Once more Tajikistan comes on the radar screen. Who will be the next president of Tajikistan? How is the ban on the hijab helping the deradicalization of Tajik society? What is the role of the Chinese and Russian influence? And how is the relationship with the European Union coming along? 

Every year we face a plethora of Tajik issues, for example corruption and drug usage involving officials, now the ban on face veils, or the newest version a ban on black clothes. The desecration of the grave of one of leaders and the promotions of killer squad of the ministry of interiors. 

Despite the ICC dispatches a fact-finding mission on Tajikistan and reports back we need to ask the question what has changed, if anything? So far very little, to near nothing. Observers of the Tajik issue reports an uptick of Chinese involvement, or Russian press gang related issues to force Tajiks to army service in the Ukraine. 

The German foreign ministry is surprisingly mum about the situation in Tajikistan. The trust level is always low. Maybe the new “Iron Lady” will bring changes to the foreign relations debacle with Tajikistan. It’s about time. 

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Tajikistan officially banned the hijab, imposing hefty fines in its latest move to curb Islamic influence.

Beni Mellal – The Central Asian nation of Tajikistan officially prohibited the wearing of hijabs and other “alien garments” this week, as the country’s parliament passed a new bill regulating Islamic clothing and Eid celebrations.

The bill, approved by the upper house of parliament, Majlisi Milli, on June 19, comes after years of an unofficial clampdown on the hijab in the Muslim-majority country.

Under the new law, individuals wearing hijabs or other banned religious clothing could face hefty fines of up to 7,920 somonis (approximately $700). Companies allowing employees to wear prohibited garments risk penalties of 39,500 somonis ($3,500). Government officials and religious leaders face even steeper fines of 54,000-57,600 somonis ($4,800-$5,100) if found in violation.

The bill also restricts children’s participation in festivities and gift-giving traditions associated with the Islamic holidays of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha. Government officials stated these measures aim to ensure “proper education and safety” of children during the holidays.

Tajikistan has seen an influx of Islamic clothing from the Middle East in recent years, which authorities view as linked to extremism and a threat to the country’s cultural identity. In a March address, President Emomali Rahmon referred to the hijab as “foreign clothing.” The government has long promoted traditional Tajik national dress as an alternative.

The new law represents an escalation of Tajikistan’s unofficial restrictions on Islamic garb. Since 2007, the hijab has been banned for students, with the prohibition later extending to all public institutions. Authorities have also informally discouraged bushy beards in men, with reports of police forcibly shaving thousands of beards over the past decade.

Human rights organizations have criticized Tajikistan’s hijab ban as a violation of religious freedom. With Muslims comprising over 98% of the population, the law is likely to face significant opposition within Tajik society as it goes into effect.

Source

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The international human rights organization Freedom House called Tajikistan one of the “most repressive” countries in the world in 2023.

In its new report, the organization gave Tajikistan just 5 points out of 100. Freedom House’s annual report “Freedom in the World – 2024. The Growing Damage of Unfair Elections and Armed Conflicts” was published on February 29.

“The level of freedoms in Tajikistan decreased by two points in 2023 due to ongoing actions to suppress freedom of expression and discrimination against the Pamiri minority,” said Catherine Groth, Middle East and North Africa research analyst at Freedom House.

“It had a bad effect”

She sent her opinion on the situation in Tajikistan in writing to the editorial office of Radio Ozodi. According to her, over the past ten years – from 2013 to 2023 – a sharp decline in the level of freedom can be observed in Tajikistan.

“This situation is bad for political rights and civil liberties and is the result of the leadership of autocratic President Emomali Rahmon, who has been in power since 1992,” Groth explained.

Officials in Tajikistan have not yet expressed their opinion on the report, but in the past they have always reproached human rights organizations for biased and one-sided coverage of the issue.

For example, the authorities deny the existence of political prisoners from among the opposition and their supporters, as well as well-known bloggers and journalists, claiming that they were punished for the crimes committed. Although the convicts themselves, their relatives and supporters consider the criminal cases against them to be politically motivated.

Freedom House researchers say that since the crackdown on protesters in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region in 2022 and the arrest of dozens of people, including at least eight journalists and bloggers, attacks on civil liberties have been on the rise.

“Journalists and bloggers who have expressed their views in writing and orally have been harassed and threatened by the authorities. Several journalists have been arrested and imprisoned for long periods in the past year, and the authorities continue to suppress and censor the free press,” the report said.

