, alongside government willingness to heed it. So, what does the public think?

A Central Asia Barometer (CAB) poll conducted last May and June suggests that 63.5 percent of Kazakhs and 60.8 percent of Kyrgyz believe that joining the EAEU benefited their national economy. Also, it shows that public intimacy with Russia is still high in the region: 85.7 percent of Kyrgyz, 76.4 percent of Uzbeks, and 55.2 percent of Kazakhs have a favorable opinion of Russia.

However, a more striking point is that most people in these three Central Asian countries think that Russia will hit them hard due to their improving economic ties with China. 67.6 percent of Kyrgyz and 55.3 percent of Kazakhs believe that better economic relations with China could harm their economic relationships with Russia. In Uzbekistan, a non-EAEU member, this ratio is remarkably lower, at 28.4 percent.

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Affinity toward Russia at the public level is still very high, but Russian culture and language are losing their dominant position and must compete with different worldviews to win the hearts and minds of younger Central Asians. These highly-diverse and broad-minded generations are shaped by inspirations from Europe, Turkey, China, or the United States.

Russia has little to offer economically; the unanticipated consequences and rising costs of reliance on Russia will force these governments to diversify their diplomatic ties more than ever. However, this shift does not necessitate that these governments will seek stronger ties with the West or adhere to the conventional paradigm of multivector diplomacy. Instead, Central Asian leaders may be inclined to establish closer ties with China and Turkey. Both countries can provide better economic opportunities to Central Asians. China is the most important economic actor in the region; it is the largest trade partner to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan by imports and Turkmenistan by energy exports.

While Russia is distracted in Ukraine, Turkey is seeking stronger economic cooperation with Central Asia, too. In this regard, the Turkic Investment Fund was created following the last summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in November 2022. The fund aims to increase economic cooperation within member countries by supporting small and medium enterprises in various industries.

Russia’s weakness in providing economic prosperity through the EAEU and increasing Chinese and Turkish economic presence in the region may also feed the weakness in Russia’s ability to be a security provider through the CSTO. If Russia’s primary security provider role in the region begins to be questioned, entrenched Russian dominance will weaken. If this occurs, it would be unrealistic to expect the EAEU to expand and have a voice in the future of Central Asia.

Source : TheDiplomat

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