According to the authors of the report, such pressure on the press has led to the fact that even ordinary citizens in Tajikistan are now trying to be careful in expressing their opinions in order to avoid persecution.

“Additional Measures to Suppress the Pamiris”

Catherine Groth also stressed the deterioration of the situation of national minorities, in particular the Pamir diaspora. She points out that “in 2023, the Pamiri community faced even harsher discrimination, and the authorities took additional measures to suppress the Pamiris.”

Officials in Tajikistan have previously said they disagree with the position of international organizations that portray the Pamiris as a national and religious minority.

“The Muslims of the Pamirs are followers of the Ismaili sect in Islam and a religious minority widely persecuted in Tajikistan. In 2023, they faced severe restrictions on their religious freedoms. Authorities restricted the places where they prayed and fined several people for organizing prayers inside their homes. In addition to this restriction of religious freedoms, Pamiri activists and ordinary citizens have faced arbitrary arrest and harassment, and even more Pamiris have fled for fear of persecution,” Catherine Groth added.

In August 2023, the authorities confirmed that they had banned five NGOs in Gorno-Badakhshan in the past six months, and the reason for this decision, they said, was that these organizations had “links to criminal groups.”

As part of the operation to suppress protests in the region, the Tajik government said that these measures were taken in order to strengthen the “factor of strengthening security,” and called the arrests “a way to prevent crimes against public order and officials of the Ministry of Defense.” However, Pamiri activists and opponents of the Tajik government say the purpose of the operation was to suppress dissidents and dissatisfied citizens with the government’s policies.

Freedom House says Russia’s two-year-old war in Ukraine has affected all of Central Asia.

Tajikistan’s economy remains heavily dependent on the income of migrant workers in Russia. As a result of the border conflicts between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the level of hostility between the border population has sharply increased and the security of the residents of both states is suffering. Negotiations between Dushanbe and Bishkek continued throughout 2023, although the level of diplomatic relations between the two countries remained at a low level until the end of the year.

Source: Pamir Inside

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The president of Tajikistan likes to wrap himself in the robes of Islam.

Literally, in some cases. 

In January 2016, Emomali Rahmon performed a pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca, and took several members of his family along too. His office documented the event by releasing images of the leader covered only in the seamless white garment that must be worn by Muslims performing this rite.

The pictures were doubly striking since the Tajik authorities had for many years been actively repressing pious Muslims. They continue to do so today.

This plays out in absurd ways. From time to time, police will go on the hunt for young men with beards, carting them off to the nearest barber for a shave. Women are chided for wearing the hijab on the grounds that it is not a traditionally Tajik form of dress.

It feels like a paradox for this to be happening in a country where the vast majority of people self-describe as Sunni Muslims. But it isn’t.

What Rahmon’s corrupt and authoritarian regime wants is an antiseptic and lightly worn form of Islam. One that promotes folkish conservatism, compliance and consensus. People may by all means pray and believe, but those things should be confined solely to the mosque. 

And not any mosque at that. In the years after Rahmon paid his visit to Mecca, the government forced the closure of thousands of informally run and unregulated neighborhood mini-mosques dotted around the country. The only permitted places of worship operate under the close scrutiny of the government. State-appointed imams up and down Tajikistan deliver dull, facsimile sermons.

And the regime systematically worked to dilute incoming generations’ familiarity with their own faith.

From 2010, the government started forcing young people studying at Islamic places of learning abroad to return home. Rahmon argued that Tajiks going to foreign Islamic schools, or madrasas, were “not becoming mullahs, but terrorists.”

In 2016, the authorities introduced a ban on private religious schools. Two years after that, it became illegal for children to study the principles of Islam in either mosques or madrasas. The job of teaching about religion was accordingly transferred to state educational institutions. But poorly funded Tajik schools and teachers are ill-equipped to provide basic instruction in subjects like maths and science, let alone religion.

And then, in 2021, the government introduced severe penalties for teaching religion via the internet.

Nusratullo Mirzoyev, the first deputy chairman of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB), justified this cascade of clampdowns as precautionary measures.

“According to studies, 95 percent of young people who joined radical groups and movements got their primary education in private religious schools,” he said.

Even studying the Arabic language was for a time rendered difficult by an informal prohibition. 

The result is a country increasingly populated by the religiously semi-literate. Tajiks are told from birth that they are Muslims, but then purposely denied the right or ability to make sense of that identity.

Conditions could not be more ideal for recruiters from militant organizations like the Islamic State. A 2008 analysis by Britain’s domestic intelligence agency, MI5, concluded that “far from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly.”

“Many lack religious literacy and could actually be regarded as religious novices. Very few have been brought up in strongly religious households,” the analysis argued.

The authors had extremist recruits in the West in mind when they wrote those words. But they are just as valid in Tajikistan, whose government has added a few push factors of its own for good measure.

Anywhere north of 1.3 million Tajiks, mostly men, have been compelled by lack of opportunity in their home country to relocate to Russia. Once there, they endure a life of financial privation and routine humiliations at the hands of police and unscrupulous employers. Their dwellings are typically crowded apartments, hostels and dormitories, or even the very same building sites where they work.

Away from the family unit and shorn of the solidarity provided by tight-knit communities, some vulnerable men in those circumstances – and it should be stressed that the numbers are small in relative terms – are ripe for recruitment. Ample research points to how extremist groups use social networks, personal relationships, and specific sentiments of perceived deprivation or grievances when identifying and enlisting members. 

The Crocus City Hall massacre will not, however, give the Tajik government any pause for thought.

In a speech to mark the Nowruz spring equinox holiday, President Rahmon said that what happened last week was a warning to “all of us, especially parents, to once again devote even more serious attention to the education of children.”

“We should protect teenagers and young people from the influence of such destructive and terrifying groups and movements, and we should not allow our children to harm the good name of the Tajik nation,” he said.

What he means by devoting greater attention to education is not teaching Tajik young people more about Islam. Quite the opposite.

Source: Sub Stack

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A diverse group of Pamiri and Ismaili interest groups gathered to discuss the terror attack in Moscow. “We reject the notion this were Pamiris or Ismailis representing us”, said one of the spokespeople, who want to remain anonymous out of fear of persecution by the Tajik authorities. 

“They are Takfiris”, he said. Non-believers, apostates to the cause. The majlis (meeting) was called after Moscow was quick to blame Tajik immigrants for the terror attacks. Previous warnings were ignored by Moscow. “We as a Pamiri community do not belief in the use of violence against the innocent. We understand the suffering and pain caused by such an attack.”, he added. 

The leaders assembled in Dushanbe and represented most of the diaspora in Tajikistan and abroad. “The attempt to taint us with the terrorists is rejected.”, he added. 

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Tajikistan’s existential project to build the colossal 335-meter-high Roghun hydropower dam is proceeding apace, but costs are spiralling, and to a level that is making it hard to see where the government is going to find the funds needed to finish the work.

To complicate matters for Dushanbe, this is happening against the backdrop of calls from environmental watchdogs for international development lenders to pause the allocation of any future funds to Tajikistan pending a fresh assessment of the project.

The extent of the budget overshoot is striking.

In a press conference on February 16, Finance Minister Faiziddin Kahhorzoda revealed that the government spent 5.2 billion somoni ($475 million) on construction work at Roghun in 2023. That was 2.7 billion somoni more than had been planned, he said.

The projected government spend for this year, meanwhile, is 5 billion somoni. It is projected that 2.2 billion somoni can be solicited from foreign-based parties, Kahhorzoda said.

When work on Roghun, a project that was in its origins the brainchild of Soviet engineers, resumed in earnest in 2008, the estimate for the overall cost stood at $3 billion. This climbed upward through the years.

In 2016, officials threw around the figure of $3.9 billion. In mid-2022, the Energy Ministry announced $5 billion would be needed for full project implementation. 

On February 1, Energy Minister Daler Juma offered a new forecast: $6.2 billion. That is high, although admittedly quite a bit short of the $8 billion prognostication he volunteered in an interview to Reuters news agency in June 2022. 

While the budget balloons, the timetable is sliding

Once completed, Roghun will be fitted with six 600 megawatt turbines, amounting to a total installed capacity of 3,600 megawatts. As Milan-based WeBuild (formerly Salini Impregilo), which has been contracted to implement the project, has claimed on its website, that is “the equivalent of three nuclear power plants.”

The first generating units were put into operation in November 2018 and September 2019 to much clamor, but there has been limited progress since then. 

State media accentuates the upside. It cites energy officials as saying that while insufficient water pressure is causing delays, the generating units in place have to date produced around 7 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. They furthermore value that volume of electricity at 1.5 billion somoni ($137 million).

Current annual electricity production in Tajikistan, much of which is accounted for by the Soviet-vintage Nurek hydropower plant, is around 17 billion kilowatt-hours.

Putting this together, it implies that Roghun has, since the first generating unit began working, likely contributed to well under one-tenth of Tajikistan’s electricity output. 

In 2019, managers of the Roghun hydroelectric plant reportedly predicted — possibly speaking in the spirit of hope rather than pragmatism — that a third generating unit would be installed within another two years. All six units were to be operational by 2026, according to that timetable. 

That was before COVID-19, however. The pandemic caused a major slowdown on work at Roghun along with much other economic activity in the country. 

Another deadline is now in place

“We intend to put the third unit of the Roghun hydroelectric power station into operation in 2025,” President Emomali Rahmon said in an address to the nation in December.

He noted in that speech that the project is employing 15,000 laborers and technicians.

When Rahmon speaks of Roghun in his speeches, he couches the project in talk of the “bright future” awaiting the country and that it should serve as a “source of pride” for every Tajik citizen.

A more sober reality is that Roghun is part of the race against time to keep the country’s economy afloat.

Despite the additional productive capacity added by Roghun, the population still has to endure annual rationing of electricity.

When the temperature sinks below a certain level, output from the Nurek hydropower plant grinds to a near-halt. Under the annually imposed economy regime due to end in March, as is customary, households outside the country’s largest urban centers endure blackouts from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m and then from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m.

Meanwhile, the rate of population growth means that demand for electricity will continue surging. 

The World Bank in 2022 estimated that Tajikistan had the “youngest and fastest growing population in the Europe and Central Asia region.”

“Children under six years old comprise 17 percent of Tajikistan’s population, while roughly one of every three people is under 15 years of age,” the bank said at the time.

State statisticians have said that the current population of Tajikistan is just a whisker over 10.1 million. Fresh figures from last week, based on birth and death data, showed a population increase of 200,000 in 2023. That is a 2 percent rise.

Getting a clear and reliable idea of how much has been spent on Roghun over the past 16 years is tricky. Juma, the Energy Minister, threw out the figure of $3 billion in 2022. 

Dushanbe-based news outlet Asia-Plus cracked some numbers to come up with an updated estimate earlier this month and arrived at around 40 billion somoni, or $4 billion.

Considering current projections, which Juma says were calculated with the assistance of international consultants, that leaves $2.2 billion to go.

Tajikistan makes no secret of the fact that it is hoping for white knight investors to swoop in and provide the cash needed to get it over the line. 

But its efforts to get foreign funding so far have exposed it to considerable debt-servicing expenditure. 

In September 2017, the National Bank issued $500 million worth of eurobonds on the international market. That venture means Tajikistan is on the hook for around $850 million to be paid to investors by 2027.

Important chunks are arriving from here and there, though.

In December, the state-backed Saudi Fund for Development announced it was under a development loan agreement with Tajikistan contributing $100 million to fund the Roghun project.

A few months earlier, in May, China-dominated development lender Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank had reportedly — according to President Rahmon’s office — pledged to extend a soft $500 million loan to Dushanbe for the same purpose. Talk on this commitment has gone a little quiet since then.

Back in 2022, a representative for the European Union’s investment arm, the European Investment Bank, told Reuters that it was exploring becoming “the largest investor” in Roghun. That conversation too has withered for reasons unreported.

Environmental concerns are another factor.

Last month, a coalition of nongovernmental groups — Rivers without Boundaries, the NGO Forum on Asian Development Banks and the Bankwatch Network — issued a collective appeal to development banks to demand public discussions on an updated environmental assessment of Roghun before parting with any funds. The World Bank-backed environmental impact assessment conducted in 2014 is now woefully out of date, the coalition argued in its statement.

“Over the last 10 years we accumulated new knowledge about the dynamics of climate change, new factors of impact on the hydrological regime of the Vakhsh River and the entire Amu Darya basin,” Evgeny Simonov, international coordinator for Rivers without Boundaries, was cited as saying.

“Even the most superficial analysis shows that potential transboundary impacts of the [Roghun] hydropower plant are enormous, and their consideration in the new environmental assessment … is practically non-existent.”

Source: Eurasia

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Tajikistan’s existential project to build the colossal 335-meter-high Roghun hydropower dam is proceeding apace, but costs are spiraling, and to a level that is making it hard to see where the government is going to find the funds needed to finish the work.

To complicate matters for Dushanbe, this is happening against the backdrop of calls from environmental watchdogs for international development lenders to pause the allocation of any future funds to Tajikistan pending a fresh assessment of the project.

The extent of the budget overshoot is striking.

In a press conference on February 16, Finance Minister Faiziddin Kahhorzoda revealed that the government spent 5.2 billion somoni ($475 million) on construction work at Roghun in 2023. That was 2.7 billion somoni more than had been planned, he said.

The projected government spend for this year, meanwhile, is 5 billion somoni. It is projected that 2.2 billion somoni can be solicited from foreign-based parties, Kahhorzoda said.

When work on Roghun, a project that was in its origins the brainchild of Soviet engineers, resumed in earnest in 2008, the estimate for the overall cost stood at $3 billion.

This climbed upward through the years.

In 2016, officials threw around the figure of $3.9 billion. In mid-2022, the Energy Ministry announced $5 billion would be needed for full project implementation. 

On February 1, Energy Minister Daler Juma offered a new forecast: $6.2 billion. That is high, although admittedly quite a bit short of the $8 billion prognostication he volunteered in an interview to Reuters news agency in June 2022. 

While the budget balloons, the timetable is sliding.

Once completed, Roghun will be fitted with six 600 megawatt turbines, amounting to a total installed capacity of 3,600 megawatts. As Milan-based WeBuild (formerly Salini Impregilo), which has been contracted to implement the project, has claimed on its website, that is “the equivalent of three nuclear power plants.”

The first generating units were put into operation in November 2018 and September 2019 to much clamor, but there has been limited progress since then. 

State media accentuates the upside. It cites energy officials as saying that while insufficient water pressure is causing delays, the generating units in place have to date produced around 7 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. They furthermore value that volume of electricity at 1.5 billion somoni ($137 million).

Current annual electricity production in Tajikistan, much of which is accounted for by the Soviet-vintage Nurek hydropower plant, is around 17 billion kilowatt-hours.

Putting this together, it implies that Roghun has, since the first generating unit began working, likely contributed to well under one-tenth of Tajikistan’s electricity output. 

In 2019, managers of the Roghun hydroelectric plant reportedly predicted — possibly speaking in the spirit of hope rather than pragmatism — that a third generating unit would be installed within another two years. All six units were to be operational by 2026, according to that timetable. 

That was before COVID-19, however. The pandemic caused a major slowdown on work at Roghun along with much other economic activity in the country. 

Another deadline is now in place.

“We intend to put the third unit of the Roghun hydroelectric power station into operation in 2025,” President Emomali Rahmon said in an address to the nation in December.

He noted in that speech that the project is employing 15,000 laborers and technicians.

When Rahmon speaks of Roghun in his speeches, he couches the project in talk of the “bright future” awaiting the country and that it should serve as a “source of pride” for every Tajik citizen.

A more sober reality is that Roghun is part of the race against time to keep the country’s economy afloat.

Despite the additional productive capacity added by Roghun, the population still has to endure annual rationing of electricity.

When the temperature sinks below a certain level, output from the Nurek hydropower plant grinds to a near-halt. Under the annually imposed economy regime due to end in March, as is customary, households outside the country’s largest urban centers endure blackouts from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m and then from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m.

Meanwhile, the rate of population growth means that demand for electricity will continue surging. 

The World Bank in 2022 estimated that Tajikistan had the “youngest and fastest growing population in the Europe and Central Asia region.”

“Children under six years old comprise 17 percent of Tajikistan’s population, while roughly one of every three people is under 15 years of age,” the bank said at the time.

State statisticians have said that the current population of Tajikistan is just a whisker over 10.1 million. Fresh figures from last week, based on birth and death data, showed a population increase of 200,000 in 2023. That is a 2 percent rise.

Getting a clear and reliable idea of how much has been spent on Roghun over the past 16 years is tricky. Juma, the Energy Minister, threw out the figure of $3 billion in 2022. 

Dushanbe-based news outlet Asia-Plus cracked some numbers to come up with an updated estimate earlier this month and arrived at around 40 billion somoni, or $4 billion.

Considering current projections, which Juma says were calculated with the assistance of international consultants, that leaves $2.2 billion to go.

Tajikistan makes no secret of the fact that it is hoping for white knight investors to swoop in and provide the cash needed to get it over the line. 

But its efforts to get foreign funding so far have exposed it to considerable debt-servicing expenditure. 

In September 2017, the National Bank issued $500 million worth of eurobonds on the international market. That venture means Tajikistan is on the hook for around $850 million to be paid to investors by 2027.

Important chunks are arriving from here and there, though.

In December, the state-backed Saudi Fund for Development announced it was under a development loan agreement with Tajikistan contributing $100 million to fund the Roghun project.

A few months earlier, in May, China-dominated development lender Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank had reportedly — according to President Rahmon’s office — pledged to extend a soft $500 million loan to Dushanbe for the same purpose. Talk on this particular commitment has gone a little quiet since then.

Back in 2022, a representative for the European Union’s investment arm, the European Investment Bank, told Reuters that it was exploring becoming “the largest investor” in Roghun. That conversation too has withered for reasons unreported.

Environmental concerns are another factor.

Last month, a coalition of nongovernmental groups — Rivers without Boundaries, the NGO Forum on Asian Development Banks and the Bankwatch Network — issued a collective appeal to development banks to demand public discussions on an updated environmental assessment of Roghun before parting with any funds. The World Bank-backed environmental impact assessment conducted in 2014 is now woefully out of date, the coalition argued in its statement.

“Over the last 10 years we accumulated new knowledge about the dynamics of climate change, new factors of impact on the hydrological regime of the Vakhsh River and the entire Amu Darya basin,” Evgeny Simonov, international coordinator for Rivers without Boundaries, was cited as saying. “Even the most superficial analysis shows that potential transboundary impacts of the [Roghun] hydropower plant are enormous, and their consideration in the new environmental assessment … is practically non-existent.”

Source

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Dushanbe 25/2 (35.71).

The social networking activity of “influencer” Ismoil Mahmadzoir is causing a stir within the country’s political and security corridors. His grandfather President Emomali Rahmon is planning his succession, which has triggered quiet maneuvering within elite factions, including Mahmadzoir’s relatives. Nobody is clear about how becomes the next president of Tajikistan. The daughters jockeying for the top job besides the grandson.

Video of a bland speech by Tajikistan’s long-time President Emomali Rahmon was posted late last month on Instagram by Buzkashi_1111, a handle created by Ismoil Mahmadzoir, the 25-year-old son of Firuza Emomali, one of the president’s daughters, who is the country’s No. 1 social media influencer with more than 1.3 million combined followers. His visibility on social media, however, has become a political liability.

The younger Rahmon posts often ostentatiously display his wealth, numerous feature videos showing huge piles of bank shrink-wrapped $100 bills, for example, to the exasperation of those in ruling circles. Flaunt it if you got it, seems the theme of the day.

Their fear is that Mahmadzoir’s flaunting of his lifestyle could cause a backlash among less privileged citizens at a time when different factions within Rahmon’s family and advisers are discreetly angling to gain an edge for their side in an unfolding battle to succeed him.

Although Mahmadzoir himself is not a contender to inherit the throne, the favorite is Rustam Emomali, the president’s eldest son, his close relatives are key powerbrokers in the opaque and treacherous succession process.

The U.K. connection

Mahmadzoir’s father, Mahmadzoir Sokhibov, is a construction magnate and top presidential adviser, including on the all-important topic of allocating business concessions to the well-connected. Mahmadzoir’s uncle, is UK-based Shamsullo Sokhibov, head of business conglomerate Faroz and husband of another of Rahmon’s daughters, Rukhshona Emomali.

Both brothers are well-connected to powerful security officials at the ministry of internal affairs and at the State Committee for National Security (SCNS), the national intelligence agency that is known in Russian as the GKNB.

Both Sokhibov brothers are keeping a close eye on the succession process, as is Hasan Asadullozoda, Rahmon’s brother-in-law and owner of one of Tajikistan’s main banks, Orienbank, which oversees major investments in the country. Earlier this year, according to our sources, Asadullozoda began looking for ways to move his capital from Tajikistan, including to the United States.

My Best Friend in Dubai!

To build his brand as a social media influencer, Mahmadzoir posts on Facebook, TikTok and five Instagram accounts. Post by Ismoil8, his handle at the account with the largest following, plays up his standing as a trendy fashionista, his role as president of the national Judo Federation of Tajikistan, and his frolics in Dubai. Managing a company called IM Group, he is frequently seen with his friend Osama Ahmed Abdullah Al Shafar, who holds a seat on the UAE’s 40-member Federal National Council, which helps prepare all proposed legislation in the monarchy.

Al Shafar, a former president of the UAE Cycling Federation, is a member of the management committee at the Swiss-based Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI). Al Shafar is also active on Instagram, where he mentioned his “dear friend” Igor Makarov, a billionaire Russian-Turkmen energy magnate, president of Areti International Group and energy adviser to former Turkmen president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov (IO, 26/04/22). The United Kingdom has hit Makarov with financial sanctions and travel bans over allegedly providing Moscow with important economic and strategic assistance. As a result, various national cycling federations have called for his expulsion from the UCI, where he is also a management committee member.

Photo: On his various social media accounts, Ismoil Mahmadzoir shows himself with his grandfather, Tajik’s President, but also with $100 bills, in Dubai, and in his role as judo federation president. © ismoil8/Instagram – rayison_tj/Instagram – @ismoilim8/Twitter

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Infighting over the succession and growing frustration in the regions could shatter the stability that the Tajik president has been building for so many years.

Next year will mark thirty years of Emomali Rahmon’s presidency in Tajikistan, now the only country in Central Asia that has not seen a change of leadership since the early 1990s. Unsurprisingly, there have been rumors of an imminent transition of power for a decade.

The name of the successor is no secret: it’s Rahmon’s son, thirty-six-year-old Rustam Emomali. But there is no consensus within the president’s large family over the succession. Some of the president’s other children have their own ambitions to run the country, which could upset plans for the transition.

President Rahmon is seventy-one years old, and has reportedly suffered numerous health issues. Arrangements for the transition have long been in place, but events keep getting in the way of its implementation: first the pandemic and its economic fallout, and then the street protests in neighboring Kazakhstan in January 2022, which frightened the Tajik leader and persuaded him it was not a good time to step down. Even Turkmenistan has seen a power transition in recent years. Now Tajikistan is expected to implement its own in 2024.

Rustam has already headed a number of government agencies. Since 2017, he has been mayor of Dushanbe: a post he has combined since 2020 with that of speaker of the upper house of parliament, to whom power would automatically pass if the current president were to step down early.

His supporters argue that as the capital’s mayor, he has improved the city, supported youth initiatives, and started to form his own team of young technocrats. Some are counting on him to carry out at least limited reforms once he is in power, such as those seen in neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Not everyone believes Rustam is ready to take over, however. The future president is an unknown quantity for most Tajiks. All of his public appearances are prerecorded and accompanied by information read out by the broadcaster, meaning that people have not even heard him speak. His nickname on social media is “the great mute.”

More worryingly, the heir apparent has reportedly shot and wounded two people: his own uncle in 2008, and—just last year—the head of the State Committee for National Security, Saimumin Yatimov, supposedly for refusing to carry out orders.

There are those within the presidential family who do not want to see Rustam succeed his father because they fear losing prestigious posts in government and business. They are indignant that there are no relatives within the team he is building. The current president cannot possibly keep everyone happy, and this could threaten the transition, as ambitious clan members prepare to battle it out for the top job in order to retain their privileges.

Rahmon has seven daughters and two sons. The most ambitious of them is generally considered to be the second daughter Ozoda, who has headed up the presidential administration since 2016. She is very experienced, works well with her staff, and has the trust of the security services. Unsurprisingly, given the alleged shooting incident, there is no love lost between Rustam and the country’s main security official Yatimov, who has reportedly been paving the way for Ozoda’s candidacy. In addition, her husband Jamoliddin Nuraliev is also considered a very influential figure, having been deputy chair of the country’s central bank for over seven years.

Another contender for the presidency could be Rahmon’s fifth daughter, Ruhshona, a seasoned diplomat who is well versed in Tajikistan’s political affairs. Her husband is the influential oligarch Shamsullo Sohibov, who made his fortune thanks to his family connection to the president. Together with his brothers, he controls entire sectors of the economy, including transport, media, and banking. Change at the top could deprive the Sohibov clan of both influence and money, so Ruhshona and her husband may well throw their hats into the ring.

They might get the backing of Rahmon’s other children, who also control various sectors of the economy, including air travel (the third daughter, Tahmina) and pharmacies (the fourth daughter, Parvina). There are also plenty of Rahmon’s more distant relatives who owe their fortunes to the president and fear losing their positions under his successor.

Rahmon has relied on the loyalty of various relatives to ensure the stable functioning of his regime. But overly vociferous squabbles within the family could destabilize the situation, and for precisely this reason, Rahmon has tried to temper their ambition. Ruhshona, for example, was sent to the UK as Tajik ambassador to stop her from interfering in the plans for the transition. Her oligarch husband went with her.

Nor is the heir apparent himself outside the fray. There is evidence that Rustam was involved in leaking information to the media about his sister Ozoda’s alleged affair with her driver: something that, in patriarchal Tajikistan, caused serious damage to her reputation. There are also rumors that Ozoda’s main ally Yatimov will be retired from his post as head of the security services and replaced with a close friend of Rustam, Shohruh Saidov.

Right now, international circumstances are conducive to a swift transition. Tajikistan’s relations with its trickiest neighbors, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, are improving. While the Taliban has yet to be recognized as the legitimate Afghan government by Dushanbe, both sides agreed to strengthen economic ties during the first visit to Tajikistan by a delegation from the radical Islamist movement in March this year. Meanwhile, the Tajik government has pledged to resolve the border dispute with Kyrgyzstan—an issue that has led to several armed clashes in the last three years—by spring 2024. Rahmon is clearly trying to hand over a stable country to his son.

The situation at home, however, is more complicated. There is also considerable opposition to Rustam’s candidacy among the regional elites, who have long supported Rahmon in exchange for access to state resources, and are now seeing many of the most lucrative cash flows appropriated by the presidential family. A transition of power could be an opportune moment to express their displeasure.

Events in Gorno-Badakhshan in spring 2022 were a stark warning of the dangers of that displeasure. After the civil war that ravaged the country in the early 1990s, many of its field commanders settled in the region. Over time, they became informal leaders of the local communities, helping to solve problems that the central government was ignoring, sometimes strong-arming local officials into making the required decision. Rahmon ordered several security operations to rid Gorno-Badakhshan of this dual power system, only for it to reemerge further down the line.

Last spring, protests erupted there after a local man was killed by law enforcement officers. The unrest lasted for several months until Rahmon crushed it by force. Many of the activists were killed or imprisoned, while others fled the country, and the region was brought back under Dushanbe’s control. But the anger simmering in the region could boil over again at the first sign of conflict.

For now, the other regions remain loyal to the regime, but that could change after the power transition if the local elites feel they are not getting sufficient state resources.

By directing all the streams of income and control of the country to his own relatives, Rahmon has painted himself into a corner. Infighting over the succession and growing frustration in the regions could shatter the stability that the president has been building for so many years. Power transitions rarely go to plan in Central Asia, and Tajikistan may be no exception.

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President Kassym-Joomart Tokayev approved the new government of Kazakhstan under the leadership of Olzhas Bektenov. The names of the ministers were published on primeminister.kz.

Most of the ministers remained from the old government.

Four ministers were replaced: Nurlan Baibazarov was appointed Deputy Prime Minister – Minister of National Economy instead of Alibek Kuantyrov, Madi Takiyev became Minister of Finance instead of Erulan Zhamaubaev, Akmaral Alnazarova was appointed Minister of Healthcare instead of Azhar Giniyat, and Chingis Arinov became the new Minister for Emergency Situations instead of Syrym Shariphanov.

Members of the government who remained in their positions included First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar, Minister of Foreign Affairs Murat Nurtleu, Chief of Staff of the Government Galymzhan Koishybayev, Deputy Prime Minister Tamara Duisenova, Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, Minister of Defense Ruslan Zhaksylykov, Minister of Internal Affairs Yerzhan Sadenov, Minister of Justice Azamat Yeskarayev, Minister of Energy Almassadam Satkaliyev, Minister of Agriculture Aidarbek Saparov, Minister of Digital Development, Innovation and Aerospace Industry Bagdat Mussin, Minister of Education Gani Beisembayev, Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources Yerlan Nyssanbayev, Minister of Science and Higher Education Sayasat Nurbek, Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Nurzhan Nurzhigitov, Minister of Culture and Information Aida Balayeva, Minister of Tourism and Sports Yermek Marzhikpayev, Minister of Transport Marat Karabayev, Minister of Labour and Social Protection of the Population Svetlana Zhakupova, Minister of Industry and Construction Kanat Sharlapaev, and Minister of Trade and Integration Arman Shakkaliyev.

There are currently 26 members of the government. The composition was renewed for 16%. There are six deputy prime ministers left. 16% remained women.

President Kassym-Joomart Tokayev decided to resign the government of Kazakhstan on February 5. The duties of the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan were temporarily assigned to Roman Sklyar. The next day, the president said the government’s resignation was aimed at providing new impetus and meeting public expectations. In addition, the president promised that the new government will use new approaches.

The head of the Presidential Administration of Kazakhstan, Olzhas Bektenov, headed the government of Kazakhstan on February 6. His candidacy was proposed by the Amanat party, it was supported by the president, the majority of factions of political parties in the Parliament agreed to the appointment. Olzhas Bektenov replaced Alikhan Smailov, who had headed the Cabinet of Ministers since January 2022.

Source: Akipress

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